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THE SOUTH AFRICAN OPPOSITION

"Hierdie kinderlike gekibbel van ons ou nasie is—op 'n afstand beskou soos 'n mens 'n skildery bekyk—tog ook een van sy aantreklikhede, iets wat selfs op 'n goeie afstand beminlik is, omdat dit so natuurlik is"

Professor L. J. du Plessis,
August 1944

THE
**'SOUTH AFRICAN
OPPOSITION**

1939—1945

An Essay in Contemporary History

BY

MICHAEL ROBERTS

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Grahamstown*

• AND

A. E. G. TROLLIP

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PREFACE

THIS book originally ended with the General Election of July, 1943. It was ready for the Press in May, 1944, and we had hoped that it might have been published before the end of that year. War-time restrictions upon the use of paper, however, made it necessary to abandon hope of publication until the end of the war. Since much of interest in Afrikaner politics had taken place in the intervening two years, we felt it necessary to add a further chapter (Chapter VI) giving some account of these later developments. Chapter VI, however, is on a less detailed plan than those that precede it, since a full narrative would have made the book over-long, and we were in any case concerned only to present an outline account which would complete the story to the cessation of hostilities in Europe.

To the many South Africans, of all parties and both language-groups, who have given us invaluable advice and assistance, we should like to offer our warmest thanks: they are too numerous alas, for separate acknowledgment. But we cannot omit to express our especial gratitude to Mr. A. E. TROLLIP, M.P., and to Mr. T. W. N. HIRGE, without whose unwearied assistance it would have been impossible, in the unavoidable absence of both of us overseas, to prepare this book for the Press. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that we alone are responsible for any opinions expressed.

JANUARY, 1947.

M.R.
A.E.G.T.

NOTE

- The mixture of English and Afrikaans is deliberate. For readers who cannot read Afrikaans there is a full glossary of all Afrikaans words used in the text, and also an appendix of translations of the more extended quotations in Afrikaans.

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TO
ALFRED ERNEST TROLLIP

*Deputy Speaker of the Union
House of Assembly*

INTRODUCTION

The trouble about writing contemporary history is that it is difficult to be contemporary and impossible to be historical. Between the event and the publication that records it falls the shadow of those manipulative processes which are inseparable even from art; so that narration seeks in vain to come up with the unhampered progressions of life. But this enforced delay is too short to bring compensations in the way of matured judgment or historical perspective. Thus "contemporary history" can claim consideration neither for its news nor for its views; for the one is stale, and the other half-baked.

The weight of these objections is such, that it might be thought wonderful that the race of contemporary historians has not been quite extinguished; as no doubt it would have been, were it not for sundry human weaknesses which continue to afford it nutriment. Of these the most important is the shortness of man's memory; which in times like these, surcharged as they are with heroisms and follies, is the less to be wondered at. But so it is, that—in the opinion of the authors of this book—there are many South Africans (perhaps a majority) who have forgotten, if they ever knew, much of the internal history of their country over the last six years. This is particularly true of the English-speaking section, for the activities of the Opposition, though liberally reported in the Afrikaans press, tend increasingly to be crowded out of the English newspapers by more spectacular events overseas. We have met Afrikaners also whose recollection of the events of even a couple of years ago has already begun to grow cloudy and distorted. And, since the development of internal politics in the war-years is likely to be a matter of some moment to the future of South Africa, it seemed possible that there might be room for a plain account of what occurred.

Such, then, is the object of this book: to tell a straightforward story as truly and indifferently as possible. The story cannot be wholly true, for we make no claim to an intimate knowledge of what went on behind the scenes. Our sources are (with very few insignificant exceptions) such sources as are available to any person with the energy to find and collate them: newspapers, pamphlets, books, reported speeches. A later age may probably

conclude that the picture thus presented to general inspection does not, in many important respects, tally with the truth; the publication of memoirs and letters will no doubt invalidate many of our judgments and conjectures. But this we cannot help, and do not feel called upon to excuse: indeed, as historians, we look forward to any such publication, any such castigation by posterity, with an impatience which is (alas) unlikely soon to be rewarded. Nor can our story be wholly indifferent, since all narration implies selection, and all judgment must be subjective. Nevertheless, we have done our very best to tell what we had to tell with the same detachment with which we should have treated the history of some long-vanished mediaeval duchy—not refraining from expression of opinion, but without heat, without malice, without partisanship, and without emotion. It was said of the Austrian statesman Count Taaffe that his object was to keep all the nationalities within the Habsburg dominions in a state of moderate dissatisfaction: if this book succeeds no worse than to induce that same feeling in all the various groups of men with whom it is concerned, we shall have achieved as much as we hoped for, and more, perhaps, than we expected. Where we err, we err in ignorance; for after all (to borrow a celebrated phrase of Dr. van Rensburg) we are but “ *twee van die kinders in die politiek* .”

Some warning must, however, be sounded as to the book's intent and scope. Our purpose is a purely political history; our subject exclusively the Opposition. With the Government parties we have nothing to do. And if it be objected that the use of the words “Afrikaner” and “Afrikanerdom” in the course of the book necessarily implies the inclusion of at least those Afrikaans-speaking persons who support the Government, we can only cry pardon, and plead convenience of language. We are aware that there are those who deny to such men the status of “ *ware Afrikaners* ,” because they are not “ *Nationalist* ” in the specifically Party sense. Our usage of the terms “Afrikaner” and “Afrikanerdom” to exclude members of the United Party implies no judgment upon this question. Their claims to be considered Afrikaners, their creed, their political behaviour, are simply not the subject of this book, and no reference in it to the sentiments and policy of Afrikanerdom should be deemed necessarily to be either applicable or inapplicable to them: the question does not, for our purposes, arise. But, since the Opposition is wholly Afrikaans-speaking, since a majority of all Afrikaans-speakers adhere to the Opposition groups, and since this is a book about the Opposition only, we have thought it legitimate to apply the terms “Afrikanerdom” and “Afrikaner” to the Opposition only, as a convenient shorthand for “those Afrikaners who opposed the war and are members of the H.N.P. or O.B. or A.P. or N.O.”

Secondly, the narrative adheres strictly to the history of party-politics. There is nothing about "subversive activity." There is nothing about the Afrikaans Churches. There is nothing about the F.A.K. or the R.D.B., except for that moment in 1941 when they came into immediate contact with party-politics. There is nothing about the Broederbond. These matters are omitted, not because we are not well aware of their importance : on the contrary, we are very conscious that no complete history of Afrikanerdom in these years can be written without a full investigation of the problems they present. They are omitted because we believe that party history can be treated in isolation, *provided* that the reader bears always in mind the fact that this is not the whole story ; secondly, because in regard to some of these questions there is not sufficient published information to make a history possible at present ; and thirdly, because some of them, if adequately treated, would need a volume to themselves. This is particularly true of the Afrikaner economic movement.

In short, our aim is limited, our field narrow, our purpose unambitious. We seek only to answer such questions as : What was the origin and nature of Hereniging ? Why did General Hertzog leave it ? What was the Handhawersbond ? What were the points of difference between the H.N.P. and the O.B. ? How was it that, between 1939 and 1945, there were in existence several political organisations, all opposed to the Government's war policy, all in favour of a Republic for South Africa, and yet in bitter rivalry for the support of Afrikaans-speaking South Africans ? It is the purpose of this book to provide answers to these queries. But it should be emphasised once again that what follows is merely an interim report on a specific aspect of a large subject : it makes no higher pretension.

HERENIGING

(i)

On September 4th 1939, by 80 votes to 67, the South African House of Assembly approved a motion for severance of relations with the German Reich and for the refusal to adopt an attitude of neutrality in the war with Germany.¹ No other nation to take that step, then or later, could show such an even division of opinion. In the other members of the Commonwealth the entry into the struggle was the signal for an abatement, or even a cessation, of party politics; in South Africa it was the signal for the opening of a domestic strife whose bitterness had not been equalled since the days of the 1914 rebellion. For many, indeed, the internal problem overshadowed the events in Europe, and a struggle upon which might depend the future destinies of the world became merely an issue in local politics. Men quarrelled over the war, as once they quarrelled over the official language, or the flag, or Dominion status. And while the fate of the country was being decided, at Stalingrad, or Alamein, or in the southern English skies, the politicians, on both sides of the House, thrust and parried, lunged and riposted, more briskly than ever.

There was this, however, to be said for the party politics of the years that followed—that they were not mere vulgar contests for power, nor simply the manifestation of the rival ambitions of ruthless professionals. The battles were fought over principles; principles, moreover, which had been of capital importance in the days of peace, and which would resume their importance when peace returned. So far as the will and efforts of South African parties might be supposed to have any real bearing on the question, the matter at issue was nothing less than the whole future of the country.

For the most part, the clashing tides of opinion flowed back and forth along channels that had been familiar for nearly a generation. It was inevitable, however, that a new element should be provided in the shape of certain totalitarian notions; though it must be confessed that, like other perishable articles, these suffered a certain mellowing in the process of crossing the Equator. A more unexpected phenomenon was the realignment

1. The motion of the Minister of Justice, Gen J. C. Smuts, is in *Union House of Assembly Debates* vol. 36., pp. 30-31. The voting in the motion is in *Debates*, vol. 36, pp. 95-96.

of political personalities and parties. The vote of September 4th caused the Prime Minister, General Hertzog, such bitter chagrin that he resigned immediately and, taking with him almost all his political followers, crossed the floor of the House to range himself beside Dr. Malan, the leader of the Nationalist Opposition. This reinforcement of nearly 40 members provided a formidable accession of strength to an opposition which, in numbers at all events, had hitherto been undesirably weak. But it also presented problems of adjustment which were not to be solved in an hour. Malan's Nationalist Party, like the Hertzogites, had opposed the war, but it is doubtful whether this in itself would have been sufficient to ensure unity between them had not certain other considerations come into play. Of these the most important was that both halves of the Opposition were Afrikaans parties, behind whom stood the majority of the Afrikaner section of the population. There was thus between them a bond of racial feeling, which was enormously strengthened by the conviction, common to both, that the war was being waged in the interests, not of South Africa, but of England or "the Empire." Further, there was the fact that there had been a time, only six years previously, when Malan had acknowledged Hertzog as his leader. Both the Opposition Parties could claim to be the lineal descendants of the Nationalist Party which Hertzog had led from 1913 to 1933. In the latter year, indeed, they had parted company, and had by doing so broken the solid Afrikaner front which had been growing in power in the preceding twenty years. Many Afrikaners, whether Hertzogites or Malanites, had lamented the breach, and many now felt that the time had come to heal it. There arose, then, almost spontaneously, a desire throughout the length and breadth of Nationalist Afrikanerdorp for "Hereniging." It was a feat which, if good-will alone could have effected it, would have been achieved in an instant. But there were in reality serious difficulties, of which benevolent amateurs took too little account. These difficulties, which retarded the realisation of reunion, and eventually brought it in ruins to the ground, were rooted in the history of the past two decades. If we are to understand the rise and fall of Hereniging, we must turn first to the background against which it was set.

In 1924 the Government of General Smuts was defeated by a coalition of the English Labour Party with the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, and General Hertzog, the Nationalist leader, formed a government which was to last until 1933. The achievements of the Nationalists in the eight years that followed are writ large on the face of South African life. The two languages, the two flags, the two anthems, bear witness to that work; the "civilised labour" policy is its glory or its shame; and the Statute of Westminster set the seal upon it. For six years of abounding

prosperity South Africa was able to devote herself to constructive legislation and vigorous political controversy. But at the beginning of the 'thirties there came a change. A rude blast from the economic blizzard which was raging in Europe and America struck the country, and before South Africa had grasped what was happening, she was in the thick of a crisis. And, since it is possible to lose money in any language, the racial issue became for the moment less interesting than the ledgers of commerce or the state of the Stock Exchange. At this conjuncture of affairs, Mr. Tielman Roos, whom everybody in politics had supposed to be desiccating respectably in the dignified *penetralia* of the Appeal Court, emerged upon the anxious gaze of the public, tacking hither and thither in a fever of infectious energy. While other statesmen eddied furiously in circles, Mr. Roos floated triumphantly before the breeze, in a manner which claimed, and obtained, a considerable share of public attention. Sounding the tocsin with one hand, and with the other flinging away the winter garments of judicial repentance, he proclaimed the downfall of the Golden Calf with an eloquence which would have done credit to the Old Testament. Nor, when General Hertzog gave ear to his calling, and linked himself once more to sterling (in despite of Self-Determination) was Mr. Roos' prophetic ardour much abated. From being a voice crying in the wilderness, he became the conductor of a semi-chorus of fifteen Members of Parliament. He enjoyed the position. He intended that his semi-chorus should be heard, and to advantage. For after all, the Government's majority was only 16.

At the turn of the year 1932-33 Roos announced his intention of working for the formation of a Coalition Government on a non-racial basis, from which all members of Hertzog's Government should be excluded. His obvious ally, therefore, was Smuts' South African Party; but Smuts found his terms too stiff. Nevertheless, the country, moved perhaps by other examples of National Governments in time of crisis, cried loudly for a coalition of some sort. So, at the beginning of the session of 1933, Smuts offered the assistance of his Party to General Hertzog. The offer was at first rejected, but the need to prevent Roos and his fifteen members from continuing to hold the balance of power in the House soon led to more prudent counsels. Hertzog and Havenga, on the one side, Smuts and Duncan on the other, reached an agreement on seven basic points, which was endorsed unanimously by the South African Party caucus, and *nemine contradicente* by the caucus of the Nationalists. The formation of a Coalition Ministry of six Nationalists and six Smutsites was announced by Hertzog on 28th February 1933, and his action was approved by large majorities at the Nationalist Party Congresses in the Transvaal and Free State later in the year.

Already, however, there was a rift in the lute. Thirty members of the Nationalist caucus had abstained from voting when the decision was taken, and Dr. Malan, the leader of the Cape Nationalists, had from the beginning declared his hostility to any Coalition. He had refused the office that was offered him and, to Hertzog's disgust, had secured the condemnation of the Coalition in the Cape Nationalist Congress by 141 votes to 30. In the Transvaal he had only one M.P. to support him—Adv. J. G. Strydom; in the Free State not more than three or four—including Adv. C. R. Swart and Dr. N. J. van der Merwe; but in the Cape he actually had a majority. The General Election of May 1933 had given the Coalition no less than 138 members in a House of 150: so strong was its hold on the imagination of the country that Malan and his followers had found themselves constrained to stand as Coalition candidates, in order to be sure of their return. Once the elections were over, however, they showed their disapproval of the new arrangement. Hertzog was naturally reluctant to allow a split in his Party if it were possible to avoid it. By reasoning and blandishments he sought to persuade this errant sheep to return to the corral, where the ninety and nine were already safely folded. The errant one, however, was disposed to argue and impose conditions, and though the negotiations made fair progress, Malan cried off when he heard the terms that Hertzog had conceded to his Smutsite allies. "Fusion," cried Malan in a speech at Piet Retief, "Fusion is dead." He was egregiously mistaken. As a matter of fact, it was in process of gestation.

The alarming Mr. Roos (intelligibly enough) had not been satisfied with the Coalition. It had, among other defects, no room for him. At the end of 1933, therefore, he began to demand that Coalition give way to Fusion—that the alliance of the two parties be replaced by the foundation of a new Party in which each should sink its identity. Discussions on this point were protracted, but at last, on 6th June 1934, the terms of Fusion were published in the Press, and the United National South African Party came into existence. The Federale Raad of the Nationalist Party approved the step by 13 votes to 7. The minority, led by Malan, were more resolute than they had been a year previously. They not only refused to enter the new United Party, but they publicly seceded from Hertzog, and themselves founded a new Party, popularly entitled Die Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, and in the session of 1935 this Party, 19 strong, formed the official Opposition to the Government.¹

Such, then, were the circumstances of the breach in Nationalist unity, which it was hoped that the declaration of war might

1. Colonel Stallard had earlier withdrawn, to form the Dominion Party, as a protest against the Status Act.

heal. We have, however, still to enquire as to the points at issue between Malan and his former leader. There were two immediate causes for the secession of Malan and his followers from General Hertzog's allegiance. In the first place, they distrusted Smuts, and declined to fuse with the South African Party "as at present constituted."¹ This was an intelligible objection, in view of the history of the preceding decade, though it might have been suggested that if Hertzog, who had been Smuts' lifelong political foe, was prepared to bury the hatchet, Malan might reasonably be expected to participate in the obsequies. The second and more serious ground of refusal concerned the constitutional position of South Africa within the Commonwealth. Malan was not satisfied with the situation as it existed after 1931, and desired that it might be made more precise upon a number of important points. The chief of these concerned the divisibility of the Crown, the right of neutrality, and the right of secession; though he also demanded the abolition of such "constitutional anomalies" as the office of Governor-General, and the appeal to the Privy Council. And finally, he desired that the right of every member of the new Party to make Republican propaganda should be entrenched in the Party's programme of principles.²

Hertzog's replies made it clear that there was no irreconcilable difference of opinion between them upon this matter. He personally considered that the divisibility of the Crown and the rights of neutrality and secession had been in effect secured since the Imperial Conference of 1926, but he argued that it would be unwise to define these rights too precisely: "To define is to limit, and I am not prepared to undermine or to help to undermine our independent national freedom, which we possess to-day in fullest measure."³ As to the Governor-General and the Privy Council, that was for the people of South Africa to decide.³ In short, Hertzog's attitude was in full harmony with the faith in evolution, the reluctance to trust to written constitutions, which have been characteristic of the statesmanship of the Commonwealth in its more enlightened moments. That his view of the constitutional position was a sound one has been proved by recent Commonwealth history, particularly in the case of Eire. Upon the question of Republicanism, he was prepared to incorporate into the principles of the Party a provision permitting its members to advocate any form of government—whether Republican or monarchical. But he was not prepared to prescribe a Republican *credo* as a test of membership. The corresponding article in the Beginsels of the old Nasionale Party had certainly

1. C. M. van den Heever, *Generaal J. B. M. Hertzog* (1943) p. 609. On 14 March 1935 Malan expressed this fear in the House: "Ek het keur op keer gesê dat ek bang is dat hy die Eerste Minister" (*i.e.* Hertzog) "deur die Minister van Justisie" (*i.e.* Smuts) "en die S.A.P. sal uitroei word." G. D. Scholtz: *Dr. N. J. van der Merwe*, (1943) p. 226.

2. Leslie Blackwell, *African Occasions* (1943), p. 238-9

3. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

not done that.¹ He was himself a convinced Republican ; as he said in the House of Assembly in 1917 :

"Ek persoonlik was altyd getrou aan die verdrag van Vereeniging, en sal dit altyd bly ; nietemin het ek die reg om te sê dat ek die republikeinse staatsvorm as die beste vir Suid-Afrika beskou. Elke nasie het met verloop van tyd sy vryheid gekry, en òf dit 'n honderd jaar duur, òf 'n duisend jaar, Suid-Afrika sal sy vryheid kry."²

But he was not therefore ready to turn the Party into an avowedly Republican organisation, for to do so would be to frighten the English, and make fusion in the wider sense an impossibility. The Englishman must be educated gradually to republicanism: it was no use trying to force him to it.

"Voor jy die Engelse . . . kan laat "d" sê, moet jy hulle eers laat "a", "b", en "c" sê . . ."³

It is possible that Malan might have found a satisfactory basis of agreement in these answers, if Smuts had not intervened. Smuts on his side also desired to know where Hertzog stood on the constitutional issue, and he presented Hertzog with certain propositions for his acceptance or rejection. Upon the question of neutrality, divisibility and secession, he suggested that the difference between them was one of interpretation only, and not of fundamental principle ; secondly, he stated that he could not agree to any measure which meant a substantial modification of South Africa's common status inside the Commonwealth, as it existed side by side with Union nationality ; and lastly (with reference to Republican propaganda) he demanded that any reference to this matter in the Party's programme of principles must be governed by a clear declaration that the party stood for the maintenance of South Africa's constitutional position as laid down in the South Africa Act and the Statute of Westminster.⁴ Hertzog, in his reply, expressed his full concurrence with Smuts upon all three heads.

It is difficult to see that there was any real inconsistency between these replies and those he had made to Malan. Yet Malan at least appeared to think that they were not consonant with each other, for it was on this question that he finally cut adrift from Fusion and proceeded to the foundation of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party.

In reality, however, the difference upon the constitutional issue was, if not a pretext, then at least the symptom of a deeper cleavage—a cleavage that went to the very roots of the policy which Hertzog had created the United Party to carry out. The

1. As Hertzog said in 1919 : "Dat die oorgrote meerderheid van die Party republikeinsegesind is, lag geef twyfel nie. Maar republikeinisme as partybeginsel wat elke lid moet aanneem of wat vir elke lid bindend is, is geen beginsel van die Party nie." van den Heever, p. 429.

2. A. C. Cilliers, *Generaal Hertzog en Hereniging*, p. 22.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

4. Blackwell, *African Occasions*, pp. 241-2.

split of 1934, in fact, was merely the climax in a process of political development which had been in operation for some years, and which here found its inevitable outcome

The first phase in Hertzog's political career had been concerned with a long uphill struggle for the right of the Afrikaner to receive equal treatment with his English fellow-citizen. To obtain this right Hertzog had founded the Nasionale Party, and had waged war, in season and out of season, upon the "conciliation" policy of Botha and Smuts. It was a hard fight, and, essentially, a defensive one. It must not be supposed, however, that by his rejection of "konsiliatie" Hertzog was basing his policy upon the deliberate fostering of racial hatred: no policy rooted in such a sterile soil could have produced a harvest as rich as that which he was eventually to garner. But konsiliatie, as interpreted by Botha, too often meant a solution by unilateral concession, with all the surrenders from the Afrikaner side.¹ Until the language, culture and civic status of his people were secured by legislation, until the Afrikaner and his way of life received from the English the unquestioning respect to which they were entitled, Hertzog felt that no good purpose could be served by smooth words and insincere gestures. It was not that he was anti-English; as early as 1911 President Steyn observed that

"die Hertzogbeleid nie die baasskap van die Afrikaner oor die Engelsman beoog nie; as dit so was sou hy" (Steyn) "nie dié dag aanwesig gewees het nie."²

No, he was not anti-English; he was simply pro-Afrikaner. This phase of his career closed with his accession to office in 1924, and was succeeded by a second phase, a phase of great creative activity. All the rights he had claimed for Afrikanerdom were now secured by his energy, and most of the promises he had made when in opposition were now redeemed. As the result of his premiership, the Afrikaner could hold his head high in South Africa, and treat with the Englishman for the first time upon a basis of equality.

And with that arose the question whether the time was not now ripe to treat the Englishman as a friend. General Hertzog began to think so. He had long looked forward to that time. In the course of his tenure of office he had had to represent his country at the crucial Imperial Conference of 1926. He soon ~~learned~~ ^{discovered} that he had developed into a progressive Commonwealth statesman. And he learned, perhaps, just how little substance there was in the old story that South Africa was tied fast by political bonds to the Mother Country. "The Empire" had

1 Cf. Hertzog's speech in Pretoria 10 December 1930 " . . . Waar kom hierdie onsen van hante as ons die Englessprekendes vra om met ons saam te werk dat party van ons mense moet skree 'Konsiliatie' ". Dit is die Bothaleer is nie en dat ek steeds met die doel voor oë gewerk het, is aangedui in my antwoord aan Generaal Botha op 8 Maart 1912. Ek het hom gevra of ek ooit die idee van konsiliatie verag en belaglik gemaak het. Ek het aangehoor dat ek die konsiliatiekeret verag het, wat nie werklik samewerking beoog nie. Toe, net soos nou, wou ek konsiliatie en toenadering hê, maar nie op 'n basis van eenzijdige opoffering nie " van den Heever, p. 591.

2 Cilliers, *Generaal Hertzog en Hereniging* p. 16

become a thing of the past, "a geographical expression," so far as the Dominions were concerned. Was it not then at least possible that the English in South Africa could be won to a policy of cooperation on the basis of the motto "South Africa first"? Hertzog was prepared to try the experiment. And in such circumstances, konsiliasie assumed a very different aspect. As Professor van den Heever remarks,

"Met krag het generaal Hertzog sedert 1926 al die idee voorwerp dat die woord Konsiliasie mens moet laat skrik."¹

So, by the end of the 'twenties, Hertzog was entering upon his third, and to his mind most important, phase—the phase of conscious and deliberate nation-building. By 1930 he had plainly made up his mind that the task of South African statesmanship now lay in the fostering of a really united national feeling to match that legal nationhood which was to be conferred in the following year by the Statute of Westminster. The two streams of national life, English and Afrikaans, must both be set to work in one common interest, till the day—it might be near or distant—when they should find themselves merging in a new nationalism which should be neither Afrikaans nor English but South African.² In his speech to the Bloemfontein Congress of the Nasionale Party in 1930, he said :

"Wat ek vir 'n lang tyd al voel, en ook lankal voor werk, is dat die tyd gekom is vir ons Suid-Afrikaners, Hollandssprekendes of Engelssprekendes, om in te sien en die feit te erken, dat so lank soos ons apart staan en ons doel langs verskillende weë wil bereik, ons moet verwag dat die grootste deel van wat ons as 'n nasie wil bereik, nie verkry sal wees nie . . . Na die verrigtinge van die Rykskonferensies van 1926 en 1930 bestaan daar vandag geen enkele rede meer waarom op staatkundige en politieke gebied Hollands- en Engelssprekende Suid-Afrika nie in die gees van 'n gekonsolideerde Suid-Afrikaanse volk sal voel en handel nie."

But he added also :

"Dit sal geskied en dat dit so gevoel word, is die taak waartoe die Nasionale Party tans geroepe is. Is die Nasionale Party tot volbrenging van hierdie taak in staat ? So nie, dan is sy tyd uitgedien. Laat ons, Nasionaliste, ons taak aanvaar. Engels- en Hollandssprekende Suid-Afrika staan vandag, soos nog nooit tevore nie, gereed om mekaar in wederkerige opregtheid die hand toe te ~~reik~~ as gelyke en gelykberegtigde Afrikaners."³

1. van den Heever, p. 390.

2. "Die Suid-Afrikaanse lewende vloei voort in twee kultuurstrome, 'n Engelse en 'n Afrikaanse; hulle vloei lank mekaar tot 'n historiese noodlot wat hulle in die verre toekoms moontlik sal laat saamvloei," van den Heever, p. 682. It is curious that even so well informed a person as the late Mr. A. K. Long should have misunderstood Hertzog on this point. See *In Smuts' Camp* (1945) p. 15, where he writes: "He called his point of view the 'two-stream' policy. The future of the two white races was to flow not in a mingled but in a dual tide. The tide was to have two currents. Though the two were to touch each other perpetually, to flow in constant contact, they were never [sic] to mix their waters."

3. van den Heever, p. 600. A. C. Cilliers, *Generaal Hertzog en Hereniging*, p. 15.

What steps he would have taken to realise this new programme, had the circumstances remained normal, it is impossible to conjecture. But the economic crisis, and the campaign of Tielman Roos, presented an opportunity which could hardly have been bettered. For the first time since Union, South Africa was psychologically ready for the policy which he had in mind. Hertzog was therefore able to launch the United Party upon a wave of national feeling, while a freshening wind of returning prosperity filled the bellying sails of its enormous majority. For him, the very existence of that Party was a sign that the time had come for the abandonment of a system of politics in which the divisions between Parties ran mainly upon racial lines. The Englishman, he hoped, could now be trusted, as sooner or later he must be trusted, to cooperate frankly and whole-heartedly in the making of a real South African unity. What alternative was there? To continue the policy of the 'twenties was hardly possible, for that policy had virtually reached its logical conclusion. The only respect in which the Afrikaner could rationally be dissatisfied with his position was in regard to the "Imperial" connection, and Hertzog knew, better perhaps than his opponents, how easily that connection could be broken, if the nation willed it so.¹ What then remained? To pursue a policy of Afrikaner exclusivism? To build up Afrikaner strength until the old English position of supremacy passed into Afrikaner hands? To seek ultimately to impose Afrikaner ideals and culture upon the non-Afrikaners? This, he felt, was the negation of statesmanship. It would mean the perpetuation (and inevitably the embitterment) of racial politics for at least another generation, and in the end it could not be sure of success—the balance between the races was too even. And what, in the meantime, of patriotism, of national pride, of the national entity itself? Could South Africa ever hope to be a real nation under such conditions? He could not believe it. His classical culture unfitted him for the extremes of racial isolationism. He loved his country too well to subscribe to such a programme. For him the obvious duty was to induce such cooperation between the races as should cause differences of language and habit, environment and feeling, to sink into insignificance before a common devotion to South Africa, and a common readiness to serve her.

To Malan and the Gesuiwerdes the position appeared very different, the future much less roseate. The fight was not over for them, even though the first round had gone in their favour. They would have been ready for cooperation with Smuts and his

1. cf. Hertzog's Potchefstroom speech, 8 May 1933: "Die stryd is beëindig deur die aanname van die Statuut van Westminster, want daardeur is Suid-Afrika deur die wet as 'n vrye en soewereine volk erken. Wat die taalgelykheid in die praktyk betref, is dit reeds sedert 1924 deur die N.P. toegepas, en daar die S.A.P. dit as 'n grondbeginsel van samewerking aanvaar het, is die stryd finaal besleë. Die twee groot strydpunte van 1913 is dus uit die weg geruim..." Scholtz, *Dr. N. J. van der Merwe*, p. 241.

followers for a limited period, and for carefully defined ends—until the economic crisis was over, and the Boer on his feet again—but they could not enter into a partnership without limit, or promise collaboration over the whole political field.¹ They dreaded, in Coalition, a dilution of their principles. True, in the immediate future their policy did not differ greatly from Hertzog's. They desired to commit their party to a more explicit Republicanism but, until 1936 at all events, they were not prepared to make a Republican profession of faith the condition of membership, and they freely acknowledged that the Republic could be founded only "op die breë grondslag van die volkswil."² They were more urgent in their demands for a severance of the British connection, but even they accepted it as an inevitable, though transitory, phase in the development of the nation.³ Where they differed from Hertzog was in their diagnosis of the existing situation, and in their prognosis of its future development. To them, Hertzog was a great man who had allowed himself to be beguiled by illusions. They did not believe in a South African national unity of the type to which he looked forward: the thing was not possible, except in the minds of wishful thinkers. The facts simply did not point that way—or rather, they set an absolute bar to any development in that direction.⁴ The Malanites too had their ideals; but they were ideals which (as they contended) took account of the history of their country, and of the nature of the English-speaking population that lived in it. As they looked back on the past century and a half, they saw very little to persuade them that the Englishman had changed for the better. Slagtersnek, the Trek, the annexation of Natal, the snatch at the Diamond Fields, the two Vryheidsoorloë, the concentration camps, Jopie Fourie—was it not all of a piece? A black record indeed! From Somerset and Philip to Carnarvon and Shepstone, and so to Rhodes, Chamberlain and Milner, the Englishman in South Africa had been the enemy of their nation. Why should he be supposed to have altered?⁵ Even Smuts, "the handyman of the Empire," was not English enough for the hotheads of Natal, where the echoes of a secession-cry had hardly yet died away.

"Het die Engelse volk al ergens in die hele wêreld of ooit in die geskiedenis enige tegemoetkoming wat taal- of bestuursregte betref aan 'n onderhorige volk betoon—tensy dit afgedwing is of

1. As N. J. van der Merwe put it: "As die koalisie net 'n tydelike samewerking tussen die twee partye gaan wees om die land op ekonomiese gebied in hierdie tyd van krisis deur te help en veral die boere red, sal niemand met groter blydskap en trou die samewerking ondersteun nie." Scholtz, p. 236.

2. Scholtz, pp. 300-1, 304-5: the provision whereby party members were not obliged to be avowed republicans was deleted from the party programme in 1936.

3. Motion by N. J. van der Merwe at N. P. congress in O.F.S. 1 August 1934: "die Nasionale party wat wel tydelik die huidige Britse konneksie aanvaar, dog die ideaal buidig van uiteindelik af te skiel van die Britse Ryk en dus weier om bulle tot aktiewe handhawing van die Britse konneksie te verbind." Scholtz, p. 289.

4. D. F. du T. Malherbe, *Afrikaner Volkseenheid*, pp. 34-5.

5. This line of argument is well developed in Scholtz, pp. 281-2.

'n ander gedragslyn 'n verkeerde uitwerking sou meebring? Elke bladsy van die geskiedenis van Ierland gedurende 700 jaar bewys hoe absoluut ydel so 'n hoop of verwagting is."¹

Such concessions as Afrikanerdom had won had been taken by force, amid the protests of the racial fanatics of Durban and East London. Who should have known that better than Hertzog?

"Die eerlike Engelsman glo nie aan 'n 50:50-beleid nie . . . maar alleen aan 100 persent of niks . . . Of anders is dit die 50:50 van die hotelkok, wat hasepastei gemaak het uit haas- en perde-vleis volgens die 50:50 resep, d.w.s. een haas en een perd."²

In short, in the words of a studiously temperate Gesuiwerde:

"Die geskiedenis in Suid-Afrika lewer bewys dat die Engelsman net dan bereid is om saam te werk wanneer hy kans sien om die Afrikaner te gebruik of te verengels as hy nie altwee kan regkry nie. Sy vriendskap was tot op datum slegs 'n nuwe aanvalfront . . .³

*Moreover, that was not all. Between the Afrikaner and the Englishman was interposed not merely the flaming sword of the Recording Angel, but the formidable obstacle of an utter difference in methods of thought, religious feeling, habits of life, and psychological constitution. It was futile to expect races with lewensbeskouings so utterly at variance to cooperate cordially at the invitation of two political leaders joined in temporary alliance.⁴ It was all very well for Hertzog to luxuriate in metaphors and similes, to wax romantic over the "two streams" flowing through South African life, but the fact was that one of the streams did not take its rise in South Africa at all, but in England. In the context of South African politics the famous lines of Robert Montgomery at last acquired a precise meaning.

"The soul, aspiring, strives its source to mount,
As streams meander level with their fount."

The Englishmen in South Africa, in the opinion of the Gesuiwerdes, did just that. From England they came, and to England they directed their gaze, not caring much whether they irrigated the South African landscape or not. How was it possible to fuse English and Afrikaner into one nation, when in fact the English were not South Africans at all? Where was the English South African culture, to match the achievements of Afrikaans? The very clubs and associations to which they belonged betrayed their inability to cut loose from "The Old Country" and be something which, though English in speech, should be South African in feeling: 'Sons of England,' 'Caledonian Societies,' 'Cambrian Societies,' Freemasons of the English or Scottish

1. Malherbe, p. 30.

2. Malherbe, p. 33.

3. L. Ign. Coertze, *Die Ware Politieke Probleem Vandag*, p. 14.

4. A. C. Cilliers, *Die Stryd om Volkseenheid*, p. 42; Scholtz, p. 238: "Tussen lewensbeskouings is daar dikwels onoorbrugbare klowe. Tussen die lewensbeskouings van 'n groot deel van die lede van die S.A.P. en die lewensbeskouing van van der Merwe was daar so 'n onoorbrugbare kloof."

foundation . . . How was it possible that a population which had ever one eye on "home" should not be torn by divided loyalties, which, in a crisis, must mean disloyalty to South Africa?

"Ons verwerp," wrote Professor L. J. du Plessis, "Ons verwerp geheel-en-al die opvatting dat alle Suid-Afrikaners saam as een volk gereken moet word: Die Afrikanerdom is vir ons die Volk van Suid-Afrika, en die res van die Suid-Afrikaners is, vir sover hulle blank is, òf potensiele Afrikaners, òf vreemdelinge."¹

What, then, was to be done? Malan and his followers were not so foolish as to believe that South Africa could ever be a satisfactory country to live in if two-fifths of the white population were to be for ever regarded as "unassimilable elements," condemned to the discontents of an inferior status. Still less did they believe in the possibility of a solution along Hertzog's lines. Yet the English problem must be solved sooner or later, by persuasion or by force. For themselves, they favoured persuasion. But they were not sufficiently optimistic or convinced of their inherent strength to believe that persuasion would have much effect until the English had been brought face to face with the other alternative. They proposed, therefore, to concentrate for the moment on the strengthening of Afrikanerdom by every possible means, and in every field of human endeavour. They could count on the semi-religious fervour of their own countrymen, as they certainly could on the blindness and sluggishness of the complacent English. They hoped within a reasonable time to consolidate an Afrikaans bloc powerful enough to return a majority to Parliament. The Republic once established, they would proceed upon an avowedly pro-Afrikaans tack, with Afrikaans as the official language, and English tolerated "for reasons of convenience." It would not be long before the English came to perceive that, if they were to count for anything in the new State, they must be South Africans in their life and thought, as well as on their passports. Or rather, they would perceive that they must make up their minds to be Afrikaners—not necessarily in language, but certainly in spirit. In this there would be nothing artificial or constrained, for to be an Afrikaner was for a South African something inherent and natural.² Indeed, once the unsatisfactory psychological state induced by two allegiances had been done away, it was reasonable to suppose that the English (not as a rule a culturally sterile stock) might play a more important part than they had hitherto done in the intellectual and artistic life of the country. Malan considered himself, in the last analysis, to be no more anti-English than Hertzog, but he felt himself justified in stipulating that before he took the Englishman by the hand, he should have a reasonable certainty

1. *Die Transvaler*, 30 April 1941. There is a good appreciation of the point of view in Long: *In Smuts' Camp*, pp. 23 seq.

2. Malherbe, p. 111.

that the Englishman cherished the loyalties of the Afrikaner, and abjured all other. Thus he believed that national unity would be the *result* of the Republic, which must precede it,¹ whereas Hertzog believed that the Republic could come to birth only when national unity had already been attained. And, holding as he did that only in the Afrikaner was undivided loyalty to South Africa to be found, Malan was insistent that the unity to be aimed at should be Afrikaner Volkseenheid (in which, of course, the English would eventually be full and hearty participants), while Hertzog's Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid he condemned as a figment of the imagination, since it presupposed that the unregenerate English and the sincere Afrikaner could somehow stand in the same relation to the country in which they lived. And this could never happen, since to the Afrikaner South Africa was indeed "home," while to the Englishman, always looking wistfully back to Europe, it was still "The Tavern of the Seas"—suitably modernised, of course, and heavily capitalised, with very comfortable quarters at his disposal, but not a place where a man could strike deep root.

It is clear, then, that in regard to party politics, Malan must aim at a different goal from Hertzog. Hertzog had succeeded in breaking down the old Nationalist Afrikaner bloc. He had carried a large majority of it over into Fusion. Malan, on the contrary, must endeavour to reverse the process, to re-form the bloc, to drive a wedge between Smuts' followers and the Hertzogites. If he could do that, the way would be open for a reintegration of parties on purely racial lines—the only realistic and honest lines of cleavage, in his opinion. And so, at the very moment when Hertzog was preaching Vereniging, Malan launched the counter-doctrine of Hereniging.

For four years after 1934 Nationalist Afrikanerdom was in the wilderness. The Fusion Government was strong, and showed few signs of splitting; the Opposition, an impotent minority. In 1938, however, there came a change. It was the year of the Centenary of the Great Trek, and the Nationalists capitalised the occasion with endless ingenuity, astonishing vigour, and very considerable success. As a result, a wave of Nationalist feeling swept through Afrikanerdom, stirring even those who had been willing partakers in Fusion. The Afrikaner's pride in his history, in his culture, in his race, so strongly stimulated by the celebrations, induced the feeling that it was undesirable and wrong that Afrikanerdom should be divided into opposite political camps. The idea gained ground that efforts should be made to heal the breach between Malan and Hertzog, if necessary by the foundation of a new political party.

1. Malherbe, p. 35.

The initiative was taken by Professor A. C. Cilliers of Stellenbosch, who in January 1939 produced a striking pamphlet with the title *Quo Vadis?* In it he examined the differences existing between the United Party and the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, and outlined a *Program van Beginsels en Aksie* which he hoped would prove acceptable to Afrikaners on either side of the House, and which would form the basis for a new Afrikaner Party. His analysis found one main cause of divergence,¹ namely, the attitude to be adopted to the British connection.² For this he proposed the following compromise: the new Party was to accept *de facto* and *de jure* membership of the Commonwealth, it being understood that the Crown was to be considered as divisible, and the right of neutrality to be recognised, but members were to be free to advocate a change in the constitution of the State, and to make propaganda for such a change, "binne die raamwerk van die Party." Candidates at elections could adopt a Republican platform if they desired to do so. But only if two-thirds of the Party membership were in favour of an alteration in the Constitution was the question to be raised in Parliament, and only if such a change were accepted by a two-thirds majority in a national plebiscite was it to be carried into effect.³ Further, the *Program van Aksie* committed the Party to abolition of appeals to the Privy Council, revision of the Simonstown agreement, amendment of the nationality laws so as to preclude dual nationality in future, and official recognition of "Die Stem van Suid-Afrika" as the national anthem of the Union.⁴

In order to rally support for his plan, Professor Cilliers organised at Stellenbosch a so-called *Versoeningskomitee*, composed of a score or so of members of the University staff, with Cilliers himself as secretary. This committee, on 4th March 1939, issued a statement of its aims, from which it appeared that the members

"... gepaard gaande met die heling van die breuk op politieke gebied tussen Afrikaanssprekende Afrikaners beoog het 'n eenheidsfront wat nie net die hele Afrikaanssprekende gemeenskap sal omvat nie, maar ook soveel Engelssprekendes as wat hul werklik reeds op Suid-Afrikaanse burgerskap beroep, en, as bewys daarvan, bereid is om met eersgenoemde op gelyke voet saam te werk aan die uitvoering van 'n duidelik omskrewe program van beginsels en van aksie."⁵

And to this end it proposed a sort of convention, consisting of 25 representatives of the Universities, together with four or more leading personalities from each of the two Parties.⁶

1. A secondary point was in regard to native policy.

2. Cilliers, *Quo Vadis?* p. 11.

3. Cilliers, *Quo Vadis?* pp. 14-5.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

5. *Die Burger*, 6 March, 1939; Cilliers, *Die Stryd om Volkseenheid*, pp. 38-9; van den Heever, *Hertzog*, p. 684.

6. Cilliers, *Stryd om Volkseenheid*, pp. 38-9.

The reaction among the Afrikaners on the Government benches was not unfavourable. Hertzog himself was sympathetic, no doubt because the English were not specifically to be excluded, while Pirow "threw himself heart and soul into the scheme," and described it as the only practical and really acceptable proposal so far put forward for the restoration of unity.¹

The Gesuiwerdes, on the other hand, were distinctly cold. Even before the foundation of the Committee, and the publication of its manifesto in the Press, Cilliers was complaining of the suspicion and reserve with which his efforts had been greeted in that quarter.² *Die Burger* was frankly hostile. The way to Afrikanereenheid, in *Die Burger's* opinion, did not lie along Cilliers' road. It lay rather in the breaking away of the nationally-minded Afrikaners in the United Party, and their return to the Nasionale Party; or, if this seemed too hard, let them first found a new Party of their own, and then begin negotiations with Malan. If they pursued that course, *Die Burger* had little doubt that collaboration between all nasionaalgesinde Afrikaners would speedily be secured.³ The implication was plain: the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party considered itself to be in fact the sole repository of the true Nationalist principles, the only political expression of the vital aspirations of Afrikanerdom. Its members had held out against any watering-down of their principles in 1934, and they saw no reason to compromise now. If those Afrikaners who five years before had left die Pad van Suid-Afrika to go a-whoring after their own inventions had recovered their senses at last, their duty was clear—to return to the old Party which had maintained, in good report and evil report, an honourable consistency in its ensuing of the national ideal. Malan put the issue in a nutshell, when at Porterville he said: "Eers skeuring in die V.P., en dan 'Onderhandelings'."⁴

Thus the first attempt at Hereniging broke down. But already there was another scheme in the field. Two days before the publication of *Quo Vadis?* Albert Hertzog, the Prime Minister's son, had addressed an appeal to his father through the medium of *Die Burger*. As in the case of Professor Cilliers' proposals, committees were formed, with the name of "Albert Hertzog-komitees," to forward the reconciliation that was desired. But this time the basis was to be a narrower kind, and it was made clear that Hereniging was to be of such a nature as to rule out all English participation.

As General Hertzog put it:

"Volgens hulle basis die Afrikaanssprekende deel van die bevolking die enigste deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse bevolking sal wees

1. van den Heever, p. 685; *Die Burger*, 6 March 1939.

2. Cilliers, *Quo Vadis?* p. 19.

3. *Die Burger*, 6 March 1939.

4. Cilliers, *Stryd om Volkseenheid*, p. 39. "M.a.w." comments Cilliers, "Hereniging in die nouer sin, en nie volkseenheid in die breër sin nie."

wat geld as volk, en dat die Engelssprekende deel van die Afrikanerdom nie sal geld as deel van die Afrikanervolk nie. Die magsposisie moet dus by die self-gekonstitueerde Afrikanervolk berus . . .”

With such a proposal he would have nothing to do. His answer was an uncompromising refusal:

“Onder geen omstandighede, wil ek julle verseker, sal ek ooit in die politiek my samewerking verleen aan persone wat nie gereed is om te erken en te aanvaar die beginsel van volkome gelykheid en gelykberegtiging tussen ons Afrikaans- en Engelssprekende volksdele.”¹

Thus the negotiations with the Albert-Hertzog-komitees broke down almost before they could be said to have begun: Hereniging seemed further off than ever. But the Versoenings-komitees and the Albert-Hertzog-komitees were not disbanded. They continued, in a state of suspended animation, waiting for the coming of a more favourable opportunity. On 4th September 1939 the opportunity arrived.

(ii)

Towards the middle of August 1939 the law advisers of the Government noticed that the life of the Senate was due to expire within a few weeks, and since the cooperation of the Senate is necessary for the passing of legislation, it became desirable to take measures for the prolongation of the Senate's term.² General Hertzog therefore summoned Parliament for a special three-day session, the opening day being 2nd September—a Saturday.³ On Friday, 1st September, Germany invaded Poland.

The Union Parliament met on the following morning, and at once a demand arose for a declaration of policy upon the international issue. General Hertzog, however, announcing that only formal business was to be done that day, declined to make any statement until Monday, 4th September.⁴ That same afternoon the Cabinet met at Groot Schuur, and at once it became clear that, in General Hertzog's words, “a profound difference of opinion” existed upon the question of whether or not to declare war. A second meeting on Sunday afternoon brought no solution; the six followers of Hertzog favoured neutrality, the seven adherents of Smuts demanded war.⁵

Meanwhile, on Sunday morning, the leaders of the Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party had gathered at Malan's residence at

1. van den Heever, pp. 685-6

2. Opening speeches of Mr. Speaker and the Prime Minister on 2 September 1939. *Debates*, vol. 36, p. 3.

3. General J. G. Kemp (*Die Pad van die Veroweraar*, p. 433) gives an unusual explanation for the summoning of Parliament. He asserts that Parliament met, “as 'n aanleiding van seker maneuvers van genl. Smuts, teenkynlik met die doel om die Senaat se lewe te verleng, maar in werklikheid met andere duistere bedoelings.”

4. *Debates*, Vol. 36, p. 3.

5. For all this see Deneys Reitz, *No Outspan* pp. 236-44.

Sea Point, "om te beraadslag hoe ons verder pressie op Hertzog vir neutraliteit kon uitoefen."¹ They decided to send the Prime Minister a letter promising their support for a policy of neutrality, and at 3 o'clock Paul Sauer, Chief Whip to the Party, took this letter to Groot Schuur. That evening Malan visited Hertzog, and returned at 10.45 with the news that "Hertzog vir neutraliteit gaan staan."²

When the House met on Monday, 4th September, 147 members (not including the Speaker) out of 153 were present.³ A preliminary canvass undertaken by General Smuts's supporters had estimated that in the United Party 66 members would be for war, and 38 for neutrality.⁴ Thus, with 29 Gesuiwerdes, the anti-war vote would be 67, while on the other hand Smuts would be able to count on the assistance of the Labour, Dominion Party, and Native Representative members. The event proved the justice of these calculations. The voting fell precisely as Smuts had foreseen, and by 80 votes to 67 the House decided for war.⁵

General Hertzog resigned the Premiership that same night. The Governor-General, declining to follow his advice and hold a General Election, asked Smuts to form a Ministry. On Wednesday, 6th September, the new Prime Minister announced his Coalition Cabinet.

And so, for the first time for fifteen years, Hertzog found himself in Opposition, sitting side by side with his old adversaries the Gesuiwerdes, and in agreement with them, moreover, upon the greatest question then before the country. Some sort of common action between them seemed certain; the question was, would it extend to Hereniging in the full sense of the term?

Immediately after 4th September, and before Parliament rose, an "influential group" of Hertzogites had begun negotiations with the Nationalists.⁶ They proposed that a single Opposition Party be formed, with Hertzog as its leader, and they indicated that the Hertzogites would consider the period of Fusion as an experiment that had failed, and would be ready to return to the basis of 1933, provided that the Nationalists would do the same—it being understood, of course, that in the altered circumstances some alteration of policy and principle would be accepted.⁷

1. Extract from Dagboek of Dr. N. J. van der Merwe: Scholtz, *van der Merwe*, p. 396. It appears that as early as 1 September the N.P. caucus had decided to send such a letter to Hertzog.

2. Scholtz, p. 396.

3. 104 United Party; 29 Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party; 7 Dominion Party; 4 Labour Party; 3 Native Representatives.

4. Reitz, pp. 236-44. "We had made a preliminary canvass, and were sure of our ground." B. K. Long (*In Smuts' Camp*, pp. 41-46) believes that the issue was actually in some doubt, and was possibly influenced by his own speech. He states that he personally was never canvassed; that there was, however, canvassing of uncertain votes by both sides; and that as far as he knew neither Smuts nor Hertzog took any personal part in it.

5. *Debates*, Vol. 36, pp. 95-8.

6. Cilliers, *Volkseenheid*, p. 17; Scholtz, p. 398: the group consisted of Havenga, Kemp, Pirow and Fagan, among others.

7. *Die Volksblad*, 4 December 1939.

It seems that no definite result was arrived at, and perhaps it was not immediately expected. The Hertzogite proposal had been in the nature of a feeler. It is very doubtful, however, whether the Nationalists would have accepted this offer, had it been pressed.¹ They had moved some distance forward since 1933, and it was too much to expect them to recur to a stage which they had long since left behind. Indeed, as appeared when serious negotiations began, the points of difference between Hertzog and Malan were considerably more conspicuous than the points of agreement.²

A *rapprochement* was, however, facilitated by the great meeting at Monumentkoppie on 8th September 1939. Here, on the spot where only a year previously the celebrations of the Centenary of the Great Trek had reached their climax and conclusion, the supporters of Hertzog and Malan gathered in their thousands to seal the reunion between two leaders whose paths, for the past six years, had seemed to be diverging ever more widely. With prayer and thanksgiving, with earnest and moving orations, the split in the ranks of Nationalist Afrikanerdom was healed, and the bitter broedertwis declared at an end, as the national poet Totius read an address "waarin onderneem word om die volk te dien tot opbou en tot ons mekaar se hand te gryp op die Pad van Suid-Afrika, om nooit weer los te laat nie." There can be no doubt that all present fully shared in the emotion of that hour, when the bad years of volkskeuring seemed to drop behind into oblivion, and the future of Afrikanerdom appeared to grow brighter against the background of its present adversity. Yet it was too much to hope that by a single act of faith the memories and rancours of years could be completely exorcised. And even at Monumentkoppie, even in the speeches of the leaders upon the occasion, there were signs that it would not be easy to secure intellectual agreement, or reach an understanding as to the precise direction in which Die Pad van Suid-Afrika was to lead them. The theme of Hertzog's speech was Moderation; his watchword was Caution; and he refrained from adverting to the republican issue. Malan, on the other hand, devoted much space to the coming Republic, and roundly declared for the speedy severance of all connection with Britain. The difference was as yet one of emphasis only, but it was indicative of troubles to come.³

It was, indeed, evident that the Republican issue was going to give trouble. As N. J. van der Merwe put it:

"Dit is nie enige soort eenheid of eenheid teen enige prys wat ek nouem nie . . . Die groot saak waarop ek die aandag vestig, is dus nie net die eenwording van die Afrikanerdom nie, maar die eenheid op die Pad van Suid-Afrika."⁴

1. Though Scholtz asserts that they "was volkome bereid om hierdie voorstel te aanvaar." Scholtz, p. 398.

2. Scholtz, *loc. cit.*; Cilliers, *Volkseenheid*, p. 19.

3. Ciesuwerde eye-witness accounts remark on the fact that Hertzog seemed to be holding himself in; that he was unduly restrained; and that he seemed too concerned with the English-speaking section

4. Scholtz, quoting *Die Volksblad*, 18 October 1939.

And, for the Gesuiwerdes, that path must lead to a Republic, for "van daardie jaar" (1934) "af tot 1939 het die republikeinse ideaal soveel dieper in die harte van die Nasionaliste ingedring. Hulle sou geen Nasionaliste wees, indien hulle nie ook republikeine was nie. Nasionalis en republikein was in 1939 reeds sinonieme terme."¹

The truth of the matter was that the Nationalists were afraid that Hertzog was not prepared to forget his Hertzogism; that he would refuse to believe that the declaration of war had given final proof that the English-speaking Afrikaner did not exist, and never could exist. Their misgivings were justified, as Hertzog's Smithfield speech on 4th November 1939 showed. In the course of that speech he said that the cardinal problem facing statesmen in South Africa was the building up of the two sections of the population into a united people, and added that, for the present at least, he declined to be placed in the category of those who desired to break all constitutional ties with Britain.² The effect of this on the Gesuiwerdes was, as N. J. van der Merwe temperately put it, "heelwat teleurstellend." It boded no good for the negotiations for Hereniging which opened three weeks later.³

On 23rd November 1939 the Hertzogite and Nationalist representatives met in Pretoria, in an effort to come to some agreement which should give practical effect to the will to unity so plainly manifested at Monumentkoppie.⁴ The discussions, which extended over two days, reflected the general desire for reunion, and the delegates were still to some extent under the influence of the exaltation of spirit which had inspired Totius two months before. But goodwill and enthusiasm were not sufficient to remove practical difficulties, or conceal differences in principle; and common hostility to the war was found to be inadequate in itself as a ground for union. Before ever the negotiations had begun, the Nationalist delegates had agreed not to tolerate any watering-down of their principles, or any interference with their identity as a party.⁵

When the meeting opened, Hertzog proposed from the chair that they consider first the question of what the new Party was to be called. But this did not suit the Gesuiwerdes. They were not sure that there was going to be any new Party. Without unity upon cardinal principles it would be better to remain as they were. The Party name was therefore postponed, and the delegates settled down to discuss their respective creeds. At once they ran into difficulties about Republicanism. They therefore

1. Scholtz, p. 400.

2. *Die Volksblad*, 6 November 1939.

3. Scholtz, p. 402. Hertzog resigned from the United Party after a defeat in the Central Executive Committee of the Party, (by 28 votes to 10), on 3 November 1939, when he walked out of the Party congress at Bloemfontein: *Die Vaderland*, 4 November 1939.

4. Twelve Hertzogites and six Nationalists attended.

5. Scholtz, p. 402. What follows is based on Scholtz, who used Dr. van der Merwe's *Dagboek*.

appointed a sub-committee, consisting of Pirow, J. H. Viljoen and Ben Schoeman on the one side, and Strydom, N. J. van der Merwe and C. W. M. du Toit on the other, to seek for a formula acceptable to both. A formula was soon forthcoming.

N. J. van der Merwe proposed the following :

"Die Party is daarvan oortuig dat die republikeinse staatsvorm, afgeskei van die Britse Kroon, hom die beste aanpas by die tradisies, omstandighede en aspirasies van die Suid-Afrikaanse volk, en tewens die enigste doeltreffende waarborg is dat Suid-Afrika nie meer in Groot Brittanje se oorloë ingesleep sal word nie. Die Party sal hom dus in hierdie rigting beywer deur alle ongerymdhede wat die volste uitlewing van ons volksvryheid belemmer, uit die weg te ruim. Hy erken egter dat 'n republiek tot stand gebring kan word alleen op die breë grondslag van die volkswil, en met getroue inagneming van die gelyke taal- en kultuurregte van die twee seksies van die blanke bevolking. In ooreenstemming hiermee lê hy vas dat hierdie konstitusionele verandering tot stand gebring sal word alleen ingevolge 'n spesiale en besliste opdrag daartoe van die stemgeregtigde blanke bevolking en nie bloot as gevolg van 'n parlementêre meerderheid wat by 'n gewone algemene verkiesing verkry mag word nie."

He explained to the committee that "in hierdie rigting" meant "towards the Republican goal," and that the removal of "ongerymdhede" included the removal of the British Crown. Pirow accepted the formula; but Strydom objected, since the phrase "in hierdie rigting" "nie noodwendig beteken dat jy enduit sal gaan nie." His objection seems to have been withdrawn or overruled, since in the end the committee unanimously accepted the formula. The committee then dispersed, and van der Merwe reported the results of their labours to Malan. He, like Strydom, expressed his distrust; the formula left too many loopholes for misinterpretation. He suggested, together with other minor amendments, the substitution of the word "daarvoor" for the phrase "in hierdie rigting," which, like Strydom, he considered ambiguous. But ambiguity was apparently what the Hertzogites wanted, for when van der Merwe showed Malan's amendments to Pirow, he was told that Hertzog would never accept them. Nor did he. When the amended formula was presented to the full conference, Hertzog refused to have anything to do with it.

On the following day, other formulae were tried. Malan produced one which was designed to put South Africa "op die pad van Ierland"; Havenga produced one to reflect the Hertzogite viewpoint. But Hertzog rejected Malan's, and the Nationalists rejected Havenga's. Hertzog, it appeared, was opposed to recognising the Republic as a national goal, while Havenga was refusing to continue discussions if the continued existence of the Nasionale Party were admitted. There seemed little point in going on, and the meeting came to an end. "Although," as the

official statement to the Press put it, "there was general agreement on most [*sic*!] questions of principle, no solution could be reached on the two problems of the Republican aim,¹ and the name of the new Party."¹ Hereniging seemed to be indefinitely postponed.

The difficulty about the name of the new Party was of minor importance. It arose from the fact that the Nationalist Party were beneficiaries under the will of Mr. Justice Beyers, and were afraid that if the name were altered they might preclude themselves from the further enjoyment of these advantages; while, on the other hand, the Hertzogites were unwilling to accept the name of a Party with whom they had so recently been at war. Experience was to show that it was not a matter of any great difficulty to devise a form of words which should satisfy the requirements of both sides. Much more serious was the difference of opinion upon the matter of the future Republic.² N. J. van der Merwe went to the heart of the matter when he wrote:

"Die verskil het dus hierop neergekom. Generaal Hertzog het gemeen dat ons die ongerymheid kon wegneem en tog onder die Britse Kroon en lid van die Britse Gemenebes bly, terwyl ek bedoel het afskeiding van die Britse Kroon en Gemenebes. Generaal Hertzog het verklaar dat hy, net soos in 1927, die reg wil hê om my te bestry, as ek vir 'n republiek propaganda maak. Hier het ons dus vasgesteek."³

Hertzog and Havenga wished the Republican issue to be dealt with as it had been dealt with by the old Nationalist Party before Fusion and by the United Party after it; that is, that individual members should be allowed to make propaganda for or against the Republic within the Party, but that adherence to the Republican ideal should not be made obligatory, nor included as one of the principles of the Party's constitution. There were many Afrikaners, they believed, who, although hostile to Smuts and "Imperialism," were not unconditional Republicans. The new Party should aim at including these, as potential Nationalists, and no Republican commitment should be allowed to interfere with the great task of reforming Afrikanerdom into a solid bloc. The Gesuiwerde Nationalists, on the other hand, insisted upon a clear statement that the Party was a Republican Party, and that the immediate attainment of a free and independent Republic was one of the most urgent and important of the tasks which it proposed to itself. Moreover, the difference which might in itself have been no more than a divergence of view upon a question of expediency, extended to related and more important questions. Granted that a Republic was the political aim of a majority of

1. *Die Transvaler*, 24 November 1939; *Die Vaderland*, 27 November 1939. This was also Malan's view of the case: see *Die Burger*, 4 December 1939.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 20 November 1939. See, too, Hertzog's Smithfield speech: *Die Volksblad*, 4 November 1939.

3. Scholtz, p. 404.

Nationalists, by what means was that Republic to be attained? Havenga was emphatic that a constitutional change of such importance could not be safely carried through upon the authority of a majority in Parliament. The majority might be narrow and ephemeral; the House might have been elected after an appeal to the Country upon quite other issues. In his view (and it was the view of the Hertzogites in general and of Hertzog in particular) such a revolution must require the support of a decided majority of the European population, must be based "op die breë grondslag van die Volkswil," and before such a basis could be secured, a good deal of "missionary" work would be necessary, particularly among the English. To him, it was a question to be decided by the nation as a whole: "The only majority necessary to proclaim a Republic is the majority which can maintain it." Any attempt to impose the Republic upon a large unwilling minority could only lead to friction, perhaps to civil war, and perhaps even to intervention from abroad. The experience of the Nationalist-Labour coalition in the 'twenties had proved the wisdom of progressing by way of cooperation and education, and the lessons of that experience were still valid.

Many of the Gesuiwerdes thought differently. To them Havenga's policy seemed to involve the postponement of the Republic to the comparatively distant future, and they were not prepared, for the sake of a victory by persuasion, to sacrifice the prospect of a Republic within a relatively short time. The Republic, freed from the taint of all foreign association, rooted in history and tradition, emancipated from the fetters of an alien capitalism, culturally self-sufficient—in short, purely Afrikaner in spirit—the Republic could not remain in the wings until it should please the English to identify themselves with Afrikaner feelings and aspirations. The Greek Kalends, they felt, was not the most auspicious day for the promulgation of a new Constitution. But if there was thus no great hope of a decisive plebiscite in favour of a Republic within a measurable time, there was at least a sporting chance of a majority in Parliament. And if they secured such a majority, upon what principle of quixotry could they decline to act upon its mandate? Why abjure the opportunity for a scruple, a whim, a nothing? That the Republic must come in the end even the Hertzogites seemed to agree. Havenga's solution postulated the slow education of the English, but would not the English be better and more quickly educated into Afrikaner consciousness within an Afrikaner state? Why then refuse to seize any legitimate chance to secure a real independence? Even among the Hertzogites there were those—notably Pirow, Grobler and Kemp—who believed a Republic to be the only means whereby South Africa could regain her

* *Die Transvaler*, 21 November 1939.

neutrality,¹ and neutrality was the very *causa causans* of the formation of the Hertzogite group. On their own principles, then, the Hertzogites must concur in the Gesuiwerde view.

It was upon the issue of Republicanism, therefore, that the Hereniging conference of November 1939 broke down. It was natural that the Gesuiwerdes should place the blame for the rupture upon the shoulders of Hertzog and Havenga.² Each side was intensely suspicious of the other.

"Die samesmelting van 1934 het 'n vlag van bitterheid, wrok en wantroue oor die Afrikaanse volk laat uitsak soos selfs die Rebelle van 1914-5 nie veroorsaak het nie . . . Sulke haat en bitterheid word nie met die swaai van 'n towerstok verwyder nie. En ook 4 September het dit nie verwyder nie."³

It was no easy matter to put behind them in a few weeks the personal animosities and rankling injuries of the Fusion period. Principle might for the moment be kept in the background, but human nature would thrust itself to the front. The Gesuiwerdes could not forget that in 1933 the good old cause had seemed to be deserted by its leaders; they could not avoid considering themselves as the orthodox stem of Nationalism. Hertzog was now, by his actions, acknowledging that in 1933 they had been right and he wrong. They might forgive him, but they could not forget; nor, perhaps, could they be discreetly silent.⁴ They looked jealously on the terms of any agreement, and felt, now that the Prodigal had returned, some of the unsatisfactory sensations of the Elder Brother. The Hertzogites, on the other hand, believed that, had Malan and his followers stuck by Hertzog in 1933, the present crisis would never have occurred. The reason for the breakdown of Fusion, in their view, was to be sought not so much in the fact that Fusion was wrong in principle, as in the fact that neither the Malanites nor the English had been prepared to pursue the path which Hertzog, with superior discernment, had pointed out as the one sure road to national salvation. If it came to desertion and betrayal, who had so great a right to feel resentment as the old leader who was deserted and betrayed in 1933?⁵ Thus there was from the beginning a danger of mutual

1 Pirow's speech at Lichtenburg, 25 November 1939, and at Germiston, 29 November 1939, reported in *Die Transvaler* 26 and 30 November 1939. Grobler, see *Die Transvaler*, 30 November 1939. Compare Havenga's frank avowal at Trompsburg Vraestel "Genl. Kemp het hom openlik en ondubbelsinnig ten gunste van 'n republiek verklaar. Waarom verskil u en Genl. Hertzog van die Nationaliste op hierdie punt?" Havenga "Ek het altyd van u party op hierdie punt verskil." *Die Transvaler*, 28 November 1939.

2 *Die Transvaler*, 27 November 1939, where Hertzog is quoted as saying that he could not consent to be a member of a party which had as its avowed aim the establishment of a republic. After this, comments *Die Transvaler*, further negotiations were "vanselfsprekend onmoontlik."

3 Scholtz, p. 397.

4 See, e.g., Swart at the HNP congress in the O.F.S. (5 November 1940) when he welcomed back to the fold those Hertzogites who had strayed. Calliers (*Stryd om Volkseenheid*, p. 22) describes this attitude as "n politieke fiksie wat Hereniging van die begin af belemmer en in die weg gestaan het."

5 Yet Hertzog was anxious to avoid recrimination. "We must see to it that the group referred to by the newspapers as the Hertzogites, does not say 'We annexed the Nationalists,' and in the same way the Nationalists must not say that the Hertzogites wormed their way in among them."

recrimination, tempered only by an affectation of charity which was almost more odious than a direct attack. At any moment some over-enthusiastic partisan might start bandying epithets.¹

There were, besides, more personal feelings. It could not be forgotten that Pirow had referred to Strydom as " 'n plattelandse prokureurtjie." Nor did Swart fail to remember that his hopes of office had been disappointed by Hertzog. And, with a galaxy of ex-Ministers available, there were now too many candidates for office, if the electoral wheel should take a turn. The Gesuiwerdes had already, as the official Opposition, begun to prepare an alternative government, against the day when they should return to power. Outstanding members had begun to specialise in particular subjects, with their eye upon an appropriate portfolio in a future which they hoped would not be too distant: thus Werth was virtually "shadow" Minister of Railways, and N. J. van der Merwe "shadow" Minister of Finance. These vested interests would now be upset. A great deluge of administrative talent was pouring in; what places were to be found, in the future composite Government, for men of the calibre of Hertzog, Havenga, Grobler, Pirow and Kemp? Or rather, how would it be possible to find consolation prizes for those who, having borne the heat and burden of the day, found themselves—not merely paid equally, but positively supplanted, by labourers who had begun work in the vineyard only at the eleventh hour?

Yet the deadlock was also inherent in the essential political principles of either side. The difference of opinion was not merely upon tactics: both Parties were at least agreed upon this, that the Republic must come by constitutional methods. Nor was it a question simply of timing and expediency. The root of the difficulty lay in the fact that Hertzog and Malan professed political philosophies which were not merely different but divergent. It was this fact which had caused the breach between them in 1933, and the intervening years had certainly not done anything to make the breach less real. Hertzog on the one hand and Malan on the other offered a different analysis of the racial problem in South Africa and a different solution to it. To Malan, the best hope for the country lay in an assimilation of the English to the Afrikaner way of life; and should they prove unassimilable, they must either leave the country or be content with an inferior civic status. To Hertzog, on the other hand, it seemed that only by common effort and mutual respect and tolerance could a sound South African nation be built up. Where the Gesuiwerdes longed for a revival of the Boere-Republiek, suitably modernised, the Hertzogites dreamed of a new type of State, which should be

1. See, e.g., "Menings van ons Lesers" in *Die Transvaler* for 13 November 1940: "U [sc. Hertzog] het samesmelting aangegaan en dit was 'n mislukking. Baie bitterheid het tussen die Afrikaners gekom deur daardie samesmelting. U het destyds teen mede-Afrikaners opgetree. U het hulle sieg gesê en beleedig. U wou hulle uitdelg. U het gesê dat die N.P. 'n groet was" etc., etc.

better than the ideal either of Kruger or of Rhodes, and better because it was to draw upon the finest elements in each. In short, to the one side "republic" meant the triumph of one section of the population (admittedly by peaceful and constitutional means), while to the other it meant the ultimate disappearance of purely sectional aspirations in the face of pride in a common South African nationhood. Thus Hertzog and Malan, even when they used the same words, were not speaking the same language. And it becomes clear that difference of opinion upon timing and tactics were strictly the *consequences* of this fundamental divergence of principle. In the face of the clash of political theories no formula of concord, however ambiguously worded, could form a really solid bridge between the two Parties. Yet both Malan and Hertzog were ready, on 23rd November, for a patched-up truce, an *ad hoc* arrangement, in the face of an emergency. Both of them were keenly sensible of the popular demand for Hereniging, and Hertzog, for all his solicitude for the rights of the English, could not forget that he also was an Afrikaner. But there were some, especially among the Gesuiwerdes, who from the beginning believed that real reunion was impossible. Such were Strydom, the Nationalist Party leader in the Transvaal, and Dr. Verwoerd, Editor of the Nationalist daily, *Die Transvaler*. Not merely did they disbelieve in the possibility of Hereniging, but they were also sceptical as to its desirability. And from their own point of view they were right. Either the Nationalist Party was based on principle, or it was nothing. An alliance with Hertzog (unless Hertzog were to abandon Hertzogism) must be founded on a compromise. But they were not prepared to compromise. Why should they do so when, after six years of struggle, one of their adversaries took a course which proved that they, and not he, had all along been in the right? The Nationalist Party had managed very well without the Hertzog-persoon hitherto, and they saw no reason to purchase him as an ally at the price of partial acceptance of the Hertzog-beginsels. As to the desire of the Volk for Hereniging, it was the duty of the true Nationalist to hold course steadfastly, "be the people never so impatient." Swart, of the O.F.S., and Eric Louw, of the Cape, were equally averse to any arrangement. Malan, however, appears to have thought that he could not afford to ignore the popular demand, and perhaps he trusted to his adroitness to get the better of any bargaining that might be necessary.¹ Nevertheless, when all these facts are considered, the failure on 24th November 1939 ceases to be in any degree surprising. The wonder is rather that the negotiations should have been successful two months later.

The collapse of the Pretoria Conference, although complete,

1. For all this see C. W. M. du Toit: *Die Verkiezing, die Malaniëte, en ons Volk*, pp. 2-5, together with a remarkable press interview which he gave to *Die Vaderland*, 13 December 1940. It is alleged that Malan was taken aback by Verwoerd's patent hostility to Hereniging.

had not been definitive. Hereniging had not been rejected ; all that was needed was a "formula" acceptable to both sides, and it was open to any responsible politician to devise such a formula if he could. The first to attempt it was Pirow. In a speech at Germiston on 29th November 1939 he put forward what purported to be a new formula. In effect, it was literally identical with the first draft which N. J. van Merwe had laid before the Committee, excepting only that for the word "doeltreffende" it substituted the word "effektiewe."¹ He announced his intention of presenting it to the forthcoming congress of the Hertzog group on 8th December 1939, and expressed the opinion that Hertzog would accept it. It would then depend on Malan whether Hereniging were completed or not.

The reaction of the Gesuiwerdes was hostile, as, indeed, it was bound to be. Strydom complained, justly, that this represented no advance upon the proposals discussed at Pretoria. Like them, it was deliberately ambiguous, and sought by the vagueness of its wording to permit widely-differing interpretations. What the Nationalists wanted was a simple declaration that the new Party would take the attainment of a Republic as its avowed object and do everything in its power to obtain it quickly, but this was exactly what Pirow had avoided. The only conclusion to be drawn, in Strydom's view, was that Hertzog was not a Republican—at least, in the sense in which the Gesuiwerdes used the term.² Malan was equally dissatisfied. He had carefully amended van der Merwe's formula ; he had made it clear that the formula in its original form was not acceptable; and now here it was again, produced with a flourish of trumpets as though it were something new, and as though Pirow, by an intense concentration of thought, had discovered unaided the instrument that was to save and unite Afrikanerdom. With exemplary patience Malan once more indicated his objections. That phrase, for instance, "Die Party sal hom dus in hierdie rigting beywer . . .". In which direction ? Towards a Republic outside the "Empire" or to some less far-set goal ? If the former, it would have been better to say so, since there were some, at least, in the Hertzogite group who fell under the suspicion of desiring to retain the "Imperial" connection. And the sentence continued : ". . . deur alle ongerymdhede wat die volste uitlewing van ons volksvryheid belemmer, uit die weg te ruim." But "volksvryheid," in the opinion of many Hertzogites, could be achieved not only by cutting the painter but by way of Dominion status, as defined in the Statute of Westminster. Which was intended here ?³

1. *Die Transvaler*, 30 November 1939.

2. *Ibid.*, 1 December 1939 (Strydom's statement, and editorial).

3. It is noteworthy that neither Strydom nor Malan paid much attention to the provisions about the securing of the Republic only upon "die breë grondslag van die volkswil," and not merely as the result of a majority in Parliament. But perhaps they felt that these were questions of tactics, which might be deferred.

To these enquiries Pirow vouchsafed no reply; but it soon became apparent that he had accurately expressed the views of the Hertzogites at least. On December 8th 1939 they held their first Party Congress at Pretoria, and unanimously accepted Pirow's formula, which, he informed them, enjoyed General Hertzog's approval. It was incorporated into the principles of the Party as Beginsel 2. And, encouraged by Pirow and Professor A. C. Cilliers, they took for themselves the name of "Die Volksparty,"¹ in the hope, as one of the delegates remarked, that by choosing this title they might pave the way to a solution of the difficulty about the name of the new Party which was to be born of Hereniging, since it would surely be an acceptable compromise to call it "Die Nasionale Volksparty," or some such name. Compromise, indeed, was the essence of the Hertzogite policy at this period. They were, as a body, more anxious for Hereniging than were the Nationalists, and they knew that Hereniging was only attainable on a basis of compromise. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Hertzogite paper, *Die Vaderland*, should have welcomed the Volksparty's first congress as the most important step so far taken towards the restoration of Afrikanereenheid.²

Meanwhile, the great mass of nasionaalgesinde Afrikaners who were not in the confidence of the leaders were getting impatient. "Die volk was ontstel."³ The Hereniging conference had come and gone, and it was not easy to gather from the newspapers the real reason for its failure. The Pirow formula might or might not be acceptable: that was for the leaders to say; but if it was not, was it not somebody's duty to devise an alternative? What positive steps were the Nationalist Party taking in the matter? Hitherto, as far as the public could see, they seemed to have played a purely destructive part. The Pretoria Conference of 23rd and 24th November had resulted in only one definite step forward—the setting-up of Skakelkomitees in each of the four Provinces of the Union. These committees, which were composed of two Hertzogites and two Gesuiwerdes, were supposed to settle any small contentious points between the representatives of the two Parties in the Provinces.⁴ But any chance they might have had of making a real contribution to Hereniging was prejudiced by the fact that they never met.⁵

In these circumstances there arose an intelligible itch for more decisive action. It seized with especial severity upon Mr. G.

1. "Die Volksparty" in the Transvaal. The Hertzogites in the O.F.S. were known simply as the "Hertzog-groep."

2. *Die Vaderland*, 9 December 1939. Cilliers, *Stryd om Volkseenheid*, pp. 20-21; where the author claims for himself (and denies to Pirow) the credit for the foundation of the Volksparty; and adds that before the party was constituted the advice of prominent Nationalists was sought.

3. Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

4. Official statement in *Die Transvaler*, 24 November 1939.

5. *Die Transvaler*, 29 January 1940.

Yssel, at that time lecturer in Geography at Potchefstroom University College and subsequently, as we shall see, to be concerned in more than one free-lance venture into politics. On 28th November 1939 Yssel addressed a well-attended meeting at Potchefstroom on the necessity for doing something. His audience, which seems to have been equally representative of the local Hertzogite and Malanite groups, so far agreed with him as to set up a Waaksaamheidskomitee, and pass the following resolutions unanimously :

- i. This Committee still believes in the possibility of Hereniging.
- ii. It still has faith in the leaders of Afrikanerdom, and believes that unity can be achieved through them.
- iii. The Afrikaners of Potchefstroom are already united, and refuse to separate again.
- iv. However, they will also continue to remain members of their respective Parties.
- v. They will preserve the existing position until 31 January 1940, and if by that time Hereniging be not effected, they will unite officially in a local political organisation based upon the principles of the Voortrekkers.
- vi. They disapprove of the discussion in the Afrikaans press of negotiations still in progress, and invite the press, firmly but courteously, to refrain from such discussion in future.¹

Die Transvaler was highly indignant at this unauthorised initiative, with its pert ultimatum. If, indeed, through the attitude of Hertzog, Hereniging should in fact prove unattainable, then there might perhaps be room for a new Party on a Voortrekker basis, but such a Party would in fact be virtually identical with the Nationalist Party as it existed at the moment. As to Press comments on the negotiations, it was surely the duty of the Press in these momentous hours to speak its mind and enlighten its readers. Impatience and impertinence were both out of place in the existing delicate situation. And so on, and so on.² In fact, Yssel was severely snubbed. Yet it is probably true to say that at that time Yssel reflected the feelings of the average Nationalist Afrikaner far more faithfully than did Dr. Verwoerd. The Waaksaamheidskomitee's action had, indeed, no effect; its ultimatum never ran out; but it had its importance as indicating the anxious temper of the people.

The Potchefstroom Waaksaamheidskomitee was not the only unofficial body which did its best to hasten Hereniging. When the negotiators at Pretoria abandoned their task on 24 November, the Albert-Hertzog-Komitees and the Versoeningskomitee began to make efforts on their own account. This was precisely the situation with which they had been created to deal. They now

1. *Die Transvaler*, 29 November 1939.

2. *Ibid.*, *ibid.* cit.

began to get in touch with one another to see what could be done. The result of all this private activity was the production by the Versoeningskomitee of a new formula, which on December 7 1939 they submitted to Hertzog.¹ It ran as follows:

- (1) Die Party neem aan, en spreek dit as sy oortuiging uit, dat weens historiese, geografiese, volkekundige en staatkundige oorweginge Suid-Afrika as witmansland net een bestemming het—'n vrye, onafhanklike Republiek, afgeskei van die Britse Kroon en Ryk.
- (2) Met hierdie bestemming voor oë, beskou die Party dit as sy onmiddellike taak om alle Suid-Afrikaans-nasionaal-voelende elemente saam te snoer in 'n hegte partypolitieke verband met die doel om stap vir stap alle ongerymdhede wat die volste uitlewing van ons volksvryheid in dié rigting belemmer, uit die weg te ruim.
- (3) Hy erken egter dat 'n Republiek tot stand gebring kan word alleen op die breë grondslag van die volkswil en met die getroue inagneming van die gelyke taal- en kultuurregte van die twee sekshies van die blanke bevolking. In ooreenstemming hiermee lê hy vas dat hierdie konstitusionele verandering tot stand gebring sal word alleen ingevolge 'n spesiale en besliste opdrag daartoe van die stemgeregtigde blanke bevolking en nie bloot as gevolg van 'n parlementêre meerderheid wat by 'n gewone algemene verkiesing verkry mag word nie.²

Hertzog signified his approval and acceptance in writing, and on 21 December 1939 it was passed on to Malan. Malan found it, on the whole, tolerable, saving that he amended the conclusion of clause (2) to read: "wat die volste uitlewing van daardie volksvryheid belemmer uit die weg te ruim"—a change which was certainly in the interests of clarity; and he promised to recommend it to his Party in that form. The amendment was referred to Hertzog, and was accepted by him on 27th December.

The new formula, though in the main strikingly reminiscent of that of Pirow, marked a considerable advance. While the characteristic principles of Hertzogism were fully safeguarded in clause (3), the ambiguities to which Malan had taken exception in Pirow's clause (c) were now—particularly after his amendment to clause (2)—satisfactorily removed. Whereas Pirow's phraseology had made it possible for each side to read into the formula the expression of its own convictions, the proposal of Cilliers and his colleagues necessitated concessions on either part in the interests of a common front, and faced that fact. The Hertzogites went further than they had ever done before in subscribing clause (1).³ They committed themselves now quite definitely to a Republic "afgeskei van die Britse Kroon en Ryk." True, in

1. Cilliers, *Volksreënheid, of Broiloks en Bittergat* ? pp.14,10.

2. Cilliers, *Volksreënheid*, p. 15.

3. And also the amended version of cl. 2. N. J. van der Merwe, who visited Malan at Hermanus on 23 December 1939, and was informed of his amendments, wrote: "Ek twyfel of Hertzog dit sal aanvaar." (Scholtz, p. 407).

deference to Hertzog's judgment, they did not even yet proclaim the projected Party as a Republican Party; they did not inscribe that alarming word boldly on the Party's banner. But they avowed their conviction, not merely that a Republic would *suit* South Africa best (a tepid expression of opinion) but that a Republic was South Africa's *destiny* (which might be construed as a profession of political faith). On the other hand, by accepting clause (3) Malan was forcing Strydom and the more extreme of his followers to make a real sacrifice. However, it was possible to represent it as a sacrifice not of principle, but merely of opinion. The question could be considered as one of tactics rather than as touching fundamentals. It was possible, certainly, to look at the matter in this light; but it was not correct. As we have seen, behind these questions of tactics lay differences in conviction, divergences in principle, from which really these minor disputes about tactics took their rise, and which were not to be eradicated, though they might for the moment be obscured, by any tacit agreement to treat them as though they were not matters of urgency. Sooner or later some of the Nationalists were bound to advocate courses of action which would violate clause (3). Sooner or later, then, the Hertzogites were bound to retract clause (1) on the ground that they could only support it if the full implications of clause (3) were accepted by their allies.

The immediate question at issue resolved itself, therefore, into this: Whether the peculiar circumstances of the moment did not justify the formation of a common front, even though it might be inevitable that sooner or later that front should dissolve again into its constituent parts. No leader on either side could be unaware that the clash of principle was still unresolved, and that the difference was probably irreconcilable; but it was possible to hold two opinions as to whether the issue between them might not be postponed. In waging a mortal struggle it is not advisable to scan too nearly the present opinions and future plans of a serviceable ally. Such, certainly, was the view of Malan and Hertzog; and such, equally certainly, was not the view of Strydom and Verwoerd. All through the earlier half of January, 1940, while the lobbies of the House were buzzing with the efforts of well-meaning persons to induce the Nationalists to accept the compromise, Strydom waged unceasing war against any concession. To him the issue was plain—Republicanism *versus* "Imperialism." If the hopes of Afrikanerdom should make shipwreck, if Hereniging should remain a dream, the fault would lie with Hertzog and Havenga, "who refuse to join a purely Republican movement." If they persisted in their refusal, the negotiations must end. Better a dream unrealised than an ever-present nightmare. On this question Strydom held that no compromise, no middle way, was possible, and he warned the Party

leaders in the name of young South Africa that, if they consented to sacrifice principle for a momentary advantage, the Afrikaner people would desert them and seek its leaders elsewhere.¹ Within the Nationalist Party Strydom commanded the support of a group which, though small in numbers, was thought to be extremely powerful; and it seemed, to well-informed observers, that he held the success or failure of the negotiations in his hand.²

Public opinion, however, proved stronger than Strydom, or at least it had more weight with Malan, and, on 27th January 1940 a declaration appeared in the Press, over the names of Hertzog and Malan, in which it was announced that the Parliamentary caucuses had reached a basis of agreement which they now offered to their respective Parties for confirmation by Provincial Congresses. Pending such confirmation it was their intention to act together in Parliament as a single Party. The Agreement represents in its terminology a curious reversion, at some critical points, to the formula of van der Merwe and Pirow; we can only assume that Hertzog's private assurances to Malan, and the greater frankness of the Cilliers formula, had sufficed to convince the Nationalists that upon the Republican issue the Hertzogites were to be relied on. It contained, moreover, an important new sentence tacked on at the end of clause (3), laying it down in unequivocal terms that membership was not to be denied to any Nationalist-minded Afrikaner who was prepared to subscribe to the Party obligations, even if he were not convinced of the desirability of a Republic under existing conditions. It added, moreover, that "pending the drawing-up of a revised programme of Principles and Action" the existing programmes of both Parties were to be used—a provision which might seem to be not without danger. The problem of the name was solved by making the best of both worlds; the title was to be *Die Herenigde Nasionale of Volksparty*. There followed details as to the methods by which reorganisation was to be effected, and the whole concluded with a solemn pledge by both leaders to combat any attempt to sabotage Hereniging, it being intimated that special consideration was to be given to sitting Members at the next General Election.³

The Hereniging Agreement (which was subsequently accepted by the Provincial Congresses of the two Parties⁴) was, if not a

1 Speeches at Standerton and Morgenster *Die Transvaler*, 9 January 1940

2 *Die Vaderland*, 18 January 1940

3 The main change was the reversion to the wording "Die Party is oortog dat die Republiekeinae staatsvorm, afgeskei van die Britse Kroon, hom die beste aanpas." etc *Die Vaderland*, 29 January 1940

4 *Die Vaderland*, *Die Transvaler*, 16-30 March 1940, *Die Transvaler*, 9 February 1940. A good deal of reorganization was necessary. In the Transvaal, e.g., the different branches of the two Parties were merged into a joint H N P of V branch. A new caucus was chosen. Each Party Congress chose 5 members to represent them on the new joint Federale Raad, which was to consist of 40 members, 10 from each Province. The two head-committees formed a joint head-committee until such time as the new organization was complete and at congress of the H N P of V could elect a new head-committee. The joint head-committee was composed of 43 Hertzogites and 37 Gesuwerdes, and met for the first time on 29 March 1940, when C. W. M. J. Toit was elected chairman. *Die Vaderland*, 29 March 1940. In the O F S, on the other hand, it was agreed that the two Parties should retain their identity until the meeting of the first Provincial congress of the H N P. This did not take place until 5 November 1940. *Die Vaderland*, 7 November 1940.

victory for Hertzog, at least a defeat for Strydom.¹ The membership clause had still further strengthened the Two-Stream element in the compromise, and if the Hertzogites had advanced to an acceptance of a Republic as "the most suitable form" of government, they had even yet refused to accept explicitly Republicanism as one of the formal principles of the new Party. It was no wonder that *Die Vaderland* should have celebrated the conclusion of the negotiations in a jubilant editorial, in the course of which there occurred some passages of poignant elegy over fellow-Afrikaners, old and trusty comrades of former years, who had chosen to follow Smuts in the hour of decision, and for whom there would ever be an affectionate welcome should they consent to abjure their present errors. For, after all, it was of paramount importance not to interpose any unbridgeable gulf between Afrikaner and Afrikaner. If any Nationalist read *Die Vaderland* he must have felt a sharp twinge of misgiving. His party had scarcely consented to participate in Hereniging in the expectation (still less the hope) of one day being able to embrace a bevy of repentant Smutsites.

Strydom and Verwoerd were now placed in a difficult situation. It was not easy to disguise the fact that they had decidedly drawn the shorter straw. The best they could do was to pretend to be satisfied, to affect to have been convinced by arguments which they were conscious of having demolished. Strydom, for instance, authorised *Die Transvaler* to publish his acceptance of the Agreement, and to state that he now felt assured that the Republican aims and aspirations had been unambiguously expressed and fully guaranteed.² Yet the final Agreement did not differ in any material point from the two formulae which he had so vigorously denounced. Still, Strydom's bald statement was preferable to the tortuous and embarrassed argumentation of *Die Transvaler*. In an editorial on Hereniging Verwoerd argued that the Agreement "really" meant that the Party was pledged specifically to the attainment of a Republic, even though it was not specifically a Republican Party. And as to the clause respecting membership, a careful distinction must be drawn between Republicans, non-Republicans and anti-Republicans. The clause meant merely that non-Republicans or, better, non-active Republicans, were not to be excluded from membership. It was, therefore, quite acceptable; indeed, it was also necessary. In any party—even the Nationalist Party—there must be those who, for professional, business or religious reasons, do not actively support the party's principles, while others are active only in specialised fields. In these days of mass-production and high complexity it is only

1. Senator Smit, in a statement to the press (*Die Vaderland*, 21 December 1940) alleged that Swart was so infuriated and recalcitrant upon the completion of Hereniging that van der Merwe had to soothe him and calm him down.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 30 January 1940.

natural that such a division of labour should be found in any great organisation. One point only in the Agreement was adversely criticised—the suggestion that seats be guaranteed to sitting members. Verwoerd, with gratifying indignation, condemned this as undemocratic.¹

It is to be hoped that the readers of *Die Transvaler* were persuaded by this reasoning, so strangely Hertzogite in tone; but the truth of the matter was that Malan and the bulk of the Nationalist Party had decided for Hereniging, whether as a matter of political expediency or in response to pressure from outside is of no great consequence. Strydom and Verwoerd and Swart, accepting that decision, had to make the best of a bad business. They could hardly persuade themselves that the Hereniging Agreement was satisfactory as the basis for any prolonged cooperation, for they did not believe that *any* satisfactory basis could be found—in which belief they were of course quite right.² They could not in public attempt to justify Malan's action on the grounds of simple expediency, which would have been as much as to say that both sides went into Hereniging to get what they could out of it. They had not the slightest intention of provoking a split with Malan upon the issue. The easiest course was therefore to echo *Die Burger*, with such explanations of the more dubious points in the Agreement as might suggest themselves to their ingenuity, and be supposed to be acceptable to their public. But not for a moment did they alter their opinions. For them Hereniging was a sham, and might become a danger. They were not at the moment prepared to face the reproaches of Afrikanerdom by openly continuing to oppose reunion,³ but they held themselves at liberty in the future to avail themselves of such opportunities as might offer to persuade Malan and die Volk that Hereniging had been a mistake. They can hardly have escaped a feeling of very real chagrin at the success of the Hertzogites in the negotiations, and it is probable that this feeling gave them an added incentive (if any were needed) to undermine Hereniging from within. For the moment they bided their time, but they did not doubt that the hour would come when they would be able to reverse the verdict which had now been given against them.

The Hertzogite view of Hereniging was perhaps best expressed by Hertzog himself in his speech to the O.F.S. Congress of the Hertzog-groep on 14th March 1940. He repudiated the contention that Afrikanerdom, in his sense, must mean a bloc of Afrikaans-speaking persons. Afrikanerdom, in the past, had never implied anything so narrow, and it must never be so interpreted in the

1. *Die Transvaler*, 29 January 1940.

2. In a press statement to *Die Vaderland*, 19 December 1940, Mr. Lindhøfst alleged that in a letter to M^r. D. van der Merwe, M.P.C. for Rosendal, written on 27 February 1940, Swart denounced the Hereniging agreement as "politieke bedrog," of the same order as Hertzog's "bedrog" in 1933.

3. Strydom urged that something must be sacrificed if the ideals of Afrikanerdom were to be attained. *Die Transvaler* 30 and 31 January 1940.

future. That was a point upon which he had repeatedly laid stress in the course of the negotiations. He did not hide the fact that difficulties must still be expected between Nationalists and Hertzogites; but he believed that they would prove unimportant in the presence of the broad concept of Afrikanerdom which he had outlined.¹ Hertzog, in fact, seems to have believed that he would succeed in imposing Hertzogism on the Nationalists who had rejected it in 1933. It was a disastrous illusion.

(iii)

It was not long before Hertzog was given a sharp lesson on just how much—or how little—Hereniging might mean. One of the points settled in the course of the negotiations was the policy to be adopted in the Provincial bye-elections in the Winburg and Hoopstad constituencies.² Both the Volksparty and the Nationalists had nominated candidates for both seats, and it was accordingly decided that the Volksparty should withdraw at Winburg, while the Nationalist candidate stood down at Hoopstad. A joint appeal to the local Party branches, enjoining this policy, was issued by Malan and Hertzog, backed by the two Provincial leaders in the O.F.S., Senator Brebner and N. J. van der Merwe.³ Despite this appeal, despite the arrangement decided upon at the time of Hereniging, despite even the withdrawal of the Hertzogite at Winburg, the Nationalist candidate at Hoopstad refused to give up the contest, and prosecuted it with such vigour that he won the seat by a very substantial majority. From which it might be concluded that Strydoms' policy was not without its supporters in the general body of the Party, and that, however the leaders might fraternise, the fountains of bitterness were still springing strongly in the Platteland.

For some months after this regrettable episode there was comparative peace in the Herenigde camp. The work of recasting the organisation of the two old Parties into a single machine took up a good deal of the leaders' attention, and the necessity of harassing the Government took pride of place over other topics, for so long as the session lasted. But even in this regard there was no absolute unanimity. *Die Vaderland*, for example, had more than one editorial preaching the need for cooperation with the English, and went so far as to observe that among the H.N.P.'s political opponents were many who believed in "South Africa First," and who were to be considered, therefore, as having committed errors of judgment rather than as fundamentally vicious.⁴

Hitler's offensive in May, the capitulation in quick succession

1. *Die Vaderland*, 15 March 1940.

2. *Ibid.*, 27 January 1940.

3. *Ibid.*, 1 February 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 1 February 1940.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 9 May 1940.

of Norway, Holland, Belgium and France, had important repercussions on South African internal politics. The probability of the early overthrow of Britain, followed by the disintegration of the Empire and Commonwealth, could not but be encouraging to Republican-minded Afrikanerdom. It seemed likely that within a few weeks or months they might find themselves presented with an opportunity beyond their most sanguine expectations. But above all they must get South Africa out of the war in time to avoid the penalties of an Imperial defeat, in time to convince the victorious Axis of the real neutrality of the Afrikaner people. Hertzog, therefore, on 19th July 1940 addressed a public letter to the Prime Minister, and followed it up two days later with a manifesto signed by himself and Malan. In these documents they protested against South Africa's continued participation in a struggle which they declared to have become hopeless, and called upon Nationalist Afrikanerdom to hold meetings to demonstrate in favour of peace.¹ The alarm in South Africa at that time was great; the search by official and unofficial means for "fifth columnists" was vigorous; and the Government's supporters were made the more active by their fears. The Opposition, on their side, began to take their own measures, in the main for self-protection, and the formation of "Waaksaamheidskomitees" went on briskly.² The country was indeed seething with excitement, with whispered fears and hopes half-expressed, and all parties were equally affected. The "krisisuur," so long expected, the oft-announced moment of Afrikanerdom's lotsbeslissing, seemed in reality to be at hand. How, at such a moment, could a zealous Nationalist be content with the hints and allusions, the qualifications and half-promises, of the Hereniging Agreement? A document which had served well enough while the Maginot Line still stood, appeared hopelessly inadequate at a moment when the German and Italian Armistice Commissions were perambulating French Africa. It was no longer possible, in the opinion of an increasing number of Nationalists, to palter with the Republican question.

Considerations of this sort induced a feeling among a certain section of the H.N.P. that some more definite step should be ventured towards the attainment of the Republic. At a joint meeting of the Head Committees of the Nasionale Party and the Hertzog-groep in the O.F.S. on 25th June, a suggestion was put to Hertzog that a great Republican demonstration be organised. But Hertzog bluntly refused to have anything to do with the proposal "in the existing circumstances," and roundly told them they were fools to think of it.³ This unfavourable reception did not, however, deter N. J. van der Merwe, leader of the O.F.S.

1. *ibid.*, 19 and 21 June 1940.

2. Not to be confused with Yssel's committee.

3. Statement by Senator Smit: *Die Vaderland*, 21 December 1940; Scholtz, p. 421.

Nationalists, and on 10th July 1940 he made an important announcement. On that day he issued, through the Press, an appeal to all Afrikaners to attend a Republican rally at Bloemfontein on 20th July, whose purpose was "to take active and immediate measures, on constitutional lines, to bring about a Republic." His appeal appeared with the support of a self-styled "Committee of Action," whose members were Swart, Jim Fouché and D. C. de Wet Krige.¹

The summons to the meeting appears to have been the last stage in a series of private conferences among the Bloemfontein Gesuiwerdes, which had already roused the suspicion of the Hertzogites. Their suspicions seemed now to be confirmed, and they scented, in the forthcoming meeting, a possible attack on their leader. *Die Vaderland*, for instance, denied that any difference of opinion upon the Republican question existed between the two leaders of the H.N.P. Everything that could be done by constitutional means was in fact being done, by propaganda and protest. The proposed meeting was therefore superfluous²; it was also incomprehensible, and potentially dangerous, since it was calculated to produce a state of emotional excitement unfavourable to that process of "persuasion" upon which the Hertzogites relied. And, in any event, why had not Hertzog been consulted? What was to be the future of the Party if every potential leader, every aspirant to office, every private group were to act thus hastily on its own initiative, without advice, without warning, without consultation?³ Hertzog himself was seriously annoyed. He repudiated all connection with the meeting, warned Afrikanerdom against attending it, and forcibly condemned it as not merely entirely undesirable, but extremely stupid.⁴

This produced some sharp exchanges between the Herenigde allies. First Swart, in an embarrassed and unsatisfactory interview, deprecated the idea that the appeal was in any way a blow at Hertzog.⁴ Then Verwoerd explained the purpose of the meeting more fully. The intention, it appeared, was to make certain recommendations to the leaders who, obviously, could not be approached until these recommendations had been formulated. (This was a view of the question which had been unaccountably omitted from van der Merwe's appeal). It was, *Die Transvaler* continued, a very proper and democratic step to take. And then came the kernel of the argument. The clause in the Hereniging agreement regarding the attainment of a Republic "op die breë grondslag van die Volkswil" was no doubt sound tactics in normal times. But these were not normal times. The Union might at a moment's notice have to choose between being a free Republic

1. *Die Vaderland*, 15 July 1940.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 15 July 1940.

3. *Ibid.*, 15 and 16 July 1940.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 16 July 1940.

and becoming a colony of Germany or Italy. Were they to be tied to a Hertzogian gradualism in such a tremendous hour? These arguments were reinforced by Strydom, who in a speech at Springs on 17th July 1940 urged that compromise had now become impossible . . . "If one is in earnest one cannot sit still and be silent." The place of those who were not in favour of a Republic was not with the H.N.P. at all, but with Smuts.²

What now became of the Hereniging Agreement, when die breë grondslag van die volkswil was thus recklessly discarded? What became of Verwoerd's earlier distinction between active and non-active Republicans if, as Strydom contended, no sincere Republican could now be inactive? To which presumably the Strydomites would answer, with a shrug worthy of any European diplomat, that no treaty could be expected to be immortal or immutable, and that the great point was to effect the necessary alterations with as good a temper as possible.

Apart from the tacit suggestion that Hertzog, as a non-active Republican, was not a Republican at all, the controversy had hitherto been pretty successful in avoiding personalities. The meeting at Bloemfontein was less fortunate in this respect; indeed, it developed into an almost open challenge to Hertzog's authority, and a scarcely-veiled attack on his political integrity. Estimates of the attendance vary between 15,000 and 70,000, from which it may be concluded that it was a well-attended gathering.³ It passed, amid acclamation, resolutions asserting that the time had now arrived for the creation of a free, independent South African Republic; that such a Republic, founded on the religion, history and tradition of the Boerevolk, must embody the principles of Christian-Nationalism, the maintenance of white civilisation⁴ and the economic rehabilitation of the Afrikaner, and that it was the duty of the H.N.P. leaders publicly to demand a Republic of this nature. It resolved further that a Committee of Action should be appointed to put these decisions into execution. This Committee was to grow out of the existing committee which had organised the meeting.⁴

The climax of the occasion, however, was the speech of van der Merwe.⁵ He found it impossible to ignore Hertzog's emphatic disapproval, but endeavoured to explain it away by assuring his audience that the General was labouring under a misapprehension, inasmuch as he mistakenly believed that the meeting was an attempt to deviate from the Hereniging Agreement, though that was not the case. Indeed, van der Merwe was emphatic that he stood by that Agreement, since it accepted, "in unambiguous

1. *ibid.*, 16 and 17 July 1940.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 17 July 1940.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 22 July 1940: *Die Transvaler*, 22 July 1940 *Die Volksblad*, 20 July 1940.

4. *vide supra*, p. 39.

5. *Die Volksblad*, 20 July 1940.

terms, the Republican ideal. (It may be usefully remarked here that if Hertzog had indeed made a mistake of this sort, a good deal of the responsibility must lie at the doors of Strydom and Verwoerd, since it was exactly the impression they had contrived to convey). There followed a remarkable passage:

"A certain British-Jewish influence, which played an important part in the fashioning of Fusion—a greater part than the people realise—is again at work. Their plan is that Smuts is to proclaim a Republic which will absorb the Rhodesias and possibly other British territories. In this way they hope to suppress us Afrikaners. They are already active in Rhodesia, and they believe that they can rely on the support of General Hertzog, and Mr. Havenga, for their schemes . . . I do not need to remind General Hertzog of his Black Manifesto when Smuts mooted a similar proposal for expansion northwards in the 'twenties."¹

It is not easy for anyone who was not present at the meeting and had no opportunity of hearing the tone in which these sentences were delivered, to form an accurate judgment of their import. It was possible to construe them (particularly in view of all the circumstances of the meeting) as an oblique attack on Hertzog, an insinuation that he was engaged in negotiations to betray the Republican ideal, or at the least that his Republicanism was feeble enough for the "British-Jewish elements" to look upon him as an ally. This is an interpretation which gains in probability from the fact there were already in circulation rumours about Hertzog similar to the allegations in van der Merwe's speech. The speech seemed, therefore, to give official confirmation to a suspicion which was already harboured by many Nationalists. Nor was that all. Immediately before the meeting a certain Joubert had put about a preposterous story to the effect that letters from Hertzog and Havenga had been found in a box belonging to the Freemasons, and that these letters had promised assistance to Smuts in his nefarious plan, provided the interests of the Freemasons, the Jews and the English were safeguarded. This silly tale spread very quickly, and very widely, and everyone who heard it, in the days immediately after van der Merwe's speech, would inevitably jump to the conclusion that the Freemason story was known to van der Merwe (which was, as a matter of fact, true) and believed by him (which is much less certain).² On the other hand, in a statement to *Die Volksblad* two days later, van der Merwe protested that he had been mis-reported. These intrigues, he asserted, did exist in fact, and he had excellent evidence of them, but he had never said that he really believed Hertzog to be capable of participating in them; on the contrary he had every confidence that Hertzog and Havenga would put

1. *Die Volksblad*, 20 July 1940.

2. For a full account of the problem of the Vrymesselaarbriewestorie and the controversy to which it gave rise, see App. I.

the Smutsites in their place, as they had done once before by the "Black Manifesto."¹

This was not the view of Hertzog's supporters. Even if it were conceded that no reflection upon the General's loyalty to Hereniging had been intended, it was extraordinarily tactless, to say no more, to have attributed an important part in the formation of the Fusion government to "British-Jewish elements." This was to throw Hertzog's political past in his face in the most wounding fashion, so that he appeared to have been in 1933 either a dupe or a traitor to his people. And indeed it seems very likely that the Bloemfontein audience, rendered warm and enthusiastic by its copious libations at the founts of Republican oratory, must have understood the speaker to be aspersing Hertzog's political integrity. The Hertzogites came to believe that the meeting had been deliberately engineered to create the impression that Hertzog and Havenga were untrustworthy and not true Republicans; in the light of later developments they set it down as the first stab in the back of Hereniging. And when they perceived how the Freemason story spread through the country, to the incalculable detriment of their leader's reputation, they came (too readily, perhaps) to believe that their adversaries, the Gesuiwerdes, had invented both the story and the unadorned rumour, expressly for the Bloemfontein meeting, and that van der Merwe's speech had been designed to give to both the fullest publicity.

Whether this were indeed the intention of the conveners or no, the effects were undoubtedly serious. The cohesion of the Party received a severe shock. The Strydomites took fresh heart, while the Hertzogites' faith in their new allies sustained a blow from which it never recovered. Malan was very conscious of the damage that had been done, and perhaps he was alarmed by it, for when he spoke at Worcester on 25th July 1940, he took occasion to warn his hearers of the futility of rebellion and the inefficacy of violence. The Republic they were seeking, he added (in terms which Hertzog would have freely owned), must be obtained by strictly constitutional means, and could be successful only if the language, culture and rights of both sides were respected. He, personally, had no objection to a meeting at which Republican sentiments were publicly expressed, but he could hardly approve the appointment of a Committee of Action. If any overt steps were to be taken, they must be taken through the proper channels of the Party organisation. However sincere the men of Bloem-

1. *Die Volksblad*, 22 July 1940. As van der Merwe's speech is given in full, between inverted commas, it seems likely that the full text was handed by him to the Press. In which case it becomes difficult to explain how he was so grievously misrepresented. In this connection one may recall an attack by *Die Transvaler* (30 March 1942) upon Dr. P. J. Meyer. This was followed by a letter from a reader complaining that Dr. Meyer had been misrepresented by *Die Transvaler*. Verwoerd replied (6 April 1942) that *Die Transvaler* had simply copied *Die Vaderland* (a paper sympathetic to Meyer, with no wish to misreport him), and further that journalists are scrupulously careful to avoid misreporting. From which he was inclined to deduce that Dr. Meyer's remarks must have been extraordinarily ambiguous.

fontein might have been (and as to that he had no doubt) he could not encourage courses which might imperil unity, and eventually end in divided leadership.¹ Thus Malan, at least, was not yet prepared to jeopardise Hereniging. *Die Transvaler*, on the other hand, felt that the long-desired wedge had now successfully been inserted, and plainly was only awaiting the opportunity to drive it home.²

The season was certainly not favourable to caution and constitutionalism, when democracies were everywhere overwhelmed by devotees of audacity and ruthlessness. If South Africa were to get any good of the world-revolution which appeared to be in progress, she could not afford to wait for slow elections and cumbrous plebiscites. The cry, therefore, was for Action, and it was a cry which, among Strydom and his followers, grew ever louder and more insistent. Now apart altogether from any doubts they may have had as to the genuineness of Hertzog's Republicanism, they were confident that he was not a suitable leader for a revolution. He had fought for Afrikanerdom all his life, but, apart from 1899-1902, his weapons had always been constitutional weapons, his chosen paths the paths of parliamentary procedure. He was, after all, the product of a slow-moving, almost static, society, governed by institutions borrowed from the "decadent" Old World. He would be faced with a problem outside his previous experience; he would have been unfitted by his very achievements for the consummating of the liberation of Afrikanerdom. In the difficulties into which South Africa would be plunged after the now imminent collapse of Great Britain, a strong hand, and perhaps a ruthless one, would be required. Hertzog, in their opinion, was simply not the man for the times. Even if, in his handling of the expected crisis, he were so far successful as to establish an independent Republic, it was most improbable that it would incorporate those changes in social, economic and political structure which they deemed desirable. It would be the old thing under another name.

Again, if the H.N.P. obtained power and office under Hertzog's leadership, they would have to reckon, not merely on a strong admixture of Hertzogite policy, but also upon large Hertzogite claims in the disposition of offices. A place in the Cabinet must be found for Havenga, and for Pirow also. Havenga's Republicanism was under suspicion, while Pirow was considered to be an ambitious intriguer,³ and the rival of Strydom for the H.N.P. Leadership in the Transvaal.

What, then, in view of all these circumstances, were the Gesuiwerdes to do? There were two courses open to them. They

1. *Die Vaderland*, 26 July 1940.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 22 July 1940.

3. See an extraordinary sub-leader, attacking Pirow, in *Die Transvaler*, 3 February 1940.

might deliberately wreck Hereniging, and force Hertzog and his followers to get out of the Party. Or they might retain Hertzog as a sort of figurehead and nominal leader, while depriving him of all real power, and his followers of all real influence. This latter was in many respects the alternative to be preferred, if they had patience for it. Hertzog's prestige with the public was an asset not lightly to be discarded. His reputation for moderation might assist the acceptance of programmes which were in themselves anything but moderate. On the other hand it would be no easy task to induce Hertzog to remain as a *fainéant* leader. Still, no one was anxious to appear before Afrikanerdom as a volkskeurder, with Hereniging barely six months old. Whatever the difficulties, therefore, it might be safer and easier to try to convert Hertzog into a tool.

But it was not only Hertzog with whom they had to deal. Hitherto Malan had remained loyal to the Hereniging agreement. It became the task of Strydom and his friends to convince Malan that his union with Hertzog had been a mistake, or at least that it no longer served any useful purpose. The best way of convincing him was to demonstrate that Hereniging no longer had public opinion behind it. Accordingly, between August and October 1940, the correspondence columns of *Die Transvaler* were full of complaints about the inadequate leadership of Afrikanerdom in this time of crisis. Professor L. J. du Plessis, for instance, came forward with a statement that the leader of Afrikanerdom must give a strong lead to a Christian-National Republic.¹ Verwoerd urged that the nation's leaders (in the plural) ought at every opportunity to identify themselves with the volkskoers,² and on another occasion he wrote: "Nobody will want to be in the shoes of any political leader who, when the Afrikaner obtains political power, does not use every effort to bring about a Republic."³ In short, the impression was sedulously created that die Volk was getting restive: how far the impression corresponded with reality it is not easy to decide. The main target of their arrows was obviously Hertzog, but Malan must also have felt that one or two of them came whistling past his own ear. No serious attack on Malan, however, was either made or intended, but from Strydom's point of view it was all to the good if he could be frightened a little. He seems to have taken the hint. To a Republican deputation (which Hertzog had refused to receive) he made a suggestion for putting the leadership in commission or, to use his own phrase, "n leierskap-in-raad." This proposal, as Verwoerd explained,⁴ would eliminate the existing confusion and uncertainty, which were the consequence of the

1. *Die Transvaler*, 5 August 1940.

2. *ibid.*, 6 August 1940.

3. *ibid.*, 3 August 1940.

4. *ibid.*, 15 August 1940.

lead's being vested in one man. This, one may remark, is probably the only occasion in the history of political parties upon which it has been argued that the leadership of a single person makes for confusion, while that of a committee makes for simplicity. But whatever the practical merits or demerits of the suggestion, it should hardly have come from Malan as long as he still nominally owned to Hertzog as his chief.

As if these manœuvres against Hertzog were not sufficient, a demand was now fostered for the calling of a meeting of the Federale Raad of the H.N.P. in order that it might draft a Program van Beginsels en Aksie. This, too, was an obvious reflection upon the course the Party had hitherto been steering under Hertzog's pilotage. In his letter supporting the summoning of the Federale Raad, Strydom wrote: "See to it that, by your firmness, you keep your leaders on the right course; stick to principles and not leaguers—the latter can fail you; take courage to root out from your leaders anything that is defective; for instance, weakness."¹ *Die Transvaler* lent point to these words with a bitter attack on Havenga early in September, for Havenga in a recent speech in Parliament had adverted to the possibility of cooperation between English and Afrikaner after the war.² Nationalist Afrikanerdom, Verwoerd reminded him, would not tolerate a *second* betrayal; which could only be taken to mean that Havenga had betrayed Afrikanerdom already, presumably at the time of Fusion.³ And three weeks later another editorial in the same paper asserted that any sort of cooperation with the English was both tactically unnecessary and ideologically impossible.⁴

The Hertzogites were not blind to the way events were shaping.⁵ If we may believe the public speeches which Hertzog made after the catastrophe, he had for months realised what was happening; indeed, as early as the beginning of the year he had wished to resign his leadership on account of the "intrigue and undermining" with which he felt himself beset. In his view, it was the work of a comparatively small group within the H.N.P.—he estimated it on various occasions as numbering from four to ten men—and in this group he considered Swart to be the most culpable, for upon Swart's shoulders he laid the blame for the initiation and dissemination of the Freemason story.⁶ When the H.N.P. caucus met in Cape Town on 7th September 1940 he complained that his position as leader was becoming intolerable, and demanded from Swart suitable apologies. These Swart

1. *Die Transvaler*, 23 August 1940.

2. *Debatte*, vol. 40 pp. 355-363.

3. *Die Transvaler*, 3 September 1940.

4. *ibid.*, 24 September 1940.

5. *Die Vaderland*, editorial, 21 August 1940.

6. *Kommissie van Onderzoek* (*Die Transvaler*, 31 March 1942).

declined to give, preferring to deny the charges which Hertzog laid against him.¹

Thus the September caucus meeting was not a very harmonious gathering. Yet the Hertzogites, since they believed in Hereniging, laboured still to preserve it, and they still had sufficient influence in the inner Councils of the Party to prevent immediate disintegration, for the meeting passed a resolution expressing full confidence in Hertzog and Malan; it reaffirmed the Hereniging Agreement with the explicit stipulation that a Republic could only be obtained op die breë grondslag van die volkswil (though full liberty of private opinion was to be permitted, as heretofore); and it requested all Party members to refrain from public expression of opinion which would be obnoxious to either wing of the H.N.P., until such time as the various Provincial Congresses had discussed these questions and agreed upon a policy.² The caucus resolutions, however, could not stem the Gesuiwerde tide; indeed, they merely gave official recognition to the weak and divided state of the Party. Nor was the Caucus Committee very efficacious.³ This committee of the caucus, which had Malan as its chairman, and was to report to Hertzog, was designed to guarantee unity of action in all circumstances, and to act as liaison between the leaders and "the various executive bodies." It held its first meeting on 24th September 1940,⁴ but the resolutions it took, though described as important, had little perceptible effect.

The final crisis in Hereniging was now at hand. On 15th October 1940 the first meeting of the Federale Raad of the H.N.P. took place. It was summoned, according to its chairman (Malan), to draw up a Konsep-Konstituë and Program van Beginsels for the Party, and the results of its labours were to be submitted to the Provincial Congresses for approval.⁵ This was to touch on one of the most delicate and controversial points in the whole Hereniging Agreement. That Agreement, despite all the argument that had preceded its conclusion, had left many problems unsolved. Among these was the question of just how a Program van Beginsels en Aksie was to be drawn up, and also the question of the nature of such a programme. The Agreement had embodied, in terms whose vagueness was probably deliberate, certain principles upon which the two sides, in response to public pressure, professed agreement. In actual fact, however, it left unsolved the question as to which of the two conflicting philosophies, Hertzogism or Malanism, was to colour the character of the new

1. *Die Transvaler*, 31 March 1942.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 9 September 1940.

3. See Havenga's speech (*Die Vaderland*, 25 September 1940) where he diagnoses the disease of the Party as "wire-pulling designed to undermine confidence in the leaders, and maliciously to drive men apart."

4. *Die Vaderland*, 14 September 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 25 September 1940. It was later known as the "Krisis-Komitee."

5. *Die Vaderland*, 14 October 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 15 October 1940.

Party; and hence the period between the conclusion of the Agreement and the retirement of Hertzog was essentially a period of struggle between these two philosophies for control of the Party. It raged most fiercely, as was inevitable, round this matter of the Program van Beginsels, and the right to draw up that Program. This, in its turn, was a matter which was affected by the nature of the Constitution of the H.N.P. Was it a federal or a unitary party? The federal system had in the past proved to be attended by many inconveniences, and at the time of the Hereniging Agreement both wings of the Party had decided for a unitary organisation. Later, however, Malan seems to have felt that by adopting a unitary basis he might be prejudicing the claim of the old N.P. to the continued enjoyment of the Beyers bequest, and at a meeting on 15th April 1940 he requested that the Party be allowed to continue on a federal bottom.¹ Hertzog, with great reluctance, agreed, since he had no wish to damage the finances of the N.P. But he warned Malan that he must be prepared for the logical consequences of federalism, and in particular for the full autonomy of each Provincial Congress within its own province, and the virtual atrophy of the Federale Raad. Each Provincial Congress would now be fully entitled to draw up and decide upon the Party Programme for that Province. And he added that he personally intended to prepare such a programme for the O.F.S. The Gesuiwerdes heard this announcement with consternation, and a deadlock seems to have ensued.² However, it appears that soon afterwards Hertzog and van der Merwe came to an arrangement. For the first O.F.S. congress, which it was intended should be held in the middle of the year, soon after the close of the Session, a programme was to be produced by the joint efforts of the two, Hertzog taking Beginsels and van der Merwe Aksie.³ Unfortunately this Congress never took place. But Hertzog did perform his share of the task, and on 8th May forwarded to van der Merwe a draft-programme of Beginsels, whose nature was such that van der Merwe is said to have complained that it was a divagation from the Republican clause of the Hereniging Agreement.⁴

A month later, on 25th June 1940, a joint meeting of the Hoofbesture of the two groups in the O.F.S. was held in Bloemfontein. Here, among other decisions, it was agreed to appoint a Committee of ten (five from each side) "om stukke in orde te bring vir Kongres." But at this same meeting the Hertzogites again denied the validity of the decisions of the Federale Raad. On the other hand they conceded to van der Merwe the right to consult

1. *Kommissie van Onderzoek (Transvaal, 4 April 1942.)* considered that Malan's interpretation more consistent with Hereniging Agreement than Hertzog's.

2. *ibid.*

3. *Die Transvaal*, 23 October 1940. Editorial.

4. Scholtz: *Dr. N. J. van der Merwe*, pp. 418-9.

the Federale Raad "i.v.m. opstel van 'n Program van Beginsels en 'n Program van Aksie," and to lay the results of such consultation before the Committee, and admitted the right of the Nasionale Party to introduce their own programme at the forthcoming Congress, if they should disagree with the programme eventually drawn up by the Committee.¹

The Committee duly met shortly afterwards, and decided that Hertzog, as Hooftleier, had the right to draw up his own programme; though, once again, the Hertzogites agreed that van der Merwe should be entitled to suggest any amendments.² Unfortunately, van der Merwe died on 11th August. The Gesuiwerde elements, led in the O.F.S. by Swart, now agitated more vehemently than ever for the summoning of the Federale Raad, and the announcement of its meeting—with the avowed purpose of drawing up a programme—was a success for them at Hertzog's expense.

Hertzog, on his side, seems to have decided to get in his blow first. At all events, on 19th October 1940, he published, on his own authority, a *Konsep van Beginsels*, to the great scandal and indignation of *Die Transvaler*.³ Hertzog's *Konsep*, however, unlike the *Program* of the Federale Raad, was to be submitted to one Congress only—that of Hertzog's own Province, the O.F.S., and was intended to serve merely as a basis of discussion. "In the interests of clarity," however, "and to avoid confusion," Swart, since van der Merwe's death the leading Free State Gesuiwerde, felt impelled to explain the true position to Afrikanerdom, or at least to such of it as read *Die Transvaler*. The Federale Raad, it appeared, had been entrusted with this task by virtue of resolutions passed by the Gesuiwerde Nationalist Party Congress of the O.F.S. in March 1940.⁴ It alone had the requisite authority. But to take away all reasonable ground for question, Swart had arranged for a Committee of ten Free Staters, (five Gesuiwerdes and five Hertzogites) to deliberate, in the course of the coming week, upon the agenda of the O.F.S. Congress, and upon the *Program*, which was to be submitted to that Congress.⁴ Whether this Committee actually met or not is not clear, but if it did, its meeting did not alter the situation. To the Hertzogites the decisions of the Federale Raad still seemed of no effect, pending the decision of the O.F.S. Congress: to the Gesuiwerdes they still appeared the only possible authoritative pronouncement.

The Federale Raad's *Program van Beginsels* appeared on 28th October 1940. It was a much more exhaustive document than

1. Scholtz, pp. 420-1, *Die Vaderland*, 21 December 1940: statement by Sen. Smits. Hertzog's view was that any Party council, including the Federale Raad, and any member of the O.F.S. Congress, was fully at liberty to lay a draft programme before the Congress; but that Congress alone could make the final decision.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Die Vaderland*, 19 October 1940.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 23 October 1940.

Hertzog's draft, and differed from it in several important particulars. But since the merits of the two schemes were never really in question, their comparison may for a moment be deferred. The important point was that the Federale Raad was evidently intending to pit its constitution against Hertzog's at the O.F.S. Congress. Before that meeting took place, however, the Provincial Congress of the Cape had accepted the Federale Raad's *Program*. It had, indeed, no other plan before it. Much more significant than the Cape Congress' resolutions was a passage from the speech of Malan, in which for the first time he fully identified himself with the view that, since these were abnormal times, those provisions of the Hereniging Agreement concerning the method by which a Republic was to be obtained (and which had been designed for normal times only) could no longer be considered to apply. Circumstances might now lead to the creation of a Republic by other means, which would render these provisions unnecessary, and even dangerous. Thus Malan at last capitulated to Strydom. Die breë grondslag van die volkswil was thrown overboard for good, and the doctrine of the snap-majority, the *coup d'état*, and the groep-diktatuur was frankly embraced in public. Or, to put it more abstractly, Malan had at last been brought to realise that Krugerism¹ could not be allied to Hertzogism without sacrificing its essential tenets.²

The O.F.S. Provincial Congress of the H.N.P. began its sessions at Bloemfontein on 5th November 1940. Hertzog had realised that he must make a stand now or never, and if it came to a fight, he was a bonny fighter. His opening speech did not mince words. He told the meeting that he had been subjected to constant intrigues and subterranean influences. He instanced van der Merwe's statement at the Bloemfontein meeting, which he branded as an infamous lie. Moreover, hardly had that statement been made when he had been informed that certain persons in the O.F.S. had taken a decision to spread a rumour that letters had been found in a Freemasons' Lodge purporting to prove the truth of van der Merwe's insinuation. In consequence, he had been pestered by enquirers from all over the country, anxious to learn if the story were true. "It is the dirtiest lie ever told." How could he be expected to work with people who spread such stories? He made it clear that the Congress was to be regarded as a test of the support he could command, and he assured his audience that he would not be the leader of Afrikanerdom unless he enjoyed the confidence of his people.³

Malan's speech, in which he rather feebly endeavoured to shift the issue to purely personal grounds, went wide of the mark.

1. "Krugerism": the name given to the body of doctrine and political ideas of the *Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party*. Professor A. C. Cilliers, was probably the first to use the word in this way. It is so used by B. K. Long (*In Smuts' Camp*, p. 7).

2. See *Die Transvaler*, 1 November 1940.

3. *Ibid.*, 6 November 1940.

The real champion of the Gesuiwerdes was Swart, whose address was of the most uncompromising kind. Those who had once deserted the Nationalist Party were now welcomed back to the fold. The English were informed that in the coming Republic they would be subjected to the same treatment as was meted out to Afrikaners in Rhodesia. And in his peroration he called for Action—"Action, not a lot of talking and the slavish worship of leaders. We must break away from personalities."

The next day went badly for the Hertzogites from the start. Hertzog's nominee for chairman, his old and tried friend Jack Brebner, was easily beaten by the Nationalist candidate. The presentation of Hertzog's *Konsep* was immediately followed by Swart's moving the adoption of the *Program* of the Federale Raad, and from the long and animated discussion that occupied the rest of the day it soon became clear that Hertzog would be defeated. Havenga did not allow the meeting to remain in any doubt of the issues involved: Hertzog, he told them, was resolved to treat the vote on the substance of the programme as a question of confidence. Swart and his supporters were equally adamant in their insistence that the *Program* must be accepted in its entirety. Well-meant efforts at compromise quickly foundered on the intransigence of both parties. The closure was applied, and the vote taken. And Congress, by "'n oorweldigende, oorgrote meerderheid"¹ rejected Hertzog's *Konsep*.

Hertzog, for the moment, sat still. He had thought it fitting and right that, for so long as he was Leader of the Party in the O.F.S., his draft should be taken at least as the basis for discussion. But he was not prepared to give his enemies an opening to accuse him of dictatorial methods, by breaking with them on a formal question of procedure. He did not doubt that a better opportunity would shortly present itself.

Congress now proceeded to discuss the draft of the Federale Raad, point by point. When it came to the relevant clause Hertzog put to Swart a single question. Where, he asked, in the programme that had been adopted as the basis for discussion, was there a clause corresponding to that clause in his own programme which guaranteed full equality of rights to the English? Swart's reply, referring the General to Art. 3, did not satisfy him: he saw in Art. 3 guarantees for linguistic and cultural equality, certainly, but an ominous omission of any reference to equality of status and political rights. He was not prepared, now in his old age, to associate himself with a policy by which such rights were not secured. Not for this had he created the Nationalist Party; not for this had he led it through more than a generation of struggle and triumph. Swart's policy would lead Nationalism deep into the wilderness, where not the Party only, but Afrikaner-

1. *Die Transvaler*, 7 November 1940.

dom itself, might perish. And with one slash of that sharp sword which was his tongue he cut through the mesh of compromise and intrigue: "I resign my leadership in the O.F.S., and also my membership of the Party in the O.F.S. . . . Havenga will follow me; Pirow too must go; and Malan will follow later." And with this dark prophecy the old General took his hat and walked out, with Havenga, Brebner and Edwin Conroy at his heels. As he made his way to the door through the uncomfortable silence, Swart seized the microphone and began an agitated medley of excuse and explanation. But no one listened. With a scraping of chairs and a rustle of agenda papers, the meeting had risen to its feet, moved by a common spontaneous desire to pay this last homage to the victor of so many a struggle, whom their votes had now condemned to the melancholy isolation of a lost leader.¹

The emotional tension of the meeting, already high, was raised to a climax by what followed. Not only were the audience affected by the exaltation which accompanies a moral purge carried through at the expense of personal feelings; not only did they respond to the inspiring influence of a real unity secured at last by the rejection of "unassimilable elements:" they super-added to these a quasi-religious enthusiasm which engendered something like the atmosphere of a revivalist meeting, and which reached its height in the avowal of Mr. D. J. de Jager, M.P.C., that he had sought the guidance of the Lord and "God had instructed him to remain in the Party."² And Swart, in the elation of his hour, confessed that he had shed "tears of joy over those Hertzogites who have remained with us; we dare not separate over personalities or the rights of the English." The meeting proceeded to elect Swart to the office of Provincial Leader for the O.F.S.; while (a graceful gesture this) the Deputy-Leadership was given to J. C. Buys, a Hertzogite who had seen the light.³ The *Program* of the Federale Raad was now adopted, though two amendments were forwarded to it for consideration. They were sufficiently significant. By the first a new Republican clause was proposed, since that of the Federale Raad was considered too colourless and compromising. By the second it was proposed that the name of the Party revert to the old form and be once more Die Nasionale Party.

(iv)

→ The dramatic withdrawal of General Hertzog, which seemed to point to the imminent collapse of Hereniging, struck Afrikanerdom with confusion and alarm, as at the premonitory rumblings of an earthquake. At once there arose a tumult of voices, mingling

1. *Die Transvaler*, 7 November 1940; *Die Vaderland*, 7 November 1940.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 7 November 1940.

3. Afterwards joined the O.B. *Die O.B.* 28 October 1942.

wild explanations with wilder charges ; now denouncing vengeance from the public platform, now whispering confidential " revelations " in the strict privacy of the correspondence columns of the daily Press. The General's action was explained, justified, condemned, in every place where Afrikaners gathered together. And, not least, it was explained by the General himself. In a succession of speeches delivered between 7 and 11 November 1940, he made his position clear.¹ He had long felt that a strong section of the H.N.P. of V. was not amenable to his leadership, and quite early in the year had offered to resign his position. His offer had been refused ; but the subterranean campaign had, he asserted, gathered strength, until it had culminated in the story of the *Vrymesselaarbriewe*. The O.F.S. Congress gave him his chance to test the length to which this movement had gone. He could, he believed, easily have secured a mere vote of confidence ; but such a vote, confirming him in the retention of a position increasingly divorced from all real power, was not what he desired. By placing his *Konsep* before the meeting, in opposition to the Federale Raad's *Program*, he would be able to discover what support he could command for any positive act of leadership. It was not that he wished to force his scheme, unaltered, upon Congress : whichever of the two programmes might be adopted would, he conceived, be treated merely as a basis for discussion, and could be freely amended. But he would by this means be able to apply an acid test ; to find out exactly what proportion of his nominal followers was prepared to trust him with something better than empty dignity ; to know (and this came before all) how far he could reckon on good faith. The answer to his enquiry had been decisive. His resignation was the consequence, then, of a virtual vote of no-confidence, which itself was a violation of the spirit of Hereniging. He had indeed, in his farewell speech, criticised the *Program* for not embodying the principle of full equality for the English. But it was not that clause that had prompted his resignation. He had adverted to the question mainly to illustrate the spirit behind the policy put forward by his opponents, and to make it clear how far they were straying, by propounding such a policy, from the terms of the Hereniging Agreement. In short, the General took his stand on the letter and the spirit of Hereniging, caring nothing for the doctrine that circumstances alter cases, and not concerning himself overmuch with the problem of the peaceful modification of treaties which have become out of date.

The revisionists (to pursue the international analogy) found it less easy to arrive at an agreed explanation of what had happened. The exhortations of Strydom and Verwoerd, before

1. *Die Vaderland*, 7, 8, 11 November 1940 ; and statement by Brebner ; *Die Transvaler*, 15 November 1940.

the Congress, to cleave to principles rather than to persons, and the opening addresses of Malan and Swart, at the Congress, announcing as they did that agreement on principles was so complete that a split could come only on personal grounds, had already committed them to the view that the quarrel had concerned the Hertzog-personoon rather than the Hertzog-beginsels. But to this clear-cut position Swart, in his speech after Hertzog's withdrawal, had added a complicating factor, when he imputed the blame to Hertzog's concern for the rights of the English. The Gesuiwerde element had henceforth to choose between two possible explanations. On the one hand was the view that Hertzog had wilfully wrecked Hereniging for the sake of his personal prestige, or through sheer obstinacy, in spite of the fact that there was no real dispute between the allies on fundamentals; on the other, the view that he had been constrained to quit the Party because the rival programmes had revealed, in acute form, a difference in principle which could be most simply expressed by saying that Hertzog was prepared (where the Gesuiwerdes were not) to prejudice the aims of Afrikanerdom for the sake of the English.¹ They found it extraordinarily difficult to decide between these two explanations, either of which, indeed, could be framed in a way calculated to damage Hertzog's reputation; and this embarrassment, together with the earlier pronouncements of Strydom and Verwoerd, lend some colour to the supposition that they were taken by surprise by Hertzog's action. The choice was a matter of some urgency, for there was, or appeared for the moment to be, a real danger that Hertzog might draw a great section of the H.N.P. after him. It was Malan who saved the situation by ingeniously rejecting both explanations. The question was not, he explained, one of confidence, for Hertzog would have received a vote of confidence if he had asked for it; nor, on the other hand, was it the result of the clash of principles or policies—as Hertzog himself had admitted. Indeed, a true estimate of the affair was in the present state of their information impossible. The duty of Afrikanerdom, therefore, was to cease from speculation upon this painful subject, and to close its ranks. Whatever happened, "die Afrikanerdom weier om te skeur."²

The effect of this exhortation was, for the moment, all that could be desired. Brought thus face to face with the threat of skeuring, Nationalist Afrikanerdom shuddered and stood fast. The H.N.P. tided over the danger of immediate disintegration; and when, two months later, skeuring actually occurred, and the Afrikaner Party was formed, its following was, and remained,

1. The "personal" explanation came from Malan (*Die Transvaler*, 14 November 1940; *Die Burger*, 7 November 1940; *Die Volksblad*, 7 November 1940); and Verwoerd (*Die Transvaler*, 8 November 1940). The explanation based on principles from Verwoerd (*Die Transvaler*, 13 November 1940); Kestel (*Die Transvaler*, 11 November 1940); and Louw (*Die Transvaler*, 18 November 1940).

2. *Die Transvaler*, 14 November 1940

small¹, in spite of the considerable provocations offered to the Hertzogites in the interim. When the most instant danger was over, and the initial heats had in a measure abated, the definitive explanation could be launched, and it is satisfactory to find that the Gesuiwerdes were sensible and candid enough to base it at last on the ground of principle.²

In the meantime, despite Malan's rallying cry, it was no easy task that faced his supporters if they were to retain control of the situation. The Hertzogites had some thirty-eight M.P.s to set against their twenty-seven. They included men of wide experience and national reputation. Pirow and Havenga had both been likely candidates for the next Premiership. Kemp was the romantic Boeregeneraal, the rebel leader of 1914. And, above all, there was the compelling personality of Hertzog himself. Judge, General, Premier for fifteen years, he had epitomised and led Afrikanerdom's struggle for nearly thirty. Possessed of extraordinary personal magnetism, he was one of the great "helde" of Afrikaner history. He had fought side by side with de Wet and de la Rey; he had assumed the mantle of President Steyn. There was only one other living Afrikaner of equal status, and he was not a member of the H.N.P. at all.

On the other hand the Party had certain advantages of first-rate importance. They were much better organised than the Hertzogites, for the Volksparty and Hertzog group were not yet a year old, and had scarcely got into their stride; and the existence of a large Party machine made it certain that the Malanites could reckon on the support of many interested office-holders, and also that their point of view would reach all Party members. They were helped in this, too, by their strong daily Press. Against *Die Burger*, *Die Transvaler*, *Die Volksblad* and *Die Oosterlig*, the Hertzogites could set only the limited circulation of *Die Vaderland*. They had, moreover, no less than Hertzog, the support of past history. Against Hertzog's long premiership they could cite their own record during the years of Fusion, a record upon which they could certainly look back with satisfaction. All these factors weighed the heavier because Afrikanerdom as a whole was not well-informed as to the realities of the position, and in the existing confusion of public opinion was unusually disposed to be told what to think. The Malanite publicity saw to it that Afrikanerdom was told. For the doubters, straws to clutch at were cast upon the waters with a liberal hand. Such a straw, e.g., was the suggestion that, after all, this was an affair which was purely domestic to the O.F.S.³; and such too, perhaps, was the announcement on 20th November 1940 that it was intended to appoint an impartial commission to investigate the question of the Vrymesselaar-

1. "n Afskilfering," Malan called it.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 16 December 1940; and *ibid.*, 18 and 19 December 1940 (Strydom's statement).

3. Mrs Badenhorst and even Pirow took this line: *Die Transvaler*, 11 and 13 November 1940.

briewe.) And, in the last resort, few Afrikaners among the general public were prepared to face another split. The Gesuiwerdes were, after all, the backbone of the Opposition; the old Nationalist Party was compact and highly organised; its principles were plain, intelligible, reasonably consistent, and in conformity with the mass of Nationalist Afrikaner opinion. The Party, therefore, must go on, even though Hertzog and his followers might retire from its ranks. What alternative was there?

There appeared to be no alternative. Hertzog was finished with politics—at any rate for the present. He was old, disappointed and deeply wounded. He absolutely declined to put himself at the head of a new party.² It was this, perhaps, more than anything else, that saved the H.N.P. from a really serious split; for Hertzogism without Hertzog lacked the glamour of greatness to most of his former followers.³ He did, indeed, approve Malan's proposal of a Commission of Enquiry; but, holding that his actions needed no defence, he declined to nominate the two members of it who were to have been his representatives, and recommended that the chairman should be a person learned in the law, and that proceedings should be modelled on those of a court of justice.⁴ When his recommendations were disregarded he manifested, in public at all events, no further interest in the matter. The Hertzogites eventually were nominated by Pirow and Edwin Conroy, and the final composition of the Commission, as announced by Malan on 6th December 1940, was as follows⁵: Professor J. C. van Rooy, Chairman; Pirow and Jan de Wet (representing the Hertzogites); P. Serfontein and W. Hofmeyr (for the Malanites).

It is understandable that the H.N.P. should have been reluctant to give any more publicity than was strictly necessary to the proceedings of the Commission. The presence of reporters would have served to keep the dissensions of Afrikanerdom prominently before the notice of the public, and thus have reinforced a tendency to disunion which was strong enough even as it was. Nevertheless, their refusal to agree to Hertzog's suggestions necessarily gave their adversaries ground for insinuating that they feared a public investigation—an impression to which Malan's repeated allusions to the strictly limited nature of the Commission's terms of reference in a measure contributed. It was very many months before the findings were made public, and in the meantime the two Hertzogite members had resigned in disgust. And even before the Commission was a fortnight old, *Die Burger* was advocating its abolition. If, argued *Die Burger*,

1. *Die Transvaler*, 21 November 1940.

2. Speech in the Koffiehuus. *Die Vaderland*, 7 November 1941.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 9 December 1940, quoting a letter of 29 November to the Krisis-Komitee.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 9 and 10 December 1940.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 6 December 1940.

there is indeed a bad spirit abroad in the Party, then it can be dealt with most efficiently by the Party's trusted and respected leader, Dr. Malan.¹ All these things made it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Gesuiwerdes regarded the Commission less as a serious effort to tell Afrikanerdom the truth than as a necessary sop to public opinion. Not until the affair had been superseded by other burning questions, and had come to be half-forgotten, did they feel it wise to promulgate their findings. The report which they issued in March 1942 exculpated Swart from the charges that he had originated or spread the Vrymesselaar-briewestorie, and maintained that its promulgation had nothing to do with Hertzog's retirement.²

In the meanwhile, the leaders of the Gesuiwerdes had been pushing their advantage. Whether they had decided to extrude all Hertzogites from the Party, even though they had not followed the General at Bloemfontein, or whether the victory they had won made them reckless of consequences it is, perhaps, impossible to determine. It is at all events certain that in the first week in December they permitted themselves to take certain steps which considerably assisted the formation of a new Hertzogite Party. The occasion was the Transvaal Congress of the H.N.P., held in Pretoria on 3rd and 4th December, 1940. Here Strydom and Verwoerd were upon their own ground, and no mercy for the Hertzogites was to be expected. Nor, indeed, was it shown. It had of recent years become the custom for all H.N.P. Provincial Congresses to pass a formal vote of confidence in the Leader of the Party. As a result of the federal constitution of the H.N.P., however, the anomalous position had arisen that though Hertzog had resigned the leadership and his Party membership in the O.F.S. he was still Hoofleier and Parliamentary leader as far as concerned the other Provinces and the Union as a whole. It became a delicate question, therefore, whether in these circumstances the usual vote should be moved or not. It was suggested, by way of compromise, that the motion should be extended to include Hertzog and Malan jointly. This proposal was debated by the Krisis-Komitee, and was rejected mainly, it is said, owing to the opposition of Strydom, who is alleged to have threatened "dat hy so'n mosie hand en tand sal beveg, indien dit aan die Kongres voorgelê word."³ Hertzog was accordingly ignored, and Strydom, in his opening speech, appealed to members to refrain from discussing or alluding to the recent events at Bloemfontein.⁴ Malan took the same line: it was not the business of the Transvaal Congress to meddle with a matter which concerned only the O.F.S. It was agreed, therefore, to ignore the whole affair, a

1. *Die Burger*, 19 December 1940.

2. See App. I. and *Die Transvaler*, 30 March 1943.

3. Press statement by S. C. Quinlan (a Hertzogite) *Die Vaderland*, 18 December 1940.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 3 December 1940.

decision which Malan applauded because it would mean that Congress would "refuse, no matter what happened, to jeopardise the newly-won volkseenheid."¹

The Congress, thus relieved of all major distractions, was able to turn its attention to the *Program* of the Federale Raad, and to carry three important amendments to it. The first of these altered Art. 12 (that which concerned the coming Republic) to read: "The Party recognises that the Republic shall be brought into being merely by a majority in Parliament." The second denied membership of the Party in the Transvaal to Jews, and requested the Federale Raad to persuade the other Provinces to follow this example; while the third left the choice of the future name of the Party to the decision of the Federale Raad.² These motions, and indeed the whole spirit of the gathering, must have convinced the remaining Hertzogites that, whatever the reason for Hertzog's own actions, there now existed a great gulf between themselves and the Malanites on questions of principle. It was no longer possible to pretend a belief in Hereniging on the old basis. At the close of the Congress some forty Hertzogites (*though there was not one M.P. among them*) signed a manifesto of sympathy for General Hertzog, deploring the treatment to which he had been subjected, and assuring him of their steadfast loyalty.³ On the following day a Transvaal M.P., Mr. S. C. Quinlan, announced his resignation from the Party in a statement communicated to the Press.⁴ His reasons for resignation epitomise the indignation felt by most of the Hertzogites in the Transvaal, and foreshadow the ground of further defections. Quinlan complained that there was a spirit of extremism abroad which was driving the Party into new and dangerous courses; that Hertzog had been still further insulted, inasmuch as the Congress affected to regard even the mention of his name as a threat to Afrikaner unity; and finally, that the majority of the H.N.P. in the Transvaal were endeavouring to destroy not only the Hertzog-persoon, but also the Hertzog-beginsels.⁵

Five days later, on 12th December 1940, Hertzog and Havenga took the final step of resigning their Parliamentary seats. In letters to their respective constituencies⁶ they explained that their action had been determined by the bad faith which, already in evidence at the Bloemfontein Congress, had now become so apparent at Pretoria, and by the fact that the resolutions carried at the two Congresses indicated that the Party was now set upon a policy which, in their opinion, must of necessity lead to the

1. *Die Vaderland*, 5 December 1940.

2. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

3. *Ibid.*, 6 December 1940.

4. *Ibid.*, 7 December 1940.

5. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

6. *Ibid.*, 12 December 1940.

downfall of Afrikanerdom, and with which they could not in any circumstances permit themselves to be associated. And, since they assumed this spirit to be reflected also in their own constituencies, they preferred to resign their seats.

The unhappy experiences of the preceding fifteen months had convinced Hertzog that there was no place for him in South African politics until such time as the wheel should have taken another turn. Between the martial ardour of the Government's supporters and the extreme Nationalism of the Malanites, the dulcet voice of Hertzogian good-sense would be unable to secure a hearing. He felt himself incapable of entering into the enthusiasms either of the one Party or of the other. The temper of the times was such as to afford small hope of rallying any number of adherents to a Party of the middle way. When the war was over, he believed, then his hour would come again, and the nation would turn once more to the policies, and to the leader, of 1933-39. Until then, he could wait. It was a somewhat sanguine programme for an old gentleman of seventy-two.

Yet, despite Hertzog's aloofness, there were already signs that the Hertzogites might rally and cohere. The frank delight of *Die Transvaler* at Hertzog's retirement was premature, for that retirement did not, as Verwoerd imagined, signify the definitive removal of the last impediment to Afrikanereenheid.¹ On the contrary. The same issue of *Die Vaderland* that announced Hertzog's retirement carried also the news that at a meeting of Hertzogites in the Transvaal it had been decided to form an Afrikaner Unie, whose aim was to be the maintenance of all those ideals and policies for which Hertzog and Havenga had stood. It was to be the forum open to all who sympathised with those ideals. Its chairman, appropriately enough, was S. C. Quinlan.² Four days later Mrs. Kenny Malherbe, a highly respected member of the Hertzogite Party in the Transvaal, and a member of the Federale Raad, announced her resignation from the Party in terms which reveal the disillusionment of a moderate. She grounded her resignation upon the irresponsible extremism into which the Gesuiwerdes had drifted, upon the unseemliness of the Party's triumphings over Hertzog, and upon the "political scurrility" of *Die Transvaler*. "Hereniging," she concluded, "stands revealed as political deceit."³ To which, of course, Strydom and Verwoerd could justly have retorted that they had made the same observation nearly a year ago, and no one had paid any attention to them.

Nevertheless, the Gesuiwerdes were uneasy at these latest

1. *Die Vaderland*, 16 December 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 13 December 1940.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 12 December 1940. The main function of the A. U. soon came to be the gathering and publishing of material designed to expose the alleged intrigues and meannesses of Swart and his allies. Its effective sniping proved a source of irritation to *Die Transvaler*, which returned its fire with interest.

3. *ibid.*, 16 December 1940.

developments. They rightly discerned in the Afrikaner Unie the possible embryo of a revived Hertzogite Parliamentary group, and they immediately deployed all their strength to kill it. Strydom, in a statement to the Press,¹ accused the Unie of being a political movement designed to serve a purely personal interest, whose only object was the creation of friction, and ultimately of disintegration. In view of the fact that a Commission of Investigation was already looking into the reasons for Hertzog's withdrawal, there was no legitimate reason for the Unie's existence, and it was the duty, therefore, of all Afrikaners to refrain from anticipating the Commission's report, and to offer resistance to any organisation which neglected that duty. *Die Transvaler* warmly endorsed this view.² Malan rammed the point home. In his New Year message he described the A.U. as the beginning of a return to Smuts, and a deadly blow at the soul of the H.N.P. All Afrikaners who prized their dearly-bought volksseenheid must unite to crush it. "The fate of Hereniging now lies more in the hands of the Hertzogites than of any other section."³ Thus the Gesuiwerdes made it clear that they considered the H.N.P. of V. as still in existence; that they considered themselves as the representatives of a volksseenheid which had not seriously been impaired by the insignificant "afskilfering" of Bloemfontein; and that if the Hertzogites persisted in the Afrikaner Unie or, still worse, founded a new party, they must expect to draw upon themselves all the odium attaching to volkskeurders and tools of Smuts. This threat was given substance, too, by the attitude of the O.B., which identified itself with the Party on this issue. On 29th December 1940, for instance, Assistant-Commandant-General J. A. Smith forbade such O.B.s as were Members of Parliament to leave the H.N.P., and stigmatised any who might disobey this injunction as "enemies of the people."⁴

About this time, the death of Dr. N. J. van der Merwe caused a vacancy in the constituency of Winburg, and Swart was put up as the H.N.P. candidate. Malan had already spoken strongly in his favour in his New Year message; and in a speech at Winburg on 5th January 1941 he went to considerable lengths in his support. Indeed, the matter of the speech made it clear that for the moment the bye-election was a secondary consideration, and that Malan was mainly concerned to attack Hertzog for his secession, and to defend Swart from the accusations which were made against him. The real issue that had faced the Bloemfontein Congress, he concluded, had been the choice between Hertzog and Hereniging. "If I, personally, had had

1. *Die Transvaler*, 18 December 1940.

2. *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.* (editorial).

3. *Ibid.*, 21 December 1940.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 30 December 1940.

to choose . . . I should have voted as the Kongres did."¹ It was apparent, then, that Malan had prejudged the issue of the Commission of Investigation; and this despite the fact that he was the chairman of the Krisis-Komitee to which the Commission would report, and which would thereafter take such action as might be required. But not only that: among those engaged in canvassing for Swart at Winburg was Serfontein, one of the Nationalist members of the Commission—not to mention Paul Sauer, who was *secundus* to the other.²

The frank hostility to Hertzog which had been apparent at the Pretoria Congress, in Malan's New Year message, and in the events at Winburg, was equally in evidence when, at the beginning of the Parliamentary Session in January 1941, the H.N.P. caucus met in Cape Town. Here Malan proposed that he should move in the House an unopposed motion of appreciation of Hertzog's long services to the country. It was evident that he had decided to treat Hertzog as a political corpse, and contemplated a sort of elegy or funeral oration. This did not suit Pirow, and he proposed as an amendment that a sentence be added to the effect that the House hoped that Hertzog's services might again be available in the future. This Malan opposed tooth and nail, and succeeded in defeating it by 29 votes to 27.³ It now began to be rumoured that all members of the Afrikaner Unie were to be expelled from the Party; and, *per contra*, that Swart was to be excluded from the caucus until the Commission should have reported.⁴ But so far was the latter from being true that on 27th January 1941, by 37 votes to 21, Swart was admitted a member of the H.N.P. caucus. Moreover, Malan indicated that it was by no means certain that the Commission's report would be laid before the caucus at all, since the Krisis-Komitee was competent to take action: the presence of Swart on the caucus could therefore be considered unexceptionable. Immediately afterwards, however, the Hertzogite members of the Commission announced that they declined any longer to serve upon it; adducing, as their weightiest reason, the fact that Swart was now a member of the Krisis-Komitee also!⁵

It was the last straw. Already in December a movement had been started in Smithfield, Hertzog's old constituency, to form a new Hertzogite Party.⁶ The events of the succeeding weeks had done much to favour such a step. With the meeting of Parliament and the decisions of the caucus, the final plunge was taken. On 30th January 1941, General Edwin Conroy in the House

1. *Die Vaderland*, 6 January 1941.

2. Cilliers, *Strydom Volkseenheid*, pp. 26-8.

3. On the ostensible ground that the Government would object, and the unopposed motion would fall away. Smuts, in the end, forestalled him by proposing a pension of £2,000 per annum for life to Hertzog. Cilliers, *op. cit.*, p. 31; *Die Vaderland*, 27 January 1941.

4. Swart had meanwhile been returned for Winburg.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 28 January 1941.

6. *ibid.*, 23 December 1940.

of Assembly announced the formation of the Afrikaner Party in all four Provinces.¹

It was not, at its inception, and it never became, a large party. Of the 37 M.Ps. who followed Hertzog into Opposition in 1939, only 10 joined Conroy's new Afrikaner Party;² and two of these, as we shall see, subsequently seceded to the United Party. The seats vacated by Hertzog and Havenga were captured by Malanites. The remaining 25 members stood fast for the moment within the H.N.P. They found leaders in Kemp, and above all, in Pirow. Pirow was a much younger man than Hertzog; he had been freely spoken of as a coming Prime Minister; and the 25 probably believed that there was more prospect of a political future for them as Pirow's lieutenants, supported by the powerful machinery of the H.N.P., than as ploughmen of the A.P.'s lonely, erratic and ineffective furrow.

So Afrikanerdom, despite all efforts, was split once more. The H.N.P. of V. did indeed retain its name, and stoutly affirmed that Hereniging still stood; but henceforth the Party had a rival, and soon it was to find another, more formidable still, in the O.B. Hereniging had failed; and it had failed because it had never, from the very beginning, found a solid basis of principle. The Gesuiwerdes had been proved right in the end: it was not possible to found a Party merely upon community of race and language; it was not possible to collaborate when an unbridgeable gulf existed between the ultimate political ends. The differences of opinion between Strydom on the one hand and Hertzog on the other had turned out to be hardly less than those which separated Strydom from Smuts. And so the idea, always present in the minds of many Afrikaners since the dark day of Fusion, that sometime the two halves of the old Nationalist Party might come together again, was demonstrated to be an illusion. The deduction which Strydom made from these facts was simple. In his view they proved that the Hertzogites were not true Afrikaners at all; that the only real manifestation of Afrikaner feeling and policy was embodied in that party which since 1934 had been so unswervingly constant to genuine Afrikaner ideals. Henceforward they must strive for a unity which should be real, a unity based not on comprehension and compromise, but on principle, and on principle alone. The hope of Afrikanerdom lay, therefore, not in extending the old Nationalist Party, but in purifying, in purging it of all wavering and drossy elements; and in inflexible opposition to every man and every organisation which should dispute the Party's monopoly of patriotism, or rashly challenge the leadership of Malan.

1. *ibid.*, 30 January 1941. *Debater*, vol. 41, p. 1928. The leadership of the A.P. was offered to, and accepted by, Havenga. In view, however, of Havenga's resignation of his seat, the Parliamentary leadership was entrusted to General E. Conroy.

2. This was the figure given by Harm Oost in his speech to the House of Assembly on 30th January 1941. (the day the A. P. was formed): *Debater*, vol. 41 p. 1939.

THE HANDHAWERSBOND¹

Soon after the Hereniging negotiations had been brought to a successful conclusion, the political scene was diversified by the appearance of yet another Afrikaner organisation. It called itself the Handhawersbond—a name already famous in South African history from the time of the Taalstryd—and its moving spirit and probable founder was that same G. Yssel who four months earlier had attempted to hasten Hereniging through the action of the Potchefstroom Waaksaamheidskomitee. The new movement, which began towards the end of March, 1940, was initiated without seeking the advice or assistance of the H.N.P. leaders: General Kemp was simply asked to announce its launching, at the forthcoming National Congress. Nevertheless, though unofficial in its origin, it soon secured the interest and enlisted the adherence of a number of considerable Nationalist figures, among them the Rev. C. M. W. du Toit, General Kemp, G. Bekker, the Rev. S. W. Naudé, Senator B. Cilliers, J. S. Labuschagne and Dr. N. J. van der Merwe. Pirow himself seems to have been in close touch with Yssel and the Bond, though he was too cautious to commit himself openly. Most important of all, N. L. van der Walt, the Hertzogite joint-secretary of the H.N.P. (an office he shared with the Malanite M.D.C. de Wet Nel) was almost from the beginning a strong partisan of the movement, and was probably counted on by Yssel to reconcile the Party to its existence.

The objects of the Bond, as defined in Yssel's letter to *Die Vaderland*,² were as follows:

- (a) "om die waarheidsridders en ander landswye organisasies te bekamp wat die Smuts-bewind staande probeer hou deur bedreiging en vervolging van Afrikaners;
- (b) beskerming te verleen aan alle bedreigde Afrikaners;
- (c) Kakie-propaganda in die Unie uit te delg;
- (d) monumentskenders op hulle plek te sit; en
- (e) kragdadig mee te help om die nuwe Herenigde Nasionale Volksparty aan bewind te bring en sy ideale tot verwesenliking te voer."

1. This section is based to a certain extent upon private information.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 1 April 1940.

It was thus an organisation designed to serve a particular purpose, and provoked by a particular set of circumstances. It was also, in contradistinction to the O.B., avowedly a political organisation.¹ It established its headquarters in Koedoe Arcade, Pretoria, P.O.Box 1270; and it was from this address that it published its Grondwet, the salient points of which were as follows:

"Om met enige geoorloofde middel, en sonder enige persoonlike offer te ontsien, met die mannekrag van die Boerenasie met daadkrag by te dra tot:—

- (a) Handhawing en uitlewing van die heilige gelofte by Monumentkoppie om mekaar se hand te gryp op die pad van Suid-Afrika en nooit weer los te laat nie.
- (b) Om ons nasionale selfrespek en volkseer te handhaaf in die volste sin van die woord en ook om die mannekrag van die Boeredom gereed te hê vir enige gebeurlikheid, nou of in die toekoms.
- (c) Die Verlossing van die Boerenasie op politieke en ekonomiese gebied deur daadwerklik by te dra tot die daargestelling van 'n Republiek wat aanpas by die aard van, en die vereiste tot, redding van die Boerenasie.
- (d) Die onmiddellike en volledige Verlossing van die Boerenasie op politieke en ekonomiese gebied met ons Bond se leuse: Met abnormale maatreëls is die Boerenasie tot abnormale armoede gebring; slegs abnormale maatreëls kan ons red."

There was an amplitude about the phraseology which was not without a certain popular appeal; and indeed it would have been difficult for the authors of the Grondwet to have been more specific in suggesting definite courses of action without exposing themselves either to the charge of inadequacy, or to the attentions of the police. Of this they were well aware; and to the end of its career the Handhawersbond made no real effort to draft a more precise programme, let alone to implement it.

Subsequent clauses emphasised the full adherence of the Bond to the H.N.P., and pledged it not to attempt interference in the official organisation and business of the Party. It is clear that from the beginning Yssel entertained some apprehensions—later to be fully justified—that his proffered aid might not be particularly welcome to the H.N.P. leaders, and that he sought to avert any hostility by protestations of devotion. The Handhawersbond itself was to be provided with an organisation whose clarity of outline offered, perhaps, some compensation for the vagueness of its plan of action. It was to be based on the unit of the Vegkommando, of which there was to be one in each dorp, or each city ward; and the minimum membership required for the formation of a Vegkommando was ten. Each kommando was to elect its veldkornet, who was to have one assistant for every ten men in

1. "Die Handhawersbond tree nie op as Kultuurligaant nie, maar mag in besondere geval bystand verleen aan Kultuur-organisasies."

the ranks. The veldkornette in their turn would elect a kommandant from each district, the districts to be delimited by the Opperste Krygsraad. The kommandants would elect a General, and as the supreme direction of the movement there would be constituted an Opperste Krygsraad composed of Generals, Staff-Generals, the Assistant-Commandant-General and the Commandant-General: of these the last three were to be elected by the full Congress of the Bond, which all officers were entitled to attend. In the intervals between the meetings of Congress, the Opperste Krygsraad would act as an *ad interim* Executive. Only male Afrikaners of Christian-National principles were to be eligible for membership. The entrance fee was fixed at the modest figure of one shilling, and (with pleasing faith in human nature) the amount of any subsequent subscription was left to the taste and fancy of the subscriber. And, finally, there was an Oath, which bound members to obey their superiors, to be faithful to the objects of the Association, and more especially to collaborate in measures to rescue Afrikanerdom from economic bondage.

There is a fine catholicity about all this. The political aims of the H.N.P., the organisation of the O.B., the economic objects of the Reddingsdaadbond, were all, by an audacious eclecticism, to be fused in a single organisation. It would be difficult, from a reading of the Grondwet, to scent any serious challenge to the forces of law and order; but this relatively innocuous document was followed by another publication, the "Kort Verklaring," which was considerably more vigorous in tone. Men were required (it appeared) who were ready and willing for action—"manne wat manne in die volste s'n van die woord is—bulle wat vir niks sal stuit nie." . . . De Wet Afrikaners." But even here, the programme of action seems to be confined to passive resistance: "om lydelike verset doeltreffend te laat plaasvind moet ons dwarsdeur die land vegkommandos hê van De Wet-Afrikaners." It is not easy to guess how it was proposed to provide the fighting commandos with action correspondent with their nomenclature, if they were to be restricted to peaceful and lawful methods, as suggested. The confusion is not diminished by a paragraph which ran:

"Soos die polisie diens en die leër die staat dra en steun sonder seggenskap in die regering, so wil ons die Party dra en steun sonder inmenging in die organisasie. MAAR ons wil vooraf duidelik sê dat ons nie weer 'n herhaling van 1924 en 1929 se optrede wil hê nie . . . Met abnormale maatreëls moet ons 'n abnormale toestand beveg."

It was this insistence on abnormal measures, despite an equal insistence on passive resistance, that alarmed the Government.

But when it came to the point the bulls roared like any sucking doves.

Behind all these public declarations, however, lay another object which was very dear to Yssel's heart: the fostering of a better spirit within the H.N.P. Yssel foresaw the breakdown of Hereniging, and desired to prevent it; in his own mind, at all events, he designed the Handhawersbond to be an agent for the drawing-together of the two wings of the H.N.P.

The movement seems to have spread quite quickly; and Yssel aimed at a membership of 100,000 by the end of May. The first commandos were formed at Smithfield, Reddersburg and Zastron—a curious circumstance, in view of the fact that the Bond had originated in Pretoria. The explanation is perhaps to be sought in the known connection of van der Walt with the movement; for this was essentially a Hertzogite area.¹ In the Transvaal there were strong centres, at Rustenburg, Potgietersrust, Wolmaransstad, Pietersburg and the Zoutpansberg²; and also in the east, particularly in the region of Tzaneen and Gravelotte: and this in spite of the fact that Strydom, the H.N.P. leader in the Province, ostentatiously disavowed all connection with the movement, and that *Die Transvaler* from the beginning expressed scepticism. *Die Vaderland*, on the other hand, gave its support: and continued to keep on terms with Yssel long after he had quarrelled irreconcilably with the Malanites. In the Cape, the movement was most flourishing among the railway workers at Uitenhage, and at Middelburg and Cradock; and in each case owed its success to the efforts of a few enthusiastic individuals. It had commandos, too, in Pietermaritzburg and Durban. The Afrikaans Universities, on the whole, seem to have held aloof. U.K.O.V.S., for instance—or rather the A.N.S. at U.K.O.V.S.—politely declined membership on the grounds that the Handhawersbond was a political movement; but an attempt was made to introduce it at Cape Town. In the first three months after its foundation, the demand for enrolment forms was brisk; and among others who seem to have been interested, at all events momentarily, was the Greyshirt Leader Louis Weichardt.

Thus by July 1940 the Handhawersbond appeared to be successfully launched; and Yssel was encouraged to embark upon a new venture, obviously closely linked with the Bond. This was the institution of the Nasionale Wetgewers Buro, which operated, like the Bond, from P.O. Box 1270, Pretoria. It professed to provide a Press Review service for the benefit of those interested in politics, and more particularly for Nationalist Members of Parliament. In the Reddingsdaadbond supplement

1. The enthusiasm at Zastron was such that the women there formed a "Susters Bond" in defiance of the Grondwet—an action which caused some dissension at the congress later on.

2. By August, 1940 Yssel reported over 1,000 members each for the Rustenburg and Pietersburg commandos: *Die Vaderland*, 19 August 1940.

number of *Die Vaderland* (31 August 1940) it advertised itself conspicuously as supplying candidates and members with "political dynamite." The Review was no doubt conducted upon lines conformable to the course of the Handhawersbond, and was designed to serve the same objects:¹ as the Bond was proclaimed to be the reply to the Kakieridders, so perhaps the review was designed to be the answer to the United Party's *News Letter*.

The fortunes of the Handhawersbond reached their highest point on 17th August 1940, when the first (and only) Conference of the movement was held, with elaborate precautions to secure secrecy, in Pretoria. No less than 150 members put in an appearance; and since not more than 40 had been expected the attendance must have been considered extremely encouraging. There were prayers at Monumentkoppie, led by the Rev. P. J. S. de Klerk, and there were prolonged debates which apparently tended to no very definite conclusion. The only evidence of "action," indeed, was the election of seven Staff-Generals, and the appointment of Yssel as Assistent-Kommandant-Generaal—the post of Kommandant-Generaal being for the present left open. It is a fair speculation that it may have been intended for Piròw, if he could be induced to accept it. Five days later, on 22nd August 1940, the offices at Koedoe Arcade were raided by the police. It seems likely that for some time the Bond had been under police surveillance, if we may argue from the fact that as early as May the General of the Gravelotte area, E. Hiemstra, had been interned for some weeks at Baviaanspoort, before being released without a charge having been preferred against him. It is said that the raid was the result of sworn declarations to the police to the effect that the Bond was striving to disseminate the principles of Fascism and Nazism.² Yssel protested in *Die Vaderland*:

"The Sons of England, the New Guard, the B.E.S.L. and other un-Afrikaans organisations may continue their activities unhindered. The Handhawersbond, on the other hand, which stands only for the protection and salvation of the Boer people on political and economic grounds, is stormed like a mob of gangsters . . ."³

The police raid coincided with the turning point in the history of the movement. Henceforward it was destined to lose ground, then to decline rapidly, and ultimately to perish so obscurely that no man can place with certainty the date of its demise. It is, however, wholly mistaken to ascribe this rapid collapse to the effects of the raid. What documents were actually found by the police has not been revealed; but it would be in the highest degree surprising if they had found any of real significance, and certainly

1. It has unfortunately proved impossible to obtain copies of the review.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 22 August 1940.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 23 August 1940.

neither Yssel nor any of his leading lieutenants was arrested. No; the decay of the Hawersbond had nothing to do with any illegalities it might be supposed to have committed or to be contemplating. It was the result of broad political considerations, which were the concern, not of the agents of the Government, but of the leaders of the Opposition.

In the first place, despite the earnest assurances of Yssel and his colleagues, it was not at all clear that the Handhawersbond was not duplicating functions already discharged by the O.B. Each aimed at appealing to the broad masses of Afrikanerdom, at enlisting the active cooperation of ordinary persons who in the normal course of events would take little active part in the work of the Party; each sought to provide a sphere of activity in which such persons might find expression for their nebulous but quite sincere desire to *do something* to forward the Afrikaner cause. Each was ready to come forward with practical measures of assistance for Afrikaners who had suffered economic hardship as a result of their political opinions. The organisation of the Handhawersbond, as we have seen, was closely modelled on that of the O.B. The distinction between the O.B. as a cultural, and the Handhawersbond as a political, movement was more real in theory than in practice, since the O.B. was already beginning to develop important political activities, and since no really national Afrikaner organisation could remain entirely outside politics. Thus it is not surprising that new members of the Handhawersbond were apt to be puzzled as to the relationship of the one organisation to the other, and that they should even have enquired (to the consternation of the Handhawersbond leaders) whether, if an O.B. branch were already established in their locality, there were any real need to form a Handhawersbond commando. The Handhawersbond had the attraction of novelty, but when the novelty had worn off it was impossible to prevent awkward questions of this sort from occurring to its members. The O.B. was well established; its services to Afrikanerdom were well-known to every Afrikaner; its leaders had a national prestige with which Yssel could not hope to compete. Quite early in the history of the Handhawersbond, therefore, there was discernible in some of the commandos a tendency to fuse with the local branch of the O.B.; and before the Grondwet was a month old Yssel had perceived that he would do well to avoid open competition with Colonel Laas by some sort of amicable arrangement. And he did, indeed, succeed in evading a direct clash; but only at the expense of ultimate absorption by the older and stronger movement.

Secondly, there was the difficult question of relations with the H.N.P. It is clear that men like Kemp and du Toit would not have lent themselves to the movement if they had not expected

that some stable and friendly arrangement with the Party would be secured. Yssel certainly tried his best to secure it. His Magsorder No. 1 was notable for its painful care not to give offence to the Party leaders. The principles of the movement were undoubtedly consonant with those of the Gesuiwerde section of the H.N.P. But these considerations did not avail to protect him from the displeasure of the leading Transvaal Nationalists, and in particular from the hostility of Strydom and Verwoerd, who probably sensed in the very foundation of the movement an implied criticism of their leadership, and who had certainly not forgotten or forgiven Yssel's actions in the previous December. They did not relish free-lance departures of this sort, and they regarded Yssel as something of an upstart. Moreover, they probably suspected that behind the Handhawersbond lay a spirit desirous of a conciliatory bearing towards the Hertzogites; and that was quite sufficient to explain their distrust.

Strydom's hand was certainly strengthened by a step which the Party took in June 1940. On the 22nd of that month Hertzog and Malan issued their joint protest against the continued participation of South Africa in the European War, and demanded the immediate summoning of Parliament to consider the national emergency. They added a strong protest against the victimisation to which Afrikaners were being subjected, and urged the formation of Waaksaamheidskomitees to prevent, or failing that to avenge, persecution of this sort.¹ The suggestion was taken up by the H.N.P. Press,² and was quickly put into effect. Vigilance committees headed by influential Afrikaners were formed in various centres, particularly in the Transvaal, and soon began their work of defending Afrikaner interests, and compiling black-lists of oppressors of die Volk. They were strictly Party bodies, functioning under the control of the Party Branch Committees, who selected the personnel and were responsible for their creation.³ Thus the Party had taken into its own care one of the few useful functions which the Handhawersbond could claim to be discharging. The move is not to be considered as a deliberate blow at the Handhawersbond. It was determined by more general considerations. In the presence of an imminent national revolution, the activities of Yssel can hardly have occupied much of Malan's and Hertzog's attention.

At a moment when the position of the Bond was thus weakened by the H.N.P.'s action, Yssel went out of his way to provoke the resentment of the Party leaders by a misguided interference in the Party's internal affairs. Like Hertzog, Yssel felt that the nation stood on the brink of a crisis, and on his own authority he decided to hold a Conference of such Nationalist M.Ps. and

1. *Die Vaderland*, 24 June 1940.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 3 July 1940.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 12 July 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 17—18 July 1940.

M.P.s. as he considered to be the most energetic; and issued invitations to attend it early in July 1940. The project, of course, fell to the ground, but it was succeeded by a still graver indiscretion. On 13th July Yssel sent out a circular letter to such of the Nationalist M.P.s. as met with his approval, in which he made certain "revelations." On the one hand he asserted the indifference or hostility of certain sections of the O.B. to the H.N.P. leaders; and, on the other, alleged that a conspiracy was hatching within the H.N.P. against the leadership of Hertzog. Yssel's information may very probably have been mainly correct: he seems somehow to have got wind of the preliminary meetings which preceded the Republican Congress at Bloemfontein on 20th July 1940. But, whether correct or no, his action could not fail to provoke the liveliest reactions from the Gesuiwerde elements in the H.N.P. From this moment, Strydom declared a war of extermination.

In these circumstances, it became clear that the Handhawersbond had no prospects within the Party, at all events in the Transvaal. And outside the Party it could hardly expect to compete with the O.B. It became, therefore, the part of wisdom to seek an accommodation with the O.B. in the Transvaal; and between August and October 1940 various efforts were made to come to some arrangement. About the first week of October they were crowned with success, and it was agreed that the Transvaal commandos of the Handhawersbond should be absorbed into the O.B. It does not appear, however, that the movement as such was formerly dissolved; indeed, as late as November 1940 Yssel was to be heard speaking in the name of the Handhawersbond.¹ But in reality it was all over. As to Yssel himself, he shed few tears over this untimely demise. He had already found other employment. Before the end of October he had transferred his services to the New Order, recently founded by Pirow; and the offices in Koedoe Arcade were transformed into the central stronghold of that Studiekring which was to disseminate throughout South Africa the gospel of Totalitarianism.

What then was the significance of the Handhawersbond? It was, after all, a small affair. If a guess may be hazarded from the attendance at its solitary Congress, its numbers cannot have exceeded 5,000. Had it really any importance, except to its sponsors?

Considered in its simplest aspect, it was a typical "ginger-group" movement of a type very familiar in English political history. From this point of view, its purpose was to goad the

1. After General Hertzog walked out of the Bloemfontein Congress, a small group gathered around his car; to whom Yssel observed "Die gees van die Afrikanerdom moet u gees wees, of hy gaan ten onder." But on a later occasion he explained that the Handhawersbond had never intended to offer Hertzog support, but merely sympathy. *Die Vaderland*, 7 November 1940; *Die Transvaler*, 11 November 1940.

Party leaders to more trenchant political action. Its principles were mainly Strydom's principles : it demanded only that they should be put into immediate effect. As in all such political groups, the dynamic behind the movement was largely the political aspirations of its founder. It naturally, therefore, met with the disapproval of the established Party chiefs, to whom its obvious indiscipline seemed to outweigh its potential services. But this interpretation, while correct up to a point, would hardly justify such detailed treatment as has been accorded to it above, and would ignore entirely its deeper meaning.

The extraordinary success of the O.B. had proved, if proof were needed, the strength of the national and political consciousness of the Afrikaner people. It had proved also that the volksgees could not fully express itself through the carefully buoyed and charted channels of the Hertzogite and Malanite political groups. The political parties were not enough. The reservoirs of popular enthusiasm poured their ample streams along those channels, but there were still large surpluses washing over the spillways, waiting to be canalised in the interests of Afrikanerdom. The O.B. had perceived this fact and taken advantage of it, turning these reserves of power into all sorts of national-cultural and quasi-military activities. But even so, there was still plenty to draw on. The more impatient spirits reflected that the O.B., in the eighteen months or so of its existence, had really effected little, despite the constant drilling. Was there not room for another movement of the same type, but with more explicitly political objectives ? The internments, the discrimination, the boycotts and the victimisation which in 1940 filled the pages of the Opposition Press with indignant comment, afforded an admirable nucleus around which to base such a movement. But indeed all the evidence goes to show that in 1940 almost any leader who came forward with an energetic programme was certain of some sort of a following. There were several such leaders to choose from, outside the Party chiefs : there was Maritz, who in July founded an anti-parliamentarian Volksparty in the Pietersburg district ; there was Colonel Laas, who after Maritz's death and on his own expulsion from the O.B., founded with Maritz's widow "Die Boerenasie", and, when he had quarrelled with her and been expelled from that movement, "Die Boerevolk" ; there was even Weichardt, whose Greyshirts still commanded totalitarian sympathies. And, last of all, there was the New Order.¹ In short, Afrikanerdom in 1940 was in a state of effervescence—eager, anxious, ready for adventure, provided only that something was really *done* to bring nearer the goal at which the Party leaders aimed, but apparently could not attain. The H.N.P. was fully conscious of this feeling, and was periodically

1. For this, see below, p. 80.

uneasy at the people's lack of confidence in its leaders.¹ It did not need a very shrewd or a very ambitious man to perceive the opportunity. Not one of the movements noted above—from the O.B. to the Boerevolk—could claim any direct connection with the orthodox stem of the Party. Most of their members were indeed steady adherents of the H.N.P. at election time; but the situation was conceivable in which they might find themselves distracted by divided loyalties. The unusual prescience of Yssel consisted in this: that he saw that the moment had come to form a movement of the O.B. type *within* the Party; to enlist for the H.N.P. not merely the votes but the great floating strength of unharnessed political enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people. His success, in the face of the disapproval of his party superiors and the competition of the O.B., is astonishing proof of the correctness of his calculations. The comparative feebleness and emptiness of his performance and programme were no deterrent; for his language at least provoked the right reactions.

It was, perhaps, one of the most serious mistakes into which Strydom ever led his party, that Yssel's new organisation should have been denied their support. He was presenting them with a ready-made nucleus of what they were afterwards to expend untold efforts in trying to obtain—an "aksiefront." Kemp and du Toit and N. L. van der Walt must have realised this. *Die Vaderland* realised it too, hence its continued support after Strydom had declared war. Pirow certainly saw the possibilities. He took good care to keep on terms with Yssel; and, when all was over, actually enlisted him as organiser of the New Order. The right policy for the H.N.P. was to have appropriated the Handhawebsbond; to have put it into other hands than Yssel's; and to have made of it a great popular extra-Parliamentary movement buttressing the Party, and drawing off as by a safety-valve all the ebullient matter and vaporous oratory of a nation deeply agitated by prolonged spiritual crisis. It is true, and it may be urged in mitigation, that there was, as yet, no reason to fear a clash between the Party and the O.B.; that, indeed, the H.N.P. might reasonably hope that the Groot Raad would continue to be filled by solid Party men. Yet, even so, they would have been safer with an O.B. of their own, and that was precisely what Yssel was offering them. But the truth of the matter was, that their minds were so preoccupied by the crisis in Hereniging, by the great question of whether or not Hertzog and his followers were to remain within the Party, that the exigencies of the moment left them no time for long views. Malan and Strydom, in pursuing a principle until they had virtually forced Hertzog's retirement, could hardly be expected to parley with Yssel, least of all when he was striving to preserve that Hereniging which they had at last

¹ See *Die Transvaler*, *passim*, September-October 1940.

steeled themselves to destroy. Yssel and his movement were too hastily dismissed as simply another challenge, and a weak one, to the Malanite predominance in the Party. And once they had adopted that attitude the fate of the Handhewersbond was sealed. But a year later Yssel could claim a handsome revenge.

THE H.N.P. AND THE O.B.

(i)

The breach in Hereniging was not yet complete, the strains of the Handhawersbond *intermezzo* still echoed round the political firmament, when Malan was called upon to deal with a challenge to his authority less easily disposed of than Hertzog or Yssel. The Ossewa-Brandwag was threatening to become a factor in politics.

The O.B. movement had been founded in Bloemfontein in October 1938, upon the occasion of the centenary of the Great Trek; and its original purpose was nothing more or less than to embody and perpetuate the idealism to which the celebrations had given rise. The foundation members all came from Bloemfontein and the surrounding district, and the first chairman was a Bloemfontein predikant, the Rev. C. R. Kotzé. As it was intended that the movement should be organised on a commando basis, it was found desirable to appoint, in addition, a Kommandant-Generaal, and this office was filled by an officer of the Permanent Force, Colonel J. C. C. Laas.¹ On 4th February 1939 the first regular meeting of officers took place in Bloemfontein, and the constitution was drawn up. In a subsequent interview with *Die Volksblad* Colonel Laas defined more precisely the objects of the Association :

Die doel wat met die Ossewa-Brandwag beoog word, is: die bestendiging van die ossewa-gees in Suid-Afrika, die handhawing, die uitbouing en die uitlewing van die tradisies en beginsels van die Dietse Afrikaner, die beskerming en die bevordering van die Godsdienstig-kulturele en stoflike belange van die Afrikaner, die aankweek van vaderlandsliefde en nasionale trots, en die inskakeling en samesnoering van alle Afrikaners, manne sowel as vroue, wat hierdie beginsels onderskryf en gewillig is om hulle kragdadig daar-

1. C. R. Kotzé, *Die Ossewa-Brandwag*, pp. 3-4. The original members were Professors D. F. Malherbe, H. v. d. M. Scholtz, J. de W. Keyter, J. G. A. Arndt; the Revs. P. J. Pienaar, D. G. van der Merwe and C. R. Kotzé; Messrs. S. J. Naudé, A. Schlebusch, G. and N. van Tonder, Col. Laas and Dr. Steynman. For the circumstances of the foundation of the movement (in which the leading part was played by Col. Laas and Prof. Scholtz), see A. J. H. van der Walt, *'n Volk op Trek*, pp. 8-12. Similar, unsuccessful, attempts had earlier been made by Prof. C. J. H. de Wet, and Dr. Steyn Vorster (van der Walt, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9). Van der Walt's list of members in Nov. 1938 differs slightly from Kotzé's by including Prof. J. Dekker, Mr. F. Naudé, and Dr. Pretorius, and by omitting Prof. Arndt and Mr. G. van Tonder. By the time the meeting was held in February 1939 there were already representatives from the Transvaal. (*ibid.*, p. 11).

voor te beywer . . . Die werkmetode is as volg : die viering van Afrikaanse volksfeeste en verjaardae van ons helde, die daarstelling van gedenktekens, kransleggings by monumente, die opsporing en instandhouding van geskiedkundige plekke en die grafte van Afrikaners wat op die Pad van Suid-Afrika gesterf het, die hou van byeenkomste soos skyfskiet, papegaai- en aasvoëlskywe, jukskeigooi ens., die beoefening van volkspele en volksliedere, die hou van optogte, gereelde byeenkomste van opvoedkundige en gesellige aard, opvoerings, lesings oor ons geskiedenis, letterkunde . . . debatte, kampe vir mans en vroue, ens.¹

Enthusiasm for the movement spread rapidly, first throughout the O.F.S., and very soon all over the Union. By August 1939 it had been found necessary to open a central office in Bloemfontein to deal with the administrative side of the work.² There is no doubt that the O.B. successfully capitalised the spirit of renaissance of which the Trek had at once been the cause and the symptom; but the power of its attraction was in truth based on other and less ephemeral grounds. The O.B. succeeded because it seemed to offer to every man—and at first also to every woman—the chance of an individual and ponderable contribution to the great task of unifying the Afrikaner nation. At braaivleisaande, at jukskei meetings, at the local kultuurvereniging, and even on occasion at church, Afrikaners could meet in that Trekker dress which was to be the uniform of the movement, and feel a sense of community of culture, of common heritage, of organised progress towards a great goal—a feeling which they did not always (or even, perhaps, often) experience within the framework of their political parties. The O.B., indeed, aspired to embrace the whole Volk. Where parties divided, quarrelling over sordid personal issues, the O.B. united. It was to be the Highest Common Factor of Afrikanerdom, the negation of that volkskeuring with which the rival charioteers on die Pad van Suid-Afrika were always charging one another. It was no wonder that it spread so quickly. Not the least of its attractions was its professed indifference to party politics, which permitted the Hertzogite and Malanite, the New Orderite and even the Smelter, to lie down in amity together. If the Republic were really to be founded on die breë grondslag van die volkswil, where else was such a basis to be found than in the O.B?³

There were, of course, disadvantages. The leaders were not the old, well-trying leaders of Afrikanerdom, and the Kommandant-Generaal, in particular, was not in every respect satisfactory. The military discipline might lead in some cases to a local tyranny,

1. *Die Volksblad*, 6 February 1939, where Laas is described as the "founder of the movement" See, too, *Die Ossewa-Brandwag, vanwaar en waarheen*, and *Die Ossewa-Brandwag, Konstitusie*.

2. Kotzé, *op cit*, pp 3-4.

3. cf A C Cilliers, *Nasionale Volksorg*, p 72 "Die OB staan vandag vir 'n breër volkseenheid as die H N P., wat vir seksionele partysenheid staan" words not without significance for the future, since at that time (November 1941), Cilliers was associated with the Afrikaner Party.

to boycott and persecution, to the oppression of Afrikaner by Afrikaner, and even to difficulties with the Churches; but it was to be presumed that as membership became universal, these difficulties would tend to disappear. More serious were the possibilities of conflict with the Government. Even before the outbreak of war, Pirow had dismissed Laas from his military employment, and forbidden U.D.F. officers to belong to the O.B.¹ With the coming of hostilities and the Government of General Smuts, it was hardly to be expected that the authorities would view with complacency a national organisation, compact, wealthy and powerful, which was known to be opposed in principle to the war, and which had evolved a semi-military scheme of training. It could hardly have come as a surprise, therefore, when the Government prohibited its employees from becoming members, and made assurance doubly sure by calling in all rifles in private ownership.²

The disasters to the Allied cause in Europe, however, which convinced many that the Boer Republic was actually in sight, gave an added impetus to the movement: when the great hour struck, Afrikanerdom must not be found with ungirt loins. At a meeting on 27th May 1940, the O.B. received its definitive organisation and drafted its constitution.³ In July 1940 the first Congress of the O.B. was held in Bloemfontein, when the Hoof Raad (later called the Groot Raad) was constituted for the first time, with Kotzé as its president, and the salary of the K.-G. was fixed at £50 per month.⁴ But with growing power came also the temptation to use it. The O.B. in its corporate capacity had, no doubt, nothing to do with the great Republican gathering of July 1940 in Bloemfontein, but Kotzé and Swart were concerned in it, and they were both at this time intimately connected with the movement.⁵ Professor Cilliers of Stellenbosch noted these developments with alarm, and warned Malan of the danger:

I said, among other things, that an army cannot do nothing, that there was nothing in the cultural field for the O.B. to do (it was still allegedly a cultural organisation) and that it was thus looking for spheres of activity—and where else but in the field of the party?⁶

This might be true enough, but Cilliers' suggestion that the only way to avoid a clash was to secure a leadership common to both Party and O.B. was a vain crying for the moon. Neither the

1 Van der Walt, p. 19 (28 February 1939)

2 *ibid.*, pp. 20, 47

3 *ibid.*, p. 13

4 Kotzé, p. 5, Van der Walt, p. 15, J. G. Strydom, *Volkseenheid op watter Grondslag* p. 5

5 Cilliers, *Nasionale Volksorg*, pp. 67-8

6 Cilliers, *op cit.*, pp. 68-9. See too L. J. du Plessis in *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941.

It was significant that at the meeting of the Hoof Raad in Bloemfontein in July 1940 it was proposed by Mr O. Nel that the O.B. should step forward as a political movement 'om omdoende oërvleueling met ander liggame te verboed' (!) Col. Laas assured the meeting that no "oorvleueling" existed, and the proposal was dropped. Van der Walt, p. 16. There was, however, considerable suspicion of the O.B. in certain sections of the Party (*ibid.* pp. 20-21), even though prominent Party-men like Swart and M. C. de Wet held responsible positions in the movement (*ibid.*, p. 24).

the O.B. on the non-political terrain.¹ The Groot Raad had already issued a statement to the Press reaffirming the ideals for which the O.B. stood, with the significant addition of the foundation of a "free, independent, Christian-National Republic," and had taken the occasion to declare "dat die O.B. *as organisasie*,² geen ondermynende bedrywighede en geen gebruik-making van geweld of van ondergrondse rewolusionêre aktiwiteite beoog of duld nie, of om bevriende politieke partye of liggame in hul bedrywighede te benadeel of op enige wyse te ondermyn nie."³ The significance of the two italicised words was to become only too clear in the course of the following year. For the present, it might seem that harmony was secured, especially as the O.B. officially, and the H.N.P. semi-officially, had identified themselves with the Christian-National policy, so strongly championed by such men as Dr. Diederichs and the Calvinists of Potchefstroom.⁴ Malan even stated he would be willing to support the O.B. to the uttermost should they be the victims of persecution by the Government.⁵

(ii)

The O.B. had now to proceed to the election of a successor to Laas. They did not find the choice easy. Kotzé, Smith, Swart, and even that stormy petrel of politics Maritz, were at one time or another suggested.⁶ But when at last the Groot Raad met at Kotzé's parsonage on 10th December, Jerling proposed a new candidate. This was the Administrator of the Free State, Dr. J. F. J. van Rensburg, with whom Smith and the more militant elements in the movement had, since September, been negotiating in secret.⁷ The voting was by ballot, and the number of votes cast for or against van Rensburg was known only to the chairman, Kotzé. From his account it appears that van Rensburg's election was carried by a single vote (6-5). Kotzé voted in the minority; and it is noteworthy that among the reasons he assigns for doing so are, that van Rensburg's friendship with Hertzog must pre-

1. Kotzé, p. 6; "Eenheid, Vryheid en Reg!" (Official H.N.P. publication) pp. 15-6.

2. Our italics.

3. *Die Volksblad*, 24 October 1940; van der Walt, pp. 27-8.

4. See, e.g., N. Diederichs, *Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing* (1935) S. du Toit, *Die Profete en die Wêreldrewolusie*; C. J. H. de Wet, *Ons Christelike Republiek*; and L. J. du Plessis (*Koers VIII*, 125: December 1940): "Volksverdedigheid en volksverknegting kan alleen beëindig word as leiers lei en volgelingen volg, nie na willekeur van die een of ander kant nie, maar volgens die Woord van God en die historiese vasgelegde volksbestemming."

5. Malan had originally asked the O.B. to agree to the following clause: "Dat die O.B. erken dat die verwesenliking van staatkundige ideale soos o.a. die totstandkoming van 'n republiek en die vaststelling van sy politieke wese en struktuur, langs staatkundige weg moet geskied, so dat die bepaling van die stappe wat daartoe moet lei tot die funksies van die politieke party behoort en daarom buite-kant sy eie beslek lê." They had rejected this clause, and thereby (contents van der Walt) "is stilswygend maar onmisverstaanbaar neergeleë dat, alhoewel die O.B. hom nie wens te begewe op die party-politieke of parlementêre terrein nie, hy hom andersins nie wou laat beperk t.o.v. die stappe wat by mag nodig ag vir die bereiking van sy doel, ook nie wanneer die stappe mag lê op die 'staatkundige' weg nie." Van der Walt, p. 30.

Speech in the House of Assembly on 4 February 1941. *Debates* Vol. 41, p. 2196.

6. Smith refused to stand. Van der Walt p. 32.

7. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

dispose him against the O.B., and that van Rensburg had beerf, and still was, a National-Socialist.¹

Dr. van Rensburg accordingly resigned his position as Administrator as from the end of the year, and devoted the interim to the making of somewhat colourless speeches which were rich in references to the crisis of Afrikanerdom and his desire to serve his people, but which eschewed any reference to the O.B.² It was not until his inauguration as K-G. at Kroonstad on 15th January 1941, that he came out into the open as the spokesman of the movement, and deployed on its behalf that pregnant and Tacitean eloquence which was not the least of his assets. The O.B., he asserted on this occasion, was to be considered as Afrikanerdom mobilised on all fronts and for all emergencies. That its functions occasionally overlapped those of the F.A.K. or R.D.B. might be true, but it was not relevant, since "Die O.B. is die kern en konsentrasie van die Afrikanerdom," and could not, therefore, stand aloof from "die mees fundamentele instellings van die Afrikanerdom." "Waar hy kan dien, sal hy dien." But service did not lie along the road of revolution: "ek het nie in die O.B. gekom om rebellies en bloedvergieting te bewerkstellig nie"; on the contrary, the call was for discipline, constancy, patience and fortitude. And when he had finished, he was thus adjured: "Jy is deur God geroepe om jou volk te lei, Johannes van Rensburg: Wees sterk, hou koers."³

The O.B. had certainly changed horses for the better; and *Die Vaderland* took pleasure in devoting a eulogistic editorial to van Rensburg's outstanding qualities, expressing the hope that the O.B.—"the greatest Afrikaans organisation outside the Church" might by his means be securely harnessed to the volkswa.⁴ This was gall to *Die Transvaler*, which scented danger in van Rensburg's appointment, and which therefore made its comment on the K-G's *pronunciamento* vague in content and cool in tone.⁵ Undeterred, however, by the reactions of Verwoerd, van Rensburg now began a propaganda tour, accompanied, as Kotzé sourly noted, by an adjutant and a couple of bodyguards.⁶ And the O.B. grew by leaps and bounds.⁷ Afrikaners of every

1. Kotzé, pp. 6-11; van der Walt, pp. 32-3. The following members of the Groot Raad attended: Kotzé, Eloff, C. L. de Jager, J. J. Kruger, Schoeman, du Toit, van Zyl, Neethling, Cadie, J. F. v. d. Merwe, Nel, Stander, Smith, Jerling, Swart—i.e. 14 in all (*Die Volksblad*, 13 December 1940). But Kotzé asserts there were only 12 present; van der Walt states that one member refrained from voting. Stander resigned when van Rensburg was declared elected, on the grounds that he knew little of him, and that it was not fair to ask him to give up an assured position for the uncertainties of the Kommandant-Generaal's career. (van der Walt, p. 33).

2. See *Die Volksblad*, 13 December, 16 December, 31 December 1940.

3. *Die Transvaler* 18 January 1941.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 1 January 1941. Compare L. J. de Plessis' description of van Rensburg as "jonk, besielend, en met politieke (hoewel nie party-politieke nie) rigting." *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941. And see van der Walt pp. 34-37, for an account of van Rensburg's earlier career.

5. *Die Transvaler*, 18 January 1941.

6. Kotzé, pp. 11-12.

7. Malan in a speech to the House of Assembly on 4 February 1941, gave the strength of the O.B. as 300,000-400,000. *Debates*, Vol. 41, p.2196.

shade of opinion, disillusioned by the failure of Hereniging, animated by a vague idealism which could find no other obvious nucleus around which to crystallise, and swayed, undoubtedly, by the spectacular triumph of the German armies, rallied to van Rensburg's banner. In 1940 there had been founded in the Transvaal the corps of Stormjaers, an *élite* within the O.B., whose purpose was to protect their meetings from molestation, and who formed, as it were, the Stormtroopers of the movement. For a short time the apprehensions of the moderates had compelled the divorce of the Stormjaers from the O.B.; but they soon reunited, and indeed had never ceased to be commanded by the K-G. Van Rensburg took particular interest in the Stormjaers, whose discipline and military character made a special appeal to him; and from the time he became K-G. the militarist side of the O.B. was correspondingly strengthened. During the five months' absence of Kotzé (recuperating at the coast) those elements in the O.B. which were hostile to the H.N.P. began to get the upper hand, and their contempt for parliamentary methods was more and more openly expressed.¹ Van Rensburg had already been asked to stand for Parliament, and his refusal had rather increased than diminished his popularity.² In short, the O.B. was emerging, not as a non-political party, but as a "no-party!" party, a national anti-Parliamentary movement within which there were at least some extremists who shrank neither from the prospect of violence nor from the necessary preparations for it.³ There was indeed as yet no direct or open clash with the Party on questions of policy, but there was a perceptible tendency to exclude Party leaders from the innermost councils of the movement, the most notable example being the removal of Swart from the O.F.S. Beheerraad.⁴ The prospect was the more disturbing because the National-Socialist convictions which van Rensburg personally held (and of which he made no secret), were being disseminated now within the Party itself, and might form a bridge over which Party-members might pass to van Rensburg's allegiance. Ever since Otto du Plessis had published his pamphlet, *Die Rewolusie van die Twintigste Eeu*, soon after the fall of France, there had been a movement within the Party towards totalitarian ideologies. Pirow had publicly identified himself with National-Socialist doctrines in his pamphlet *Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika*, which ran through no less

1. Kotzé, *loc. cit.* Van der Walt (p. 17) points out that the composition of the Groot Raad did not become more military in Kotzé's absence. But it does not seem to have become more sympathetic to the H.N.P.

2. *Die Transvaaler*, 16 January 1941.

3. Kotzé, pp. 41-3.

4. J. J. H. Wood, *Die H.N.P. of 's Christelike Nasionale Republiek en die O.B. as Christelike Gesagstaaf*, p. 5. L. J. du Plessis in *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941. The official O.B. explanation of Swart's removal was that his case only followed the normal rule in the O.B., that Members of Parliament should not be office-holders in the movement, and that this was especially desirable after the split between Malan and Hertzog, as the O.B. had no wish to be drawn into the quarrel. Van der Walt, pp. 52-3.

than seven editions between December 1940 and May 1941. This pamphlet had been disseminated by the comprehensively-named Christelike Republikeinse Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Studiekring from P.O. Box 1270, Pretoria—the familiar address of Yssel and the Handhawersbond, now defunct; and Yssel acted as organiser of the movement. By June 1941, when the Rev. C. W. M. du Toit put out his popularised version of Pirow, the name had been changed to Die Nuwe Orde Studiekring, and the New Order Group within the H.N.P. was an established fact.¹ It drew its recruits almost exclusively from among those members of the Party who had formerly been Hertzogites, but, having refrained from joining the Afrikaner Party, had pinned their political faith on Pirow. The only Malanite to associate himself actively with this group was du Toit; though there was a moment when Dr. Karl Bremer seemed to be attracted.²

As early as October 1940, at the Cape Congress of the H.N.P., Malan found it necessary to make a stand against "groepvorming" within the Party.³ It was not a case now of Louis Weichardt and his handful of fanatical Greyshirt anti-Semites; the danger was of a defection within the ranks of the Party of some of its best men, and their close alliance with the O.B. There was a serious risk that the leadership of Afrikanerdom might pass to the non-Parliamentary front, and that the argument of force might supplant the force of argument.

The sober leaders of the principal Afrikaner non-political organisations—the Church, the F.A.K., the R.D.B.—were not convinced that Afrikanerdom could risk a whole-hearted support of the O.B. at the expense of the Party. A political struggle must be waged by political means; there was much to be said for leaders of tried experience—and still more, perhaps, for the immunities and licence enjoyed by His Majesty's Opposition. Nor were they prepared to destroy British political habits in order to replace them with German.⁴ They saw with alarm the possibility of a clash. The stalwarts of the Party, for their part, were on the defensive. In a speech at Witkop on 31st May 1941 Strydom said defiantly:

"As daar vandag mense is wat sê dat die politiek 'n klug is, en dat die politiek iets van die verlede is, dan sê ek met alle nadruk en met alle beslistheid dat daardie mense nie alleen aan hulself 'n onreg doen nie, maar dat hulle ontrou aan hulle volk is."⁵

¹ C. W. M. du Toit, *Nuwe Orde vir S.A., uiteengevat in 'n Saamspraak tussen 'n Kaas-Boer en sy Predikant*. Pirow had maintained his claim to be a loyal member of the H.N.P. without renouncing his claim to be considered as a loyal Hertzogite, and was on good terms with the O.B. *Die Vaderland*, 16 January 1941.

² Speech in *Die Transvaler*, 4 December 1940, *Die Vaderland*, 21 October 1940 (for Bremer and du Toit).

³ Van der Walt, p. 49.

⁴ L. J. du Plessis (*Koers*, VIII 2034, April 1941); *Stryd* (May 1941); Strydom, p. 14.

⁵ *Die Transvaler*, 2 June 1941.

And Malan, taking counsel with his lieutenants, decided that the Party organisation must be remodelled in such a way as to enable it to withstand the powerful counter-attraction of the O.B. This he proposed to do by decreasing the size of the Party unit until it was possible for even the smallest community of Afrikaners to form an H.N.P. "cell." The ordinary member of the Party was to be educated in his political faith; he was to be made to feel that he counted for something in the deliberation of his chiefs; and he was to be provided with local leaders who would be kept in touch with the central executive, and could so far enlighten the "cells" that there need be no Party member in future who was in the dark as to the significance of the decisions of the caucus, or of the policy pursued in the House. In short, the Party was to take a leaf out of the O.B.'s book, and by copying its methods (though of course with a democratic flavour retained) to enlist the broad masses of the electorate.¹

Such a scheme of reorganisation made a conflict with the O.B. inevitable, quite apart from all the other irks and frets that made relations delicate. Special gatherings of O.B. officers all over the Union passed resolutions notifying the Party of their objections to the scheme.² And, indeed, it marked a deliberate bid by the H.N.P. to control, not only the sphere of parliamentary politics, but also that of Volkspolitiek. The H.N.P. contended, of course, that the two could not be dissociated, if there were to be any real vitality in the parliamentary Opposition, and that Malan was simply making efficient a system which had hitherto not worked very well. They claimed that the Cradock Agreement gave them the control of the whole political field, and that since the O.B. was definitely limited to cultural and disciplinary activities, everything outside that limitation must fall to the H.N.P. The O.B., on the other hand, asserted that the Cradock Agreement had explicitly confined the H.N.P. to party-politics, and that everything else must be considered as the O.B.'s legitimate sphere of action. Each, in short, claimed to cover the whole Afrikaner front, with the exception of a narrowly-defined sector within which the other was to be permitted to operate.³

¹ *Lenheid, Vryheid, Reg*, Appendix, for this scheme L. J. du Plessis, *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941

Malan was careful to explain that the scheme was not an aping of any other organisation's ideas "Dit is slegs bereken om die wil van die volk aan die leiers oor te dra en die besluite van die leiers aan die volk bekend te maak." *Die Vaderland*, 1 July 1941

² Van der Walt, p. 53

³ The wording of the Agreement rather favoured the O.B. interpretation. Cilliers puts the matter neatly (*Nasionale Volksorg*, pp. 69-70). "The O.B. was quite willing to leave the occupation of a limited field—the field of the parliamentary front—to the Party, just as Hitler has allowed Mussolini to occupy Greece, while he gives his attention to bigger problems. The bigger problem for the O.B. was the conquest of the much broader terrain of Volkspolitiek. The O.B. would cover the whole front—so went the watchword (though the watchword was not known at the time). It was therefore not necessary to limit the membership of the O.B. to the full-blooded Purified alone, as the H.N.P. would have liked to see it limited. The H.N.P. wanted the O.B. as its action front, the O.B. wanted the H.N.P. as its action front. The H.N.P. panzer-divisions were to punch a hole in the so-called British-Jewish-Democratic Parliamentary front, while the O.B. infantry divisions thereafter in great and irresistible numbers would surge forward and roll up the Parliamentary front to left and right. But by this time the H.N.P. leaders had begun at last to realise what the other side was up to. They were afraid that they too would be rolled up with the parliamentary front."

Ever since the closing months of 1939 there had been in existence a Policy Commission (Beleidskomissie) or, as it was sometimes called, a Provisional Committee of National Unity (Voorlopige Volkseenheidskomitee) upon which the leading Afrikaner organisations had been represented, and of which Professor L. J. du Plessis was the Chairman. Its objects were to secure a united Afrikaner front, and also to prepare, for the future Afrikaner Republic, a constitution to include fundamental principles for every side of national life; it being understood that the Afrikaner State was to be based exclusively upon Christian-National principles. The O.B., the Churches, the F.A.K. and the R.D.B. were all represented on the Committee, though the Party was not. Nevertheless, since the Party now professed adherence to the Christian-National ideal, there was no clash of principle; and indeed since the end of 1940 there had been a cordial exchange of ideas with the H.N.P. leaders. It was this Committee which now came forward to avert a dangerous cleavage in the ranks of Afrikanerdom. The solution it propounded was a unified national front, into which the H.N.P. should be incorporated, and which would, therefore, be representative of every side of Nationalist activity. It recognised that (in the words of its Chairman) the O.B. "te jonk en onbeproof, te min ingestem na die stem van die volk, en te onbesonne is om toevertrou te word met die volle leierskap." Political leadership, therefore, must remain with the Party, but the Party in its turn must realise that politics could not now be divorced from culture or social welfare, and must consent to the inauguration of some composite authority (of which it should form a part) which would be able to coordinate policy over the whole field of Nationalist endeavour.¹

These were the principles which animated the Committee members when, towards the end of May 1941, they held a meeting in Bloemfontein, the ostensible purpose of which was to put the finishing touches to that draft-constitution for the Republic upon whose preparation they had been engaged now for nearly two years. The H.N.P. was to hold a Uniale Kongres in Bloemfontein on 3rd June, and it was desired to place the draft constitution in Malan's hands, and, if possible, to obtain his approval of it, before the Kongres opened. But in view of the threatening situation² they took the opportunity of drawing up a *Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies*, in which they affirmed their conviction of the necessity of the closest cooperation between all Afrikaner organisations, upon a Christian-National basis. The organisations

¹ *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941. Compare the words of Prof. C. G. Schumann, as reported in *Die Burger*, 3 June 1941: "... die Reddingsdaadbeweging, wat ongelukkig in die politieke strydperk geskep en deur beginsellose mense uitgebuit is ...". Cilliers, *Hertzogisme en die Handel*, p. 15 note.

² So threatening that van Rensburg refused to attend the Kongres (*Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941). Kotze, on the other hand, asserts that van Rensburg complained that he had not been invited though in fact no invitations were issued.

of which they were the representatives would not, however, interfere in the field of party-politics. But they could not remain indifferent to the political struggle, which was so closely linked to their own work, and they had, therefore, decided to offer their hearty cooperation and support to the political leaders, provided that those leaders accepted and acted upon a number of principles which they then proceeded to enumerate. Of these the most important were the following: a free, independent, Republican, Christian-National State based on the Word of God, eschewing all foreign models, and adapted to modern conditions from the constitutions of the old Republics; prohibition of capitalist exploitation, and the securing of a decent standard of living for every member of the Volk; no infringement of freedom of conscience—provided that the policy of the State did not require it; a native policy based on guardianship (voogdyskap); a Christian-National educational system; protection of the rights of Afrikaners; State responsibility for native health, insanity, old age and unemployment; and “the strongest emphasis” on the disciplining of the people.¹

This *Verklaring* was presented to the H.N.P. leaders when they attended, by invitation, an augmented² meeting of the Committee on 2nd June, the day before the Uniale Kongres met; and, as we shall see, Malan's acceptance of it was announced at the Kongres the following day. Before the assessor-members were admitted to the Committee, the Chairman, Professor L. J. du Plessis, moved a resolution (which the Committee unanimously accepted) providing for the setting-up of a Council of Policy (Beleidsraad), to be constituted by Malan, and to include the heads of the various organisations. They were to be present, however, not in their official, but in their private capacity, lest they should drag their organisations (hitherto strictly non-political) into politics. The function of the Council, as its name implied, was to be to formulate and direct a general policy for the whole national movement; and, in the second place, to delimit the spheres of influence of the several organisations whose leaders were included in its membership.³ It is scarcely surprising that this proposal should have proved unacceptable to the Party leaders.⁴ The H.N.P.'s own “Committee of Policy” met that same morning, and its meeting was remarkable for a distrust of the O.B. which made it extremely improbable that du Plessis' proposal would be accepted. Strydom accused van Rensburg of aiming at a dictatorship, and Malan

1 *Die Transvaler*, 13 June 1941: it was signed by I. M. Lombard (for the F.A.K.), van Rensburg (for the O.B.), du Plessis (for the Ekonomiese Instituut, F.A.K.), Diederichs (for the R.D.B.), and the Revs J. P. v. d. Spuy, I. D. Kruger, D. F. Erasmus, in their personal capacities: van der Walt, pp. 55-57.

2 By Malan, Swart, Strydom, Attie Fourie, T. E. Donges, Verwoerd, and J. A. Smith, Kotzé pp. 13-5, van der Walt, p. 57, Strydom p. 12. Curiously enough, Malan subsequently denied that he knew anything of the meetings of the Committee before 3 June. *Die Vaderland*, 12 August 1941.

3 *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941, Kotzé, pp. 13-15; van der Walt, pp. 58-59.

4 Although van der Walt (pp. 60-61) terms its rejection *onbegryplike kortsigtigheid* “

avowed his fear that the O.B. was becoming a rival political organisation.¹ And they both urged the superior usefulness of a coordinating body, whose activity would be confined to the harmonising of the individual activities of the cultural and political sides of Afrikanerdom, and to the prevention or resolution of internal strains and stresses. A council of policy must inevitably usurp, to a certain extent, the duties of the Party leader; it must decide political strategy; it might even attempt to dictate parliamentary tactics. The Party would find itself controlled by a body upon which the great majority would be persons outside the Party's Federale Raad.²

Confronted with the inflexible opposition of Strydom and Malan, du Plessis consented to withdraw his motion, and to accept in its place the proposal for a coordinating committee, it being understood that it should exercise its functions "op so 'n wyse dat die verskillende verteenwoordigde liggame met die behoud van selfstandigheid sal optree in adviserende hoedanigheid teenoor mekaar"; in other words, that each should have full liberty to play the candid friend towards the others.³

Next day, the Uniale Kongres considered these suggestions. It resolved unanimously to accept the *Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies*, which indeed tallied very closely with the resolutions agreed to by the H.N.P. Federale Raad in April, more especially in its rejection of all foreign political systems.⁴ Du Plessis then moved the formation of the coordinating committee, in terms which had been drawn up by Malan himself.⁵ The preamble to the motion, which was to be of considerable importance in what followed, ran:

"Die Kongres verklaar dat die H.N.P. of V. op die gebied van die partypolitieke leiding die enigste organisasie is wat die nasionaal-gesinde Afrikanerdom verteenwoordig . . . Die Kongres doen daarom 'n ernstige beroep op alle Afrikaners . . . om alle afwykende rigtings en groeppormings binne of buite die Party te ontmoedig, en om die Party in sy lewensbelangrike stryd aan die politieke front met alle mag te ondersteun."⁶

If the motion were accepted, said du Plessis, Malan would henceforth be able to speak, not in the name of the Party only, but in the name of the whole of Afrikanerdom.⁷ And J. A. Smith, in a famous passage, added: "Die Afrikanerdom is nou op die

1 Van der Walt, p. 59.

2 Kotze, pp. 13-5.

3 *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941.

4 "*Eenheid, Vryheid en Reg!*" pp. 9 *seqq.* Malan subsequently handed the Committee a written reply endorsing the *Verklaring* and accepting the conditions there laid down. His acceptance, however, included the demand that "daar geen inbreuk gemaak sal word op die gebied, en daar geen inmenging sal wees in die interne sake, van enige van die betrokke volksorganisasies nie" (*Die Transvaler*, 13 June 1941). Kotze assured the Kongres on behalf of the O.B. that the *Verklaring* was acceptable to them also (*ibid.* *cit.* *loc. cit.*)

5 *Die Vaderland*, 12 August 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 4 June 1941.

6 *Die Transvaler*, 4 June, 13 June 1941.

7 Kotze, pp. 15-6; Strydom, p. 12.

stormloop na die laaste stelling toe. Ons het nie nou tyd om te twis of halt te roep vir die wat langs die pad val nie. Elkeen wat uitspring om die mede-Afrikaner in die rug te steek sal met die sambok teruggejag word in die geledere. Hy sê dit met groter beslistheid as toe hy dit voorheen gesê het. Die Vrystaat het 'n sambok aan hom gegee en hy bied hierdie sambok vir dr. Malan aan."¹

The motion was carried without a dissentient voice, and the meeting proceeded to confer on Malan the title of Volksleier, and—more important in the long run—to vote him extraordinary powers. In this crisis of the Party and the nation, when the machinery of the one and the constitution of the other were alike in the melting-pot, the H.N.P. deemed it expedient to empower him, for the duration of the crisis, or until the Kongres should otherwise determine, to exercise all functions and discharge all business falling within the competence of any Congress or Party Executive, in so far as he considered such action to be necessary in the interests of the unity and efficiency of the Party. And in the exercise of these powers he was to be responsible to the Kongres alone.²

Thus at last the creation of a strong, unified volksfront seemed on the point of realisation.³ The coordinating committee was to meet on 9th June 1941 to draft its constitution and make a start upon the ticklish business of an "afbakening van terreine." The auguries seemed fair. *Die Transvaler* professed complete satisfaction at the results of the Kongres, which had not only averted a dangerous crisis, but had demonstrated the unanimity with which Afrikanerdom demanded an independent Christian-National Republic based, not on "British-Jewish" democracy, nor on totalitarian principles, but on the sound practice of the old Republics.⁴ To *Die Vaderland*, however, always cocking an ear for rifts in the lute, the position seemed less clear. The Kongres, it asserted, had been designed to bring to a head the subterranean struggle between Strydom and Pirow for the soul of the Party, the one contending for a democratic state and an Opposition on parliamentary lines, the other for a National-Socialist Republic with no political parties but an all-embracing volksbeweging. In this view Pirow and van Rensburg were acting in concert to undermine the authority of Malan and Strydom. And, in *Die Vaderland's* opinion, the Bloemfontein meeting had done nothing to settle this undeclared war.⁵ A. C. Cilliers, writing after the breach between the H.N.P. and the O.B., went even further. The whole business of the Volksleierskap, he

1. Kotzé, pp. 15-6; *Die Transvaler*, 4 June 1941.

2. "Eenheid, Vryheid en Reg!" pp. 13-15; *Die Transvaler*, 4 June 1941.

3. *Die Burger*, 13 June 1941; Cilliers, *Hertzogisme en die Honderd*, p. 15; *id.*, *Nasionale Volksorg*, p. 48, for a pointed quotation from *Mein Kampf*.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 4 June 1941; and see Malan's speech in "Eenheid, Vryheid en Reg!" pp. 1-9.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 3 and 4 June 1941.

contended, was a trap, into which Malan stupidly walked with his eyes open. The result of the Kongres was, therefore, a great triumph for Pirow and van Rensburg.

"He exchanged the Party's first-born right (as the most sovereign organisation in public life) for a fiction—Volksleierskap. How could there ever be any question of Volksleierskap if the constituent groups—the O.B., the R.D.B., the F.A.K., the Church—were afterwards going to claim the maintenance of their independence? . . . If the Volksleierskap had any significance, then the various groups could indeed retain their identity, but certainly not—as was insisted on at the Congress—their independence . . . In any case, what Dr. Malan did (as the other groups interpreted it) was to share his political leadership with some three or four organisations, one of which had absolutely no responsibility to his leadership. Instead of one master, with the title of leader, the H.N.P. was creating four masters, one of whom had indeed the title of Volksleier, but had only a quarter of his former authority.¹

These explanations are not without a certain cogency. It is undeniable that the Party leaders viewed with alarm and resentment Pirow's spreading of propaganda for the New Order.² The resolutions of the H.N.P. Federale Raad in April 1941 had been largely concerned with this matter. The Party's attitude on that occasion had been that there was nothing in the New Order proposals which was not already covered by the H.N.P. programme—except the rejection of parliamentary democracy; and democracy (with suitable modifications) the Party was not prepared to abandon. Strydom's speech on 31st May³ had been a direct answer to a speech of Pirow on the preceding day. The issue between them would probably have to be fought out sooner or later; though the Pirowites were anxious to avoid giving the impression that they wished to split the Party, and Pirow had kept discreetly in the background at the Kongres, and even supported the resolutions.⁴ The H.N.P., on their side, had probably come to the conclusion that it was still too early to force the issue, and that everything was to be gained by waiting a little longer. The Bloemfontein meeting was, therefore, indeed an indecisive affair, as *Die Vaderland* correctly maintained. But there is no reason on that account to accept Cilliers' thesis. It presupposes, as Cilliers says, astonishing stupidity on the part of Malan and Strydom. Now neither Malan nor Strydom needed any instruction in political tactics. And, indeed, from their point of view, the Kongres had been a decided success. It had unanimously condemned National-Socialism. It had given Malan extraordinary

1. Cilliers, *Nasionale Volksorg*, p. 71.

2. See C. W. M. du Toit, *Nuwe Orde*, pp. 28 seq; Kotzé, pp. 13-15; *Die Transvaler*, 3 February 1940, for early signs of Pirow's ambition; *Die Vaderland*, 21 August 1940 on the same topic.

3. See above, p. 80.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 4 June 1941, Pirow said: "Ons het maar een Party wat ons kan red. en dit is die H.N.P."

powers which had nothing to do with the "Volksleierskap," and which he was to use to strengthen the organisation of the Party against precisely the sort of threat that a Pirow-van Rensburg alliance might be supposed to imply. It had provided a machinery of conciliation in the shape of the coordinating committee which, though it had not control of H.N.P. policy, might succeed in avoiding open war with the O.B., at any rate for the present; and this committee was to proceed to an *afbakening van terreine* which, the H.N.P. might fairly hope, would be more watertight than the Cradock Agreement. To the condemnation of National-Socialism and *groepvorming*, moreover, the O.B., through its Chairman, had given explicit assent, while the K-G. himself had signed the *Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies*. From the H.N.P. point of view, therefore, it must appear that Malan's hands had been greatly strengthened, and that if it should be necessary to proceed to disciplinary measures against the New Orderites, he would be in a much better position than if the battle had taken place at the Uniale Kongres. As *Die Vaderland* foresaw, the Transvaal congress in August would probably be the testing-time; and, as experience proved, Malan's authority was by then amply sufficient for Pirow's excommunication.

It is not quite easy to determine the implication of the Volksleierskap. From Malan's point of view, there was certainly no reason for declining it, and good reason for accepting. It might mean much or little: at least it could do no harm. If it were to give him some sort of claim to speak for Afrikanerdom as a whole, and not only for the Party (as du Plessis' speech clearly stated), why then *tant mieux*: if it should prove after all an empty honour, that would not impair the enhanced authority conferred upon him by the Kongres. Facts meant more than words, and he was the last man to allow himself to play Hindenburg to van Rensburg's Hitler. And, if the war should end quickly in defeat for the Allies, even the title might not be without its uses. But Cilliers' theory really breaks down on its implicit assumption that the whole business of the coordinating committee and the Volksleierskap had been stage-managed by Pirow and van Rensburg in collaboration. It may be that Pirow had fairly close contacts with the K-G.; but there is absolutely no evidence that they had any great influence on the course of events on 2nd and 3rd June. The initiative lay in the hands of the Provisional Committee, where van Rensburg was only one member among many, and more particularly in the hands of du Plessis. Du Plessis' object at this time was a Christian-National Republic on a practical basis of modified democracy and a theoretical basis of Calvinist political philosophy. To realise his aim, to secure that Afrikanerdom was able to live in the sort of State where it could develop "all that it had in it to be"—for these

purposes there must be a volksfront, a unified national movement, an end of volkskeuring. In the wider, humaner sense in which ~~is~~ understood politics, he believed that the statesman should be in touch with every aspect of the national life: *nihil humani a se alienum putabat*. The Party was necessary, the O.B. was necessary; and fundamentally—as their acceptance of the conditions of the *Verklaring* showed—there was virtual unanimity on all major issues. Even the New Order were to be considered as misguided and superficial thinkers, who had misinterpreted their present discontents with democracy until they fancied themselves Nazis. For himself he had still as little liking for a German as for a British Imperialism: his spiritual home was still neither Berlin nor London, but Geneva.

Under the influence of these ideas, du Plessis had endeavoured to secure a sort of Afrikaans federation, with the Beleidsraad as central government. In this he had been defeated; and it is noteworthy that the coordinating committee, with which he had to content himself, was proposed neither by van Rensburg nor by Pirow, but by the H.N.P. leaders. And du Plessis accepted it. If it prevented Afrikaners from working at cross-purposes, he would be satisfied. As to the Volksleierskap, he did not conceive it either on the one hand as putting Malan in the position of *der Führer*, or on the other as reducing him to a mere figure-head. For Malan's gifts as a leader he had a genuine respect. Malan, he considered, had the secret "om die strewinge van sy volk in sy eie persoon op te neem, te verhewe, te versterk en te verwerk tot sy persoonlike-eie beleid, en daaraan uiting te gee in 'n onvergelyklik deurwrogte en rotsvaste volksleiding," as Hertzog, for instance, could not do.¹ Malan would now, he hoped, rise above the petty internecine struggles of the factions to a broad statesmanship which should be truly national. But naturally he would not attempt to dictate to the other organisations how they should manage their own affairs: it would be the business of the coordinating committee to secure unity-in-diversity. The prefix *Volks-* therefore did not imply an unlimited sovereign authority; it was rather indicative of the fact that his leadership was in future to enjoy the moral support of all the national organisations.

"In hierdie verband" (wrote du Plessis) "het die uitroeping van die partyleier as volksleier misverstand veroorsaak, wat behoort te verdwyn so gou as ingesien word dat deur die onderlinge samewerking nie alleen die partyleier volksleier geword het nie, en wel op politieke gebied, maar ook die kultuurleier volksleier op kulturele gebied, en die ekonomiese leier volksleier op ekonomiese gebied, ens. Dit is nou feitlik die posisie, en daardeur is die selfstandigheid van elke volksorganisasie gevrywaar en die gelykheid van almal

1. Koers, VIII, 239-241, June 1942.

verseker, en veral die politieke kleur verwyder van die algemene samewerking in die eenheidskomitee.¹"

Whether the H.N.P. would accept this somewhat subtle interpretation remained to be seen. Certainly, as long as the title of Volksleier was not accorded to any other Afrikaner than Malan, it would be difficult to avoid the temptation to assume that the Volksleierskap gave to him—as Party leader—and hence by extension gave to the Party itself, a position of primacy over other Afrikaans organisations, even though he made no attempt to exploit it to exercise any control over these bodies in any field that was indisputably non-political.

(iii)

Before the new coordinating committee, agreed upon at Bloemfontein, could be constituted, it was found necessary to hold a last meeting of that provisional committee of which L. J. du Plessis was the Chairman. It met in Johannesburg on 9th June, and to it representatives of the O.B. and the H.N.P. were summoned.² The meeting decided that the coordinating committee should be known as the Afrikanereenheidskomitee, and that Malan should be its convener and P. J. Meyer its secretary. It was to comprise the leaders of "at least" the H.N.P., O.B., R.D.B. and F.A.K. as well as representatives of suitable Church bodies, "in so ver as die Afrikaanse kerke daartoe bereid is," and it was to have the right to coopt additional members. Its policy was defined as that of the *Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies* and the *Konsep-Grondwet*, both of which were formally accepted by the meeting. The delicate business of delimitation of spheres of interest was left to the first meeting of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee, but in the meantime some progress was made to an improvement in relations between the H.N.P. and O.B., by a resolution which called for an agreed policy on the question of how far individuals were to be permitted to be office-holders in both bodies. It was further agreed that the methods of organisation of H.N.P. and O.B. should not be the same, and that all Afrikaner organisations should appoint liaison officers (skakelpersone) to deal with local difficulties: major issues, of course, would be referred to the Afrikanereenheidskomitee.³ The O.B. soon afterwards implemented one of these resolutions by a proclamation which laid it down that persons who were office-holders in both O.B. and H.N.P. should

¹ *Koers*, IX, 34 35, August 1941.

² For what follows see *Die Transvaler*, 13 June 1941 (Du Plessis, statement to the Press, promulgated from Potchefstroom 11 June 1941), *Koizé*, pp 16-8, Strydom, p. 12; *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941, *van der Welt*, pp 63 *seqq*.

³ Kotze gives other resolutions, the most important of which were another disavowal of Nazism, a pledge by other organisations not to meddle in the party-political field, and a pledge of assistance to the Party. These do not occur in the official reports communicated to the press, but they were, of course, largely covered by the *Verklaring*. He also asserts that van Rensburg, on his suggestion, took the opportunity to declare he had no intention of introducing Nazism or dictatorship into South Africa.

ask themselves whether they could properly fulfil both duties, and if not—or if advised by their superior officer that they could not—they must choose between them.¹

Thus the meeting of 9th June appeared to the interested public to have been harmonious and successful, and was in all probability also considered in that light by those attending it. But one trivial incident in the course of the proceedings was to have momentous consequences. Upon the acceptance by the meeting of the draft constitution (a copy of which was in the hands of everyone present) J. A. Smith arose and asked: "Kan ons nou die Republiek propageer?" to which Malan replied, "Ja sekerlik." Kotzé afterwards conjectured that Malan had supposed Smith to be asking, "Can anybody now preach the Republican ideal?" whereas what he had really meant (as appeared from what followed) was "Can the O.B. disseminate the *Konsep-Grondwet*?"² It might at first sight appear somewhat otiose to ask Malan whether it were permitted to preach Republicanism, if we did not in fact know that Smith had asked Malan the same question already in Bloemfontein a week earlier.³ It is at any rate agreed by both sides that some question of the sort was asked at Johannesburg, and that Malan's answer gave rise to the mistaken idea that the O.B. was now at liberty to print, publish and disseminate the draft-constitution.⁴

The O.B. lost no time in acting on this presumed permission. On 3rd July they put out their ill-fated "Omsendbrief 1/41," which contained not merely the principles but the details of the new constitution; although it appears that on 9th June it had been decided to reserve the details for further discussion by the Afrikanereenheidskomitee. No less than 100,000 copies were showered upon the country.⁵ This was to give hostages to fortune with a vengeance. It availed van Rensburg nothing to declare⁶ that the O.B.'s participation in the Eenheidskomitee did not imply its subordination to any political party. For he had in fact gratuitously handed to the Party a stick wherewith to beat the O.B.—if it chose. The circular 1/41 had been a clear inroad into the political sphere. Malan, as the head of the Party, was the only man entitled to concern himself with the time and method of a Republican campaign. It was a breach of the Cradock Agreement, a breach of the undertakings, implicit or explicit, of 2nd and 9th June. If Malan chose to press his advantage, he might precipitate a

1 Kotzé, p. 17, van der Walt, p. 64.

2 Kotzé, p. 16.

3 Which might appear one argument against supposing that he was now asking it again. See Malan's speech at Stellenbosch, 27 August 1941, reported in *Die Transvaler*, 28 August 1941.

4 See van Rensburg's admission on 2 August 1941, as reported by du Plessis *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941. But Malan later asserted that in reply to a question whether he meant that the constitution could now be published, he had replied that it could not, since publication would be tactically premature (*Die Transvaler*, 28 August 1941). But who asked the question? If Smith or van Rensburg, there could have been no "misunderstanding."

5 The O.B. Groot Raad had approved it. Kotzé, pp. 18-9.

6 At Vlakfontein, 12 July, 1941. *Die Vaderland*, 14 July 1941.

decidedly awkward situation. The H.N.P., however, for the moment gave no sign. No violent reaction blackened the front page of *Die Transvaler*. Apparently van Rensburg was to be allowed to retrieve his *gaffe* in the decent privacy of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee.

On 2nd August, then, that committee held its first meeting in Johannesburg. The proceedings were mainly concerned with the constitution and conduct of the committee itself. A feeling of uneasiness had already become apparent in R.D.B. and F.A.K. circles, which foresaw the possibility that the new committee might in fact involve them in purely political matters outside their proper purview; and as early as the beginning of July this feeling had found emphatic expression at the R.D.B. Congress, when it needed all the persuasiveness of du Plessis and Diederichs to divert attacks by R.D.B. members on the policy of joining the Eenheidskomitee.¹ The *éclat* with which Malan had been hailed as Volksleier had awoken apprehensions lest the H.N.P. should try to extend its control to matters outside the range of politics. Hence on 2nd August, the F.A.K.'s representative, supported by the R.D.B., asked that the chairman of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee should be neither Malan nor van Rensburg, but someone who could stand neutral between them—a request which showed, clearly enough, that the main business of the committee would be to avoid clashes between these two powerful bodies.² Accordingly, L. J. du Plessis was elected Chairman, and any hope that the H.N.P. may have had of occupying a dominating position on the committee was frustrated. Du Plessis had obviously been giving further consideration to the best means of maintaining harmony; and he now came forward with a suggestion for a political sub-committee of the Eenheidskomitee, to consist of Malan, van Rensburg and himself as Chairman of the Eenheidskomitee; though he offered at the same time to resign the Chairmanship if it was felt that thereby matters might be facilitated. It is curious that when he had first broached the project to Malan—by letter, before the meeting—he had suggested Malan, van Rensburg and Pirow (presumably to represent the ex-Hertzogites) as the triumvirate. To this Malan had taken such decided objection that the proposal in that form had at once been dropped. It had shown, indeed, a lack of tact unusual in its author. Malan could not be expected to negotiate as an equal with one of his own followers, and one, moreover, who was suspected of aiming at the leadership, and was shortly to be the object of disciplinary measures by the Party. At all events, the Afrikanereenheidskomitee refused to accept du Plessis' resignation from the office of Chairman,

1. *Die Vaderland*, 5, 4, 5 July 1941.

2. "Hierdie voorstel" (comments van der Walt) "klink beslis eienaardig komende van dieselfde mense wat presies twee maande vroeër voorgestaan het vir 'n sentrale Beleidraad saamgestel deur Dr. Malan." (van der Walt, p. 65).

and rejected his idea of a triumvirate. Its chance of adoption was not improved, perhaps, by the phrase—"Volksleierskap-in-rade van dr. Malan op die gebied van die volkspolitiek"—in which du Plessis described it. Volksleierskap-in-rade had been precisely the rôle for which the Nationalists had cast Hertzog, a year before: it was not now to be expected that it would suit Malan. On the other hand, the use of the word "volkspolitiek"—not Partypolitiek—could not but encourage the H.N.P. to persist in claims which must inevitably clash with those of the O.B. Take it for all in all, the zeal of Professor du Plessis seems on this occasion to have outrun his discretion.¹

For the rest, the Afrikanereenheidskomitee agreed to increase the representation of the various interests upon the committee, so that the H.N.P. and O.B. should each have three members, while the F.A.K. and R.D.B. each had two. It also drew up and accepted certain grondbeginsels which in effect repeated, in altered phraseology, those of the *Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies*, and blended them with the resolutions of the H.N.P. Federale Raad.² On the all-important (but perhaps insoluble) question of afbakening van terreine, they took no decision, preferring to rely on existing agreements, "since the leaders understand one another."³ There was indeed a vague declaration that the task of the Party was "om die Republiek staatkundig te bepaal en te verwesenlik," while that of the O.B. was "om die volk te disiplineer, ten einde die Republiek deur algemene volksaksie te verwesenlik,"⁴ but that was all, and it was not much. Thus the committee deliberately burked the issue it had been constituted to solve. The more closely the question was examined, the more formidable it became. Where to draw the line between Partypolitiek and Volkspolitiek, between discipline and Party discipline? All they could do was to endeavour to cultivate a spirit of mutual trust and aid, appeal for disputes to be brought to them as a tribunal of conciliation, and for the rest affect to believe that it would be a case of *solvitur ambulando*.

There might seem some ground for such a belief in the way in which the matter of the O.B. Omsendbrief was ventilated. The question came up, apparently, incidentally ("terloops"), and was settled without difficulty in a spirit of amity. Van Rensburg confessed that the O.B. had made a mistake; that there had been a "misunderstanding"; that he ought not to have permitted publication of "details"; and he undertook to clarify the position in his next public speech, "sodat die ander deelhebbende liggame nie as gevolg van die omsendbrief in verleentheid sou kom nie."⁵

1. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941. So much so, that van der Walt considers (p. 67) that the proposal administered a shock to the H.N.P.'s trust in the Committee, from which it never recovered.

2. *Ibid.*; *Die Transvaler*, 14 and 18 August, 1941; Kotzé, pp. 20-1.

3. Kotzé, *loc. cit.*

4. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941; Kotzé, pp. 20-1.

This *amende honorable* Malan graciously accepted. The incident appeared closed. Yet it could not but have encouraged the H.N.P. in the feeling that they had gained a tactical success. The leaders "understood one another" at least to this extent, that they realised that no attack could be made without retaliation, no infringement without instant resentment, no false step without sure retribution. But this armed truce must continue. Neither dare risk accepting responsibility for precipitating a breach, so soon after the creation of the Volksfront. And so, for the present, van Rensburg mildly withdrew, and Malan refrained from pressing his advantage. But each remembered. And Malan, for his part, must have felt his hand strengthened for the work of settling accounts with Pirow—already too long delayed—on which he and his lieutenants had already determined.

The question of New Order propaganda was down on the agenda for the Transvaal Provincial Congress of the H.N.P., summoned for 12th August to Pretoria. It was still possible, of course, that a direct clash might be avoided, as it had been at Bloemfontein; and it is certain that in some H.N.P. circles no open breach was expected, since the H.N.P. on the Rand had at the beginning of July arranged for a great "fees" on 30th August at which Malan, Pirow and Strydom were to be the chief speakers.¹ But in fact Malan, spurred on in all probability by Strydom, had already resolved on the proscription of the New Order. He was not prepared wholly to abandon democratic principles; he could not help believing in the Party system and Parliamentary Government; above all, he could not be indifferent to Pirow's efforts to form, within the Party, a group which looked, not to the Volksleier, but to himself, for guidance and leadership. It was in this last fact, above all, that Malan scented real danger. The H.N.P. could tolerate the Greyshirts—could even welcome their support—for Weichardt was insignificant and his following small; it dare not tolerate a similar groepvorming by a man of Pirow's influence and personality.² On 4th August Malan appeared (somewhat reluctantly) on the same platform as Pirow, at Senekal, O.F.S. The audience found itself exhorted to diametrically opposite courses: on the one hand Pirow championed the New Order, denounced party, and affirmed his intention to maintain his own organisation; on the other, Malan inveighed against groepvorming and afwykende rigtings, and appealed to his hearers to stick to the old, tried leaders. It must have been a stimulating, if slightly confusing, occasion. "Adv. Pirow," ran *Die Transvaler's* headlines, "bly by sy Nazisme."³ It was the signal for the attack.

On 7th August the first shot was fired by Malan at Nylstroom, to be echoed the same day by Strydom at Lichtenburg. On 8th

1. *Die Vaderland*, 2 July 1941

2. *Die Vredegrond*, 11 August 1941, makes this point well.

3. *Die Transvaler* 5 August 1941.

August the barrage roared all along the line, with a slashing editorial in *Die Transvaler*, Malan in full spate in the Waterberg, and Swart gravely admonitory at Bloemfontein. Thereafter, until the Congress met on 12th August, not a day passed without an attack, either in the H.N.P. Press or from the H.N.P. platform, on the principles of Nazism, its relevancy to South Africa, or the volksvyandelike enormity of groepvorming.¹ It was inevitable (as perhaps the H.N.P. leaders foresaw) that Pirow should reply, and that his reply should exacerbate the position. His speech at Grootvlei on 9th August displayed him as the wicked animal which when attacked defends itself. He protested that there had been no prohibition of his propaganda at the Bloemfontein Congress, and professed to find this sudden onslaught inexplicable. What did it all mean? he cried, with some pathos. And he himself provided the answer: "Net dit—daar is mense wat by aanstaande Transvaalse kongres 'n skeuring gaan soek."² Here was the gauntlet flung back to some purpose. The fatal word had been spoken; the irretractable charge had been made; the inexpiable accusation had been explicitly levelled: *skeuring*. *Skeuring*—the unforgivable sin of Afrikaans politics. Pirow, himself the potential volkskeurder (or so the H.N.P. leaders represented him), had got his blow in first. Injured innocence was his line, and he meant to stick to it. On 11th August *Die Vaderland* contained the announcement that Yssel, that most ill-fated of politicians (no doubt under gentle pressure from Pirow) had resigned his position as hooforganiseerder to the New Order group, in consequence of criticisms in the Press directed to the fact that the New Order had an office and an organisation. Surely the sacrifice of this lamb must convince all the world that no groepvorming was, or had been, in contemplation?³

Malan and Strydom were not to be mollified by gestures of this sort. They had in any case other things to think about. The quarrel had broadened: the war had spread. For on that same 9th August, while Pirow had been addressing the bemused but sympathetic populace of Grootvlei, van Rensburg, by what to the Malanite section seemed almost like preconcerted arrangement, had been kindling the ready indignation of the O.Bs. of Elsburg. In the well-weighed and dispassionate phraseology of L. J. du Plessis, he "die selfstandigheid van die O.B. teenoor die party-politieke wese op taamlik ontakvolle manier beklemtoon het."⁴ He boldly appropriated to the O.B. the whole credit for the draft constitution which had been disseminated. The Republic which the O.B. desired was not simply any sort of Republic: no, it

1. *Die Transvaler*, 6 to 12 August 1941, *passim*.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 11 August 1941; *Die Vaderland*, 11 August 1941.

3. Statement by Yssel in *Die Vaderland*, 11 August 1941.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941: du Plessis also used the phrase "op taamlik, vrasse wyse" to describe van Rensburg's manner.

was a Republic better than old Paul Kruger's, a Republic in which others than the political parties should have a say. "Ons gaan ons nie laat koppel aan seksies wat wil skeur nie." "Die O.B. vir die hele volk—hy dek die hele front." Having hurled this challenge at Malan, he went even further: "Die afgelope paar dae lyk dit asof daar weer moeilikhede gaan kom op politieke gebied. Die onenigheid is soos 'n kanker in ons volk. Laat my dit sê: hoe meer skeuring en moeilikheid aan die politieke front, hoe meer rede is dit dat die hekke van die O.B. oopgegooi en ook aan elke Afrikaner gesê word: Jy is welkom binne die O.B. By ons in die O.B. is nasionaal-sosialiste ook welkom." "Ons verwelkom almal binne die O.B.—dit lyk of ons op 'n nuwe ketterjag uit is—of ons op die punt staan om op 'n nuwe ketterjag uit te gaan."¹

And what of his undertaking to withdraw and explain the Omsendbrief? To the astonishment and indignation of the H.N.P., not a syllable to this effect appeared in the accounts of van Rensburg's speech. This, however, the O.B. contended, was the result of an accident: the reporter from *Die Transvaler*, who was quite unaware of the disavowal which van Rensburg had engaged to make, left the meeting before he had finished speaking, having secured, as he imagined, the marrow of the speech. The apology, or explanation, came later, and did not appear in any newspaper, since all the others simply copied *Die Transvaler's* report.²

Yet it is impossible to believe that van Rensburg can have been under any doubts as to what he had done. He had declared war upon the Party, supported a schismatic within its ranks, and (apparently) broken his undertaking to withdraw the Omsendbrief. It was a complication of provocations, a gratuitous tweaking of the Party's nose, such as no man calling himself Volksleier could possibly endure. The armed truce had been violated, and in a manner calculated to do Malan the greatest possible injury. Some explanation of the Kommandant-Generaal's behaviour is obviously required. How did it come about that, only a week after fraternising with Malan at Johannesburg, he embarked upon a war to the knife? The natural explanation is, of course, the H.N.P.'s campaign against Pirow. That campaign, if pressed to its conclusion, seemed almost certain to cause a split, of greater or lesser dimensions, within the Party's ranks. Now in such a situation it became a main preoccupation with van Rensburg to avoid being drawn into the quarrel. He had no wish to split the O.B. on an issue domestic to the Party. The trouble which had attended the breakdown of Hereniging had been sufficiently unpleasant already. The enormous majority

1. Our *insets*. *Die Transvaler*, 11 August 1941; *Die Vaderland*, 11 August 1941; *Kotzé, pp. 21-3. The published reports do not bear out Kotzé's assertion that van Rensburg referred to the Z.A.R. as "a Sammy Marks republic"; and Kotzé was probably confusing this speech with Pirow's on 16 August. (For this speech of Pirow's, see *Die Vaderland*, 17 August 1941).

2. *Die Vaderland*, 23 August 1941; van der Walt, p. 78.

of O.B. members were also members of the H.N.P.; it was obvious that, in the event of the proscription of Pirow by the Party, they would wish to know what the attitude of the O.B. would be to the question. It could hardly be expected of van Rensburg that he should abet the Malanites in their attack upon National-Socialism, since he made no secret of the fact that it was his own creed. All that could be expected of him was that he should remain neutral. And this, in effect, was the policy enunciated in the Elsburg speech. True, it was expounded in terms which could hardly fail to be offensive to the Party; but in essence it was a declaration of the O.B.'s disinterestedness in the affair. This disinterestedness, moreover, was in consonance with the general attitude of the O.B. upon political questions. The politicians might fret and squabble and mouth and strut, but the O.B., which was the real volksbeweging, had no time to spare for such cliquy parochialism; its outlook was broader, more catholic, more truly national. And this too was an attitude which could not fail to be irritating to Malan. The prospect of the O.B.'s becoming a sort of Cave of Adullam, in which the rebels against Party discipline would receive a welcome, and be permitted to consort with and perhaps contaminate the faithful, was not to be tolerated. If this was what the collaboration promised in June was to mean, the sooner it was broken the better. From van Rensburg's point of view, too, it may have appeared that it would be well to take a firm stand in regard to the Party at once. Underlying the tone of the Elsburg speech may well have been the consideration that, after all, attack is the best defence. Pirow was the victim to-day; if he were not supported, but were allowed to be put down, might not van Rensburg be the victim to-morrow? At all events, it appears that there were not lacking cogent reasons for van Rensburg's proceedings. It was not merely the chivalry of one ideologue towards another that induced him to rush to the rescue at Elsburg. But his calculations had one fatal flaw. He was envisaging the cleaving asunder of the H.N.P., with either the victory, or the ejection, of Pirow. What he never envisaged was the disintegration of the Ossewa-Brandwag.

Thus there were far more important issues at stake than the retention or expulsion of Pirow; and the proceedings of the Transvaal Congress were affected accordingly.¹ Strydom's motion to approve the April resolutions of the Federale Raad as accepted by the Uniale Kongres, was indeed carried; and C. W. M. du Toit's amendment, which would have licensed the New Order to make propaganda within the Party, was easily defeated—in spite of Pirow's threat that "daar is duiende mense wat by die Afrikaner Party sal aansluit as die Nuwe Orde in die ban gedoen word." But Malan's big speech was so transformed

1. For what follows see *Die Vagterland*, 12, 13 and 17 August 1941; *Die Transvaaler*, 13 and 14 August 1941; Kotzé, pp. 23-4.

by the events of the previous week that its main emphasis now lay, not so much upon the repugnancy of the New Order to H.N.P. principles as upon the countercheck-quarrelsome ~~to~~ van Rensburg. As to Pirow, Malan admitted that perhaps 85 per cent. of the New Order programme marched in step with the fundamentals of the H.N.P.; but in these respects a separate propaganda institution such as Pirow had set up was quite unnecessary. And in any case, the H.N.P. neither could nor would approve the one-party system. That really disposed of Pirow; and perhaps for 'convenience' sake the sequel may be narrated here. A new oath of loyalty to the Party was voted, which, it was hoped, would separate the sheep from the goats—though many Pirowites professed themselves ready to take it. Their fate was then left in the hands of Malan, in virtue of the extraordinary powers vested in him at Bloemfontein. It did not suit them, however, to await their sentence passively: they preferred to retire with dignity rather than be summarily thrown out. So on 16th August Pirow, being willing to justify himself, made a sort of farewell speech; whereupon he, with seventeen other M.P.s, formally constituted themselves as a New Order Group, and announced their intention of defying the Party ban on their propaganda.¹ But, in 1941 as in 1940, Pirow endeavoured to make the best of all possible worlds, and carefully avoided any unnecessary slamming of doors. Just as he had remained at once a Hertzogite and a loyal member of the H.N.P. when Hereniging lay in ruins, so now the Pirowites explained with all possible earnestness that their adherence to the Party was not to be considered as in any way impaired. The parallel struck even *Die Vaderland*, whose editor, indeed, professed to feel "quite queer"—almost as if he were attending an exhumation.² But *Die Vaderland* was less concerned to point out the remarkable consistency of Pirow's political conduct than to demonstrate the analogy between the extrusion of the Hertzogites and the condemnation of the New Order. Just as Swart had hounded out Hertzog, so now Strydom was for jockeying Pirow.

The Pirow episode, however, was much inferior in importance to the struggle with the O.B., and it was to this that Malan directed the more important half of his speech on 12th August. His tactics were admirable. He kept his temper; he moderated his indignation; he eschewed rhetoric. He concentrated on putting the O.B. wholly in the wrong, not merely in the eyes of the Party, but in the eyes of their own members, as well as of all moderate Afrikaners. He addressed to van Rensburg a series of eight

1 Pirow endeavoured to persuade his audience that the New Order was really just a little study circle. The seventeen were C. W. M. du Toit, J. A. P. Venter, J. H. Grobler, N. J. Schoeman, C. J. van der Berg, P. J. Bosman, S. Bekker, J. S. Labuschagne, J. J. Wentzel, A. P. Swart, S. W. Naude, E. A. Roux, G. P. Brits, P. J. du Plessis, D. A. S. de Bruyn, J. D. H. Verster, Senator I. Raubenheimer. *Die Vaderland*, 17 August 1941.

2 "herinneringe . . . wat 'n mens 'n soort floute-gevoel gegee het, soos by die oopgrawe van 'n kuis" *Die Vaderland*, 13 August 1941.

questions. Their drift may be summed up in a single sentence: Had not the O.B. committed itself to an agreement with the H.N.P., and had it not violated the spirit and letter of that agreement? These questions he challenged van Rensburg to answer in his next public speech. Now it so happened that on the very next day van Rensburg was to address the O.B.s of Reitz. Wisely, he declined to answer Malan's questions at such short notice; but he promised a full reply in his speech at Brakpan on 23rd August. And, with some hardihood, he not merely reaffirmed his Elsburg statements, but made them even more explicit and uncompromising. He said, for instance, that "Malan se bewering as sou die O.B. die politieke leiding van die H.N.P. erken het heel ongegrond is," and added: "dat die O.B. dus die politieke leiding van een Party by voorbaat aanvaar het, is nie waar nie."² It was in any case deplorable, he felt, that dirty linen should thus be washed in public: the proper place for dealing with such matters was surely the Afrikanereenheidskomitee. This was a covert hit at Malan, who was resisting all appeals from L. J. du Plessis to call the committee together.³ It did not suit Malan's book to try methods of conciliation now. He was feeling his ground, hoping to put the O.B. still further in the wrong, working for a situation in which no impartial committee would be able to avoid deciding against van Rensburg. And so, for the moment, the dispute raged unchecked; to the great concern of men like du Plessis, on the one hand, and Kotzé, on the other.

Kotzé seems from the earliest days of the O.B. to have been one of those—Swart was conspicuously another—who hoped to see the O.B. linked as closely as possible with the Party. The removal of Swart, the advent of van Rensburg, the progressive militarisation of the movement, all alarmed him. In politics, he was no friend to violent methods. Nor did he approve of National-Socialism, which, he perceived, must destroy the Party if it won general acceptance. Carried away by good intentions, he now rushed into the fray with explanations which were designed to combat alarm and despondency among the well-disposed. No need to be apprehensive, he urged, if the O.B. welcomed the Nazis into its ranks. The O.B. was itself non-Nazi, if not anti-Nazi, in its fundamental principles—and to those principles every member subscribed. Therefore a Nazi who became an O.B. ceased in fact to be a Nazi at all.⁴ "Nothing could possibly be more satisfactory."⁵

1. For the questions, and van Rensburg's reply, see below, p. 100.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 13 August 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 14 August 1941.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941.

4. *Die Volksblad*, 15 August 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 16 August 1941; *Die Burger*, 18 August 1941.

5. Compare *The Mikado*, Act II:

KO-KO: It's like this: when your Majesty says, "Let a thing be done," it's as good as done—practically, it is done—because your Majesty's will is law. K.: Your Majesty says, "Kill a gentleman," and a gentleman is told off to be killed. Consequently, that gentleman is as good as dead—practically, he is dead—and if he is dead, why not say so?

MIKADO: I see. Nothing could possibly be more satisfactory!

This pleasing and innocent sophistry may or may not have assuaged the wrath of the H.N.P. Its effect on van Rensburg was more definite, and far from satisfactory. When the two met in Johannesburg on 16 August, van Rensburg accosted Kotzé with "Maar, dominee, u het vanmôre so 'n bom onder my bed gegooi!" to which the startled predikant could only falter in reply: "Wat, het die bom daar beland?" Apparently it had indeed.¹ What had been intended simply as a bromide for the public had been mistaken by van Rensburg for veiled criticism of himself. Each was now thoroughly suspicious of the other. Any split in the O.B.—always a possible risk in a straight fight with the Party, especially since the accession of van Rensburg—might find in Kotzé a potential leader of secession. But if the worst came to the worst, van Rensburg was resolved to have the Groot Raad behind him; and he now forced the reluctant Kotzé to summon it for 20th August 1941, despite the fact that Kotzé pleaded prior and pressing engagements.²

And so, in the chilly dawn of a Bloemfontein winter's morning³ the Groot Raad assembled in Kotzé's study. Their purpose, naturally, was to debate the situation that had arisen, and more especially to consider the reply to Malan's questions which the K-G. proposed to make in his forthcoming speech at Brakpan. Kotzé pointedly absented himself until the evening, when about 8 o'clock he was summoned by telephone to give his views before the final decision was taken. Upon his arrival he was handed the typescript draft of the answer which it was proposed that van Rensburg should make. This was accompanied by the Resolutions of the Groot Raad, which (as van Rensburg had hoped) endorsed all that he had said and done, and expressed confidence in his conduct for the future, adding, by way of a side-hit at Kotzé, that the Kommandant-Generaal (*not* the Chairman) was the mouthpiece of the Groot Raad. Kotzé was far from satisfied with the proposed answers, but he was prepared to let them pass in the hope that when van Rensburg had made his debating points, he and Malan could then be reconciled. But the Groot Raad's resolutions were not so easy for him to swallow. Indeed, he took the strongest exception to that clause which described the K-G. as the mouthpiece of the Groot Raad,

1 Yet van der Walt remarks of Kotzé's argument (p 88) "Teen hierdie stelling kon en kunniks ingebring word nie."

2 Kotzé, pp 25, 32. The literary bomb came near to provoking detonations of a less metaphysical nature. Two young men are said to have approached van Rensburg soon after the publication of Kotzé's letter, and to have said, with true Garibaldian simplicity "Se nou net, dan sal ons na Bloemfontein gaan en bom doodskiet." The offer was declined, but, Kotzé thought it prudent to let the K-G know that he had placed in the hands of trusty friends lists of persons from whom he had reason to apprehend violence. Kotzé, p 32.

3 The meeting began at 7.30 a.m. For what follows Kotzé, pp 27-31, and van der Walt, pp 73 seqq. are the main authorities. See too *Die Transvaler*, 22 August 1941. The following were present: Kotzé, Jering, de Jager, Nel, du Toit, van Zyl, J. Schoeman, C. H. Botha, Stander, Cadle, J. F. v. d. Merwe. Van der Walt reports Kotzé as professing himself completely at one with van Rensburg, until the proposal of the clause describing the K-G as the sole mouthpiece of the O.B., which Kotzé "as 'n reaksie op sy optrede en as 'n persoonlike beleëging opgevat het." (pp 88-89).

and to that which affirmed the Groot Raad's conviction that the speeches at Elsburg and Reitz were in the best interests of the nation as a whole. On each of these two questions Kotzé offered his resignation, only to withdraw it when the first clause was deleted and the second softened to a more non-committal phraseology. The draft, as amended, he did sign at last, reluctantly and hastily (as he asserted), for he was anxious to get back to his synodal meeting. The unanimity of the Groot Raad thus secured, van Rensburg could proceed to Brakpan to reply to Malan's challenge. Yet he must have felt a certain uneasiness at the news which appeared in *Die Transvaler* of 21st August 1941. For on that day "Generaal" Sauer, with 138 other officers of the O.B., published a protest against the policy which the K-G. was pursuing. They argued that whereas the O.B. had originated as an Afrikaner "action front," it had now become the mere creature of the K-G.; that the encouraging of Pirow's disobedience was in contradiction with the O.B.'s idea of discipline; that the O.B. was also undermining the H.N.P.; that the K-G. had no right to deny the leadership of the H.N.P. on the political front, or to trespass on the Party's domain by publication of the Omsendbrief; and finally, that van Rensburg's assertion that the O.B. covered the whole front was in conflict with the agreement reached at Bloemfontein.¹ The signatories of this manifesto were at once suspended from the exercise of their offices, and subsequently resigned. It was not, perhaps, a very happy augury for the Groot Raad's policy.

Van Rensburg's speech at Brakpan on 23rd August, so far from doing anything to settle the dispute or clarify the issue, served only to embitter and complicate matters still further. The questions were indeed answered, but after a fashion so provocative that it was apparent that the K-G. had no wish to avoid a conflict. The only point he conceded was, that the O.B. did not consider itself to be a political party, and had no intention of becoming one; but this was linked to a protestation of the O.B.'s scorn and contempt for party politics as a whole. And he wound up with a piece of what Kotzé rightly calls effrontery: he waved the Omsendbrief at the audience and demanded

"Nou vra die O.B. in alle opregtheid aan dr. Malan, watter grondbeginsels daarin genoem, kan u onderskrywe en watter onderskryf u nie? . . . As die vraag oortuigend en bevredigend beantwoord word, dan offer die hele O.B. en seer sekerlik ook ek persoonlik aan dr. Malan die hand van kragtige medewerking."²

1. *Die Transvaler*, 21 August 1941.

2. *Ibid.* 13 and 24 August 1941; Kotzé, pp. 28, 34; Van der Walt, pp. 70-72, 77-80.

Malan's questions.

1. Whether the Cradock Agreement still holds?

2. Whether that Agreement provides for co-operation and non-interference each in their own field?

van Rensburg's replies.

1. Yes, as accepted by Malan at Bloemfontein.

2. Yes.

To the citizenry of Brakpan, who were presumably not too well-informed upon the merits of the H.N.P. quarrel, it must have seemed from van Rensburg's speech that the real point at issue was, whether Malan was prepared to accept the Republican constitution promulgated in the Omsendbrief. It would be difficult to imagine a more ingenious distortion of the true facts of the case.

Malan judged that the moment was arrived for a decisive blow. Van Rensburg had denied to the H.N.P. the allegiance of the O.B., even on the political field; he had proposed to substitute for its democratic organisation the *Führerprinzip*. He had broken the Volksfront—not merely by assisting Pirow, but by overthrowing the very foundations upon which that front had been laid at Bloemfontein. Appropriating, without right or title, the programme of the konseps-grondwet as his own, he had endeavoured to obscure his misdeeds by casting doubt upon the integrity of the Volksleier's Republicanism. All these things were rehearsed by Malan in his speech at Stellenbosch on 27th August. His reply to them was a three-pronged ultimatum. The O.B. must immediately withdraw the Omsendbrief 1/41; it must retract the order for the propagation of that document; and it must do both these things before Saturday, 30th August 1941. If this ultimatum were rejected, Malan, by virtue of the authority entrusted to him by the constitution of the Party, would declare the movement hostile to the H.N.P. and order all Party members to resign from it.¹

The O.B. professed to be greatly shocked at this violent step. But what did they expect? Jerling and van Rensburg might assume an attitude of pained surprise;² they might call indignantly

3 If so, how does it tally with the claim that the O.B. covers the whole Front? And with the fact that 1/41 contained nearly the whole Party programme as annexures?

4 Were not the contents of 1/41 intended merely as leidrade vir bespreking by 'n ander liggaam?

5 Did you at any time admit you were wrong to issue 1/41, and promise to put the matter right?

6 Do you agree with decision of the Voorlopige Eenheidskomitee that in cases of dual membership loyalty is due to the body of which you were first a member? If so, why did you invite Pirow to join the O.B. if ejected?

7 Do you intend to make the O.B. a new political party in competition with H.N.P.?

8 What would you think if I behaved as you have done?

3 O.B. has always said it fights for the whole people 1/41 was merely a reshuffle of agreed points for a Christian National republic is not a programme meant to be propagated?

4 He was not aware of this 1/41 was issued for guidance

5 He did admit 1/41 contained "onnodige besonderhede" At Elsburg he said that the republic was based on broad principles of 1/41, but not on the details, but *Die Transvaler* did not report this

6 He never invited Pirow, or even mentioned his name he merely stated indifference of O.B. to party politics.

7 No We do not desire that the O.B. should be any sort of political party

8 Falls away

1. *Die Transvaler*, 26, 28, 29 August 1941, Kotze, p. 35

2 For Jerling, see *Die Transvaler*, 28 August 1941 Jerling complained that when the O.B. had disseminated a pamphlet entitled *Die Boere-Republiek* in 1940 the H.N.P. had raised no objection, why should they do so now? The answer surely was, that the H.N.P. were using the Omsendbrief only as a handy (and quite legitimate) weapon in a struggle which had been begun, not by Malan, but by van Rensburg. For van Rensburg, see his speech at Winterton on 30 August (*Die Transvaler*, 31 August 1941), Kotze, p. 35. On this occasion A.K.G. Nel said: "Ons gaan nie die politiek volg nie, want die politiek plaas die partybelange voor volksbelange."

for the summoning of the Afrikanereenhedskomitee; but they can hardly have believed that Malan would either tamely turn the other cheek or be content to leave his defence to the arbitrators. None the less, at the request of the O.B., L. J. du Plessis called the Eenheidskomitee together for 1st September at Bloemfontein, and the Groot Raad was appointed to meet on the same day. Meanwhile, Kotzé had been urgently telephoning Malan to secure the deferring of the expiry of his ultimatum, so that the Groot Raad might have time to meet; and he was in fact successful in obtaining an extension to 4 p.m. on 4th September. His negotiations with Malan were naturally disliked by his fellow-members of the Groot Raad; but he seems to have warned van Rensburg at an early stage that if it came to a direct conflict of loyalties he must throw in his lot with the H.N.P.¹ He appears already to have decided to use all his efforts to restore peace; but it is certain that he did not believe that relations could ever be really satisfactory until there had been a radical reorganisation of the O.B. "Back to 1940!" was his motto; and in the last resort his attitude would depend upon the willingness or unwillingness of the Groot Raad to follow him.

On Monday, 1st September 1941, the Afrikanereenhedskomitee met in Bloemfontein. In accordance with the decision of the previous meeting, the F.A.K. and R.D.B. now had two members apiece, while the O.B. had three. The H.N.P. should have had three also, but only Strydom (acting as *secundus* for Malan) put in an appearance.² In the country, a virtual truce had been declared until 4th September, broken only by an O.B. meeting at Kuruman. The whole of nationalist Afrikanerdom watched the proceedings from afar with strained and anxious attention, and intermittently peppered the Committee with telegrams of protest against "skeuring."³

To some extent the course of the meeting had been determined beforehand. On Sunday night, a telegram had arrived from Malan, stating his conditions of peace. The Cradock Agreement must be recognised by the Committee, and the O.B. pledged to observe it; the O.B. and the Committee must recognise that the H.N.P. was the organisation from which Party-political leadership was to be admitted; the Committee must repeat their resolution of 2nd August that the O.B. had no right to issue the Omsendbrief; and finally, the Committee must give guarantees that it would advise the O.B. to cease trespassing outside its sphere.⁴ The Committee was disposed to concede the substance of these

1. Kotzé, pp. 35-7; *Die Transvaler*, 1 September 1941.

2. The composition of the gathering was: Strydom (H.N.P.); Kotzé, Smith, van Rensburg (O.B.); Diederichs, E. Greyling (R. D. B.); Lombard, I. D. Kruger (F.A.K.); L. J. du Plessis (Chairman); P. J. Meyer (Secretary). Van der Walt (p. 82) gives Verwoerd as Malan's *secundus*, instead of Strydom. *Die Vaderland*, 2 September 1941: Malan's absence was thought unwise and quixotic, both by Kotzé and du Plessis.

3. Van der Walt, p. 82.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 1 September 1941.

demands. Du Plessis, for instance, could not but feel that the O.B. had acted extremely injudiciously, to say the least of it.¹ They felt, however, that they could not simply accept Malan's conditions as they stood, since to do so would be to preclude the O.B. from Republican propaganda altogether. Strydom, for his part, would not tolerate the slightest verbal alteration. With reluctance, therefore, the Committee was constrained to reject Malan's conditions in the form in which he had presented them. But the resolutions which they did pass (and which had been preceded, on Kotzé's suggestion, by an apology from van Rensburg for the use of the word *ketterjag*²) in effect conceded all that the H.N.P. could fairly demand, and yet at the same time saved van Rensburg from absolute humiliation.

They resolved:

1. That the H.N.P. was to have the lead in the political (not party-political) field: other bodies were in this sphere to have only advisory rights; but all *volksorganisasies* were to have the right to make propaganda for policies already accepted and promulgated by the H.N.P.
[This was an afbakening more definite, and really more favourable to the H.N.P., than any agreement hitherto.]
2. Van Rensburg had not meant to interfere in party politics at Elsburg, though his words inevitably gave that impression: his object was only to make it clear that the H.N.P.'s attitude to Pirow would not affect the position of the New Orderites in regard to the O.B.
3. The Grondwet upon which the Omsendbrief 1/41 was based had been given to the H.N.P. by the Provisional Committee in order that the Party might consider it, and give a lead by further discussions and by public propaganda. But leave was never given by the Committee to disseminate excerpts from it without acknowledgment. The O.B. had published the Omsendbrief in good faith owing to a misunderstanding, because the afbakening van terreine was not at that time concluded. If the O.B. now withdrew the Omsendbrief it should be replaced as soon as possible by a Declaration of Policy, to be promulgated by the H.N.P. after discussions with the Afrikanereenheidskomitee.³

In short, the Committee admitted the H.N.P.'s main contentions, that the taking of overt action upon the Republican question was their affair; that the political leadership of Afrikanerdom was inherent in the Party; that van Rensburg, at Elsburg, Reitz and Brakpan, had been unjustified and culpable in the language he had used in the Party's regard. At this moment Malan had the verdict of impartial observers on his side. Those who were most genuinely desirous of maintaining Afrikaner unity, those who were most sincerely anxious for the welfare

1. Strydom, p. 17.

2. Kotzé, p. 37.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941, van der Walt, pp. 21-25.

of the Nationalist cause, had pronounced in his favour. Except that the terms were not of Malan's framing, they could hardly have embodied a more complete defeat for the O.B.

On the following day, 2nd September, du Plessis brought Malan and Eric Louw to the meeting, when its session was resumed after lunch. They were presented with the Committee's verdict, and after what appears to have been a lengthy discussion, they accepted it.¹ And the terms, as accepted, were forwarded to the Groot Raad for their consideration.

The Groot Raad met on 4th September in Kotzé's study. It must have felt that it had no real alternative to acquiescence. Rejection of the Committee's terms would put the O.B. irretrievably in the wrong. All it could do was to attempt to cover its retreat by the appearance of bargaining. It therefore accepted the decision of the Committee upon the major question at issue, but for its part put forward certain counter-demands. These fell broadly into two classes: first, demands for loyal cooperation and the cessation of recrimination; secondly, demands for the retraction of various statements made or alleged to have been made by Malan, to the prejudice of the good name of the O.B. and its leader.² Lastly, while formally withdrawing the Omsendbrief 1/41, the O.B. replaced it by Omsendbrief 2/41, "wat beginsels vir die vestiging van die Republiek bevat, soos reeds deur die Eenheidskomitee gepubliseer."³

This document in its turn was handed to the Afrikanereenheidskomitee on 5th September, and on 6th September, L. J. du Plessis' statement to the Press announced its acceptance. In his considered view the O.B. had agreed to the substance of Malan's demands, and to the unanimous resolutions of the Committee. No further points of difference remained; the crisis was over: it was time to restore normal relations. As to the O.B.'s counter-demands, these had been discussed in the Committee, and it had appeared that "daar geen sprake kan wees van insinuasies of van oneerlikheid aan enige kant nie." The counter-demands therefore presumably fell away. The real cause of the troubles, in his opinion, had been "nie soseer verskil van beginsels of bedoeling of selfs metode van optrede . . . nie, as wel die feit dat . . . elke samewerkende organisasie nog nie sy erkende vaste perk in die samewerkende geheel kon vind nie." However, the danger was past: let them reunite in brotherhood and, for the future, trust in God.⁴

Alas for these bright hopes! The ripe and dispassionate judgment of Professor du Plessis could no doubt pronounce with admirable impartiality upon such issues as were submitted

1. *Die Transvaler*, 3 and 6 September 1941; Kotzé, p. 37.

2. Kotzé, pp. 38-39: especially the accusation that van Rensburg seemed to have a special partiality for Pirow and Weichardt; van der Walt, p. 87.

3. *Die Transvaler*, 6 September 1941.

4. *ibid.*, loc. cit.; *Die Vaderland*, 9 October 1941.

to him ; but there remained complications which had never been brought before the Committee, and which were to make any restoration of the Bloemfontein Volksfront out of the question. One of these was a matter, trivial enough in itself, but indicative of the extent to which passions had already been roused, and of the lengths to which fervid partisanship might go in prosecuting a vendetta. Some time about 3rd September 1941, there came into the possession of Kotzé, and also, it appears, of Swart, a cyclostyled "Vlugskrif," entitled *Die Kronkelgang van 'n Party*. The nature and object of this production, the circumstances attending its composition and dissemination, and even the question as to whether or not it existed, became in the next few months subjects of such bewildering and envenomed accusation and rebuttal, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to arrive at the true facts of the case. This much, however, seems certain. A certain N. G. S. van der Walt, who had been secretary to the O.B. in the early days of the movement,¹ had, until the end of August 1941, been employed on the staff of *Die Volksblad*. This young man had occupied his leisure in working for the M.A. degree, and was in process of writing a thesis on the Republican movement in South African politics since Union. Of this thesis Professor du Plessis was the promoter. In the course of his work van der Walt had collected a considerable number of excerpts from the speeches of Malan, which illustrated the fact that the Volksleier had altered his opinions on this question, and had at one time been anything but a convinced Republican. Van der Walt, about the end of August, had this collection cyclostyled under the heading *Die Kronkelgang van 'n Party*; and in this shape it circulated in Bloemfontein, and even as far afield as Kuruman, at the very moment when the Afrikanereenheidskomitee was holding its meetings. Whether the pamphlet was inspired by the O.B., or deliberately disseminated by them, it seems impossible now to say : van Rensburg's references to the subject are more remarkable for heat than for light. In general, he contends that the pamphlet was simply an excerpt from a piece of academic research ; that van der Walt was an insignificant person—"een van die kinders in die politiek" ; that copies were made simply "for reference purposes," and that the copy which came into Kotzé's possession had been stolen for him by a person who had afterwards obtained employment as his secretary.²

However that may be, the Vlugskrif acquired an importance far exceeding its real merit. That Malan in the course of his

1. Van der Walt, *op cit.*, p. 12.

2. Kotzé, pp. 39-41 ; *Die Transvaal*, 10, 11 and 18 September 1941 ; *Die Volksblad*, 9 September, 6 October 1941 ; *The Friend*, 12 September 1941. The O.B. organ for the Transvaal, *Die Wa-Ketting* (No. 5) is regularly enough on one page referred to the Vlugskrif as "non-existent," and on another as having been in any case unknown to 99.9 per cent of O.B. members. A year later the O.B. felt it wiser to publish the text in full : see *Die O.B.*, 16 September 1942. It is perhaps not insignificant that N.G.S. van der Walt became in September 1941 Propaganda Officer to the O.B., and two months later the editor of *Die O.B.*

political career should have changed his opinions was no great matter for remark: there were few leaders on either side of the House of whom as much could not have been said. But it was of the most capital importance that this scurrility—or this abstract dissertation (whichever it was)—should have been endorsed by the O.B. (even if it was not inspired by them) at the very moment when van Rensburg had capitulated all along the line. It gave the Volksleier another grievance, if he should need one. It probably explains his complaisance in accepting the Committee's terms instead of his own. It cast the gravest suspicions upon the sincerity of the O.B.'s share in the reconciliation which du Plessis imagined he had effected. And it quite probably nerved Kotzé to persist in the course which was eventually to split the O.B. from top to bottom.¹

Kotzé, as we have seen, came to the meeting of the Groot Raad on 4th September determined to remodel the O.B. The domination of van Rensburg was to be checked, the movement so orientated that in future collaboration with the H.N.P. should be easy and natural. Such an arrangement, it is perhaps pertinent to note, would lend crucial importance to the position of Kotzé himself, who would in his own person form the hinge between the Party and the O.B. There is some reason to suppose that he was acting, if not in concert with Malan, then at all events with his cognisance: we have Kotzé's own testimony that he persuaded Malan to delay a decision until he should have been informed by Kotzé of the Groot Raad's proceedings.² These proved to be somewhat protracted. The members had sat all day and half the night before Kotzé, close on midnight, presented them with his carefully-prepared ultimatum, and informed them that in the event of its rejection, he should feel himself bound to resign. It was a document of the most formidable character. Kotzé demanded:

1. Dat al die kantoor-bedrywighe en ander organisasie-werk-saamhede van die O.B. in alle opsigte 'n Christelike en Afrikanergees moet openbaar.
2. Dat die O.B. se propaganda-afdeling nie sal gebruik word ten koste of ten nadeling van enige organisasie of liggaam wat saam met die O.B. in die Eenheidskomitee gekoördineer is nie.
3. Dat hierdie vergadering hom in die openbaar uitspreek teen die nasionaal-sosialisme of enige ander vreemde regeringstelsel vir die Boerevolk.

1. Kotzé (*loc cit*) asserts that it was the Vlugskrif that induced him to put forward the second of his demands (see below)

2. Kotzé states (p. 44) that on 3 September he had been in touch with Malan by telephone, and had asked him not to take any action until he had heard from him. He gives as his reason his fear that the meeting might not be over until after 4 p.m. on 4 September—the hour at which Malan's ultimatum was due to expire. But the discussions in the Afrikanereenheidskomitee had already made it probable that van Rensburg would capitulate at discretion, and Malan was hardly likely, therefore, to act on his threat: it seems more probable that Kotzé was informing him of the conditions with which he intended to confront the Groot Raad, and that it was agreed between them that the H.N.P. attitude should be determined by the Groot Raad's reaction to them. For the O.B. view of Kotzé's proceedings, see van der Wal, pp. 87-91.

4. Dat die Groot Raad nou sal saamgestel word uit manne wat nie gesalarieerde ampsdraers is en nie offisiere wat as sodanig onder die gesag van die Kommandant-Generaal staan nie.¹

Van Rensburg could not possibly accept these terms: every one of them was a dagger aimed either directly at himself or indirectly at the Junta of generals which surrounded him. But there was a chance—and herein lay the importance of Kotzé's *démarche*—there was a chance that the Groot Raad, chastened by the obvious disapproval of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee, alarmed by the consequences of the K.G.'s rashness, might throw van Rensburg over and turn to the safer leadership of Kotzé. It was but a chance. Kotzé had much underrated the discipline and loyalty of van Rensburg's followers; perhaps, too, he had overestimated the readiness of the Groot Raad to swallow a scheme which too obviously redounded to the advantage of the H.N.P. The Afrikanereenheidskomitee had forced the O.B., at the bar of Afrikaner public opinion, to display a willingness for reconciliation; it did not therefore follow that they were equally charitably disposed in the privacy of their innermost councils. At all events, after two hours' stormy debate—in the course of which they went so far as to accept the first (and least important) of Kotzé's terms, and even offered to agree to an emasculated version of the second—after two hours of mingled pathos and venom, it came to an open breach. Kotzé walked out of the meeting alone. It was a decisive moment.

Decisive—for from that moment Malan saw his course clear before him. The compromise peace which du Plessis by his tact had effected, even though it virtually gave Malan the victory, did not satisfy him. He did not trust van Rensburg; he did not trust the O.B. as long as the van Rensburg influence was predominant. But these were motives which, in this sacred hour of union restored, it was impossible publicly to adduce. Convinced as he was that he had at this moment an opportunity such as could not be expected to recur, a chance to subject, once and for all, the O.B. to the Party, he felt that he had been deprived, by the very completeness and publicity of his victory, from exacting the uttermost farthing. The O.B. still stood, temporarily humiliated though it might be, an organisation powerful, compact, possibly vengeful, certainly outside the control of the H.N.P. Until the Groot Raad should dance dourcely to the Volksleier's piping, the Party could not feel safe from a *revanche*. But the Groot Raad showed no signs whatever of emulating David before the Ark of the Cradock Covenant. Wherefore the Volksleier must find pretexts still further to wage war. These pretexts he had now at his disposal. On the one hand the dissemination of the Vlugskrif could be urged as evidence of van Rensburg's

¹ Kotzé, pp. 46-50.

bad faith; on the other—and this was far more important—Malan would claim that the best elements in the O.B. had themselves condemned their leader.¹ The tables were now to be turned. As once van Rensburg had interfered in the H.N.P.'s domestic forum, so now Malan proposed to import himself into the civil war within the O.B., and deploy his hosts for the benefit of Kotzé: a pretty irony. He believed that Kotzé would be able to command wide support for his four points within the O.B. ranks—Sauer's resignation was already a sign that the wind blew that way. And so he decided to press his advantage, to carry on the war, to support Kotzé's project for a purified O.B., and to urge upon all loyal Party members the severance of their connection with van Rensburg. From this moment, L. J. du Plessis and his Committee became superfluous; became, indeed, a hindrance and an irritation. A ketterjag, indeed! They should learn the meaning of a ketterjag. He would make them conform themselves, or he would harry them out of—the Party, at all events, and perhaps nasionaalgesinde Afrikanerdom as well. Thus Malan crossed his Rubicon; and at the very moment when du Plessis was celebrating the cessation of hostilities and trumpeting an armistice in the public prints, the Volksleier embarked upon his war to end wars.

(iv)

The rest of the story is in the nature of mere epilogue. All the negotiations that followed, all the proposals and counter proposals, the ingenious compromises, the solemn appeals of respected national figures—all were a vain beating of the air, a jockeying for position, a courting of public opinion. They had no firm basis in reality. There was only one thing that mattered—that Malan was resolved to go to any lengths to smash van Rensburg. Not for one moment did he allow himself to be deflected from that resolve.²

On 7th September Malan made his first public speech since the meetings at Bloemfontein. Much of it was concerned with answering the final counter-demands of the Groot Raad, and in regard to these he was frankly impenitent; indeed, he reiterated the very statements to which the O.B. had taken exception. He indicated, too, the line which the Party was now proposing to adopt in regard to its rival. The advice which he had given to H.N.P. members, over two years ago—to become members of the O.B.—he now formally retracted: henceforth they were at liberty to resign from the O.B. if they chose. The O.B., he insisted, must be thrust firmly back upon the objects for which it had

1. It was a point frequently made in H.N.P. propaganda subsequently that all the original founders of the O.B. had left the Groot Raad. But, as *Die O.B.* (2 September 1942) pointed out, they had all resigned—except Kotzé—before the conclusion of the Cradock Agreement and the accession of van Rensburg.

2. It should be made quite clear that this analysis of Malan's motives is largely conjectural.

originally been founded. It must content itself with being the aksiefront of the Party. It must reform itself in that sense. If it did not do so, then the H.N.P. must form its own aksiefront.¹ *Die Transvaler* reinforced these points in two important editorials which left little to the imagination. It was essential, Verwoerd considered, that the political- and action-fronts should fall under the same control and the same leadership. The issue was not, as the cynics of *Die Vaderland* seemed to imagine,² a question of personalities: it was a question of the efficiency of the whole Nationalist movement. The refusal of the Groot Raad to accept Kotzé's second demand as it stood was final proof that no loyal cooperation, much less loyal service under Malan, was to be expected from van Rensburg. The H.N.P. was therefore confronted with the choice of tolerating the continuance of a system of dual leadership—which had obviously broken down—or of forcing the issue of single, unified leadership. And since, for the achieving of the Republic, the H.N.P. was the only organisation capable of political leadership, the control of the aksiefront must inevitably be vested in the hands of Malan.³ With the O.B. as a body the Party had no wish to quarrel. With van Rensburg and his professional generals it was no longer possible to keep any measures: "hulle is te gevaarlik."

Thus Malan now placed the onus upon Kotzé and his sympathisers within the O.B. If they could carry a majority with them for the policy of Kotzé's four points; if, that is to say, they could make the O.B. the instrument of the H.N.P.; then the O.B. might be retained with great advantage to Afrikanerdom. Van Rensburg, for his part, might be allowed to decline into oblivion, as Laas a year before had sunk from O.B. to Boerenasie, and from Boerenasie to Boerevolk. It was uncertain, however, how far Kotzé would be able to command a following. The lists of resignations from the O.B. had already begun to appear daily in the columns of *Die Transvaler*, where they made a brave show, certainly; but the number of these defections from van Rensburg was really insignificant in relation to the total membership of the movement. However, Kotzé on 25th September called a conference of the Free State seceders: it was to meet in Bloemfontein on 1st October, and it was to discuss the following points:

- (1) Shall we remain within the O.B. and reform it from within?
- (2) Shall we resign from the O.B. and form no other action-front?
- (3) Shall we form a new action-front under the lead of the H.N.P.?
- (4) Shall we form an independent action-front which will stand in friendly relations with the H.N.P.?⁴

1. See Malan's speech, reported in *Die Transvaler*, 8 September 1941, van der Walt, p. 93.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 16 October 1941: "... en siet u, die republikeinse strewe is wel belangrik, maar veel belangriker is tog wie die krediet gaan ontvang!"

3. *Die Transvaler*, 8 and 16 September 1941.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 26 September 1941.

The regular Beheerraad of the Free State O.B. had refused to summon a conference to discuss this agenda, in spite of the request of a monster meeting at Winburg;¹ so Kotzé was taking the law into his own hands.

From Malan's point of view, Kotzé's Bloemfontein conference proved a failure. It was, no doubt, well-attended and "representative," but its decision put an end to Malan's policy of capturing the O.B. through Kotzé. For the delegates abandoned the idea of reforming the O.B. from within; resolved to resign their membership and to urge others to do likewise; declined to initiate a new, independent movement; and decided only upon the formation of liaison committees for each Province, to consist of two ex-O.Bs. and two Party members. These committees, it appeared, were to operate within the framework of that new H.N.P. organisation-scheme which had so alarmed van Rensburg in June.² Thus it became clear that Kotzé and his friends could not carry the mass of the O.B. with them;³ that the O.B. would persist as a separate movement loyal to van Rensburg; and that the H.N.P., therefore, would be driven to form its own aksie-front. There was thus no point in hesitating further upon the question as to whether members of the Party should retain their membership of the O.B. Malan's attitude upon this question accordingly stiffened. During September no great pressure seems to have been brought to bear upon Party members. Strydom and Kemp, indeed, trumpeted their own resignations, while the O.B. actually expelled Eric Louw;⁴ but, in general, the Party offered nothing more than "advice" on this head.⁵ But with the failure of Kotzé, Malan came forward with a more positive pronouncement. In a statement to the Press on 3rd October, endorsed by an editorial in *Die Transvaler* and subsequently by statements from Kemp and Strydom, an "urgent summons" was made to all Nationalists to cut their connection, not merely with van Rensburg, but with the O.B.⁶ From about 10th October (Kruger Day) the H.N.P. propaganda machine was in full blast. In the Transvaal, Colonel Wilkens, de Wet Nel and Werth; in the O.F.S., Swart and Kotzé; in the Cape, Louw and Erasmus, made speech after speech attacking van Rensburg and summoning the faithful to forswear the dangerous temptations of National-Socialism, and to return to the ample bosom of the Party. In the H.N.P. Press every issue contained long lists of resignations from the O.B. Grave warnings were uttered against the futility

1 *ibid.*, 22 September 1941

2. *ibid.*, 2 October 1941. It is quite possible that Malan and Kotzé had agreed on this line before Kotzé's conference took place. Malan's statement to the press (*Die Transvaler*, 3 October 1941) emphasises the suitability of the H.N.P. organisation to the formation of an action-front.

3 Kotzé had a very stormy meeting in Johannesburg on 3 October. See *Die Transvaler*, 4 October 1941

4. *Die Vaderland*, 1 September 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 17 September 1941.

5 *Die Transvaler*, 13, 22, 25, 27, 29 September 1941.

6. *Die Transvaler*, 3 and 6 October 1941. The Party even circulated to its members specimen letters of resignation from the O.B. van der Walt, p. 96

of rebellion and the folly of blood-baths;¹ and Afrikanerdom was admonished that it must not be content to look for its salvation only to the triumphs of German arms. And, that nothing might be lacking, the cause was furnished, if not with a martyr, at least with a victim. *Die Transvaler* of 25th October revealed that three days previously Verwoerd had been held up outside his peaceful home by four armed, masked men, who threatened to hale him before the O.B. Krygsraad, and might indeed have done so had he not so discouraged them by his resistance that they made off, their nefarious purpose unaccomplished.²

Even the Government caught the prevailing infection. On 24th October the *Gazette* prohibited certain classes of civil servants from belonging to the O.B.; on 1st December Mr. Harry Lawrence made a dramatic revelation of an O.B. plot at Durban, the details of which were so mysterious that the public was never favoured with the result of the investigation; on 7th December the (then) Q.B. Volkstoeier, Johannes van der Walt, was interned.³

The O.B. met this onslaught with a combination of spirit and discretion which was not without its effect on the wavering and the impartial. If it came to slinging mud, they had an aim as true, and ammunition almost as copious, as that of their enemies.⁴ But it was obviously their line to affect pained surprise at the unmeasured terms in which they were assailed. Had they not bowed to the decision of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee? Had they not loyally accepted its verdict, even though that verdict had gone heavily against them? It was not they from whom this latest and most deplorable skeuring had come. Indeed, they saw no real issue of principle upon which a division could be based. Therefore, though they held themselves free to resent and retort upon any direct attack, they could revel in the luxury of a clear conscience, and exercise the virtue of charity so far, that no reasonable proffer of reconciliation would find them disinclined to listen. The official O.B. conference at Bloemfontein, held on 13th October, and attended by over 1,000 officers from all parts of the Union, fully endorsed the attitude which van Rensburg had taken up, and made it clear that the O.B., secure in the consciousness of rectitude, was not unprepared to be conciliatory—*provided* that the H.N.P. did not adopt a form of organisation resembling their own.⁵

1 See too, e.g., Malan's speech at Paarl on 14 November, where he dwelt much on storm-troopers, weapons, blood-baths *et al*, and accused the O.B. of being a "Russiese kommunistiese stelsel" (!) *Die Vaderland*, 15 November 1941

2 *Die Transvaler*, 10-31 October 1941, *passim*, for the speeches and lists, *ibid*, 25 October for the Verwoerd outrage

3 *Die Transvaler*, 25 October, 8 December 1941, *Rund Daily Mail*, 1 December 1941

4 Van Rensburg, with pleasing humour, compared the adjective *verward* as follows: *verward*, *verward*, *verward* *Die Vaderland* 18 September 1941

5 *Die Transvaler*, 11, 30 September, 14, 15, 18 October, 7, 8 November 1941 *Die Vaderland* 18 September, 14, 15 October 13, 15 November 1941 In order to meet the criticism that the O.B. could have no claim to propagandise for the republic, since their published constitution made no mention of a republic (e.g. Strydom at Klerksdorp, *Die Vaderland*, 17 October) the conference incorporated the konseps-grondwet in the O.B. constitution

This mildly deprecatory attitude was spoiled by one fact which the H.N.P. took care not to forget: the National-Socialism of van Rensburg. On this point, at any rate, there was a clear difference of principle; and from the very beginning of the crisis Malan had made the most of it. In this he showed sound judgment; for the majority of Nationalists were, if not parliamentary democrats at least democrats within the limits of Calvin's *Institutes*, and they had little love for the New Order. Van Rensburg was probably followed far more as a personality than as the apostle of a creed. The H.N.P.'s incessant hammering on the theme of Nazism made the average Nationalist uneasy, and the "revelations" as to the O.B.'s violent propensities made him even more so.

One curious and unexpected consequence of the revival of hostilities was the intervention of the German short-wave station at Zeesen in Afrikaner politics. Hitherto Zeesen had preserved a marked discretion, its announcers pretending valiantly that all was harmony and brotherly love within the ranks of the Opposition. When Hertzog was ejected from the Party, Zeesen's attitude had been to pay tribute to the departing leader, and thereafter to transfer its panegyrics to Malan. It had notably refrained from embarrassing the Volksleier by open support of Pirow's New Order propaganda. It would have been well for Zeesen's reputation in Nationalist circles if it had adhered to these non-committal policies. But, with great unwisdom, it now imported itself into the conflict with considerable acrimony, on the side of van Rensburg. From 5th September onwards it broadcast periodical comments on South African politics which were as pungent as they were partisan. It did not hesitate to hint that Malan was deliberately playing Smuts' game, and it spared no effort to represent van Rensburg to its listeners as the destined saviour of oppressed Afrikanerdom.¹ Loyal O.B.s were encouraged by the information that the latest edition of the *Münchener Illustrierte Zeitung* carried a photograph of van Rensburg, with a long caption narrating the incidents in his career in the most eulogistic terms.² Van Rensburg's adversaries, meanwhile, were assailed with broadsides of this nature:

"If certain people cannot even be united in a domestic struggle against a common enemy, how will they eventually be able to give a stable government to South Africa?"

It was not pure love for democratic ideals that caused Smuts to grant the Afrikaans press a considerable measure of freedom during the war. Smuts hoped . . . that the freedom of the press would cause Nationalist Afrikaners to fight, reproach and insult one another, and thus bring about the disintegration of Afrikanerdom. This

1. Zeesen, 8.45 p.m. 5 September 1941; 7 p.m. 18 September 1941. "At 8.45 p.m. on 7 October Zeesen suggested that "certain pamphlets and posters directed against Dr. van Rensburg" were "for the most part . . . printed in Mr. Schlesinger's printing works in Johannesburg."

2. Zeesen, 8.45 p.m. 26 September 1941.

desire has been fulfilled by a number of Afrikaans newspapers during recent weeks . . .

Apparently it is not a difference in political principles, although certain politicians are trying to foster such disagreement. Is the whole struggle caused by party politicians who think less of the future of the nation and its great national movement, than of their personal ambitions, their precious seats in Parliament, and the interests of a political party? If Afrikaner politicians quarrel among themselves to-day because of such narrow-minded selfishness, what do they hope to gain through the struggle? Neither the Afrikaner nation, whose interests are to them of secondary importance, nor the friends of the Afrikaner nation abroad will have any enthusiasm or sympathy for the continuation of such a struggle."¹

Malan was pained at these attacks; Strydom was deeply offended; *Die Transvaler* was indignant. And indeed Zeesen had made a stupid psychological blunder. It did van Rensburg a disservice; and it lent point to the H.N.P.'s denunciations of National-Socialism as *een onnasionale stelsel*.

Professor L. J. du Plessis, thus left high and dry by the tide of events, must by this time have been experiencing sensations of the keenest chagrin, and might have been pardoned if his chagrin had been mingled with exasperation. He had laboured with great patience and tact to preserve the Volksfront; his reward was to find himself placed uncomfortably between two irate parties, exposed to the journalistic arrows and oratorical brickbats of each of them. From time to time a missile was flung with deliberate aim in his direction; and it was noticeable that these stray rocks emanated exclusively from the H.N.P. lines.² The H.N.P., as we have seen, had no further use for the Eenheidskomitee; the O.B., on the other hand, saw no reason to throw it overboard: support of it was consonant with their attitude of deprecatory moderation. But the H.N.P. had, in addition, a grievance against du Plessis personally. On 8th October he had published in *Die Vaderland* his account of the crisis. It was a very fair account on the whole, but it certainly gave the impression that there might be two sides to the question, and that was a possibility which the H.N.P. leaders flatly refused to admit. In their eyes a tepid and Laodicean impartiality was little better than open hostility; and they looked somewhat sourly upon du Plessis in consequence.³

It had not been du Plessis' intention merely to promulgate his report through the medium of the Press. He had hoped

¹ Zeesen, 7 p m 25 September 1941, 8 45 p m 26 September 8 45 p m 29 September 8 45 p m 7 October 1941.

² e.g. the gratuitous attack by Eric Louw at Kirkwood "Ek gaan nie stilstaan by die onbehoorlikheid van 'n universiteits-professor om hom so te meng met die sake van die party nie." *Die Vaderland*, 9 October, *Die Transvaler*, 6 October 1941. The speech was made on 4 October—before du Plessis' article appeared.

³ See editorial in *Die Transvaler*, 9 October 1941, and Malan's speech at Vryheid on 16 October (*Die Transvaler*, 17 October). Among other things it was insinuated that du Plessis' ambition had been disappointed by the failure of his scheme for a triumvirate. See *Die Wa-Ketting* (2de Skakel).

rather to be able to lay it before a National Congress. On 20th September, after consultation with the other members of the Eenheidskomitee, he had, on his own authority, issued an invitation to a Volkskongres, which he intended to hold on 7th and 8th October, and at which he hoped that "ons politieke leier dr. Malan" and "ons volksleier dr. van Rensburg" would be present. In the meantime, and by way of preparation for the Congress, the Eenheidskomitee called a meeting for 22nd September at Aliwal North, the object of which was the reconciliation of Malan and van Rensburg.¹ The reaction of the H.N.P. to the proposal for a congress was instantly unfavourable. The suggestion was premature; the time for preparation insufficient; the internal struggle within the O.B. must first be decided. A Volkskongres must represent the volk: but van Rensburg represented only himself!²

In short, the H.N.P. would have nothing to say to the proposal. On the other hand, Malan assented to the suggestion that he should meet van Rensburg at Aliwal North; and thither the rival leaders duly repaired. L. J. du Plessis (in the Chair) and P. J. Meyer represented peace and fraternity. The meeting was not a success. The enthusiastic optimism of the Chairman could make no head against the inflexibility of the leaders. The idea of a triumvirate, now revived by du Plessis, proved no more acceptable than upon a former occasion; while the project of a National Congress was decisively rejected by Malan. Thus the attempt at reconciliation turned out a veritable sooterkin: *Die Transvaler* used it to hint that van Rensburg was preparing for armed rebellion.³

It had been one of the strongest of Malan's objections to the National Congress, that it would involve the F.A.K. and R.D.B. in politics. This was a danger of which those bodies were only too well aware. Their participation in the Afrikanereenheidskomitee had provoked some heartsearchings among their members. Now that the Komitee had so plainly failed in its object, they were not sorry to seize the opportunity to break away. On 29th September they formally resigned;⁴ and at the F.A.K. Congress shortly afterwards measures were taken to knit the two organisations closely together in a little united front of their own.⁵

And with that, to all appearance, the Afrikanereenheidskomitee came to an inglorious end. *Die Vaderland* celebrated its obsequies in an editorial which blended frigid distaste with malicious satisfaction.⁶ Du Plessis, however, did not accept

1. *Die Transvaler*, 20 September 1941.

2. *Ibid.*, 22 and 24 September 1941.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 8 and 20 October 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 25 September 1941; van der Walt, p. 93.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 29 September 1941.

5. *Ibid.*, 8 October 1941.

6. *Die Vaderland* 29 September 1941.

defeat so easily. He did indeed abandon his projected National Congress,¹ but he altogether declined to consider the Afrikanereenheidskomitee as defunct: on the contrary, he announced that the next meeting would take place on 24th October. And, what was more, he was as good as his word. The attendance was somewhat meagre, certainly: only the O.B. and " 'n aantal byvoegende persone." But he refused to be discouraged. The absence of the R.D.B. and F.A.K., he considered, was merely temporary—the result of the political strife; the H.N.P. he hoped to persuade back into the fold. In the meantime, some of the empty chairs were filled by the election of Totius and a couple of predikants.² It is impossible not to admire du Plessis' spirit;³ but in fact it was all over with the Afrikanereenheidskomitee. Malan would never again submit to stand on a real footing of equality with any other leader.

This fact was really implicit in all the negotiations for a National Committee, which occupied the last two and a half months of 1941. The proposal came from Malan, on 19th September, and on a subsequent occasion he was unusually frank about his reasons for making it. The suggestion was prompted (he told his audience at Paarl on 16th November) not so much by a desire for reconciliation with the O.B. as by the aspect of the European war.⁴ By the middle of September it appeared that Russia must capitulate within a few weeks, leaving Britain in a desperate situation. A German victory and a German peace seemed very near. In what state of preparedness would it find the South African Opposition? Malan suddenly awoke to a realisation of the fact that an Opposition torn by internal dissension might find the assumption of office a difficult task. Moreover, as the enemy of van Rensburg and Pirow, he, the Volksleier, was not precisely *persona gratissima* at Berlin. Once the situation had been appreciated, it was not a very protracted business to formulate a plan for dealing with it. Malan proposed the formation of a shadow cabinet, to be called the Nasionale Komitee, and to consist of some 15 or 20 members. They were to be approved by a National Assembly (Volksvergadering), but they were to be appointed (in effect) by himself, and in making the appointments political ability and experience were to be the sole criteria; there was to be no question, as on the Afrikanereenheidskomitee, of the representation of the various Volksorganisasies, as such. The Committee would have supreme control of the policy and action of the Nationalist Opposition; it would be superior alike to O.B. and H.N.P.; it alone would be entitled to speak in the name of Afrikanerdom. Thus the

1. *Die Transvaler*, 29 September 1941.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 27 October 1941.

3. Perhaps he was encouraged by his own remark that Afrikanerdom's forty-years' wandering in the wilderness was due to end with the beginning of 1942, *Koers* IX. 78 (October 1941).

4. *Die Transvaler*, 16 and 17 November 1941.

political- and action-fronts of Africanerdom would be integrated and fused in a higher unity which would transcend them both.¹

For the time being this ingenious project met with no other response than the automatic approval of *Die Transvaler*, and a somewhat ostentatious sigh of weariness from *Die Vaderland*.² The meeting of the Hoofbestuur of the H.N.P. on 6 November, however, served at least to dissipate some remaining ambiguities. Malan, it seemed, would not *negotiate* about the National Committee with the other Volksorganisasies, for that would reduce him to the undignified necessity of haggling over terms. Nor would he make a gesture of goodwill by withdrawing the summons to Party members to resign from the O.B. That organisation, together with the New Order, was still, it appeared, the object of the Volksleier's cordial detestation.³ The result of this attitude was an ultimatum from the Pirowites, threatening non-cooperation in the Party caucus, and barbing the menace with the remark that "die Nasionale Komitee sonder Hertzog en die O.B. sal dood gebore wees."⁴ Malan's reaction to this challenge was to protest that it was unnecessary. There was no intention to constitute the Komitee upon any principle of exclusion. Pirow, Hertzog and van Rensburg, they were all equally welcome, if only they would consent to abandon National-Socialism. It would not be his fault if cooperation was not secured. ~~Not~~ in any case, did he care very much if the Pirowites withdrew the hem of their garment.⁵

While Malan was thus waiting for his shadow cabinet to get some substance, a diversion was caused by the so-called "Totius Plan." This was a scheme for reconciliation which, at the beginning of October, was produced by Dr. Stegman and the Revs. de Vos and Coetzee of Johannesburg. It got its name from the fact that Totius was taken into consultation by its sponsors. It would in effect have been a revival of the Eenheidskomitee, except that Malan himself, after having laid down his office as leader of the H.N.P., would have been invested with a Volksleierskap resembling in prestige and authority the office of President in the old Republics. Van Rensburg, who had no wish to alienate opinion unnecessarily, accepted the plan provisionally; Malan, not unnaturally, preferred to stick to his own National Committee. And so the "Totius Plan" (which incidentally, was quite impracticable) was decently buried, and little more was heard of it.⁶

1. *Die Vaderland*, 4 November 1941. Malan was to choose five members who were to choose five more, and these were to choose the remainder.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 21 October 1941.

3. *ibid.*, 7 and 8 October 1941.

4. *ibid.*, 8 October 1941.

5. *Die Transvaler*, 14 November 1941.

6. *Die Vaderland*, 3 November 1941; *Die Transvaler*, 16 and 17 November 1941; van der Walt, p. 106. Another benevolent but ineffective intervention came from Professor Stokyr about this time. His idea was for a coordinating committee of three: a suggestion which seems neither novel nor helpful. See *Die Vaderland*, 19 November 1941.

And then at last the O.B., having for the past two months inspected Malan's scheme from every angle, and snuffed at it with a caution it certainly merited, decided to parley. A meeting was held on 21st November, attended by Malan and Verwoerd (for the H.N.P.), van Rensburg and Stander (for the O.B.), Professor J. C. van Rooy (for the F.A.K.) and Professor Diederichs (for the R.D.B.). "Good progress was made," if we may believe the report handed by Diederichs to the Press; though it is difficult to imagine what basis for conversation, light or serious, could remain after the virulence of the newspaper campaigns. At all events, it was agreed that Malan should submit his proposals in writing, and that the Groot Raad should take them into consideration.¹ On 24th November, therefore, Malan despatched a letter to the O.B.; on 28th November the Groot Raad ruminated upon it; and soon afterwards van Rensburg sent his reply. And thus was initiated a correspondence which dragged on until the New Year, and which, for all the courtesy of its beginnings, was not long in discovering an increasing acerbity.² The approach of Christmas, and the circumstance that negotiations were pending, induced the two leaders to agree to a temporary political truce, or at least to a moratorium of invective;³ but beneath the unruffled surface the currents of animosity were flowing as strongly as ever, and Messrs. Verwoerd and N. G. van der Walt had their pens ready cipped for use at the shortest notice.

From the beginning there was no hope that Malan's proposal would prove acceptable to van Rensburg. The method of selecting the shadow cabinet would obviously ensure for the H.N.P. a satisfactory majority upon that body, and equally obviously Malan would wield formidable powers as the shadow Premier. H.N.P. and O.B. would no doubt both be subject to the Committee's authority, but a regime which for the Party would be tantamount to self-government would for the O.B. entail a meek submission to the most implacable of its enemies. The members were to be chosen for political and administrative experience: how many of the O.B. had ever held office? Van Rensburg could secure no satisfactory assurance that the interests of the O.B. would be safeguarded by an adequate representation; indeed, the insistence with which Malan reaffirmed his determination to impose the anti-Nazi Shibboleth made it very probable that many of the O.B. leaders, and all the New Order group, would find themselves permanently excluded. Point after point seemed aimed against the O.B. Propaganda for the Republic, for instance, was to be strongly encouraged, but it was to fall under the "leiding en beheer" of the Committee; force, sabotage and underground movements were explicitly condemned; van

1. *Die Transvaler*, 26 November 1941.

2. *ibid.*, 5, 10, 24, 30 December 1941, 8 and 9 January 1942 for this interchange of letters.

3. *Die Transvaler*, 5 December 1941.

Rensburg was invited to act as Malan's assistant, etc., etc. It is wonderful that van Rensburg should ever have opened negotiations on such a basis, and still more wonderful that he should have persisted in them. For it is impossible to believe that Malan can ever have hoped for the acceptance of his terms. That the O.B. should barter its independence in order to serve the agents of its rival, in exchange for an extremely vague suggestion that van Rensburg should accept a crumb or two from the Malanite table, is a supposition too improbable to be seriously entertained. And not only that. Malan's letter, it turned out, was not a basis for discussion; it was a set of terms which the O.B. must accept or reject *in toto*.¹

The explanation for this extraordinary episode, and for the lengthy correspondence to which it gave rise, must be sought partly at home, partly abroad. It was, undoubtedly, a matter of crucial importance that at the moment when Germany dictated peace, in the Kremlin first and afterwards in Whitehall, the leadership of Afrikanerdom should be in the right hands. From Malan's point of view, as we have seen, the shadow cabinet gave him an extremely strong position in any such eventuality—so strong, in fact, that he could afford to make a gesture towards van Rensburg. The gesture, of course, meant nothing at all. If van Rensburg accepted Malan's plan, his influence would be swamped by the H.N.P. majority on the Committee; while if he rejected it, Malan could pose before Afrikanerdom as the Christian warrior who for the sake of the nation had curbed his righteous wrath and, having turned the other cheek, had duly had it smitten by an ungentlemanly and unpatriotic adversary. Van Rensburg could argue along similar lines. The H.N.P. campaign against the O.B. had met with a disquieting measure of success. The Party seemed more firmly entrenched than ever. Might it not be wise, therefore, to obtain some sort of footing in the shadow cabinet, and trust to adroitness, personal magnetism, or the favour of Berlin, to oust the Malanites at a later date? The attention of Afrikanerdom would, of course, be directed to the spectacle of a Volksorganisasie thus laying aside all personal and private considerations, and bowing itself in the House of Rimmon for a great cause. Alternatively, if the negotiations broke down, it would not be difficult to prove that Malan's terms had been impossible of acceptance.²

Thus throughout the Christmas season the two Volksleiers threaded fantastic labyrinths of their own devising, each leading the other ever deeper in, and each clinging fast to the thread that ran to his own emergency exit, until by the end of December it had become a question only as to which of them would first

1. For a full account of these futile negotiations see van der Walt, pp. 105-114.

2. Zessen meanwhile had been announcing at intervals that a reconciliation was imminent: e.g. 8.45 p.m., 11 and 19 November and 19 December, 7 p.m., 29 November 1941. *ib.*

make up his mind that it was time to put an end to the business. Malan's patience was the first to give way. His New Year Message to Afrikanerdom was phrased in terms almost gratuitously provocative;¹ and even before van Rensburg's final reply appeared in the Press, Malan had directed the Cape branches of the H.N.P. to make a return to the head office of all Party officials who were still members of the O.B.² A Party purge appeared imminent. His final answer to van Rensburg, which declared the negotiations at an end, followed on 9th January, and its rasping tone of recrimination was obviously designed to make the breach definitive.³

And so the battle was joined once more, and with greater fury than ever. Even during the closing months of 1941 Malan had gone so far in his attacks upon the O.B. that Mr. Harry Lawrence⁴ could exclaim with satisfaction: "Instead of the Government having to ban the O.B., Dr. Malan has done it for us!"⁵ To the O.B. it had seemed as though the H.N.P. leader was doing his level best, by charges of violence and sabotage, to incite the Government to put them in a concentration camp, and by this striking and simple expedient to eliminate his rivals.⁶ *Die Transvaler* published the police description of two interned O.B.s who had escaped: two days later the men were recaptured.⁷ Malan asserted that the Stormjaers were swarming with Government spies and agents. The O.B. retorted that it was he, not they, that was the ally of the Kakieridders. These deplorable excesses culminated in Malan's speech in the House of Assembly on 2nd February 1942, when he read a sworn affidavit by Johannes van der Walt, in which sensational charges of conspiracy, political assassination, corruption and treachery, were made against the O.B. leaders, and in particular against A.-K.-G. Jerling.⁸ With the truth or falsity of these allegations we are happily not concerned: for our purposes the incident is significant as marking the end of all pretence, all half-measures, and the final defeat—apparently also the irretrievable defeat—of the ideals which had animated the non-partisan members of the Afrikanereenhedskomitee, and du Plessis in particular, for the preceding eight or nine months. A new period now opens, which did not reach its term until the General Election of 7th July 1943.

(v)

Thus Malan had advanced another step forward upon the

1. *Die Transvaler*, 29 December 1941.

2. *ibid.*, 6 January 1942.

3. *ibid.*, 9 January 1942.

4. Minister of the Interior at this time.

5. Quoted in *Die O.B.*, 26 November 1941.

6. *ibid.*, loc. cit.

7. *Die Transvaler*, 3 February 1942. The persistence with which Malan accused the O.B. of entertaining plans for violence and armed revolt has real significance: it indicates very plainly how repugnant all such courses were felt to be to the public opinion of Afrikanerdom.

8. *Debates*, Vol. 43, pp. 1337-1341.

path which he had marked out for himself. With the assistance of Swart he had extruded Hertzog from the leadership and driven him into the wilderness. With the assistance of Strydom he had crushed Yssel's Handhawersbond, and forced its members in self-defence to amalgamate with the O.B. Pirow's doctrines had been formally condemned, and his New Orderites constrained to absent themselves from the Party caucus.¹ And now, though the O.B. was still a great force, he had dealt it such a blow that it was unlikely that it would ever again prove a serious menace to the Party. Its ranks were thinned by defection; its finances had suffered a catastrophic decline; and into its innermost *conciliabula* he had deftly pitched that anti-personnel bomb, the van der Walt affidavit. It is possible, though it would be invidious, to attribute these successful manoeuvres to a narrow and intolerant ambition on the part of the H.N.P. leaders. There is no doubt that they, who had for so long borne the heat and burden of the day, resented the appearance at the eleventh hour of the O.B. hierarchy of generals, particularly when the latter seemed disposed to claim, not equal wages only, but the whole pay-roll. Yet there were motives deeper and more ideal than vulgar lust for power behind Malan's tactics. He was fighting for the maintenance of the old Nationalist tradition, and also (whether he knew it or not) for the "British-Jewish-Communist-Capitalist-Imperialist-Masonic" methods of Party politics. Upon those methods Afrikanerdom had long taken its stand, and by those methods it had already won glorious victories. The Republic, that was to come would need, above all things, experience. Only in the H.N.P. was that experience to be found. "The happiness of a subject consists in his having government. A sovereign and a subject are clean different things:" a Party and its constituents also. Malan was not persuaded that braaivleisaande and semi-military parades (to mention no worse) could take the place of parliamentary management and parliamentary institutions. He did not really believe that an Athenian democracy—or even perhaps a Genevan aristocracy—could supplant a parliamentary system. At the last, *Die Transvaler* had in exasperation openly rebelled at the fine distinctions of partypolitiek, politiek, volks-politiek, and pronounced all such hair-splitting to be woordespelery.² If the impending crisis were to be successfully met, it could be met only by the creation of a unified Parliamentary Opposition, solid in support of its leader, catholic in its comprehensiveness, but of rock-like consistency in its adherence to a few fundamental principles. The fact that his own political fortunes were involved may have put an edge to his tongue, but it was not the determining motive of his conduct, any more than it was of

1. cf. Pirow's statement: "Die kliek wat Generaal Hertzog uit die politiek gedryf en ons in die ban gedoen het, is presies dieselfde as die wat die O.B. wil breek." *Die Vaderland*, 30 September, 1941.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 9 October 1941.

Koos's. The sins of the O.B. were two: first, they attempted to subvert the universal allegiance to the Party which Malan deemed essential to the interests of Afrikanerdom; and secondly, they toyed with National-Socialist notions which rejected parliamentarism altogether. And it was of the essence of Malan's position that the Republic must be the creation, not of popular violence, but of constitutional action.¹ Malan did not subscribe to Robespierre's desperate creed that virtue is always in a minority on this earth. He had good hopes that the day would soon dawn when virtue should be in a majority. But it must be organised virtue, politically disciplined virtue. It is one of the ironies of the situation that the O.B., whose purpose was to discipline Afrikanerdom, should have become in Malan's eyes the focus of indiscipline.

Similarly, to Malan the Afrikanereenhedskomitee very soon appeared as an agent for dividing rather than uniting Afrikanerdom in its allegiance to the Party. As soon as it became plain that his leadership was to be merged in a syndicated authority, he could no longer heartily cooperate. The Committee represented the federal principle; Malan must at all hazards cling to centralisation. Thus he found himself in the singular position of claiming an authority and exercising a power more akin to that *Führertum* which he comprehended than even the authority and the power of van Rensburg himself. If the absolute control of the Party over politics could have been admitted, if van Rensburg had conceded the point that the Party must be considered as "die hele volk georganiseer vir hierdie taak, nl. 'n republiek"²—then the clash might have been avoided. But when in the hour of crisis the O.B. loosened the forces of disruption, by themselves developing an independent political activity, then Malan must fight. The General Election was to show that, from his point of view, the fight had not been in vain.

The O.B., for their part, were not able to see the problem in quite the same light. Inevitably, Malan's action appeared to them as an unscrupulous defence of vested interests, a selfish clinging to power by a clique of *perpétuels*, a willingness to compromise the nation's future for the sake of £700 a year. But, just as higher motives than ambition actuated the H.N.P. leaders, so it was not a mere petty jealousy, not a bulimy for the loaves and fishes, that pricked on the O.B. Their organisation was the embodiment of the greatest nationalist movement that South Africa had seen for half a century. For range and depth, for comprehensiveness and intensity, the Party—humdrum, mechanical, old-fashioned—could show nothing to compare with it. The O.B. had the proud consciousness that they had fired the imagination of Afrikaner

1. The H.N.P. had not always been so shy of National-Socialism; see *Die Volksblad*, 18 February 1941 (quoted by van der Walt, pp. 99-102) where very warm sympathy is shown.

* 2. *Die Transvaler*, 9 October 1941.

youth. They knew that they had brought the Nationalist cause home to the people—from the bywoner to the banker, from the university student to the railway ganger—as it had not been brought home these forty years. They had collected opinion, they had canalised opinion, and they had disciplined opinion. They offered a career open to talents. Youth was on their side, and vision, and at need the audacity of Danton too.* Not for them the purges, the intrigues, the personal feuds of an ever-narrowing circle of ageing professionals. They declined to believe that a healthy nationalism could be based upon a principle of exclusion. The Party, tainted by the hated Parliamentarism of its Imperialist foe, was, after all, no better than the concave to Smuts' convex, tied by convention, hag-ridden by the *convenances* of democratic practice. Some other method was surely needed, if South Africa were to avoid a repetition of the events of September 1939.

The alternatives to which the O.B. had recourse were varied, and were variously effective. But it was inevitable that they should include an attempt, more or less conscious, to wrest the political leadership from Malan. It was inevitable, too, particularly after the election of van Rensburg, that they should seek an ideological justification of their discontents in the quarter where it lay readiest to their hand, and that, having found it, they should exert their ingenuity to make it square with that ideal of Krugerism to which all Nationalist Afrikaners subscribed. Meanwhile, the Afrikaner-eenheidskomitee was welcomed by van Rensburg because, in spite of all assurances to the contrary, it did represent an advance towards equality of status with the Party in the political field. A little more moderation at the beginning, a little more of the restraint and temper which they showed later on, and the O.B. might have achieved their object, and ousted Malan indeed. For, if they had the patience for a tontine, they held the winning ticket. The rashness and aggressiveness of van Rensburg, however, played into Malan's hands, and enabled him to inflict severe punishment upon them. The Eenheidskomitee made shipwreck, and their best hopes with it.

Between these two great conflicting interests, striving like the Sabine women to part the combatants, stood a little group of men who saw, perhaps, further into the political millstone than either Malan or van Rensburg. Such were Professors du Plessis, van Rooy and Diederichs, with P. J. Meyer and Totius. For them the events of the last quarter of 1941 were bitter, pitiful and tragic. They were too clear-sighted and too detached to shout either with the one mob or with the other. They saw the faults and the virtues of each of the contestants, and they believed, and continued to believe, that with tact and forbearance they could

bring about an accommodation which should prove H.N.P. and O.B. to be complementary rather than competing bodies. Thus du Plessis wrote that the existing feud threatened

"Om die Party te laat ontaard tot 'n tirannieke dwingelandy oor alle volkskragte, in die voorwendsel dat hy self alleen die toekomstige staat verteenwoordig"

and simultaneously to degrade the O.B. into

"'n terroristiese bende wat sy heil net met 'n uiteindelijke Duitse oorwinnaar sal kan soek!"

Yet each needed the other. The O.B. needed the sobering *gravitas* of the Party; the H.N.P. a blood-transfusion from the more virile and energetic O.B. And this at all events was certain: that the Republic, if it were to be achieved, must be helped forward by *all* Republicans; if its supporters were to be restricted only to those who were 100 per cent. Calvinistic Republicans, they would end with winnowing all away except a handful of Potchefstroom professors!² The basis of collaboration might be difficult to achieve; the expedients already tried might have broken in their hands; but to the true idealist such failure and such difficulty were occasions, not for recrimination and bitterness of spirit, but for fresh endeavour, greater tolerance, and more instant prayer.

Yet, with all his impartiality, du Plessis found at last that he must make his election between the one side and the other, at least for the present. He could not honestly tell himself that he held each party to be equally in the right. And so, in the end, with what searchings of heart we can only conjecture, he came down on the side of the O.B. No doubt he was dismayed at the weapons employed by the H.N.P. in prosecuting the struggle. Perhaps, too, he could not remain unaffected by the attacks to which he personally was subjected in the H.N.P. Press. But, in the main, he was driven to the O.B. by the logic of his own convictions. Friendly collaboration, mutual trust, common discussion of national policies; the integration or coordination of all elements of the national life in the service of the republic; the recognition of culture, and sociology, and economics, as matters of high political concern—these were things he valued. Set over against them were a narrow conception of politics as a matter of elections and divisions, lobbying and office; the iron monopoly of a clique; the principle of exclusion. If he must choose, he could hardly choose the H.N.P. in preference to their rivals. The National-Socialism of the O.B. he was still inclined—too readily, perhaps—

1. *Die Vaderland*, 8 October 1941.

2. *Koers*, LX, 146 (December 1941).

to dismiss as ~~an~~ adolescent affection which time and knowledge would cure. But of this he felt sure: that the Calvinist-National State of the future would be something new and strange, something more fitted for the venturesome than for the hidebound. And the O.B. had at least this merit, that they recognised that something new must come. Perchance it might be his destiny to teach them to root it out in the old.¹

1. For much of the above, see du Plessis' article in *Koers*, IX, 116-8, December 1941. •

"VOLKSEENHEID" OR "PARTY MACHINE" ?

(i)

By the beginning of 1942 the structure of Afrikanereenheid, whose foundations had been so painfully laid in the preceding year, seemed to have fallen into irretrievable ruin. In place of the harmonious collaboration of June 1941, there now raged an internecine war more bitter than any that had preceded it. In this conflict Pirow and his New Order group, though they had been one of the immediate causes of the outbreak of hostilities, strove hard to maintain a position of neutrality. The resolutions of the Transvaal Congress of the H.N.P. in August 1941 had all but explicitly condemned Pirow and his followers; but despite that fact, he continued to profess himself a loyal adherent of Malan. He seems indeed to have made up his mind that, if a breach with the Party must come, the responsibility should be borne by the Volksleier, and not by himself. That such a separation must occur sooner or later was almost inevitable, for Pirow abated not one jot of his National-Socialism; and Malan, now more than ever since the quarrel with the O.B., held firm for the principles of democracy.

From the Party's point of view the position of Pirow's group urgently needed clarification; and it is characteristic that the demand for a decision should have been most clearly voiced by Strydom.¹ With the opening of the Parliamentary session of 1942 that decision could no longer be delayed, and on 14th January, after a prolonged interchange of letters, Pirow announced that the New Order group would not attend the Party caucus, but would in future act independently. But even now this declaration was coupled with the statement that the New Order would remain within the Party.² In effect, however, this marks the end of Pirow's connection with Malan: there was never at any time thereafter a real possibility of reconciliation. Speculation on Pirow's future tended indeed to look for some closer association between the New Order and the O.B. It was suggested, for instance, that the New Order might serve as the O.B.'s Parliamentary Front,³ and there were reports of conversations between Pirow and du Toit, on the one hand, and Smith and Jerling on the

1. See his speech at Edinb., 3 January 1942, where he challenged the Pirowites "as hulle hifik en marlek is, om die Party te sien en hulle openlik te beveg." *Die Transvaal*, 5 January 1942.

2. *Die Transvaal*, *Die Burger*, *Die Vaderland*, 13 January 1942.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 15 January 1942.

other.¹ But if such conversations occurred, for the moment they led to no result. Upon certain questions the O.B. and the New Order might be prepared to act together, but coalition did not take place. There was not yet room, perhaps, within the limits of a single movement, for two such strong personalities as Pirow and van Rensburg.

And so, in the opening months of 1942, Afrikanerdom found itself with no less than four political organisations—the H.N.P., the O.B., the New Order and the Afrikaner Party—each claiming to voice the opinions of the truly nasionaalgesinde Afrikaner, each professing to embody the aspirations of Afrikanerdom, each with its own solution and its own tactic for the realisation of the end for which Afrikanerdom was striving. It was an alignment which was to continue unaltered until the General Election of 1943, and even after.

The struggles of Malan and van Rensburg, the mediatory efforts of L. J. du Plessis, the rebellion and ultimate secession of Pirow, which formed the subject of the preceding chapter, had undoubtedly been the centre of interest in Afrikaner politics in 1941. The old Hertzogites, the new Afrikaner Party, had occupied only an insignificant corner of the picture. O.B. and H.N.P. had agreed at least in this, that neither would have anything to do with the party of Hertzog or Havenga. While the O.B. was yet under the influence of the Party this was natural enough, but even when van Rensburg had won his battle with Kotzé the O.B. held aloof. The A.P. was, perhaps, too weak to make its favours worth the winning, or possibly its inveterate hostility to Malan made any alliance with it too obviously a provocation, for the O.B. to move in that direction, as long as any hope of peace with the H.N.P. remained. And so, though van Rensburg on the one hand and Pirow on the other held Hertzog in the highest personal esteem, they made no real effort to involve the A.P. in the great struggles which brought the Afrikanereenheidskomitee to the ground. The A.P. was never represented on that committee, and thus escaped both the stimulus and the odium of the faction-fighting at the close of 1941; and its admirable newspaper, *Die Vaderland*, was able to adopt a tone of cynical detachment which gave it, among the Afrikaans Press, the attraction of uniqueness.

This enforced aloofness did not, however, have much effect upon the party's development. The A.P. had been founded, partly as a protest against the spirit of exclusiveness and rigour which had driven Hertzog to resign, partly to give a political home to those who could not subscribe to the principles either of Smuts or of Malan, and partly as a body for the upholding

1. *Die Transvaler*, 15 January 1942.

of the principles of Hertzogism.¹ The twelve months that followed Hertzog's withdrawal had seen an attempt at Afrikaner unity upon a broader basis than the H.N.P. had ever admitted before, and the Hertzogite protest against the narrowness of Gesuiwerde orthodoxy had in consequence lost a good deal of its force. Moreover, the principles of Hertzogism, which had been rejected in 1940 by the majority of nationally-minded Afrikanerdom, did not in 1941 seem to be any better adapted to the temper of the times and the peremptory demands of the international situation. If in 1940 the triumph of the Axis had seemed inevitable in the very near future, in 1941 it still appeared probable that a German victory must be the end of the European struggle. It might be delayed by the Russian adventure, but it would be all the more secure and permanent when it came. Besides, the introduction of Russia into the drama meant that Bolshevism could be represented as the protagonist against whom the Axis was fighting. Less than ever did the balanced views, the long-term solutions, the inflexible equity of Hertzogism seem fitted to be the creed for a crisis. Yet the Hertzogites of the A.P. showed no inclination to diverge from a path which long experience had taught them to believe to be the right one. They regarded themselves as the true South African Nationalists, and their policy as the only one upon which a South African nation could—not only justly, but firmly—be based. To be the heirs of Hertzog was to them a source of pride; to found their creed upon an intellectual basis, rather than upon emotionalism or opportunism, their private boast. The pamphlets of A. C. Cilliers, the expositions of Jan Steyn,² the Party constitutions in the various Provinces, all showed the same determination to cleave fast to the Hertzogite tradition, and to moult no feather of loyalty to the principles which had led to their split with the followers of Malan, and their quarrel with the followers of Strydom. Yet though they might and did resent the treatment to which their old leader had been subjected, they contended that a sound nationalism was to be developed by laying stress rather upon likenesses than upon differences. They could not blind themselves to the points of similarity existing between their own party and other Nationalist groups; indeed, they were (in view of what had happened in 1940) perhaps too eager and ready to emphasise them. While Malan was insisting that Party members should subscribe to every jot and tittle of the Party programme, the Afrikaner Party were contending that just as Smuts had been able to unite divergent points of view by urging the paramount importance of continuing the war, so was it possible to unite Nationalist Afrikanerdom

1. "... the party to which we have given a definite shape today will again be the bearer of the Hertzog idea, of Hertzogism ..." Speech by Harm Oost in the House of Assembly on the formation of the A.P. *Debates*, Vol. 41, p. 1939.

2. Dr. Jan Steyn held a post in the Department of External Affairs till November 1940, when he resigned to become private secretary to General Hertzog.

by finding the highest common factor in the politics of the Opposition groups, and absorbing all discordant notes into a higher concord. Where Strydom could see harmony only in the rigidity of a major triad, Havenga was prepared for added seconds and sixths. In short, the Afrikaner Party's remedy for disunion was—Coalition: cooperation on certain broad issues, with each group retaining a limited independence. The experience of 1940, the failure of the Eenheidskomitee, had apparently taught them little.

This attitude was not, in the circumstances of 1941, calculated to rally large masses of opinion to their banners. They began as a small party, and a small party they remained until the Election brought virtual extinction. At their formation in January 1941 they numbered only ten M.P.s (plus two Senators), for the majority of the Hertzogites who had left the United party to participate in Hereniging preferred to remain within the H.N.P., although most of these later followed Pirow into the New Order. Yet in a certain degree they were a picked party too, men who went into the wilderness either for the sake of personal devotion to the aged General, or because they would not give up their opinions in the face of the popular current.¹ Had they not possessed a mouthpiece in *Die Vaderland* not much, perhaps, would have been heard of them. They realised well enough that they commanded little support in the country. The disastrous bye-elections at Smithfield and Fauresmith, when the candidates they proposed for Hertzog's and Havenga's places were heavily defeated, showed this plainly. It was unlikely that they could permanently hold their own against the crushing financial and organisational superiority of the H.N.P. on the one hand and the emotional and intellectual appeal of the O.B. on the other. They needed friendships, alliances; and they needed them, if it were possible, without the surrender of principle. They were therefore driven, in the first instance at all events, to advocate a solution by coalition, though the increasing tempo of the struggle between Malan and van Rensburg must have made it apparent that there was now little hope for such a policy.

The situation in which the A.P. found itself was sufficiently difficult, even had absolute unity prevailed in its ranks. But from the beginning there were ominous tendencies towards disruption. S. C. Quinlan, for instance, crossed the floor of the House in the course of the session of 1941 to sit on the Government benches, and his action was to find imitators two years later in Senators Alberts and Smit and in B. H. Lindhorst. The most able publicist they could command, Professor A. C. Cilliers, was steadily evolving in the same direction.² In the middle of 1941 he

1. Compare the comment of B. K. Long (*In Smuts' Camp*, p. 61): "It will be a pity in a way if the Afrikaner Party is wiped out, for they are not a bad crowd; and I, for one, shall not easily forget how well we got on with them in the United Party till the war debate cut us off from one another. Several of them would have voted with us then but for their loyalty to Hertzog. . ."

2. Cilliers was never a formal member of the Afrikaner Party.

collected a formidable list of Stellenbosch academics to sign a manifesto denouncing the infiltration of National-Socialist ideologies into South Africa, and deploring the growing spirit of racial intolerance in the Afrikaner people. And when Japan committed her act of aggression against the United States, Cilliers, presciently fearful for the security of South Africa itself, openly ranged himself with the Government (though he did not join the United Party) upon the war issue.¹ His action was not without effect upon the official policy of the A.P., which in the course of 1942 was somewhat modified on this point. There was still no weakening in their opposition to the war, but they were now prepared not only to concede the sincerity and even the patriotism (misguided though it might be) of those who supported the war, but also to promise to put no obstacles in the way of the Government in the execution of its policy.²

While certain members of the A.P. were thus being driven by the pressure of international events towards the Government, tendencies of a wholly opposite nature were also at work within the party. The influence of Pirow upon Hertzog had for long been a factor to reckon with, and it seems to have increased rather than diminished in the last eighteen months of the General's life. It is, at all events, to some external influence that must be attributed the pronouncement with which Hertzog startled his followers on 22nd October 1941. Much was made at the time of the "Nazi" tone of this statement, and it is not infrequently contended, by adversaries of the General, or by friends of National-Socialism, that Hertzog was a Nazi at the end of his life. It would, however, be unwise to attach too much importance to an isolated utterance. Hertzog was certainly not the man to throw overboard in a moment the habits of thought of a lifetime. That he ever subscribed to the idea of a single-party State, to the fantasies of the racial biologists, to the suppression of freedom of thought, to the exaltation of war and force as things good in themselves, to the idea of *Führertum*—these are things which are contradicted by his whole political career. If we believe that, we make nonsense of his life's work. But it is not unintelligible to suppose him to have been convinced—either by constant contact with other ideas than his own, or as the result of his leisured and saddened reflections upon politics in the period of his retirement—that some modification of the existing political and economic structure of society was both desirable and practicable. The imposition of more stringent controls upon the licence of private enterprise, the free sacrifice by the individual of some measure of liberty in the interests of a society beset by complex crises, the re-

1. See his pamphlet, *Afrikaners ontwaak!*

2. Conroy, parliamentary leader of the A. P. said, in the House of Assembly on February, 1941: "This parliament, which is the highest authority in the land, has given a mandate to the Government, and for that reason we are not going to hinder the Government's war effort, but I can assure you that we are not going to help them see the war through either." *Debates*, Vol. 43, p. 1456.

orientation of political thinking away from emphasis upon rights and towards emphasis upon duties—these were things which he might advocate without laying himself open to the imputation (whether for praise or blame) of National-Socialism. They were things not merely contemplated but effected, in more than one great crisis, by the great democracies; effected, too, by strictly democratic means. No man can be called a good democrat who is not alive to the weaknesses, and perhaps to the evils, of democracy; but his contention is that those weaknesses can and must be eradicated, and that, in a general view, the evils of democracy are less serious than those of any other political system. If the phrasing of Hertzog's message permitted any more totalitarian interpretation than this, then the error was deplorable, and Hertzog must bear at least some share of the responsibility; but as far as his own opinions were concerned, it may be safely asserted that they were no more Nazi than they were Communist.

The episode, however, created an unfortunate impression; and it was perhaps with a view to correcting any misguided notions as to where the A.P. might stand upon this issue, that the Hoofbesture of the O.F.S. and Transvaal branches of the Party in March 1942 passed resolutions affirming their adherence to democratic methods in the most unambiguous terms,¹ and that General Conroy a month later stated the Party's disapproval of the use of force, and its reprehension of all illegal methods in politics.²

Yet the uncomfortable logic of events was forcing the A.P. in 1942 into courses which seemed to lend colour to the alarmist explanations of Hertzog's statement. Malan's victory over the O.B., the dissolution of the Afrikanereenheidskomitee and the ~~Press~~ attacks that followed, together with the general (but not universal) tendency of the Afrikaner Churches to take Malan's part in the quarrel, had enormously strengthened the H.N.P. It looked forward confidently to the time when Malan should be recognised as the only leader of Nationalist Afrikanerdom, and the H.N.P. as its only political organisation. It believed (too readily, perhaps) that the O.B. was broken. The process which had begun with the extrusion of Hertzog had now been carried a stage further. What hope was there, in such a situation, for the A.P.'s policy of general Afrikaner collaboration upon a minimal programme? The H.N.P. increasingly felt that it had no need to compromise, that the moment was coming (the election would bring it for certain) when it would be in a position to prescribe adherence to its programme, down to the minutest and most unpalatable detail, upon all nationally-minded Afrikaners. In these circumstances, the A.P., if it were to survive in the General

1. *Die Vaderland*, 30 March 1942.

2. *Ibid.* 20 April 1942.

Election which must come this year or next, must seek allies, and seek them elsewhere. And where else than among the enemies of the H.N.P.—in the O.B. and New Order? Widely as its principles differed from theirs, there were yet some points of contact. The friendship of Hertzog for Pirow was one of them. The stout opposition offered by the O.B. to the dictatorship of the H.N.P. was another. Van Rensburg at least seemed to share the A.P.'s desire for a broad Afrikaner front. Moreover, the fact that the O.B., as a result of the quarrel with the H.N.P., had acquired powerful intellectual recruits, who might be expected sensibly to modify its policy, was probably not without influence too; and one of them—L. J. du Plessis—was soon to write sympathetically of Hertzog as a leader of Afrikanerdom to whom die Volk might one day return.

But, all questions of principle aside, it was a hard necessity of politics that drove the A.P. towards the O.B. And this necessity compelled it also to a political opportunism in other directions which was at times frankly avowed. The Party, for instance, openly admitted that its attitude in international affairs would be determined by the course of events; and Conroy took the same line even in regard to National-Socialism:

"Elkeen kan sien dat dit na hierdie oorlog *kan* kom. Die A.P. gaan dit nie tegemoetloop nie, maar sal ook nie sy kop teen 'n muur stamp as dit hier is nie.²

A harsh critic might condemn this behaviour as an example of cynical immorality and utter lack of political principle. To a certain extent the charge is just, though it should be noted that neither Havenga nor the two Hoofbesture ever seem to have fully participated in the manoeuvres of the Parliamentary section of the Party; but in essence these rather pitiful tergiversations, these timid waitings upon the event, were the result of weakness, and not of inherent vice. The A.P. believed with a piety which was neither outworn nor feigned in the principles of Hertzogism; but, as Mahmud II pithily put it after the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, "A drowning man will clutch at a serpent."

(ii)

The H.N.P., being firmly planted on solid ground, had another way with any serpents who might beset its path. The chief of such reptiles, in the eyes of Malan and his lieutenants, was still the O.B.; against whom, in the early months of 1942, they continued to make war with unabated ferocity. In January the Cape Hoofraad explicitly forbade any Party official to remain a member of the O.B. after 17th February 1942,³ and reprobated the O.B.

1. *Die Vaderland*, 30 March 1942.

2. *Ibid.*, 18 May 1942.

3. *Die Transvaler*, 30 January 1942.

for being "Duits Sappe," who used Zeesen for their un-national ends.¹ The O.B., on their side, developed a new line of attack. They threatened, if by 2nd February *Die Nasionale Pers* had not abandoned its hostile attitude, to institute a boycott of all its publications; and, when the ultimatum expired, endeavoured to carry its threat into effect—an action which the H.N.P. condemned as a blow "teen die taal en kultuur van ons volk."² The O.B., however, got little good of this line of action. *Die Nasionale Pers* remained hostile, and in the course of the next eighteen months van Rensburg found himself boycotted by almost all the Afrikaner Press and publishers—a state of affairs which vividly illustrates the extent of Malan's success in 1942 and 1943. But if the O.B. were getting the worst of the conflict, if the majority of the waverers were tending ever more and more to side with the Party, there were still abundant reserves of enthusiasm upon which van Rensburg could draw. The annual celebrations at Amažuba at the end of February were remarkable for the quasi-religious fanaticism of the large crowds that attended, and hardly less so for the powerful speech which van Rensburg delivered upon the occasion, wherein he went further in the defence of illegalities than he had ever done before, and openly looked forward to the domination of a National-Socialist minority in the country.³

¹ *Die Transvaler*, 2 February 1942

² Speech by General Kemp *ibid.*, 23 February 1942

³ *ibid.*, 28 February 1942, *Die Transvaler*, 2 March 1942. Upon the occasion of the celebrations a year later, a special cantata for choral verse speaking was enjoined upon the celebrants. The following are some characteristic extracts—

[Paardekraal, Des. 1830].

"... hy Amajoeba, hy
die Volkswil, praat

Waar is my vegters, en hul vroue trou,
waar my volk, my roem, my krag?

"Jaak! Ek roep jul, wees juisself!"
(*Die Volksleier*—Paul Kruger)

"Medeburgers, Volksgenote, Oproermakers
teen haar Majesteitsgesag So word ons
genoem deur hul wat teen ons oproer stook"

"Heil die Volkswil! Heil Amajoeba! Heil!"

Amajoeba is die slagkreet, Amajoeba is die Magkreet!

Heil gesalfde, ons gevags- en leidsman sterk!

Amajoeba! Amajoeba! Amajoeba!"

(*Die Teenswoordige Volksleier*—Kommandant-Generaal, 1943);

"Ons nader huis die tweede tagtig-
tydperk send en staan nou voor 'n tweede
Perdekraal, en sal, so God ons help,
die stryd beëindig met Amajoeba Twee
Groter was nog nooit gevags of donkerder
ons nags

Aan my is leuenskap, gesag vertrou.

Volg my op die strydig, Afrikaanse

slingerpad van Bloubergstrand tot Amajoeba Twee.

Die smarlik weg waarlangs die seetog trek"

"... Een doel, een troo, een Volk

Ons doores slaap nie, ons offers sterf nie.

Niks gebeur om mks nie Alles vir almal,

Almal vir elk Ons land, ons volk, ons God!"

"Gedenk ons Hollandse Volkplanters,

gedenk ons Hugenote Gelooftvaders,

gedenk ons Duitse Voortbouers,

gedenk ons helde-leiers en helde-lyers"

(*Ranking from Paul Kruger—Staatspresident, to*

Dirkie Uys and Japie Greyling—Kinderhelde)

[In conclusion]

"Heil die Volkswil! Heil Gesagsman! K. G. -Leier!

Amajoeba is die slagwoord! Amajoeba is die Magwoord!

Amajoeba! Amajoeba!! Amajoeba!"

It is against this background of unceasing strife that must be set the various appeals for unity which culminated at last in the Volkseenheidsbeweging. The first of them came on 30th January 1942 from L. J. du Plessis, and was trenchantly rejected by *Die Transvaler* on the following day. Du Plessis, commented Verwoerd, had appeared in his true colours at last—as an inveterate compromiser, as the confidant of Hertzog, as the disappointed political aspirant, as, in short, the enemy of the H.N.P. But not by such as he was Afrikanerdom to be saved: in the stormy seas through which they were faring, there was but one lifeboat—the H.N.P. Those who chose to climb in would be welcome, if they obeyed the captain's orders; those who preferred to remain outside might sink—or swim if they had strength enough.¹

Three weeks later Hertzog made an unexpected re-entry into politics with a similar appeal for Afrikaner union. But as he coupled party politicians with Imperialists as the arch-foes of his people, and as he took occasion to express the opinion that the party system had outlived its usefulness, his appeal can scarcely be considered very conciliatory;² and it is not surprising that *Die Transvaler*, after printing it obscurely on a back page, should have dismissed it in a contemptuous editorial, which took the opportunity once more to fix the stigma of Nazism upon the author.³

Du Plessis, pertinacious as ever, now returned to the charge. In a long letter to *Die Vaderland* on 20th March 1942, he proposed the foundation of a new Unity Movement, to be based on Christian National foundations and a trust in God. It would enter into no competition with any other existing organisation, but would seek rather to bind them all together for a commonly acknowledged goal. The movement itself would not be just another organisation with its own leaders (who might have political aspirations of their own); it would be rather a broad national movement in which the leaders and members of other bodies might meet upon common ground, and wherein there would be no exclusions or prohibitions upon any nasionaalgesinde Afrikaner.³

The H.N.P. was understandably irritated: sharp words were uttered about bungling and muddling professors. When the H.N.P. lifeboat was riding the breakers so buoyantly, where was the sense in advocating the construction of a rickety raft of political flotsam? Afrikanerdom was weary of such ventures.⁴ Despite *Die Transvaler's* disapproval, however, it soon appeared that du Plessis meant business. On 25th March 1942 a meeting was held in Heilbron, and numerous attended by Afrikaners from all the Opposition groups. It was convened by a "Provisional

1. *Die Vaderland*, 30 January 1942; *Die Transvaler*, 31 January 1942.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 25 February 1942.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 20 March 1942.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 28 March 1942.

Committee" of which J. G. ("Kaalkop") van der Merwe was the Chairman, and it had the privilege of being addressed by that influential Afrikaner, Professor J. C. van Rooy of Potchefstroom, in a speech which combined Olympian impartiality with Christian charity in a very notable degree. The upshot was the foundation of the Volkseenheidsbeweging, and the carrying of a series of resolutions which reflected the tenour of du Plessis' appeal. The movement was to constitute an "Afrikanertuiste" for Christian-Nationalists of all political groups; it was to endeavour to end the broedertwis by emphasising the fundamental points of agreement common to all; it was to bind together "alle Afrikaanse kragte in een strewe tot die volle verwesenliking en uitlewing van die ware nasionale lewensbeskouing"; to keep a watchful eye on all matters of national interest; and to summon one or more volksvergaderings for the whole country.¹

The Volkseenheidsbeweging, thus launched, made a natural appeal to the Afrikaner Party. It offered them a way out of their political isolation; it was essentially the solution they preferred, since it would not involve sacrifice of principle. In short, it might become the basis of a loose party confederation. They gave it their cordial support.² So, too, did the O.B. Not only was du Plessis now a pillar of the O.B., but the Heilbron *démarche* appealed to van Rensburg on more general grounds. As the resolution of the Groot Raad put it:

"Die O.B. het met waardering kennisgeneem van die beweging tot herstel van die eenheid van die nasionaalvoelende en republikeinse gesinde Afrikanerdom—'n strewe wat die O.B. hom van die begin af reeds ten doel gestel en nog altyd nagestreef het. Die O.B. wil beklemtoon dat sodanige eenheid alleen heg kan wees op grondslag van ons definitiewe Afrikaner-volkskoers soos geopenbaar in die volksontwaking van 1938. Die O.B. het hom nog steeds verplig gevoel in volksbelang om voort te gaan op sy ingeslae weg van samewerking te soek met alle volksorganisasies tot verwesenliking van die republiek op Christelik-nasionale grondslag vir ons volk, en verwelkom daartoe en daarby alle opregbedoeide en ware medewerking en steun."³

The movement, as the O.B. very well realised, would, if it were successful, mean a blurring of the sharp lines of cleavage between the parties of Afrikanerdom, and it might thus prepare the way for that destruction of the Parliamentary party system which was one of the chief objectives at which the O.B. was aiming.

It was precisely this fact which ensured the hostility of the H.N.P. Malan himself hesitated for some weeks before making a definite pronouncement. Perhaps he felt that, if the movement should achieve real popularity, it would be dangerous to offer

1. *Die Vaderland*, 26 March 1942.

2. *Ibid.*, 30 March 1942.

3. Van Rensburg's speech at Crosby: *Die Vaderland*, 13 April 1942. *Die O.B.*, 22 April 1942.

direct opposition; or perhaps he was waiting for the results of the impending bye-elections, which he hoped might strengthen his hand.¹ But other members of the Party were less cautious, and Eric Louw, in particular, contemptuously dismissed the idea of a volksvergadering as impracticable nonsense.² Nevertheless, the movement made some headway. It did not, as its authors had hoped, become the begetter of a great upsurge of enthusiasm and goodwill; it did not sweep the country, or seriously shake the position of the H.N.P.; but it spread outwards from Heilbron, and held a number of successful meetings in the O.F.S.³

Meanwhile polling-day was approaching in one Parliamentary and six Provincial constituencies.⁴ These bye-elections were of peculiar importance to Malan and the H.N.P. They might be considered as affording a dress rehearsal of the General Election which was expected in the following year. And they were of especial interest from the fact that they were the first contests to occur since the split between the H.N.P. and O.B. They would, therefore, provide a touchstone of public opinion in the country; for the constituencies involved were of sufficiently varied types to offer some sort of cross-section of South African opinion in general. The results would probably give a sufficiently clear answer to a number of questions of the highest importance to the Party. They would, for instance, give a reliable indication as to what the attitude of the O.B. would be towards a General Election. "Would the quarrels in which they were engaged prove a strong enough inducement to them to forsake the Nationalist cause altogether, and vote "Empire" from motives of mere revenge? Or would they adopt an attitude merely of passivity and watchfulness? And, if the O.B. were hostile or neutral, how would the voting strength of the H.N.P. be affected? Upon the answers to these questions depended the reaction of Malan to the Volkseenheidsbeweging, and perhaps in the last resort his attitude to the O.B. too. The H.N.P. believed that they had rendered the O.B. powerless to do them a hurt. If their calculations proved to be mistaken, a complete reorientation of policy might become necessary.

Some of these questions received an answer early in the campaign. Van Rensburg declared as early as 23rd March 1942 that he would give his support to any Republican candidate who was not hostile to the O.B.⁵ This policy was actually followed at Ermelo, where the H.N.P. candidate had the O.B.'s approval.⁶

1. Malan's statement; *Die Transvaler*, 10 April 1942.

2. Letter to *Die Burger*, 7 April 1942.

3. E.g. meetings at Hertzogville (*Die Vaderland*, 15 April 1942) and Kroonstad (*ibid.*, 18 April 1942).

4. Riversdale, Humansdorp, Namaqualand, Brits, Ermelo, Vryburg, Vereeniging. There were actually twelve bye-elections, but the H.N.P. was contesting only seven of them.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 23 March 1942.

6. *Ibid.*, 21 April 1942.

And, in general, there was none of that purely factious opposition of which the H.N.P. had, perhaps, been afraid. The O.B. clearly announced its intention of not putting forward candidates of its own, and to this policy it adhered.¹ On the other hand, as the official O.B. statement explained, the instinct of self-preservation directed that they should not assist their declared enemies to obtain positions of power or influence. The guarantees they demanded from candidates were therefore very stringently framed.

On the whole, the H.N.P. candidates (except perhaps at Ermelo) were not prepared to subscribe to the O.B.'s conditions, nor were they otherwise acceptable to the O.B. leaders. There is nothing to suggest that in these constituencies the O.B. voted against the H.N.P., but it seems certain that there were many abstentions on the part of those who would normally have been secure Nationalist votes. The polling, therefore, became a reasonably reliable indication of H.N.P. strength, independent of O.B. support. Considered in that light, the results of the bye-elections were decidedly encouraging. Although the H.N.P. won only three of the seven seats contested (Riversdale, Humansdorp, Namaqualand), it substantially reduced the United Party majority at Brits and Vryburg (where a New Order candidate drew off over 1,000 potential Nationalist votes)² and more than doubled its previous poll at Vereeniging. Despite the attempts of the O.B. and *Die Vaderland* to represent the results of the elections as a salutary lesson for Malan and his party,³ there was ~~really~~ no denying that the H.N.P. had won a success of some magnitude, and that they might face the future with considerable confidence. The judgment of *die Volk*, long awaited, long disputed, seemed at last to have been given, and it had been given in their favour. Immediate advantage was taken of it. A highly successful tour of the Transvaal by Strydom, Kemp and Wilkens, became at times an open triumphing over their defeated rivals; as when Kemp at Wolmaranstad said:

"Die ander elemente wat die H.N.P. beveg en bestry" [*i.e.*, other than the United Party] "is nog net 'n herinnering. Die A.P. bestaan nie meer nie, die N.O. is dood, en die O.B. is 'n geraamte."⁴

At the same time Malan made up his mind about the Volkseenheidsbeweging. In a Press statement on 29th April 1942,⁵ he delivered a comprehensive condemnation of versoeningspogings in general and the Volkseenheidsbeweging in particular. Professor van Rooy's mild references to the responsibility of the leaders for the existing unhappy state of affairs seems to have touched him

1. Omsendbrief of Transvaal Beheerraad, in *Die Vaderland*, 15 April 1942.

2. "In Vryburg het Dr. van Rensburg en die N. O. saamgespan om die setel aan die Britse-Joodse kapitalisme uit te lewer" (*Die Transvaal*, 27 April 1942).

3. *Die Vaderland*, 29 April, 2 May 1942 (statement by J. A. Smith).

4. *Die Transvaal*, 30 April 1942.

5. *Die Burger*, 29 April 1942.

on a tender spot, for he made obvious endeavours to draw the Professor into a public controversy in the Press on the subject of the Malanite attitude to Fusion, Hereniging, the Nasionale Komitee and other matters. Van Rooy, however, was too wary to enter upon a verbal brawl in the public prints, and his firm but temperate refusal to wrangle might have served as a model for more than one politician.¹ But as far as the H.N.P. was concerned the final decision had been taken: unity was to be realised through and in the Party, and in no other way.

(iii)

In the interval between the bye-elections of April and the great Uniale Kongres of the H.N.P. in September, this decision was reiterated again and again. The H.N.P. had taken its stand, and not one inch would it budge in the direction of compromise. In a speech at the Johannesburg City Hall on 30th May 1942 Malan underlined the points he had made in his challenge to van Rooy, and propounded his own view of the practical steps to be taken if unity were to be restored. What was needed, in his opinion, was a return to 3rd June 1941—the day when (upon the H.N.P. interpretation) all other Afrikaans organisations had agreed to recognise the Party as the sole representative of Afrikanerdom in the political field. If the events of 3rd June 1941 did indeed bear that interpretation, it was no wonder that the Volksleier should have looked back to that period as to a Golden Age; but in the circumstances as they existed a year later his remedy was one which could hardly be taken. It was akin to the remedy of those who in 1939 had cried "Back to 1932!" It ignored the (somewhat muddy) water which had flowed under the bridges in the interim.²

The refusal of the H.N.P. to treat with its rivals was, as we have seen, in part the result of its growing confidence in its ability to fight the battle of Afrikanerdom without the aid of the A.P. "afskilfering," or the O.B. "rampokkerbende," or the N.O. "Duitse Sappe." But it was something else too. It was also the result of a general suspicion that the other Opposition groups were using the popularity of the cry for reunion as a stalking-horse for their own political ends. In a straight fight with the Party they would be beaten—had been beaten; but they might still get the better of their enemies in a coalition. *Die Transvaler*, for instance, felt that all this enthusiasm for "eenheid" could be correlated with the approach of a General Election in which no Opposition candidate was likely to have much chance unless he belonged to the H.N.P.; and it suspected that when Germany had defeated Russia (the threat to Stalingrad was just beginning

¹ *Die Vaderland*, 7 May 1942.

² *Die Transvaler*, 1 June, and editorial 1 July, 1942.

to develop) Hertzog would emerge to capitalise a German victory on the basis of Afrikaner reunion.¹

In short,

"Eenhëidsbewegings het niks anders geword as politieke sette om eie belange te bevorder deur 'n teenstander in 'n hoek te manipuleer wat die publieke gevoel betref."²

There is perhaps some truth in this view; but it must be emphasised that such motives cannot be attributed to men of the stamp of van Rooy and du Plessis, who, whether they erred or not by H.N.P. standards, were sincerely anxious for Afrikaner unity as a thing desirable in itself, and who sought no obvious advantage to themselves from its realisation. These men, and other influential Afrikaners also, were simply not convinced that the H.N.P.'s rigid pattern for nationalism was the best solution of the problem of restoring a common front. And the conclusion which they reached coincided with that which issued from the vague unhappiness of many a simple Afrikaner who felt that it was morally wrong as well as politically unsound that the Volk should be divided, though he might not be able to offer any intelligible answer to the question as to how the situation was to be altered for the better.

The existence of this very general feeling explains the otherwise inexplicable pertinacity with which the advocates of Eenheid continued to make propaganda for their cause in the face of Malan's unambiguous statements. Not a week passed without *Die Vaderland's* harping upon this string.³ General Conroy, in speeches here and there in the Transvaal and O.F.S., preached the gospel of union, and airily dismissed as imponderable any objections which might be brought against it.⁴ General Hertzog sent his love to the Free Staters and urged them to forget the past.⁵ Meanwhile, the Nationalist Afrikaners of Delmas, Witbank, Ermelo and the Highveld regions thereabout, were meeting in conclave and forming committees with the same end in view. They eventually pooled their resources, and constituted a "Saam-werk Komitee" of twenty-one members (drawn from all the Opposition groups) which, after holding three meetings without much advancing matters, decided that the only thing to be done was to get Malan, Havenga, van Rensburg and Pirow together in one room in Pretoria, and hope for the best. What was to be the technique employed at this meeting is not quite clear: whether the twenty-one by sheer weight of numbers were

1. *Die Transvaler*, 21 August 1942.

2. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

3. See, e.g., *Die Vaderland* editorial of 7 May 1942, asking "in Heaven's name" what the differences were that kept the H.N.P. and A.P. apart; also *ibid.*, 28 August 1942, 14 September 1942; *Die O.B.* 8 July 1942.

4. *Ibid.*, 16 and 18 May, 25 June 1942.

5. *Ibid.*, 18 August 1942: "Gee my liefde aan die Vrystaters en sê aan hulle dat die tyd aangebreek het dat ons die verskille van die verlede moet vergeet, in voorbereiding om die toekomst tegemoet te gaan. Die tyd is nou nie meer ver nie."

to knock the heads of the leaders together and coerce them forcibly into protestations of amity, or whether they would content themselves with peppering all four with the same list of questions which they eventually put to Malan, is a matter which it is difficult to determine now, and which may have appeared dubious then. Be that as it may, the Saam-werk Komitee did prevail upon Havenga, van Rensburg and Pirow to come to Pretoria in the third week of September in the expectation of a meeting with Malan. The approach to Malan, however, was unsuccessful. Malan apparently misunderstood the Komitee, supposing them to be suggesting an election-compact, with which he would have nothing to do. They on their side denied that they had made any proposal of the sort, complained that the Volksleier "hedged" in his answers to their questions, and accused him of deliberately misrepresenting the negotiations in the Press and in public. An acrimonious correspondence flared and sputtered for some time thereafter in the columns of *Die Transvaler* and *Die Vaderland*.¹ Into this it would be profitless to enter. The Saam-werk Komitee comprised men of integrity, sincerity and goodwill, but they were not, perhaps, very well orientated in the political realities of the moment, and from Malan's point of view their amateur intervention could only be a source of embarrassment, and perhaps of danger. It cannot have been pleasant for him to alienate his own supporters; but he could hardly explain the position as he saw it to a mixed body upon which his political adversaries were also represented. If, as the deputation claimed, he hedged, it is difficult to see what else he could have done.¹

Malan was the less inclined to listen to the rather naive appeals of the Highvelders because his interview with them coincided with an impressive display of the strength and unity of purpose of his party. This was the Uniale Kongres, which met in Pretoria on 16th September 1942. The objects of the preceding Uniale Kongres in 1941 (according to *Die Transvaler*) had been the consolidation of Afrikanerdom, the laying of the bases of national unity, the entrusting of Malan with a mandate against "ondermynende groepsvorming" and foreign political systems. The objects of the Kongres of 1942 were to be the deciding upon methods for breaking away from Great Britain, no matter what might happen in Europe, and the discussion of lewenstecastele necessary to the coming Republic.² The Kongres was also designed to be a pre-election rally; and shortly before it met a "Strydfonds" campaign was launched, by which Party members were to be urged to contribute half-crowns ("silver bullets") to

1. Malan's statement in *Die Transvaler*, 18 September 1942; the Komitee's, *ibid.*, 21 September; open letter from Komitee to Malan, *ibid.*, 7 October, with editorial comment; C. W. M. du Toit, *Die Kerkiesing* . . . (etc.), p. 5, where the author goes so far as to call the Malanites "muishonde."
See van Rensburg's account at Paarl; *Die O.B.* 28 October 1942; also *ibid.* 23 and 30 September 1942.
2. *Die Transvaler*, 24 August 1942.

the fight against British-Jewish Imperialism.¹ The Kongres itself was a great success, and over 1,100 members attended. It had been designed that Malan should be drawn in triumph from the station in de la Rey's car—a 1913 English-made Daimler which had once belonged to General Beyers—but this picturesque piece of pageantry was marred by the refined malice of some unknown individual who privily removed the wheels on the preceding evening. However, Malan was ceremonially draped in the Vierkleur, and much enthusiasm prevailed. It was rewarded by an important speech from the Volksleier. Rejecting equally dictatorship on the one hand and British-Imperialism on the other, Malan pointed the way to a Christian-National Republic in which the English might have a part, but in which the Afrikaner would enjoy a position of ascendancy. Against the O.B. he voiced threats of further action in the near future; and to Conroy, who had been clamouring for reunion, he addressed a series of questions which made it clear that the differences of principle which had foredoomed Hereniging to failure were not to be obscured even by the approach of a General Election. He was given a great vote of confidence, and also a renewal of the plenary powers which had been granted to him by the foregoing Uniale Kongres.²

Under the inspiring influence of these manifestations of trust, Malan now carried on the war against the O.B. with vigour. Not, indeed, that there had ever been any question of a truce. The charges and counter-charges had been bandied about with a dreary persistency which seemed inexhaustible. But from time to time the battle shifted its terrain. In May, for instance, the conflict raged mainly round the Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond. This body had become, as to its executive at all events, preponderantly O.B. in complexion, which was the less surprising inasmuch as van Rensburg was its President; and matters came to a head at Stellenbosch when *Die Matie*, the local organ of the movement, printed matter hostile to Malan, and openly avowed its support of the O.B.³ The student body at Stellenbosch by no means shared the opinions of *Die Matie's* editorial staff, and, at a general meeting on 13th May 1942, condemned the A.N.S. attitude, and appealed to the Senate of the University to ban the paper. The struggle became general at the A.N.S. Congress two months later. At this meeting, from which the Press was excluded "omdat huidige omstandighede te gevaarlik is,"⁴ it seems likely that the O.B. elements, encouraged by van Rensburg's presence,

1. *Die Transvaler*, 7 and 8 September 1942.

2. *ibid.*, 17 September 1942. Kemp, supported by Strydom, carried a motion to change the name of the party to "Die Republikeinse Nasionale Party;" but though there were only 3 dissentients the motion does not seem to have been put into effect.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 15 May 1942; *Die Matie*, 22 May 1942, for its attitude.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 7 July 1942.

were successful.¹ It is at least certain that in August, when the opening of the University terms permitted the various branches to meet, there came resolutions from U.K.O.V.S. and Huguenot, repudiating the new line which the A.N.S. was taking, demanding adherence to the decision of the preceding Congress (which had insisted on neutrality in politics) and founding a couple of new student organisations, in secession from the A.N.S., which thus remained in O.B. hands.² The University of the Witwatersrand had already taken the same line in May, and a secession at Pretoria was to follow later. The split affected other non-political bodies also. As Malan observed at Kroonstad on 6 October :

"Die O.B. het die nasionaal-sosialisme in sy naakte vorm aanvaar. Hierdie nasionaal-sosialisme werk skeurend. Die A.N.S. is deur die O.B. se nasionaal-sosialisme van bo tot onder geskeur. Die Calvinistiese Bond is besig om in flenters geskeur te word."³

Not content with these malpractices, the O.B. (so the Malanites alleged) was actively engaged in the encouragement and subornation of sabotage and the reckless use of force. Despite van Rensburg's denials of complicity, the H.N.P. lost no opportunity of trying to fix on him the responsibility for the considerable wave of acts of violence which caused such anxiety in the middle of this year. The question became acute in the case of Visser and van Blerk, who were convicted of a bomb outrage at Benoni which had led to the death of an unoffending bystander. The H.N.P. Press used every effort to obtain a reprieve for the condemned men, and prepared a formidable petition on their behalf. While reprobating wholeheartedly the methods employed by the accused, it cast the main blame upon those who had taken advantage of the honest nationalist enthusiasm of two misguided young men to carry out, without risk to themselves, a policy of terrorism which, if persisted in, would hand over the moral advantage to the Government. Whether as a result of the petition or not, Visser and van Blerk were reprieved, and the H.N.P. could point to the incident as an example of its own sense of political responsibility, its watchfulness over the interests of Afrikanerdom, and the validity of its claim to be the real representative of the Afrikaner nationalist movement.⁴

At the same time Malan was falling out of friendship with Germany, through no fault of his own. The efforts of the O.B. to persuade Zeesen that "Codlin was the friend, not Short" had been so successful that *Die Transvaler* did not hesitate to speak of "inkruipeery by vreemde nasies,"⁵ though whether

1. Van Rensburg was re-elected Hon. President and the A.N.S. affirmed its adherence to the O.B.: *Die O.B.*, 5 August 1942.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 25 May, 29 May, 30 May, 21 August, 31 August 1942.

3. *Ibid.*, 7 October 1942.

4. For all this see *Die Transvaler*, 25 June, 21 July, 3 August 1942; and *Die Burger*, 1 November 1942; *Die O.B.* 15 July 1942.

5. 12 August editorial.

Germany or Britain was intended must remain obscure, since at the same time the paper was charging the Smuts Government with deliberately encouraging and protecting an O.B. secret wireless station which disseminated news and views hostile to the H.N.P., and thereby poisoned the German mind.¹ All this, however, did serve to bring out one essential difference between the H.N.P. and O.B. programmes—or so at least the H.N.P. Press contended. It showed that van Rensburg placed his whole reliance upon a German victory, and until that took place would undertake no constructive action for the realisation of Afrikaner ends; while the H.N.P., though it had no doubt that a German victory would make easier the achievement of the Republic, had a policy and a programme which were practical and realistic, and which would not be impaired by a German defeat.²

(iv)

Since this is how matters stood between them, it was therefore something of a political sensation when on 26th November 1942 *Die Transvaler* announced that Malan and van Rensburg were to meet on the same platform at Ventersdorp on 9th December, with Professor J. C. van Rooy in the chair.³ The meeting, which caused great excitement in the anticipation, had been agreed upon as the result of parleys between Colonel Jacob Wilkens (M.P. for Ventersdorp) and Mr. Eloff, a General in the O.B. It is important to notice that the purpose of the meeting was to enable die Volk to hear both sides of the argument between the leaders. It was *not* (as the Volkseenheidsbeweging had been) an attempt to find a compromise between them, nor was it to have made the occasion for a new versoeningspoging. The initiative had not come either from Malan or from van Rensburg: the project had arisen out of challenges "om en weer" during the preceding months. The local partisans had approached their respective leaders who had (somewhat unwillingly) consented to attend. Wilkens and Eloff, for their part, had agreed that if their side failed to put in an appearance they would immediately resign membership of their respective organisations.⁴

Certain rules were agreed upon for the conduct of the meeting. It was to be addressed by both Malan and van Rensburg. In the event of their being unable to attend in person, they were to be at liberty to appoint as deputies the Provincial leaders or Eric Louw (for the H.N.P.) and one of the A-K.-G.s or Ds. Stander (for the O.B.). Failure to appear on the part of Malan and van Rensburg was permissible only in the event of sickness

1. *ibid.*, l. skyn sy roepinge. *cit.*—Van Rensburg's comment on this episode was particularly caustic. "Dr. Malan van Dr. Coetzee te gemis het—sy aangebore talent is om hooftpeurder te word in die politieke afdeling

2. *ibid.*, 2^{de} l. in Steyn se speurders." *Die O.B.*, 28 October 1942.

3. *ibid.*, 2^{de} l. 5 August 1942.

4. Press statement, 27 November 1942.

Statement by Eloff and Wilkens, *Die Transvaler*, 30 November 1942.

or death. If, in that case, the deputies also failed to attend, their places were to be taken by Eloff and Wilkens. Speeches were to be confined to matters of policy, and there was to be no recrimination. It was to be the responsibility of each side to see that its supporters behaved in an orderly manner. No questions were to be asked; no motions moved. The H.N.P. representative was to speak for one hour, the O.B. for an hour and a half, and the H.N.P. to reply for half an hour.

Although both leaders had acquiesced in the *fait accompli*, the Groot Raad of the O.B. was displeased with the action of General Eloff. In a resolution which appeared in *Die Vaderland* on 30th November 1942 it declared that any officer who in future should compromise himself or his superiors by accepting challenges to appear on party-political platforms would render himself liable to immediate suspension. If such a challenge were issued to him, he must answer that the O.B. "nie aan die partypolitieke metode van openbare disputasie glo nie." In this single instance, however, the Groot Raad expressed itself in favour of the K.G.'s appearance.¹

The H.N.P., on its side, was uneasy also, as appeared from a long letter of Eric Louw in *Die Burger* of 1st December, in which he wrote:

— "Ek is oortuig dat Nasionaliste oor die hele land met my saamvoel dat ons Hoofleier met sy prestige en rekord van volksdiens in 'n vernederende posisie gestel word deur op 'n gesamentlike vergadering te moet kom met 'n politieke fortuinsoeker."²

These proved prophetic words; for on 2nd December Malan returned from the baths at Montagu, and on the following day *Die Burger* announced simply that he would not appear at Ventersdorp.³ *Die Transvaler*, in amplification of this news, stated that Wilkens had approached Malan on 13th November, but that Malan (whose health was not of the best), fearing that he might be unable to put in an appearance, had written to Strydom requesting him to act as his deputy, and Strydom would therefore represent the H.N.P.⁴ Strydom, in reply, had urged Malan to attend in person if it were at all possible; but the state of Malan's health made it imperative that he should decline.

Van Rensburg refused to believe that Malan would stay away; and *Die Vaderland's* special representative, who had been sent to interview the K.G., came away with the impression that if Malan did not go to Ventersdorp, van Rensburg would not go either.⁵ On the following day, another Press statement from

1. *Die Vaderland*, 30 November 1942; *Die Transvaler*, 1 December 1942, printed the following headline: "O.B. skrikkerig vir Vergadering," and asserted that "hieruit blyk dat daar vrees is by die O.B. nangaande die afloop van die Ventersdorp vergadering."

2. *Die Burger*, 1 December 1942.

3. *Ibid.*, 3 December 1942.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 3 December 1942.

5. *Die Vaderland*, 3 December 1942.

Strydom confirmed Malan's inability to attend. Strydom had on 2nd December received a letter from Mrs. Malan explaining that her husband "in die bed is, en dat dit heeltemal onmoontlik vir hom sal wees om op Ventersdorp te wees."¹

And so, on 5th December, the committee which had been organising the "circus" called the meeting off; largely, as it seems, because van Rensburg refused to accept Strydom as a disputant worthy his powder and shot.² That same evening van Rensburg intimated his intention of holding an O.B. meeting at Ventersdorp on the day originally appointed for his debate with Malan. The advantage was thus left slightly with van Rensburg, and it became necessary for the H.N.P. to put in some sort of counter-blow. *Die Transvaler*, therefore, on 7th December launched a heavy attack on van Rensburg, accusing him of refusing to appear with Strydom because he was anxious on any pretext to avoid the meeting, and alleging that he had heard with relief of Malan's illness.³ The reply of the O.B. was tart, and an unedifying controversy followed. In short, the fiasco was complete.

(v)

In these circumstances the customary political truce for the period between Dingaan's Day and New Year's Day cannot have been altogether unwelcome. But though the year thus closed in a silence which almost gave the illusion of harmony, it was, after all, an illusion. If 1942 had begun in bitterness, the situation had no whit improved a year later.⁴ Moreover, the prospect of a return to unity could be considered hopeful only by those who looked forward to the speedy triumph of the H.N.P. over all its rivals. As Malan observed, in his New Year Message, all was yet upon the hazard. Nevertheless,

"Ten spyte van die verbrekende en ondermynende invloede wat ons ongelukkig gedurende die afgelope jaar moes bekamp, het ons Party in sy organisasie ontsaglike vordering gemaak. Op onmiskenbare wyse is daardeur die bewys gelever dat die Afrikanerdom hom op politieke gebied alleen deur die H.N.P. wil laat verteenwoordig en hom daarin alleen wil organiseer."⁵

The final proof of this contention would lie in the election that lay ahead. It was not a question of the number of seats the Government might win or lose; it was a question rather of whether Afrikanerdom would return from the polls still divided, or whether it would find in the ballot-boxes the proof of that essential unity

1. *Die Transvaler*, 4 December 1942. *Die O.B.* (9 December 1942) published stories to the effect that Malan had been seen driving with his wife at a time when he was supposed to be in bed.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 14 December 1942.

3. *ibid.*, 7 December 1942.

4. *ibid.*, 1 January 1943.

5. *ibid.*, 4 January 1943.

6. *ibid.*, 1 January 1943.

of which the H.N.P., and the H.N.P. alone, was fitted to be the embodiment.

The obstacles to such a united front were not likely to come from the O.B., to whom the election appeared as an embarrassment which grew more acute as it drew near. No, the great element of uncertainty lay rather in the attitude of the Afrikaner Party. Would it put up candidates ? Or, if it failed to do so, could it be relied upon to support the Malanite cause ? No one, least of all the Afrikaner Party leaders, was under any real illusion as to the paucity of its membership and the embryonic state of its organisation; but it was at least possible that it could command sufficient votes to swing a number of doubtful constituencies. Throughout 1942 *Die Vaderland* had expounded the Afrikaner Party's position over and over again, and on many occasions had minimised the differences of principle which separated it from Malan. No doubt this line had been taken to serve the interests of Volkseenheid; but it was apparent, none the less, that there was a certain readiness for reconciliation on the side of the A.P., and that if Malan chose to bargain, it would probably be possible to devise some sort of election agreement. Hitherto, however, Malan had ruthlessly ripped off the flimsy sophistries with which *Die Vaderland* had sought to "paper over the cracks,"¹ and as the New Year opened *Die Transvaler* took the same line in a leader which, with all the brutality of the naked truth, bluntly accused Havenga and his followers of political opportunism.² Havenga personally was less obnoxious to this charge than the majority of his party; and at the important A.P. Congress in January 1943 he enunciated a statement of policy which showed that he was fully determined to base the A.P. upon the old principles of Hertzogism, and to stand or fall by that creed.³ Indeed, so far were they from exhibiting any inclination for toenadering with the H.N.P. at this moment, that the tendency seemed rather in the other direction: a handful of seceders from the Party about this time went over to the Government, as A. C. Cilliers had done before them.⁴

It is understandable that *Die Transvaler* should have seen in these converts the witnesses to the accuracy of its own diagnosis; but it is also indicative of the electoral potentialities of the A.P. that *Die Burger* should have manifested alarm at their action. It would not do to have the tendency become general. The A.P. after all, (as *Die Vaderland* had always contended) were Nationalist Afrikaners, however misguided. *Die Burger*, therefore, condescended to plead with the A.P. to consider seriously whether, in the circumstances, it was not their duty to throw in their lot

1. E.g. his questions to Conroy at the Uniale Kongres of 1942.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 9 January 1943.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 13 January 1943.

4. The seceders were: Senators, Alberts and Smit, B. H. Lindhorst, M.P. and of the A.P. in the G. F. S. Both Kok and Smit urged the A.P. to cooperate with the Government. *Die Vaderland*, 18 March 1943, and *Die Transvaler*, 10 February 1943.

once again with the H.N.P. The H.N.P., it handsomely admitted, might not be in every respect the ideal Party; might even now and then have fallen into error; but at least it was not tainted with "Imperialism."¹ The plea, however, remained for the present unanswered.

Meanwhile, the approach of the elections was exercising to its utmost the political adroitness of the O.B. and New Order. The O.B.'s position was particularly difficult. To vote for H.N.P. candidates (who in the vast majority of constituencies would be the only Opposition candidates in the field) would be to strengthen the hand of Malan, and Malan and van Rensburg each considered the other as Afrikanerdom's most dangerous enemy. What would happen to the O.B., already weakened by the split with the H.N.P., if, as a result of O.B. votes, Malan increased the representation of his party in the House? Would it not be open to him to claim it as an expression of the confidence of Afrikanerdom, as a *verdict* from die Volk in the great controversy? On the other hand, how was it possible to vote on the other side? A vote against Malan must mean a vote for Smuts, for the war for "Imperialism," for everything the Nationalist-Afrikaner abhorred. The discipline of the O.B. might be excellent, but an order to vote against Malan was an order which van Rensburg could not, dared not, give; for it would have been followed by wholesale disobedience and the disruption of the movement. There were some O.B. leaders who favoured total abstention from the elections²; and this was logical enough, since a rejection of "kruisiesmakery" and the ballot-box was a leading tenet in the O.B. creed. According to this idea, the constitution (and indeed the "Empire") was to be shaken to its foundations by an organised boycott of the elections, which would thus become an impressive "volksbetoging." But, as *Die Burger* unkindly remarked, the "Empire," if it shook at all in consequence of this *démarche*, would shake only with laughter.³ The idea was therefore gradually abandoned, though the O.B. continued to toy with it for some time.⁴ It would have foundered in any case, for many members of the O.B. were still members of the H.N.P., and an order to abstain would probably not have been obeyed.

It became, therefore, urgently necessary to devise an alternative line of action, and this van Rensburg did in his statement of 11th January 1943.⁵ Despite the indifferent success which his policy had achieved at the bye-elections of 1942, he now fell back upon it as the only practicable solution to his difficulties. He offered the support of the O.B. to all Nationalist Afrikaner

1. *Die Vaderland*, 10 February 1943; *Die Transvaler*, 16 February 1943.

2. This proposal had been considered as early as August 1942: *Die O.B.* 5 August 1942, 28 October 1942.

3. *Die Burger*, 22 September 1942.

4. E.g. *Die O.B.*, 1 February 1943.

5. *Die O.B.*, 13 January 1943.

candidates who were prepared to place their hatred for Imperialism before their disagreements with their fellow Afrikaners, and would consequently undertake, in return for support, to refrain, both before and after the election, from acts inimical to the O.B.

"In daardie gees sê die O.B. dat hy bereid is om die Afrikanerdom te dien binnekant die tronk of buitekant die tronk, met sy goed en met sy bloed, by die stembus of elders. Maar dan wil hy weet dat dit sy volk is wat hy dien en nie net een of ander partypolitieke groep wat die partygenoot hoër stel as die volksgenoot nie."¹

These conditions, van Rensburg correctly claimed, were subsequently accepted by Havenga and Pirow; but Malan, who had ignored them nine months earlier, now ignored them again. If the O.B. wished to fight him, he was not afraid. But he would make no bargain.

The New Order was in much the same situation, with even less hope of concluding any arrangement. Its numbers were quite insignificant; its strength lay in its eighteen M.Ps. whose political lives hung on a thread; it was a collection of generals without an army. Its quarrel with the H.N.P. was, perhaps, less irreconcilable than that of the O.B.; but its position was deplorably weak, and the only terms Pirow could reasonably expect to extort from Malan were surrender at discretion. Pirow did indeed attempt to reach an agreement for cooperation with the H.N.P. upon the basis of common hostility to the Government's attitude to the "Communist menace,"² but Malan apparently felt quite capable of carrying on the fight against Communism without Pirow's assistance. The New Order had therefore no resource but to declare that (in accordance with its National-Socialist principles) it would not participate as a movement in the elections, though individual members might stand, provided they did so as Independents.³ Despite this act of ceremonious political suicide, which could be represented as a magnanimous contribution to volkseeneid, the New Order failed to gain friends. The H.N.P. vouchsafed a cold word of thanks, and proceeded unmoved upon its way. The expectation which Pirow is said to have entertained, that his sacrifice would be followed by some sort of understanding between the Opposition groups, proved to have been much too sanguine.⁴

Meanwhile the H.N.P. was pressing forward its preparations for fighting the elections "op eie pote." Special care was taken to secure that the nominations should go only to candidates who could be relied upon to have no truck with "skynseeneid": by an unusual provision it was laid down that nominations must

1. The offer was twice repeated: see *Die O.B.*, 24 March, 28 April 1943.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 15 March 1943.

3. *Ibid.*, 15 March, 1 April 1943.

4. *Ibid.*, 1, 2 and 5 April 1943.

be approved by the Hoofleier as well as by the Hoofkomitee. Candidates were required to sign a declaration to the effect that they subscribed to the principles of the Party, that they were cognisant of the pledges which the Party required, and that they were prepared to keep them.¹ And a solemn warning was issued of the danger to the Nationalist cause of candidates professing to be "Independents."²

About the middle of April came the last attempt to unite the Opposition groups for common action. A few of the supporters of Malan contrived to arrange some meetings between Malan and Havenga in Capetown, at which the possibilities were discussed. The object of the talks was not any general plan of Volkseenheid, but rather the conclusion of some sort of agreement which should avoid three-cornered contests, and the accompanying wastage of Afrikaner votes. As was perhaps to be expected, difficulties arose in connection with the terms which Havenga demanded for the A.P. At the first interview he claimed H.N.P. support for the A.P. candidates in their eight constituencies; but a few days later he added three more held by the Government — Ermelo, Rustenburg and Frankfort. In return he offered little except the advantages of increased representation in the House for the anti-Government bloc. There was to be no fusion: each Party was to retain its identity and its caucus after the Election. Nor could Malan induce him to proffer any sort of guarantee that in return for aid the A.P. would in future hold a more friendly language to the H.N.P. In these circumstances it was obviously impossible to hope for any satisfactory outcome of the discussions. The demands of Havenga were, no doubt, modest enough, but his unwillingness or inability to provide anything at all in the nature of a *quid pro quo* put him out of court from the start. As Malan explained, he could not, as Hoofleier of the H.N.P., compel the withdrawal of eleven already-nominated candidates in favour of A.P. men, unless he had some tangible gain to show for it. The analogy of the old Nationalist-Labour pact was inexact, for Labour had a majority in the constituencies which were reserved to it, while the A.P. had not.³

Havenga had now to make the best of a very unpromising situation. At a meeting of the Hoofbestuur of the A.P. in the Transvaal and O.F.S. on 21st April 1943, to which he reported his failure in Capetown, it was decided to fight fourteen seats in the O.F.S., as well as a number in the Transvaal.⁴ By doing so, the Party virtually signed its own death warrant; but it is hard to see what other course remained open to it. There was just a

1. *Die Transvaler*, 22 January 1943.

2. *Ibid.*, 26 January 1943.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 27, 29 April, 25 May 1943; *Die Transvaler*, 27 April 1943; *Die Volksblad* 27 April 1943.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 26 April 1943.

chance, if the O.B. and the N.O. united to support A.P. candidates, that a handful of them might escape destruction. But it was a very slender chance, indeed.

On 15th May 1943 the Prime Minister announced that the date of the election would be 7th July 1943. The announcement came as something of a surprise, since it had lately been expected that the election would not take place until August. But in effect all parties had been feverishly preparing for the conflict since the beginning of the year, and it is unlikely that they were seriously disturbed by the choice of an earlier date. The H.N.P., like most parties on the eve of an Election, had recently been endeavouring to broaden the basis of their appeal to the country, and in their manifestos adopted a milder tone in regard to some parts of their programme: Malan, for instance, offered a guarantee to the English of full equality of political, cultural and language rights,¹ and expounded a doctrine of trusteeship for the non-European populations which, it was claimed, represented the only solution that was fair to both sides.² There were other points which had been becoming more prominent in the H.N.P. programme of recent months, as for instance a scheme of "social security" upon the lines of Malan's parliamentary motion of January; a strong insistence that the Party was simultaneously anti-Communist and anti-capitalist;³ and a demand for the industrialisation of South Africa.⁴ But for the rest, the appeal was Republican, anti-Imperialist, anti-war, and above all an appeal to Afrikanerdom to realise that only in and through the H.N.P. could its ideas and ideals be brought to fruition. A vote for any other Afrikaner Party was a vote wasted, for the H.N.P. was the official Opposition, and it alone was capable of forming a Government.

The manifesto of the A.P. ran in part on curiously similar lines. It, too, was anti-war, anti-Imperialist and pro-Republican. It, too, feared Communism, reprobated capitalism and thirsted for economic security. It, too, demanded a more effective policy of segregation. But there was a difference. They were Republicans, certainly, but they were forced as Hertzogites to admit that South Africa, *de facto et de jure*, was a sovereign independent State; they contended merely that her entry into the war had proved a Republic to be expedient. And they were not prepared to advance its realisation further than by efforts to convince a majority of the population of its desirability. "Die breë grondslag van die volkswil" was still emblazoned on their banners. So, too, in regard to the war. They might and did condemn the country's participation in a European struggle; but they were ready to avow

1. *Die Transvaler*, 15 June 1943.

2. *Ibid.*, 4 February 1943.

3. *Ibid.*, 21, 26, 27 January, 2 February 1943. *Debates*, Vol. 45, pp. 61-3.

4. *Ibid.*, 13 April 1943.

their conviction that it would be unwise to withdraw from that struggle now. And lastly, they appealed to their countrymen to condemn by their votes that party-politics which places the interests of the party above those of the nation: and this, they asserted, had been the peculiar sin of Malan.¹

The announcement of the date of the election provoked also another declaration of policy from Pirow. From this it appeared that, despite its disapproval of elections, the N.O. was concerned to swell the number of anti-Government votes to as high a figure as possible. It had therefore decided to make no distinction between Republican candidates, but to support them all impartially, though its members would not address or assist at meetings where hard words were spoken about fellow-Afrikaners.² This naive reservation effectively barred them from participating in the vast majority of meetings. The N.O., however, had another card up its sleeve. When nomination day came, on June 14, it was found that, in addition to the 110 H.N.P. candidates and the twenty-four A.P. candidates, there were eleven so-called "Volkseenheidskandidate" and one Independent Republican in the field. The Volkseenheidskandidate, who all stood for Transvaal constituencies, were the sole fruits of the movements to Volkseenheid which had filled the preceding year. It seems unlikely that they were the direct offshoot of the Volkseenheidsbeweging, for several of them were members of the N.O. group, or at least had strong sympathies with it; and one of them (Jerling) was a prominent O.B. The Volkseenheidskandidate, at all events, were the candidates whom the N.O. supported, even if it did not sponsor them.³

The manifesto which the O.B. published for the election⁴ contained nothing new. Its policy had been clearly enunciated by van Rensburg in January, and had not since then been altered. There was nothing more to be said. Within the limits of that declaration, members were free to vote as they thought proper. It was, however, far from easy to guess how the influence of the O.B. would affect the issue. Great pains had been taken to lay stress upon the fact that, as far as the O.B. was concerned, H.N.P. members were welcome within their ranks.⁵ And, on the other hand, the H.N.P. had never gone further than to prohibit its *office-holders* from remaining members of the O.B. Consequently, the average O.B. private would be faced by a problem of divided loyalties, and his vote was often incalculable. Moreover, the difficulty of prognostication was not eased by the developments which had taken place within the O.B. since the close of 1941.

1. *Die Vaderland*, 22 May 1943.

2. *Die Transvaler*, 19 May 1943.

3. See C. W. M. du Toit, *Die Malaniete, die Verkiezing en ons volk*.

4. *Die O.B. en die Verkiezing*.

5. e.g. *Die O.B.*, 15 April, 6 May, 1942.

These were concerned, on the one hand, with matters of organisation, and on the other with questions of ideology.

When van Rensburg accepted the office of K.-G. of the O.B. he took over the control of a movement whose appeal was, in the main, an emotional one. At the beginning of 1941 the O.B. was still running under the momentum it had acquired from the Trek celebrations of 1938. It stood, quite simply, for Afrikaans nationalism, with a membership more comprehensive, and a discipline more strict, than that of the Party. It still looked to the Party for leadership in matters political; its own sphere was still only that of volkskultuur and volksdisipline. By the beginning of 1942 the position had changed considerably. The O.B. had broken with the Party, precisely because the new K.-G. had wished to put a more positive political content into the movement; and having broken from the Party, it was free to develop comprehensive policies of its own. Thus the O.B. in 1942 had become essentially a body with a distinct ideology; and its objects had become no longer merely the fostering of cultural activity and national discipline, but the realisation of a distinctly political programme. This development was assisted by the fight with Malan; for as a result of it the O.B. received an important accession of strength, inasmuch as many of those moderate intellectuals who had taken the standpoint of L. J. du Plessis followed his example and went over to van Rensburg. The effect was greatly to stiffen the movement on the intellectual side. The Potchefstroom Calvinists did their best to give some solidity to van Rensburg's thinking.

Certain changes in organisation were the consequences of these new developments. In May 1942, for instance, study-groups were formed in all commandos to discuss questions of national importance under the direction of the "Information Service" of the movement.¹ The foundation of these Dienslaers, as they were called, seems to be significantly connected with the appointment of L. J. du Plessis as "Hoof van die Beleidsafdeling" of the Groot Raad. The Dienslaers were to be linked by a Uniale Koördinerende Hoof, responsible to the Groot Raad. This coordinating body would advise the Groot Raad on policy, and the Groot Raad would promulgate the substance of any advice it deemed reasonable, to the Dienslaers.² This scheme duly came into operation, and a number of the discussion-topics circulated to the Dienslaers appeared in *Die O.B.* *Die O.B.* itself, founded in November 1941, was another symptom of the new position occupied by the movement since the split with the Party. It was published weekly, and was of no great size, but it performed the office of disseminating the speeches and arguments

1. *Die O.B.*, 27 May, 15 July 1942.

2. *Die O.B.*, 5 August 1942.

of the leaders to a much wider circle than would otherwise have been possible, and it thus became the main vehicle for the propagation of the O.B.'s political and social ideas.

The foundation of the Dienslaers was also associated with the expansion and broadening of the Groot Raad in order to make it more fully representative of all the elements in the movement. It was to be preceded by a "purge from top to bottom of all untrustworthy and unsound elements," and to be accompanied by a strengthening of the central executive, the elimination of any surviving relics of provincialism, and the provision of better methods of finance. In effect, the result was to increase the academic and intellectual elements at the top—a development which probably did the movement no harm.¹ The accession of P. J. Meyer to the Groot Raad as Voorligtingshoof in February 1943 emphasised this trend.²

In May 1943 came another change: the country was to be divided, for O.B. purposes, into six districts, and the old Provincial divisions (which were regarded as at once the sign of British domination and a flouting of the will of God)³ were to be abolished. And, significantly enough, the subscription of all members was to be increased, owing to "unavoidable circumstances"—a curious circumlocution for "Dr. Malan."⁴

These changes, taken as a whole, may be considered indicative of the fact that the O.B. was being forced to tighten its belt; that it had been put on the defensive. The old days when membership could be counted by the hundred thousand, when money flowed in without stint, were over. It was no longer sufficient to appeal simply to the Afrikaner as an Afrikaner; it had become necessary to offer him some sort of programme, some body of ideas which would attract him. What then were the ideas which the O.B. was propounding, in 1942 and 1943? To a certain extent, of course, they did not differ widely from those of the H.N.P. "The Empire" was still the arch-foe, a Republic still the only means whereby South Africa could obtain her freedom.⁵ They were, at this stage, little concerned with the rights of the English-speaking section, and looked forward with satisfaction to a State in which all such "unassimilable" and "unnational" elements would be condemned to inferior civic status. Bilingualism they rejected, and hence too dual-medium education: in the new

1. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

2. *Ibid.*, 10 February 1943.

3. *Ibid.*, 5 May 1943.

4. *Ibid.*, 19 May 1943. the O.B. had earlier (e.g. *Die O.B.*, 24 February 1943) boasted of the rapid increase in membership; but on the other hand its editorial of 5 May 1943 attempted to explain why the movement had so little support.

5. A curious article in *Die O.B.* for 22 April 1942, discusses the possibility of England's sending Sir Stafford Cripps on a mission to win South Africa's support by promising her her "freedom." And there is a headline: "Gevaar dat England ons Lojaliteit gaan koop." They were inclined also to take the line that whereas the H.N.P. would be satisfied with an independent republic out of the "Empire," the O.B. in addition demanded the cutting adrift from the British-Liberal idea.

Republic Afrikaans was to be the one official language.¹ If the epithet "Isolationist!" were hurled at them, they appropriated it without hesitation, since they were prepared to contend that only by isolation could the South Africa they desired ripen to perfection.²

In much of this they did not differ widely from the more extreme sections of the H.N.P. But they did not stop there. They felt themselves, as the H.N.P. did not, the torch-bearers of a new political idea and a new way of life, which they were in the habit of describing as "The Revolution of the 20th Century."³ By this they meant some such overthrow of the Liberal-Democratic State as had occurred in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland and, most recently, France. With this revolution they identified themselves; and, had circumstances been other than they were, they would no doubt have sent their contingent to fight on the Russian front. For they shared many of those notions which have been considered characteristic of the Nazi German polity. First and foremost (and here the H.N.P. agreed with them), hatred of Communism (and even, apparently, Stalinism) which they felt to have the special disadvantage in South Africa, that its acceptance was liable to interfere with the policy of segregation.⁴ Hence the attacks upon the "Springbok Legion" in the early months of 1943.⁵ With this went opposition to capitalism, partly because of its Imperialist connotation, partly because it was condemned by German National-Socialist theory. In external affairs, it was natural that they should look primarily to Germany as the friend,⁶ just as Britain, Russia and—latterly to an increasing extent—America were the foes. There were other National-Socialist elements too: the belief in "race" and "race purity"⁷; the exhortation to "think with your blood;" the creed of "Blut und Boden"⁸; the interest in physical culture.⁹ Though they went out of their way to deny that they subscribed to the

1 The H.N.P.'s concern for the rights of the English was adduced as one of the criteria of difference from the O.B. (*Die O.B.*, 6 May 1942). On 8 May 1942, speaking at Boksburg, Jerling said: "Sekerer mense in die land praat van twee landstate. Hier wil hy verklaar dat die O.B. se taal Afrikaans sal wees. Solank daar twee landstate is, sal 'n verenigde volk nooit bestaan nie. Die O.B. sal net een amptelike taal in die republiek toelaat, en dit is Afrikaans." (*Die O.B.* 20 May 1942). For hostility to dual-medium school, see *ibid.*, 24 March 1943.

2 *Die O.B.* 27 May 1942. "Die Boeredom se opmars na volkome vryheid kan nie meer deur geweld gestuit word nie, nou moet dit afgekeer word na die woestyn van breedheid en welwillendheid waar ons nie meer sterk sal staan in ons afgesonderde suwerheid nie."

3 See *Die O.B.*, *Vunnav en Waarheen*.

4 *Die O.B.* 8 July 1942, has the text of an Omsendbrief directed against the Communist menace. Smith said (*Die O.B.* 21 April 1943). "En hoe kan die stembus oort die kommunisme vernietig?" As die kommunistiese kandidaat in Soutiriver verslaan word, beteken dit dan dat die kommunisme opgehou het om in Soutiriver te bestaan? Nee, intendeel. Het hy geen kans by die stembus nie sal hy op onkonstitusioneel wyse optree, soos daar baie voorbeelde bestaan.

5 See *Die O.B.*, 20 February 1943 for a long editorial under heading "Die Doodskaduw."

6 *Die O.B.*, 22 April 1942.

7 *Die O.B.*, 6 and 27 January 1943: an extract from the former runs "By die Nordiese ras vind ons die drang tot prestasie, die aanpakking van die wereld as weerstand. Hulle is eesinnig, bedagzaam, betroubaar, stip en verstandelik saaklik, wilskragtig, heldhefug, en het 'n diep innerlike lewe. Hulle is by uitstek 'n volhardingstipe."

8 "Gewin, bloed, en vaderlandse bodem—dit is naes ons Godsdienst en ons vryheidsliefde ons grootste heiligste volkerseffens" (*Die O.B.*, 28 October 1942). And see du Plessis in *ibid.*, 13 January 1943.

9 *ibid.*, 24 February 1943.

German maxim: "Kirche, Kinder, Küche," their attitude to women was not greatly dissimilar. They placed the strongest insistence upon family life; they were firm upholders of sexual morality; and they laid it down clearly that while the duty of man was to work and fight, the duty of women was in the first place to create and tend the home and family.¹

A society of this type would need a strong government; and here, too, the German solution was preferable. By some natural process, imperfectly explained, the turmoil and stress of the revolution would throw up the leader that was required, the Man of Destiny, the incorporation of the *Zeitgeist*: it would be unnecessary to elect him.² The authority he would wield would be almost absolute, for no party, no minor association should be permitted to interfere with the supremacy of the people. It would be a dictatorship, yet not a dictatorship in the invidious sense in which the word was sometimes used; for the dictator would rule in the hearts of his fellow-citizens, and (to paraphrase the Hegelians) love, not force would be the basis of the State.³ As to how this desirable consummation was to be achieved, official O.B. pronouncements were vague. The H.N.P. taunted them with having no worked-out plan for the realisation of the Republic, to set against the Parliamentary methods which Malan preferred.⁴ And the charge was hardly denied. The usual answer was a cloud of words that imperfectly concealed an evasion. The O.B.'s plan, it seemed, was to discipline the people, so that they might be fitted to take advantage of the long-expected hour when at last it should strike; or to cultivate the revolutionary mentality; or, more vaguely still, simply to "beweeg en storm."⁵ But the unsatisfactory nature of these answers gave them little concern. On the contrary, it was their positive boast that they had no programme. They openly avowed that they did not know what they should do. Some *deus ex machina*, or some flash of intuition, would be available at the crucial moment. How, or when or to what extent they would translate their principles into action they could not tell: they did not believe in programmes,

1 *Die O.B.*, 20 May, 28 October, 30 September 1942. An extract from the latter runs: "Hierdie proses" (as the emancipation of women) van vernietiging wil die O.B. weer ongedaan maak met die wêreld se vrou terug na jou huis. Hou op om 'n karikatuur van die man te wees, en gaan word 'n vrou en moeder. Jou eie taak is nie om die man na te aap nie, maar hom te vorm en hom in die wêreld te bring en 'n volk te bou." For morality, see *ibid.*, 28 April 1943.

2 e.g. du Plessis, in *Die O.B.*, 5 May 1943. "Uit die volksbeweging van die Afrikanerdom word ingestoot die president van Suid-Afrika wat ons eie sal wees. Dit sal onnodig wees om hom te kies, want al ons beweging en storm om die mag te vat, sal daar 'n man aan die voorpunt wees."

3 *ibid.*, 16 September, 28 October 1942, and 13 January 1943. "In die gesigstaar regeer die leier met liefde oor sy volk." And again in the issue of 16 September 1942: "Die gesag van die staat kan dus nie gewetensvryheid verwerp nie, want sy doel en strewe is volksgeluk en sonder gewetensvryheid kan daar geen geluk wees nie. Dit is die gesag met liefde en nie meer die gesag met geld nie."

4 *Die O.B.* 15 and 29 April 1942.

5 e.g. the following quotations: "Daardie nasionale ontwaking het uit die volk gegroei. Dit het geen fyn uitgewerkte program nie, want 'n volk het geen program nie. 'n Huis kan volgens 'n plan gebou word, maar geen lewende wese kan volgens 'n plan gebou word nie. Daardie nasionale ontwaking het slegs 'n roeping en 'n rigting" (van Rensburg, at Crosby, 11 April 1943. *Die O.B.*, 22 April 1943). " 'n Staat wat uit die volk groei is soos 'n skilpad se dop wat uit en saam met die skilpad groei en dus 'n lewende eenheid met die skilpad vorm. Die skilpad en die dop is een ding." *Die O.B.* 6 January 1943).

they were not willing to bind their freedom of action by any indulgence in the effete *paperasseries* of the party system.¹ After all, they had no votes to catch, no seats to win. The future was their ally, and could safely be left to manage its own affairs. This was particularly the feeling of the Stormjaers, who, although they were distinct from the O.B., were entirely composed of O.B. members. These men, the *élite* of the movement, the striking force of the revolution, had gained largely in confidence in the past two years. The philosophy of "activism" which they practised encouraged them to action rather than to the drafting of programmes. They felt themselves to have been bound together by misfortune; they esteemed themselves hardened in the fires of persecution. Every man's hand, it seemed, was against them: between the hammer of the Government and the anvil of the H.N.P. they had been forged into a new revolutionary type, and they believed that their hour would surely come. For them, the future held nothing but promise. With the thinking section of the movement they had nothing to do.

Nevertheless, there were elements which were very much concerned with ideas, and which for a time tended to modify the body of doctrine outlined above. One of these elements was religious. Even before the alliance with Potchefstroom which had been the result of the breach with the H.N.P., the Churches had had considerable influence in the movement: Ds. Kotzé had been succeeded as Chairman of the Groot Raad by Ds. Stander. Stander seems to have been willing to accept the full doctrines of National-Socialism. He wrote, for instance:

"Die O.B.-gedagte, as synde *die organiese, die huisgesin- en nasie-gedagte*, het sy oorsprong in *skepping*, in geboorte en so in God en ons het alle reg om dit as die goddelike gedagte te beskryf terwyl *die ander* as *menslike* in teenstelling met die goddelike bestempel mag word.

Die ander gedagte, *die Imperialistiese* as ook die *meganiese* of *liberalistiese* het sy oorsprong uit die verdorwe natuur van die mens, wat onder invloed van die Bose staan en is tot uiteindelijke ondergang gedoem.

Dit behoort vir ons 'n *besieling en aanmoediging* te wees om te dink dat ons op suiwere, goeie en *God-goedgekeurde grondslag* staan. Ons behoort met *vrymoedigheid* daarvoor desnoods *martelaar* te word."²

But, on the other hand there were signs that the more strictly Calvinistic elements were not prepared to swallow the totalitarian State whole. Du Plessis, for instance, at this time believed in a type of State which, although authoritarian, admitted of no earthly *Führer*, in the German sense. There was a growing feeling

1. *Die O.B.* 24 March 1942: Speech by L. J. du Plessis at Pietersburg.

2. *Die O.B.*, 9 December 1942.

that the German model did not accord perfectly with the traditions and mentality of the Afrikaner people, while the Calvinist State, *per contra*, did. Thus in a very significant passage Professor Stoker wrote :

"Dit beteken dat ons gaan beklemtoon wat die Nasionaal-sosialisme ook beklemtoon (maar oordryf) nl. die volk. Dit beteken dat daar ooreenkoms tussen ons optrede en strewe en dié van die nasionaal-sosialisme gaan wees ; nie alleen negatief in die bestryding van die verbrokkelende Liberalisme in al sy vorme nie, maar ook positief in die wyse van verwesenliking van ons ideale. Ons gaan dan ook die waarheidsmomente van die nasionaal-sosialisme vooropstel. Ons kan nie anders as om dit alles te doen nie, want ons volksgevaar No. 1 is vandag die Liberalisme, en ons hoogste nood op die oomblik is ons wegsinkende volk. Ons Calviniste gaan dus in ons doen en late skyn-nasionale-sosialiste word. Net in skyn. Want ons is geen nasionaal-sosialiste nie. Ons Calvinistiese beginsels . . . gee ons nie prys in ons beklemtoning van die huidige volksnood en in ons benadrukking van ons plig om nou in die eerste plek hierdie nood op te hef en ons vir ons volksvryheid te beywer nie. Sodra die nasionale nood min of meer opgehef is, sal ons weer in harmonie met ons nasionale belange opnuut al hierdie ander beginsels moet beklemtoon."¹

It is unlikely that this uneasiness at the applicability of National Socialism, this determination to safeguard religion and the rights of the Churches, this fear of foreign systems, were shared by van Rensburg, whose belief in the validity of German ideas remained quite unshaken by external events, and who had a good deal of confidence in his ability to persuade Afrikanerdom to accept Nietzsche and Rosenberg and Houston Stewart Chamberlain. Van Rensburg frankly confessed his acceptance of National Socialism without reservation or dilution. The Calvinists in the movement, many of whom were intimately acquainted with the history of political theory, and had an academic training which must have revealed the weaknesses in the Nazi ideology, could not at first follow him wholeheartedly in this. There appeared, therefore, the beginnings—not of a split, but of a divergence, which by the early months of 1944 had become clearly perceptible. A good example of this new line of O.B. thought is to be seen in Smith's remarks about the New Order :

"As daar sommige mense is wat sê ons is nie ware nasionaal-sosialiste nie maar hulle is dit eintlik, dan stel die O.B. die vraag : is dit wat julle 'beter nasionaal-sosialisme' noem nie miskien net daardie element wat vreemd aan ons volk is nie ?"²

There is reason to doubt whether van Rensburg would have cavilled at the New Order for being too German ; the chances

1. Stoker : *Die Stryd om die Orde*, p. 272. And see *Die O.B.*, 28 October 1942, and speeches of du Plessis reported in *ibid.*, 21 October 1942, 24 March 1943 ; and editorial, 24 April 1942.
2. *Die O.B.*, 21 April 1943.

are that he would have condemned it for not being "in murg-en-been" National-Socialist.

This development was associated with another, of the greatest importance. It became apparent by 1943 that the O.B. was endeavouring to widen the range of its appeal by making special efforts to win particular classes. Thus it showed anxiety to enlist the support of soldiers in the U.D.F.—a logical development, since it had always contended that discipline was essential to a nation.

"As die Nasionale Gesagstaat kom" (said van Rensburg at Cape Town on 19 March 1943) "sal hy op twee bene staan ; die een is die O.B., en die ander die teruggekeerde soldaat."¹

At the same time, O.B. interest was directed to industrial and agricultural problems, and special attention was paid to the improvement of the lot of the worker. It had always been the policy of the O.B. to award promotion in its ranks on grounds solely of personal merit, irrespective of social status,² and its campaign against capitalistic Imperialism and the power of wealth was fundamental to the movement. The O.B. State was, after all, to be a "massastaat." It was logical enough, therefore, to include some form of socialism among its aims. Expropriation of the gold mines and other key industries was insisted upon ; the small producer was to be protected against the unfair competition of over-powerful capitalistic combines ; and the State was to take over the advancing of loans upon mortgage.³ A good deal of attention was paid to the question of standards of living, and there were repeated statements of the O.B.'s intention to see that every family was provided with a house and garden. The industrial workers were told that the older forms of proletarian organisation had displayed their ineffectiveness, and that the best hope for the future lay with the O.B.⁴ Special attention was naturally given to the cause of the farmer, and here the O.B. claimed to have made an advance upon the record of any political party. As a member of the Groot Raad expressed it : "Ons grootste prestasie is om die Boere sosialis te maak."⁵ In short, the O.B. in 1943 was tending increasingly to lay less emphasis upon the more purely revolutionary aspects of its creed, and to

1 *ibid*, 24 March 1943. *Die O.B.* for 20 January 1943 had the headlines "Ou Orde is goen offers werd se soldaat se vrou" And du Piessis said (*ibid*, 28 April 1943) "Die volksmassas sal die rewolusie bring, en selfs al sou ons na die oorlog hier 'n Britse of Amerikaanse empire he, sal hy vernietig word deur sy huidige verdagters—die soldate in wie die gees van die rewolusie, die opstand teen die kapitalistiese oorheersing reeds nou al begin werk. Dit is God wat die rewolusie bring, want Hy is die beskikker oor die lotgevalle van die volk. Hy bring die Babilons tot 'n val."

2 "Almal is ewe waardevol of hulle in die myne werk, of op die spoorwee, op die plase of in die kantore" (*Die O.B.*, 15 July 1942)

3 *ibid*, 28 October 1942, 12 May 1943

4 *Die O.B.*, 28 April 1943, 19 May 1943, 26 May 1943. As du Piessis put it "Die O.B. self word meer en meer gesien as 'n tweevoudige volksorganisasie (onder die seen van God kerklik gewy), naamlik as 'n gesinsorganisasie vir man, vrou en kind in kommandoverband, en 'n arbeids- of beroepsorganisasie veral vir die man in die beleidsafdeling en die verwagte deurwerking daarvan in die beroepsverband" (*ibid*, 13 January 1943)

5 And see the O.B. pamphlet *Die Vooraand van ons Volksre Sosialisme*.

concentrate upon a constructive social programme which should be both Nationalist and Socialist, but which would be less obviously than before National-Socialist. From a purely tactical point of view there was everything to be said for this line; but, as has been hinted already, the reorientation is probably to be ascribed to the influence of the new recruits who joined the movement at the beginning of 1942 and thereafter.

Had the O.B. been a political party, or had it permitted itself to put forward official candidates with a platform of this nature, it is not impossible that it might have wrested some seats from the H.N.P. As it was, its election policy was a policy mainly of negation. But the O.B. could answer that though it was negative it was at least not Machiavellian, as the policy of the H.N.P., in their opinion, was. In the view of the O.B., Malan neither expected nor desired to win the election. On the contrary he hoped in the first place to eliminate all rivals, and in the second to be able to turn to Afrikanerdom when the results were announced, and attribute his defeat to the O.B. propaganda against the electoral system; upon which, presumably, Nationalist Afrikanerdom would repudiate the O.B. and return to the Party fold. Win or lose, in fact, the Party stood to gain. The real losers would be die Volk.¹

(vi)

Though polling in the General Election took place on 7th July, the difficulty of counting the votes of soldiers on active service outside the country delayed the publication of the results for some weeks. When the final returns were announced it was found that the United Party had increased its representation in the House from 70 to 89, while the total strength of the Coalition Government pledged to carry on the war had risen from 87 to 105, or (with the support of the Native Representatives and some Independents) to 110. The H.N.P. had gained two seats, and now had 43 members. The Afrikaner Party and the Volkseenhedskandidaat had not won a single seat. Thus the total strength of the opposition to the war had fallen from 66 to 43; and since the Government speakers had made the war the main issue in the Election, the Smuts Cabinet could claim a decisive endorsement of its policy by the electorate. The Opposition taunt that a General Election, had it been granted by the Governor-General in September 1939, would have shown a majority in favour of neutrality, could now, perhaps, be discounted. And indeed, the Government had won more seats than the most sanguine of its supporters had ever hoped for; while its adversaries, to quote Pirow, "het 'n kafferpak gekry."

The representation of parties in the House, however, was not

1. Du Plessis in *Die O.B.*, 28 April 1943.

an accurate measure of their voting strength. Mr. J. L. Gay's estimate (which took into account the 18 uncontested seats, 17 of which went to the United Party) gave the Government parties some 640,000 votes (or about 64 per cent.) against the Opposition's 362,000 (about 36 per cent.).¹ The United Party had indeed increased its poll by nearly 82,000; but the H.N.P. had increased theirs by nearly 71,000, so that the ratio between them, which had stood at 184:100 in 1938 had now dropped to 160:100. In 1938, moreover, the Hertzogites were still members of the U.P.: now that they had passed over to the Opposition the percentage of Afrikaans-speaking population voting for Government had sunk from about 40 per cent. to about 32 per cent—a circumstance which the Malanites might consider encouraging in view of the much greater rate of increase of the Afrikaans-speaking section.²

Thus, though Nationalist Afrikanerdom appeared to have suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Smuts, the realities by no means corresponded to appearances. Malan could with some show of reason claim that the elections had proved that the tide was setting in his direction. The contest had been fought in exceptionally unfavourable circumstances from the Opposition point of view. Their ranks were split by dissensions. It was a "Khaki-election"; the slogans with the greatest popular emotional appeal were on the other side. The country balked at the idea of "swapping horses in mid-stream," especially when the Prime Minister was a person with the personality and prestige of Smuts. The Government's gains, however, had been made mostly at the expense of the A.P. and N.O. Of the twenty-four seats held by these groups on the eve of the Election, Smuts had captured 22, while the other two went to Malan. On the hard core of Nationalism the Government's victory had made no impression. No doubt Malan's first reaction was a feeling of disappointment, as he looked at the overwhelming numbers against him, but a cooler analysis must have given him very solid grounds for hope.

If the results as against the Government might seem to have given the H.N.P. no more than a moral half-success, far different was the case in regard to their position as against the rival Opposition groups. Here the victory of the H.N.P. had been smashing, total, definitive. The question posed so often during the last two years had been answered without a shadow of ambiguity.

1. J. L. Gray, *How the Nation Voted*, (Common Sense, August 1943).

2. *Die Transvaler*, 26 April 1943, quoted the 1936 Census figures, which revealed that:

i. for every 100 English-speakers over 21 there are 115 Afrikaans-speakers.

ii. " " 100 " between 7-21 " " 185 "

iii. " " 100 " under 7 " " 212 "

On the other hand the United Party could contend that the only fair basis of comparison was with the figures for Smuts' old S.A.P. in the days before Fusion. On this basis Smuts' hold on Afrikanerdom had considerably increased.

The rebels against Malan's leadership had been simply annihilated: not a single seat survived from the wreck. On the eve of the Election the Afrikaner Party had 8 members. It put up twenty-four candidates. Between them they collected a paltry 14,759 votes; no less than 14 of their candidates lost their deposits; Havenga himself was beaten at Frankfort; while Harm Oost came bottom of the poll with a handful of votes in Pretoria District. In the O.F.S., which they had regarded as their stronghold, and where they had contested every seat, they received only 10,769 votes as against the 49,459 of the H.N.P. The party had now no M.P.s and very few supporters; its sole assets were the personality of Havenga, the memory of Hertzog, and the support of *Die Vaderland*. In the circumstances it was a gallant but perhaps futile gesture, when after the election they resolved to carry on the battle.¹ They had certainly no longer any power to offer any sort of challenge to the triumphant Malanites.

The New Order had vanished too. Before the election they had held sixteen seats. Though they had as a movement put forward no candidates some of them had appeared as Volks-eenheidskandidate or Independents. They had been smitten hip and thigh. Only 10,489 votes were cast for Volkseenheidskandidate, and not one of them came near to being elected. (See Appendix II).

The case of the O.B. was not much better. Their defeat was less obvious, but it was no less real. The success of Malan was a blow to their contention that elections were futile and outmoded. It is possible that a considerable number of O.B.s refrained from voting, for the total poll was some 300,000 less than in 1938, not counting uncontested seats. But the size of the vote for the H.N.P. prompts the suggestive reflection that, however bitter the hostility between Malan and van Rensburg, the rank and file, in their several "takke" or "kommandos" were relatively and increasingly unaffected by it. In fact, there were signs that, despite hard words and violent journalism, there was in operation a process of reconciliation in the lower strata. If that were true, it would necessarily redound to the O.B.'s disadvantage, for it would be increasingly difficult to prevent O.B. members from cooperating with the H.N.P. in the purely party-political business of elections.² The H.N.P. was now the only possible alternative Government. And it was more—it was a very *probable* alternative Government in the not too distant future. The ballot-box might make a revolution unnecessary after all. Why, therefore, toy with the *Führerprinzip*? To what end practise their drill? Wherefore "storm en beweeg"? The H.N.P.'s methods seemed to have something to recommend them. Would it after all come to

1. Statement by Afrikaner Party, *Pretoria News*, 20 August 1943.

2. The Wakkerstroom bye-election in May 1944 showed this tendency at work. See below p. 164.

this, that the O.B. might be driven to enter the parliamentary game on its own account ?

Meanwhile, Malan's long-term policy had attained its goal. The Hertzogites, the Pirowites, the O.B. had all challenged the claim of himself and the H.N.P. to be the sole representatives of Nationalist Afrikanerdom. The challenge had been met, and from the electoral battle the H.N.P. had emerged victor. It had made good its boasted monopoly. It stood now, the sole effective organ of Afrikanerdom, compact, purified, and beyond the reach of revenge. The process begun when Hertzog was extruded in 1940 had reached its end. The Opposition was *gleichgeschaltet* at last.

THE AFTERMATH : FROM THE GENERAL ELECTION TO THE END OF THE WAR

(i)

If any doubt remained in the mind of Afrikanerdom as to the significance of the General Election of July 1943, it must have been dissipated by the result of the Provincial Elections of the following October. Once again the H.N.P. refused an election-compact with its rivals, and once again its refusal was justified by the event. Fighting thus *op eie pote*, the Party succeeded in winning forty-eight seats, and retained a large majority in the Provincial Council of the Free State. The Government, it is true, could look upon the outcome with undiminished satisfaction: the winning of 118 seats, the securing of a majority in every Province except the O.F.S., constituted a triumphant vindication of its foreign policy, if not, perhaps, of its internal administration.¹ Yet from Malan's standpoint the most important consideration was not so much the dimensions of the majority against him as the fact that he was left in possession of that monopoly of constitutional Opposition which had been the prize of the General Election. The Afrikaner Party, crushed by the disasters of July, did not hazard a single candidate. There was a gratifying paucity of Independents, and only three of them secured election.² An attempt to launch a new Unity-campaign at Malmesbury proved still-born.³ Malan, in his election appeal, had frankly accepted the verdict of the electorate upon the country's foreign policy, and had exhorted the other Afrikaner groups to repudiate foreign ideologies ("in view of the course of affairs in Europe,") to return to the bosom of the Party, and to concentrate for an assault upon the Government's record in internal affairs.⁴ And it seems likely that his exhortations were not wholly in vain.

1. Though even here the United Party might claim that its victory in the Transvaal constituted a mandate for its policy of dual-medium education. Verwoerd had maintained that the U.P. dared not fight an election on this issue : *Die Transvaler*, 10 August 1943.

2. See *Die Transvaler*, 4 November 1943, and *The Rand Daily Mail*, 5 November 1943, for widely differing estimates of the votes cast for each party.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 24 August 1943.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 4 September 1943 ; Erasmus's speech at Vasco : *Die Burger*, 10 September 1943.

The¹ were certainly of a type to attract members of the Afrikaner Party; and the conjecture that it was to the A.P. in particular that they were addressed is strengthened by the fact that on 9th November 1943, in a speech at Stellenbosch, Malan made a direct appeal to them to rejoin the H.N.P.¹ The Afrikaner Party, however, turned a deaf ear to the charmer. Fortified by that stern political virtue which was at once their asset and their incubus, the faithful remnants pursued their course through the wilderness, kissed the rod of their affliction, polished with punctual piety that halo which had once adorned the brows of Hertzog, and which now vicariously ennobled their own, and (by way of preparing against the day of resurrection) girded up their loins and overhauled their organisation.²

The H.N.P., for its part, was engaged in the same inspiring occupation. No sooner were the Provincial elections over than the Party leaders began preparations for the next round. In March 1944 three important developments were announced in quick succession. At the beginning of the month *Die Kruithoring* published a comprehensive Social and Economic Programme, drafted by experts within and without the Party, and approved by a special committee appointed by the Federale Raad. The Programme committed the Party to a "controlled capitalism" superintended by councils of experts, and it was probably hoped that it would appeal to that nebulously progressive section of the electorate which thirsted for a clear-cut Plan.³ Three weeks later came the Republikeinse Strydfonds, the purpose of which was to raise sufficient money to win the next General Election. The estimated requirement was £100,000, and by the time the Transvaal Congress of the Party met in September no less than £28,000 had already been collected.⁴ Lastly, at the end of the month, the H.N.P. Press announced that it had been decided to inaugurate correspondence courses in politics. These were designed, on the one hand, for those who wished to improve their minds; and, on the other, for those (no doubt a majority) who aspired to a political career. There were to be two distinct courses, at different intellectual levels; and such fortunate candidates as might complete the senior course to the satisfaction of their examiners were to be rewarded with a diploma or certificate. The cost of each course was fixed at the modest figure of £5, payable in advance or by monthly instalments.⁵

Any members of the H.N.P. who may have remained unimpressed by these evidences of vigorous leadership must surely

1. *Die Burger*, 10 November 1943.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 25 October 1943. As Mr. Philip Guedalla wrote: "There is, perhaps, no future for political widows except political suttie."

3. *Die Kruithoring*, 1 March 1944; *Die Burger*, 6 March 1944.

4. *Die Burger*, 20 March 1944; *Die Transvaler*, 21 September 1944. Dr. van Rhijn, the editor of *Die Volksblad*, was appointed financial secretary for the Fund.

5. *Die Kruithoring*, 29 March 1944; *Die Burger*, 29 March 1944.

have been convinced, by the results of two bye-elections which took place about this time, that their affairs were in good hands, and their political prospects decidedly encouraging. A vacancy for the Transvaal Provincial Council in the Zoutspanberg division, and another for the House of Assembly, at Wakkerstroom, had recently occurred.¹ Both these seats were captured from the United Party by H.N.P. candidates; and at Wakkerstroom (a historic constituency in Nationalist annals) there was a turnover of nearly 700 votes in a total poll of just over 6,000. This triumph had a double significance. In the first place it seemed to indicate that the tide of Government success was past the flood; in the second it demonstrated, more clearly, than ever before, that in a straight fight with the United Party the H.N.P. might probably count on the votes of members of the smaller Opposition groups. The H.N.P. candidate for Wakkerstroom, Mr. J. G. W. van Niekerk (affectionately known to his supporters as "Jan Mielies") succeeded in coming to an understanding with the Greyshirts in the constituency. Their support may possibly have ensured his return, for upon the estimate of Weichardt they contributed no less than 800 votes.² But it was not only from the Greyshirts that "Jan Mielies" received assistance. The New Order, the Afrikaner Party, and many members of the O.B. collaborated with the official H.N.P. agents; and all were cordially thanked during the election campaign, and after it, by the H.N.P. candidate and his leaders. The support of members of the O.B. was, however, strictly unofficial, and was discountenanced by van Rensburg. For his part, van Rensburg was inclined to favour Mr. A. L. Hall, an Independent candidate, who made an unexpected appearance, polled ten votes, and forfeited his deposit. Mr. Hall was an ex-soldier and a former wrestler (qualifications which favourably commended him to van Rensburg) and he contested the seat as representative of a "Soldiers' Party" which is not otherwise known to have had any existence. The Press of the United Party accused the H.N.P. of inspiring Mr. Hall's candidature in order to split the vote of those in favour of the war; while the H.N.P. Press, hotly denying this, maintained that he had been put up by the United Party to split the vote of those who were dissatisfied with the Government's administrative record. Ignoring these confusing recriminations, van Rensburg took Mr. Hall at his own valuation, and accepted him as the spokesman of a considerable body of military discontent which (he believed) must eventually gravitate to the O.B. The O.B., as a militant (indeed almost military) organisation, had a fellow-feeling for Soldiers' Parties. Unfortunately, when it came to the point, the O.B. discipline proved sadly imperfect; and members light-heartedly pledged

1. The vacancy at Wakkerstroom was caused by the death of Col. W. Collins, the Minister of Agriculture.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 22 April 1944; *ibid.*, 25 April 1944; *Die Transvaal*, 26 April 1944.

themselves to "Jan Mielies" without awaiting the instructions of the K-G. Dr. van Rensburg was wounded by this. He felt that the tactics of the H.N.P. at Wakkerstroom had somehow been wanting in that openness and candour which should properly govern political relationships; and he tartly intimated that in future any request for collaboration should be addressed to himself.¹

It was now a question of some interest whether the unprecedented amity which had prevailed at Wakkerstroom could be given a more general extension. If so, a solid Afrikaner front might be expected, at any rate for electoral purposes. But it did not suit Malan to reward his Wakkerstroom allies with anything more substantial than thanks; and sometimes (as with Eric Louw) even the thanks were not without a certain sub-acid flavour. It was not long, therefore, before Weichardt began to regret the part the Greyshirts had borne in the H.N.P. triumph.² For the smaller Opposition groups, the only hope of recovering from the *débâcle* of 1943 lay now in a reconciliation—on terms—with the Party. The prospect was bleak indeed, if the only inducement which Malan was prepared to offer was a curt nod of acknowledgement. Yet, despite these disturbing signs of the times, the old kreet of Volkseenheid continued to command adherents. Conspicuous among them was Pirow. The overwhelming defeat of the Volkseenheidskandidate at the General Election had not noticeably impaired his resilience. Only three months afterwards, he had appeared before the public as sponsor of an organisation entitled Die Republikeinse Waaksaamheidsliga. The Waaksaamheidsliga, it appeared, had been born out of the deliberations of the New Order Study Circle, who had hit upon this expedient in order "to aim the voting power of die Volk at a single decisive act of liberation." All nasionaalgesinde Afrikaners, it was hoped, would consent to collaborate on these Vigilance Committees, one of which was to be established in each constituency. Despite Pirow's careful explanation that there was no intention of competing with any existing Party or Republican organisation, it is hardly surprising that the H.N.P. should have held aloof. Apart from the scheme's ominous family resemblance to the Volkseenheidbeweging of 1942, it was discommended by an infusion of New Order doctrine which flavoured it all too strongly; for Pirow had eagerly assured them that a General Election, if conducted under the good auspices of the Waaksaamheidsliga, might be properly exploited to replace parliamentarism by a social-revolutionary system. The H.N.P. was in no mood,

1. *Die Transvaler*, 18-24 April 1944, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 25 April 1944, for the controversy about Mr. Hall's political provenance: *Die O.B.*, 26 April 1944, for the O.B. attitude to him; *ibid.*, 28 June 1944 for van Rensburg's protest.

2. See Louw's letter to *Die Burger*, 18 May 1944. In *Die Vaderland* (8 June 1944) Weichardt wrote: "... do not think we voted for or against Sap or Nat. We were muzzled and had to vote for a negative aim." And see the letter of Fanie Brand (one of his lieutenants), *Cape Argus*, 5 June 1944.

however, to dabble in revolutions. It looked forward confidently to a victory within the framework of the constitution. The Waaksaamheidsliga was therefore doomed from the start. It soon ceased to interest even its parents; and proceeded, with no long delay, to join that alarming succession of abandoned political infants which encumbers the path of the South African historian, and constrains him willy-nilly to the indiscriminate benevolence of the Foundling Hospital.¹

Thus baulked of his system of general security, Pirow fell back like a prudent diplomat upon a bilateral pact. In February 1944 a pamphlet (in German) put out by one Ray K. Rudman on behalf of Die Boerenasie, announced that, in future there would be close cooperation between that movement and the New Order, as a first step to the securing of a National-Socialist Front. An invitation had been sent also to the Greyshirts to associate themselves with the Front, but for the present it was allowed to remain unanswered.² Pirow, though he was gratified by this success, was by no means satisfied. The *ignis fatuus* of Volkseenheid still glimmered uncertainly through the twilight which surrounded him; and in June 1944, a month after the Wakkerstroom result, he made another heavy plunge in pursuit. In a series of lectures to the Transvaal Congress of the New Order, he developed the theme of Volkseenheid. The New Order's mission was to inculcate in South Africa the National-Socialist attitude to life: it differed from the O.B. only in that its preoccupations were more exclusively ideological, while those of the O.B. were "activist." But although the New Order did not believe in the vote, it was prepared to support the H.N.P. unconditionally, until votes should have become obsolete; asking only that when these millennial conditions should at last obtain, the H.N.P. in its turn should support the New Order.³ To this proposal, which, all things considered, was as modest as it well could be, the H.N.P. did not deign to vouchsafe a reply.

For the moment, therefore, Pirow fell silent, but almost immediately there came another to take up the tune. This was L. J. du Plessis, who in August 1944 appealed for a fresh start. He grounded his appeal upon the Christianity common to them all, and upon a view of the future destiny of South Africa to which he believed that all Nationalist Afrikaners could subscribe.⁴ He met with no success; and the New Order and the Greyshirts were, particularly explicit in preferring their own Utopias to his.⁵ Indeed, the only effect—a somewhat unexpected effect—of du Plessis' appeal was to persuade Weichardt to change his

1. *Die Vaderland*, 18 October 1943.

2. *The Rand Daily Mail*, 16 February 1944.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 23 June 1944.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 10 August 1944.

5. Letter from Adv. L. P. Bresler, head of the Ideological Section of the N.O., *Die Vaderland*, 14 August 1944; and from P. J. Joubert of the Greyshirt H.Q., *ibid.*, 31 August 1944.

attitude. He now accepted a treaty of alliance and collaboration between the New Order and the Greyshirts, and declared it to be the foreshadowing of a National-Socialist triumph in South Africa after the war.¹

Encouraged, perhaps, by this development, which certainly did something to buttress his own political position, Pirow proceeded to another attempt. In September 1944 he proposed the formation of a National Reconciliation Committee, and added to it a scarcely-veiled invitation to the O.B. to join the New-Order-Boerenasie-Greyshirtsentente.² He drew a caustic rejoinder from Strydom, and forthwith abandoned the idea. And with that, the movement for Volkseenheid petered out. It had long since ceased to have any real prospect of success; and latterly the allocations of its champions had risen, with an inevitability almost meteorological, to find their level in the more rarefied atmosphere of wishful political thinking, high above the earth of those constituencies where Malan had planted his feet so solidly. But at ground level, conditions were less balmy: a nipping and an eager air of controversy sharpened tongues and tempers, and imparted a certain briskness and vivacity to the political scene.

(ii)

The result of the General Election had not caused the leaders of the O.B. to deviate one inch from the straight course to which they had set their hands. They had, indeed, hardly any alternative. Since the H.N.P. demanded surrender at discretion, it was natural that the Groot Raad should prefer the hazards of survival. Members were reminded that one-third of the Union Defence Force had abstained from voting—a clear indication, surely, that there was a considerable body of opinion which would rally to the anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, anti-colour programme of the O.B. These men, it was believed, would become the soldiers of the coming authoritarian State, the picked legionaries in the fight against black Communism. Hence the sympathy with which van Rensburg greeted the appearance of Mr. Hall at Wakkerstroom. Meanwhile, the struggle against the renegade Malanites continued with undiminished enthusiasm. A painful incident, however, revealed the danger that the delicious ardours of the contest might cause zeal to outrun discretion. On 20th July 1944, Mr. F. E. Mentz, Malanite M.P. for Westdene, and Party Secretary on the Rand, was kidnapped by a gang of masked men, taken out into the veld and there brutally beaten. Malan at once laid the responsibility upon the O.B.; and van Rensburg, while

1. *Die Vaderland*, 31 August, 2 September 1944. *Die Burger* (1 September 1944) unkindly commented that Smuts and Hoggheimer would welcome this alliance, and that van Rensburg ought to have been a party to it too.

2. *The Rand Daily Mail*, 13 September 1944; *Die Vaderland*, 20 September 1944.

exculpating the movement as a whole, and charging Malan with an attempt to make party capital out of the incident, did not attempt to deny that the outrage might have been the work of O.B. members.¹ Indeed, L. J. du Plessis, in a remarkably impartial article,² was inclined to place the ultimate responsibility on Dr. van Rensburg himself. However that may be, the result was to sting the H.N.P. into more drastic action against the O.B. than any that had hitherto been attempted. In 1941 H.N.P. members had been *requested* to resign from the O.B., and subsequently O.B. members had been debarred from holding office in the Party. Malan now announced that he proposed to ask the Provincial Congresses of the Party to exclude all O.B.s from the privileges of ordinary membership.³ *Die Transvaler* wrote at length of "fundamental differences of principle," and expatiated on the menace of foreign ideologies,⁴ while Eric Louw referred to the Mentz affair as "one of a series, some of which were still more serious."⁵ It was thus at a singularly inappropriate moment that L. J. du Plessis launched that attempt at reconciliation to which reference has already been made. For in September the Transvaal Congress of the Party resolved that membership of the O.B. was incompatible with membership of the H.N.P. But even now no definite date for expulsion was decided on, and Party members were urged to make every effort to convert O.B.s to the true faith.⁶ Indeed, the only immediate result of this ultimatum was the resignation from the Party of L. J. du Plessis, who in the course of a Malanite meeting at his own Potchefstroom rose from his seat in the body of the hall and ceremoniously washed his hands of them; and thereby terminated a long, and latterly somewhat painful, connection.⁷

Yet, though the H.N.P. was now resolved to make no further effort for reconciliation,⁸ the O.B., less certain of itself, possibly declining in numbers, and increasingly sensitive to the chill of isolation, attempted one more half-hearted gesture. Its leaders had for some time been pondering the expediency of a Parliamentary Front. The unfortunate affair at Wakkerstroom seems finally to have convinced them that it was necessary to try the

1. *Die Transvaler*, 24 July 1944; *Die Vaderland*, 21 and 27 July 1944. *Die O.B.* (2 August 1944) accused Malan of seizing the occasion of allied successes in Normandy for a blow at van Rensburg.

2. *Koers* XII. 35, August 1944.

3. *Die Burger*, 5 August 1944.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 24, 26, 27 July 1944.

5. Letter reprinted in *Die O.B.*, 12 August 1944.

6. *Die Transvaler*, 21 September 1944.

7. *ibid.*, 25 September 1944.

8. See the articles of Strydom in *Die Transvaler*, 27 September 1944 *et seq.*, and Malan's speech at the H.N.P. Cape Congress, where he described the O.B. as "one of the most dangerous organisations in the country." *Die Transvaler*, 13 October 1944.

experiment.¹ In the closing months of 1944 the scheme was elaborated by the Groot Raad, and on 10th January 1945 it was announced in *Die O.B.* The creation of a Parliamentary Front, it was explained, was not to be taken as implying any recantation of the former tenets of the movement: the O.B. still condemned the ballot, Parliamentary methods and party politics. The object of the Front, indeed, was to utilise the voting strength of Afrikanerdom "to deal a deadly blow to Parliamentarism on its own terrain." To this end the O.B. proposed to call a congress of all nationally-minded political leaders, in order to discuss collaboration at forthcoming elections. No fusion, no political suicide was in contemplation. The O.B. did not project the formation of a political party, but it gave warning that, once the Volksfront had been constituted, O.B.s would be free to vote only for those candidates who subscribed to that Front.² On 26th February 1945 this offer was conveyed to the H.N.P. in a letter of invitation addressed to Malan, and similar letters were sent to the leaders of the other Opposition groups.³ Malan's answer was prompt and explicit. After rehearsing the history of H.N.P.-O.B. relations from the time of the Cradock Agreement, and pronouncing a comprehensive commination upon the O.B.'s National-Socialist theories, he pointed out that van Rensburg's invitation was in fact a request for the recognition of the O.B. as an independent factor in politics, even upon the Parliamentary front—a request for the abrogation of the Cradock and Bloemfontein Agreements. This request he peremptorily rejected. The Afrikaner Party, the New Order and the Greyshirts lost no time in following his example. The O.B. Parliamentary Front forthwith collapsed.⁴

It argues either an incorrigible optimism or an equally notable effrontery in the O.B. leaders that this proposal should ever have been made. No doubt it was their hope that the O.B., by a broad national gesture, might recover the moral leadership of Afrikanerdom. But the scheme was in fact little better than a barefaced plagiarism of Pirow's Waaksaamheidsliga, and it is hard to see how they can have believed that they would succeed where he had failed. In the existing situation the attempt coolly to appropriate to themselves a benevolent suzerainty over the whole field of electoral politics was extraordinarily sanguine. Perhaps, however, it was intended merely to serve as a spirited finale to a play that had long since become tedious. At all events no other proposal of this sort was mooted during the remainder of the

1. *Die O.B.*, 27 September 1944; *Die Burger*, 2 October 1944. The Mentz-affair may also have influenced their decision: see L. J. du Plessis' comments in *Koers* XII, 35 (August 1944).

2. *Die O.B.*, 10 January 1945. The key-words of the new Volksfront were defined by L. J. du Plessis as: Christelik; Westersblank; Soid-Afrikaans; Nasionaal; Sosiaal; Republikeins. *Koers*, XII, 75 (October 1944).

3. *Die Burger*, 14 March 1945.

4. Though van Rensburg stated that he intended to proceed with it: *Die Vaderland*, 23 March 1945.

period with which we are concerned, and van Rensburg himself proclaimed that he did not intend to make any further attempt at a toenadering with Malan.¹

When L. J. du Plessis walked out of the H.N.P. at Malan's Potchefstroom meeting he marked a stage, not only in the struggle between the O.B. and the H.N.P., but also, perhaps, in the internal history of the O.B. movement. The accession of an essentially "academic" wing to the "activist" O.B. had seemed in 1942 to threaten a possible cleavage within its ranks.² The Calvinism of du Plessis and his Potchefstroom colleagues had seemed likely sooner or later to clash with the National-Socialism of van Rensburg. That this development did not in fact take place is to be attributed largely to a gradual shifting of hue in the political ideas, not of van Rensburg, but of du Plessis. By the date of his withdrawal from the Party he had absorbed into his theory of the State a surprisingly massive dose of National-Socialist doctrine. As the European war hurried to its conclusion, as he sought to find some sort of future for the South Africa of his desiring, he found himself driven ever faster along the road (which proved an unexpectedly easy one) that led from Geneva in the general direction of Berlin. He had come to the conclusion that the end of the "Christian" period of world history was now at hand: the future of civilisation, in so far as it had a future, lay not in a Europe dominated by Russia, but in America. This, however, did not imply the triumph of democratic principles, for it was impossible that the United States should remain a democracy in the usual sense of the term, since democracy could offer no effective resistance to Communism. Communism was indeed democracy's ultimate consequence, and to resist Communism, therefore, the still-Christian nations of the West would find themselves compelled to take refuge in National-Socialism—or at all events in National Socialism without the hyphen. On the point of Socialism, he was convinced that no real difference of opinion was possible, and that any controversy regarding its acceptance (among Afrikaners at all events) was merely a political sham. Moreover, he was inclined to believe that "National" could be interpreted more widely than had hitherto been usual in South Africa. In the near future, if not immediately, the English speakers would be comprehensible in the Nationalist ranks, driven thither by the press of world events. He was careful to explain that by "Socialism" he did not understand either the system of Marx or Lenin, or that of "Roosevelt, Hitler or Mussolini."

"maar alleen die algemene wêreld-beweging van ons tyd wat daar-toe strek dat die stoflike en geestelike rykdomme van 'n volk en

1. *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

2. See above, pp. 151 seqq.

'n land volgens 'n omvattende, deskundige plan gesaghebbend, ten volle ontwikkel word en regverdig verdeel word, tot bevrediging van al die stoflike en geestelike behoeftes van die hele volk in al sy lede en al sy lae . . ."

Such a system could be enshrined only in a type of State to which he gave the name "Nomocratic Democracy"—"d.w.s. volksregering wat hom laat bepaal en beheers deur die wetmatighede van die sosiaal verband, van die nasionale karakter en van die internasionale groeppvorming."

As to South Africa, he was confident that the fall of the Liberal-Democratic system of society was imminent. There had been a time when he had believed that an existing Parliamentary party might develop into a true volksregering embracing all the political life of the Volk: he did not think so now. No mere change of Government within the Parliamentary framework would suffice. The future of South Africa lay with the nomocratic, authoritarian volksstaat which would be neither a dictatorship nor a democracy, but which would be based on "the laws of God and the lines laid down by nature," and would be organised upon a corporate basis. And in order to obtain a State of this type it might be necessary to contemplate the possibility of being forced to have recourse to violent methods.¹

In spite of du Plessis' deprecation of dictatorship, in spite of his references to the growing Calvinistic orientation of the leaders of Afrikanerdom, it is clear that he had moved some distance to the right in the preceding two years. Eric Louw was curiously astray when he accused the O.B. of having deserted National-Socialism and turned Marxist;² the truth was all the other way. National-Socialism had captured the convictions of the Groot Raad's thinkers, as once it had appealed to the unsubtle emotions of the Stormjaer rank and file. The extraordinary attack upon van Rensburg by the Greyshirts in September 1944, when they accused the O.B. of unpardonable lapses from the path of Hitlerite orthodoxy,³ is most easily explicable as the expression of a sudden uncontrollable outburst of jealousy, and is reminiscent of nothing so much as the fierce exchanges which in former centuries occasionally passed between the Dominicans and the Franciscans.

(iii)

As the war entered upon its last year, and the prospect of a

¹ Much to the indignation of *Die Burger*, (29 March 1945) For du Plessis' views see *Koers*, XI, 146 (February 1944), XI, 194 (June 1944), XII, 151-2, *Die O B*, 21-28 March 1945, *Die Vaderland*, 4 April 1945

Potchefstroom provided an interesting contrast to L. J. du Plessis in the person of Professor S. du Toit, who about this time wrote "Vader Kestell het geroep 'My nassie in nood' sonder dat sosialisme gepreek is. En die R D B is gelonds, sonder dat die model elders gesoek is. . . Laat ons kreet dan nuaat nuaat. Al wat ons kan red, is die Nasionaal-sosialisme! Nee, al wat ons kan red is die vertroue op God en die intewing van ons Boerebeginsels—waarin die Calvinistiese erfenis van ons volk gekristalliseer het!" (*Koers*, XII, 11-12 August 1944)

² *Die Transvaler*, 26 October 1944

³ Mainly in the direction of Calvinistic heresies see *Die O B*, 6 September 1945.

return of the men in the armed forces drew nearer, the O.B. began to make preparations for the coming peace. Not only did it attempt, by the flotation of a limited company upon a grandiose scale, to provide itself with a better Press,¹ but it began to tackle the problem of the English-speaking section of the population. Already by the middle of 1944 its publications department had put out its first pamphlet in English. It had, moreover, pointedly refrained from taking sides in the dual-medium controversy.² But the winning of the English-speakers was made particularly difficult for the O.B. by reason of its increasingly explicit adherence to National-Socialist doctrines, which were unlikely to be popular with returned soldiers, and had in any case not hitherto enjoyed much support among the remainder of the English in South Africa. The H.N.P. in this matter had an enormous advantage. For the H.N.P. also had seen, even before the General Election of 1943, that some approach to the English was imperative. As a result of their successes on that occasion they could feel reasonably confident of obtaining the solid support of Nationalist Afrikanerdom at the polls; but their hope was now set on the winning of a clear majority over the United Party, and for that they would need some assistance from the English. They were perhaps beginning to realise that, as Havenga remarked in 1940, "the only majority necessary to proclaim the Republic is the majority which can maintain it"—a majority, in fact, which necessarily included a portion of the English electorate. The first intimation after the Election that the H.N.P. leaders were keeping this point in mind came in Malan's speech at Stellenbosch on 9th November 1943. On that occasion Malan, in an exposition of the Party's aims, assured the English that the H.N.P. would govern South Africa, not in the interests of one section only, but for the good of the whole country, and that it would adhere to the principle of equal cultural and language-rights. He might hope, moreover, that the programme he then outlined—comprising, as it did, rigid segregation and the development of secondary industries—would appeal to many English-speaking electors.³

His speech was reinforced by an editorial in *Die Burger*,⁴ which displayed concern at the unsatisfactory relations between the two sections, and predicted that if Afrikaner and Englishman could not grow together into one nation, united by a patriotism common to both, then white South Africa was doomed.

Curiously enough, at the very moment when the H.N.P. was holding this language, a gesture of reconciliation was attempted

1. *Die O.B.*, 14 March 1945, 5 and 14 April 1945.

2. Compare L. J. du Plessis' frank statement: "Inderdaad is die nasionale stryd reeds gewen, soeër dat selfs die dubbelmediumskool waarteen tereg so heftig van Afrikanerkant gereageer is, as hy tot stand sou kom, op hierdie stadium eerder die Engelssprekende sal verafrikaans as omgekeerd." (*Koers*, XI, 146: February 1944).

3. *Die Burger*, 10 November 1943.

4. *ibid.*, 15 November 1943.

from the English side. In the issue of *Common Sense* for November 1943 appeared an article by Mr. J. P. Cope, editor of the Liberal weekly *The Forum*, in which the clash of Imperialism and Republicanism was analysed and discussed. Cope suggested that one solution to the conflict might lie in the establishment of a Republic within the British Commonwealth, on the model of Eire. *Die Burger* quoted extensively from Cope's article,¹ but treated his proposals with the utmost reserve. Not so Dr. Otto du Plessis, the editor of the H.N.P. newspaper *Die Oosterlig*. In a letter to the December issue of *Common Sense* he welcomed Cope's suggestion.² South Africa's future in the African continent, and her position in the comity of nations, might both, he believed, be secured by retaining her connection with the British Commonwealth of Nations. Afrikaners therefore should accept the connection; while the English on their side should realise that the institution of a President in place of a Governor-General was essential, since the supreme executive authority must necessarily be a true symbol of full nationhood.

Dr. du Plessis forgot, however, that Malan in his Stellenbosch speech had explicitly stated that the Republic at which he aimed was a Republic outside the British Commonwealth. *Die Transvaler* lost no time in refreshing his memory on this point. To Verwoerd the proposal seemed to be a typical Imperialist trick, resorted to by the Jingoists because they knew that an H.N.P. victory was at hand. The substitution of a President for a Governor-General would be a mere change of names, without real significance, since the social, sentimental and commercial ties with Great Britain would remain, and the nature of South Africa's native policy would remain basically unaltered.³ *Die Vaderland* might regret only that Dr. du Plessis' letter had not been written ten years earlier;⁴ *Die Volkstem* might affect to treat his communication as semi-official;⁵ but in fact there is little to indicate that his policy had been approved, or even entertained, by any responsible person in the Party, at this date. *Die Transvaler* tried to minimise Dr. du Plessis' importance, and conjectured that he had written as a private individual;⁶ and Dr. E. G. Jansen, until 1943 Speaker of the House of Assembly, was put up to expound the true doctrine of the Republic in a couple of articles in *Die Burger*.⁷ They made it very clear that the H.N.P.

1 *ibid.*, 19, 22, 23 November 1943 *Common Sense* is described on its title-page as "a magazine for Jews and Christians"

2 This was the same Dr. Otto du Plessis who had so enthusiastically embraced Pirow's New Order in 1940

3 *Die Transvaler*, 21 December 1943

4 *Die Vaderland*, 4 January 1944

5 *Die Volkstem*, 21 December 1943

6 *Die Transvaler*, 6 January 1944 described him as having "temporarily acted as propaganda official of the Party till the end of November with a view to the elections." but it appears that he had been "Enlightenment Secretary" since 1940, and still held that office, and (as *Die Volkstem* remarked) no announcement had appeared to indicate that his "temporary" duties had terminated (*Die Volkstem*, 6 January 1944), though naturally it is quite possible that they had in fact done so

7 *Die Burger*, 5 and 6 January 1944.

had no intention of buying a compromise by agreeing to any such proposals as Cope had put forward. *Die Burger* in an editorial ventured on the conjecture that Dr. du Plessis had written his letter "in a moment of thoughtlessness,"¹ while Eric Louw inveighed against a "Smuts Republic" (strange, distant echo of the Vrymesselaarbriefwestorie!) and pointed out, in a highly significant passage, that if South Africa remained inside the Commonwealth, she would be "hindered by British Liberalism in our efforts to solve the colour problem and the Jewish question."²

Dr. du Plessis had now no alternative but to beat a somewhat lumbering retreat. In a letter to *Die Burger*,³ he denied that he had welcomed Cope's scheme as an official of the Party. His personal conviction was, and had always been, that the best solution for South Africa would be a Republic separated from the British Crown and Empire. He had written his letter only to test the reaction of the English: if that reaction had been favourable, nationalist Afrikanerdom might then have considered whether a compromise could not be accepted, in view of existing circumstances. The English reaction, however, had been unsatisfactory, and the question therefore fell away.

And with this the episode reached a conclusion which can hardly have been considered satisfactory by any of the parties concerned in it. Yet it was not, perhaps, altogether without significance that Dr. du Plessis remained editor of *Die Oosterlig*, nor that the editorial columns of that paper should have greeted with especial enthusiasm the articles of Jansen in *Die Burger*. For in spite of the firmness with which Jansen had rejected the Commonwealth, his tone towards the English had been markedly conciliatory, and he had gone so far as to state in round terms that a Republic in which Afrikaners alone should have a voice could never be achieved. He had preached cooperation between the two sections as the only hope for the country. "What prospect," he wrote, "is there of allowing Afrikaner principles to grow and conquer, in any other way?" The Republic, therefore, would be merely the first step towards that goal of national unity at which the H.N.P. was aiming. It might be a matter of legitimate doubt as to whether there would ever be one single unified culture within the country, "but I do believe that the time will come when the English-speaking people will show loyalty to South Africa, and to South Africa alone." In fact Dr. du Plessis and Jansen, in their different ways, were convinced that the Party could no longer afford to slam its door in the face of the English and shake its fist at them through the grille. The future of the country, no less than that of the Party, depended on their coming

1. *Ibid.*, 21 January 1944.

2. *Ibid.*, 20 January 1944.

3. *Die Burger*, 2 February 1944.

to some arrangement. 'Swart seems to have felt this too, for at the O.F.S. Congress of the H.N.P. in October he made a speech in which he referred to "this scare-bogey that we propose to drive our English fellow-citizens into the sea or deprive them of their rights."¹ And two months later Malan, in his New Year message, announced a development which seemed to prove that the Party leaders had veered round to this point of view. The H.N.P., it was stated, proposed to start a Nationalist newspaper in English on the Rand, and the first number might be expected early in 1945.² The promise was duly implemented: on 8th February 1945 *The New Era* made its appearance. Its avowed object was to appeal to the English-speaking elector; its editor, suitably enough, was Jansen. The name had, presumably, been carefully chosen.

On the Parliamentary front the new era was inaugurated by a remarkable speech from Dr. Karl Bremer, an influential and moderate member of the Party. On 22nd February 1945 he informed the House of Assembly that

"The time has arrived when we as a House must stand together and work out how we are going to save South Africa in the future against the threatened revolution. I say that we can do that. The question of whether we are going to remain in the British Empire [*sic*] and what our relationship to the British Empire will be, has in my opinion been eliminated. That will not play any rôle in South Africa, and it will not play any rôle here. . . I think it is time for us in the history of South Africa as Europeans to brush aside all our differences of the past and to stand together to see what we can do to save South Africa."³

It is uncertain just how much importance should be attached to this speech. Bremer was indeed Chairman of the H.N.P. in the Cape, but it does not necessarily follow that he was expressing the official policy of his Party on this occasion. *Die Burger* was careful to explain that Bremer's reference to "the past" referred only to the years since 1939,⁴ while *Die Transvaler* interpreted the speech as nothing more than an invitation to join the H.N.P. in the fight against Communism.⁵ Bremer himself disclaimed any idea of a coalition with the United Party.⁶ Yet, to *Die Vaderland*, for instance, Bremer's speech was "a sensation in political circles,"⁷ and certainly there was discernible a notable anxiety to explain it away. And a few months later, speaking on the problem of the returned soldier, Bremer could permit himself to say:

1. *Die Transvaler*, 25 October 1944.

2. *Die Burger*, 28 December 1944.

3. *Debates*, vol. 51, pp. 2055-2061.

4. *Die Burger*, 23 February 1945.

5. *Die Transvaler*, 27 February 1945.

6. *Die Burger*, 2 March 1945.

7. *Die Vaderland*, 24 February 1945.

"During the past five years these people have shouldered all the difficulties. During the next five years all the difficulties should be ours. Let the professors and the lecturers, persons like my Hon. friend over there [Hofmeyr] and myself, employ all our powers during the next five years."¹

This surprising solicitude for those who had risked their lives in a cause which the H.N.P. condemned might have aroused more attention if it had not been overshadowed by the speech of Mr. Tom Naudé on the same day. Naudé appealed for collaboration to all Afrikaners who meant well by South Africa, to "every man who . . . accepts the slogan of 'South Africa First,' whether he be English- or Afrikaans-speaking."² He was indeed careful to explain that he was expressing only his personal views, and that he must not be taken as voicing the views of his Party; but this did not save him from an attack by Eric Louw, who declared that Naudé "did not interpret the views of this side of the House." There was no possibility, he asserted, of cooperation with the United Party, nor was there any hope of political collaboration with the other Afrikaner organisations, "whose principles are diametrically opposed to ours."³ But Naudé refused to be silenced. He called in question Louw's right to speak on behalf of the Party. "He has just as much spoken on his own behalf as I have on mine. There are certain questions in respect of which I feel we understand each other and are able to cooperate. I am convinced that the nation is prepared for such cooperation . . . the people will come together whether we desire it or not."⁴

Thus when the war ended there were signs of a new spirit in the H.N.P.; or rather perhaps of a spirit which had been dormant for more than a decade. It is not easy to estimate how far the H.N.P. as a whole was affected. It is tempting, but it would probably be rash, to conjecture that within the Party there was emerging a more moderate, set over against a more intransigent, section. Of the one, Jansen, Bremer, Dönges and Naudé might be taken as examples, and of the other, Eric Louw and Verwoerd. That the Party had realised the need for an approach to the English-speakers is clear. What is not so clear is whether at this date there was any agreement upon the terms on which that approach should be made. Commonsense suggested that the undiluted H.N.P. programme, as it had been more or less consistently expounded in the previous six years, was not calculated to make a strong appeal to the English-speaking electorate. Principle enjoined that no dilution of that programme should take place. If Strydom and Swart and Verwoerd had presented an adamant

1. *Debates*, vol. 51, pp. 9699-9709 12 June 1945.

2. *Ibid.*, vol. 51, pp. 9718-9720.

3. *Ibid.*, vol. 51, pp. 9738-9740.

4. *Ibid.*, vol. 51, pp. 9740-9741.

integrity in face of the seductions of Hereniging, it was surely unreasonable to expect compliance for the sake of the *beaux yeux* of those who had helped to defeat them at the election of 1943. On the other hand, the foundation of *The New Era* was a solid fact of which even the most orthodox could not wholly evade the implications. No newspaper can succeed if it consistently supplies its readers with an unpalatable pabulum.¹ And, apart altogether from the exigencies of party politics (and it is futile to pretend that these carried no weight), it was at least possible that the consideration of purely domestic problems—necessarily postponed in war-time to other and more pressing concerns—might discover bases of cooperation on broad national issues, such as had been absent in the years since 1939. The Party might be considered to have won its battle, both with its Afrikaner adversaries and with the more insidious temptations that had beset it in the past six years. Its path had not been easy, but at least it had been comparatively straightforward. But the seas ahead were less well-charted; there were skerries, just awash, already discernible to the keen-sighted, and reefs, maybe, which no pilot yet could see. It was as well, perhaps, that the crew were disciplined and the helmsman alert and experienced, as they steered out into the drifting mists of the New Era.

1. *The New Era* ceased publication in April 1947.

EPILOGUE

The complicated story which thus reaches a provisional ending in May 1945 emerges from the preceding chapters as the history of the difficulties, tribulations and ultimate triumph of a particular set of men. Its narration has necessarily been concerned with the thrust and parry, the stratagems and manœuvres, of the opposing groups ; with the efforts of this leader or that to secure the following of his people; and inevitably the canvas has been somewhat crowded with detail. But the close in-fighting of the political ring must not persuade us to forget that the struggle we have been witnessing was itself only a part of a much wider conflict, which dwarfs the personalities of those concerned in it. The political battle of 1939-1945 was not only a question of the triumph of a personality and a Party, it was a struggle essentially concerned with principles.

It is perhaps a weakness in all countries insulated by nature from the general world-history that they too often consider their own annals in isolation instead of relating them to those broad currents of historical development which they are quite capable of detecting in the story of other nations. It is so in England and America ; it is so in South Africa. Yet the present state of affairs in the Union is not to be understood without an appreciation of the history of Europe in the nineteenth century. Two great movements dominated the age between 1815 and 1914, the movement for political liberties and the movement for national integration. Broadly speaking, England led the way in the first of these. With the second she had little immediate concern : a conscious, rounded national entity for centuries, she had no need to endure the travail of the Italians and the Magyars. She confined her attention, therefore, to encouraging the nationalist movement wherever it was to be found, under the mistaken impression that she was also necessarily advancing the cause of human freedom. She applied the same principles, with more success, and with greater justification, to her Dominions. Here, in fact, political liberties and nationalism grew together under her care, though the latter has not even to-day kept pace with the former. But to the process of steady

evolution from Empire to Commonwealth there was one great exception. The chequered and unfortunate history of South Africa in the nineteenth century stands in strong contrast to the easy birth of the Canadian and Australian nations. Political liberties of the English type the Mother Country did indeed confer, willy-nilly, upon the white population of the sub-continent; but the other half of the programme proved impossible of attainment. Britain could create a Dominion; she could not create a nation. And this for two reasons: the English minority, conscious always of being a minority, were for long reluctant to embrace a nationalism that might cut them off from their tap-root in Britain, and (a fact which had already been apparent for a century or more) there was another, non-British, nationalism already in existence. Had Milnerism been successful, had South Africa become in effect a predominantly English territory, there would have been no more difficulty about the development of an English South African nationalism than there had been about the emergence of a nation in Australia; but by 1910 it was already obvious that Milnerism was doomed—provided the Afrikaners could find a leader.

After Union, Britain washed her hands of the South African problem. "You are a big boy now," she said in effect, "settle your troubles for yourself. You have the best type of democratic institutions to guide you; you can be a nation if you choose. It'll be all right. Anyway, we hope so." But it was not all right. The English section in South Africa, like Peter Pán, refused to grow up; and, even worse, resented any attempt by the Afrikaans section to grow up in a direction of which it disapproved. History moves slowly in South Africa, and what the English did not realise was that in fact the Union in the decades after 1911 was living through the phase which had been lived through by the countries of Continental Europe between 1830 and 1870. By a tragic yet not unusual irony, they taught their children in the schools the history of Italian or German union, and failed to perceive that their own country was undergoing the same experience. For it was the same. It needs no more than a casual acquaintance with the Afrikaans publicists of to-day to catch echo after echo of battle-cries and debates which one might suppose to have long since sunk into silence. The notion that the nation is the creation of God, who has destined every nation for a special part in the working-out of His providence; the insistence that the true internationalism cannot be attained until each nation has been enabled to fulfil its Divine destiny; the appeal to the historic past; the appeal to the idealism of youth—all these come straight from Mazzini or Mickiewicz. We recognise the attainment of German and Italian unity as historically inevitable and desirable, however much we may deplore the methods that effected the one, or the flabbiness that followed the other. We condemn Franz

Josef and the Austrian Centralists, and wax sentimental over the Czechs. Are we to apply another standard of values to the nationalism of the Afrikaner? And whether we do so or not, is it not important that we should recognize the identity of the phenomena? The historical process which had been thought to have worked itself out by 1919 was found in fact to have still some seams of ore as yet untapped. Britain learned that: with some difficulty, it is true; yet three years sufficed to persuade her that Irish nationalism was not the undisciplined by-product of a factitious cultural movement. But by 1923 the clash of English and Afrikaner was no longer Britain's concern.

The first prerequisite, then, for any appreciation of the South African situation to-day is a sense of historical perspective. Such a sense would, for instance, prevent the cheap sneers at the factiousness of Afrikaner politics, which are still too prevalent in the English Press of South Africa, for it would enable the intelligent observer to recall the bitter animosities of Cavour and Garibaldi, La Farina and Crispi; the welter of cross-purposes and rival associations that confuse the history of German unity; the deplorable parliamentary excesses of the Czechs; the narrow exclusiveness of the Magyars; the inextricable tangle of petty jealousies and rival ambitions that marked the nationalist movement among the Poles. It is not suggested that a historical precedent makes good what otherwise would be bad. What is suggested is that such developments, however regrettable, seem to have been inseparable from nationalist movements wherever they have occurred. Again, just as it is impossible to consider the Great Trek as caused by half a dozen factors listed in a matriculation answer, without relating it to similar movements in other continents, so it is impossible to consider the linguistic problem in South Africa without relating it to (e.g.) the same problem in the Habsburg monarchy or—the closest parallel, perhaps—in Finland.

The Nationalist cause, in South Africa as in other countries, did not command the entire adherence of the population concerned. The Afrikaner people split into two sections. One of them frankly embraced all the implications of the creed, and steadily worked for the full recognition of their national individuality; the other found difficulty in going to the whole length of the Nationalist programme. This latter group feared that Nationalist idealism might lead to a breach between themselves and their English fellow-citizens, a breach which might, in an extremity, issue in civil war. They preferred collaboration with the English to the pursuit of the long and uphill struggle for equality of status. They were keenly sensible of the material advantages which (they believed) resulted from membership of the British Commonwealth; and in general they professed,

and probably felt, a stronger adherence than the Nationalists to the Liberal-Democratic ideals of the nineteenth century.

The majority of these moderates found their leader in Botha, and after him in Smuts. Both these men believed in forgetting the unhappy past, and concentrating upon establishing a South African patriotism founded upon an acceptance of the racial position as it existed, and a full participation in the Commonwealth. Smuts, however, unlike Botha, was a philosopher and a seer. His philosophy of Holism, when translated into terms of practical politics, proved to be a long-distance policy based ~~on~~ an idealism as lofty and as sincerely held as that of any of his adversaries. Accepting Botha's policy of building a South African nation through the coalescence of the diverse white racial elements in the country, he looked upon this not as the ultimate, but as the mediate goal. Not the ultimate goal, for he had already advanced in his thought beyond the nationalist ideal. He looked forward to higher integrations of human society, and had diagnosed the problem of political relationships in terms not of the nineteenth but of the twentieth century. Smuts had penetrated the great secret of the Commonwealth, which consisted not so much in the fact that it permitted the existence within its framework of sovereign independent states (though that was true) as in the fact that by facilitating the collaboration of individual nations in the cause of international decency it marked the first step, however imperfect, away from the exclusive, angular and explosive Nationalism which had been the illegitimate offspring of Mazzini and his school. He saw the immediate foreground with a clarity which enabled him to pick his way through the political quicksands with a nice audacity which provoked the admiration even of his enemies; he saw the distant horizons in a Pisgah-view which was not vouchsafed to many of his contemporaries. What he perhaps did not see so clearly was the middle distance of the next generation or so. The cold flame of his intelligence had played upon the memories of his youth and purged them of their bitterness; but he found it difficult to understand that the nationalist creed which had been exorcised for him by three years of war might in others have been confirmed and strengthened by that conflict, and that his people might not reach his standpoint until more than one generation had left the Jameson Raid and the concentration camps behind them.

The real leader of Afrikanerdom was not Smuts but Hertzog. The uprightness of his character, his great political ability, the comparative simplicity of his ideas, all endeared him to those who were unable to follow Smuts either in his Holistic flights or in his apparent indifference to the past. Without Hertzog, indeed, it would have been impossible for Smuts and his followers

to pursue their "no-policy" on the racial issue, for it was Hertzog who performed the indispensable and inestimable service of really placing the two races on a footing of equality, without which Bothaism would have been a mere combination in the void. Under Hertzog's leadership the Afrikaner became assured of a place of honour for his language and his flag, of educational facilities for his children such as he could approve, of the career open to Afrikaner as well as English talents. The Afrikaner was able to pursue that development of his literature and culture which has already enabled him to shame the colonial barrenness of his English compatriots. Moreover, Hertzog found, in his "civilised labour" policy, a bridge—and a stronger one than might be supposed—over which English and Afrikaner could advance to meet one another on a basis of common fears and common hatreds. It was Hertzog, not Smuts, who was fated to carry through those measures which culminated in the Status Act, and which secured, as far as paper and ink could secure it, the full freedom and sovereign independence of South Africa within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Hertzog's principles never varied. He had enunciated them as early as 1912 in his historic speech at De Wildt, and he maintained them unaltered until the day of his death.¹ His policy in the 'twenties was indeed merely the translation of those principles into action. And the central portion of his political creed was the "Two Stream" policy on the racial issue.

Smuts' view of the racial question was entirely justified upon his own premises, but it was apt to be reminiscent, in its philosophic detachment, of Lord Balfour's attitude to the squabbles of the smaller succession-States in Europe. It was, indeed, not a policy at all. Smuts and his followers proceeded on the assumption that the situation, in so far as it really existed, would cure itself. In a generation, or two at the worst, English and Afrikaner would have so intermarried that the question would lack reality. Already they went to the same schools, cooperated in business, sat side by side at their desks in the civil service or upon the benches in the House. They had fought together in the war of 1914-18, and the bonds of sympathy then forged would be strengthened by common sacrifices in the greater struggle that began in 1939. In the meantime, one could encourage bilingualism, so that each section might better understand the other. Now there was some truth in all this. The English, in particular, having learnt from Hertzog that equal rights were to be a reality, were reconciling themselves to the position, and with their usual political apathy would probably develop as Smuts foresaw, provided they were not frightened. But, of course, it was inevitable that they should be frightened. For Smuts' solution was character-

1. General Hertzog died on his farm in the Transvaal on 21 November, 1942 aged 74.

istically English in this, that its ripe pragmatism underestimated the force of ideas and, even more serious, the viability of ideals. Hertzog was in this matter clearer in his thought than Smuts. He did not believe that the Afrikaner national ideal would be eradicated so easily. How could he, when he subscribed to it himself? He perceived that if that ideal were to be reached, not by the triumph of Afrikaner over English, but by the agreement of both sections, a racial policy was necessary. He did not approve of such coalescence as Smuts envisaged until such time as the Afrikaner should be able to treat with the Englishman on a basis of equality. But he did approve of the inculcation of mutual respect. The English, he perceived, were in no danger of losing their characteristic ethos through contact with the Afrikaner; but the converse was not true. The Afrikaner, therefore, must live in South Africa as an Afrikaner, and not as an inferior sort of Englishman. The civil equality which he had obtained would be worthless if his national traditions and national spirit were swamped by contact with a culture which, by its bulk, its material wealth, its antiquity and its richness, was increasingly difficult to withstand. The racial poison in South Africa, he believed, was distilled from a psychological situation in which the Afrikaner, despite apparent equality, was made to feel that he was, in some undefined way, inferior, as the countryman feels inferior in a society drawing-room. The Afrikaner, therefore, must be taught that he had every reason to be proud of his language, his literature, his religion, his way of life; and the Englishman, in his turn, must be constrained to recognise in the Afrikaner a person not inferior but different, and in his own way every bit as good. Then, when that situation had arisen, the venom of racialism would leave an immunised South Africa scathless, and the coalescence which Smuts was preaching would be not merely possible but desirable. The two streams would merge as one.¹ It was an intelligent and honest policy; but its difficulty lay in the fact that, in a world where nationalism was still unregenerate, it was difficult to name any single pair of racial groups between whom this idyllic relationship did in fact exist.² Such a policy could be successful only if it admitted Nationalism to be something less than the ultimate determinant of political behaviour, and it was consequently endangered by the fact that in encouraging the self-conscious Nationalism of Afrikanerdom Hertzog might be making ultimate coalescence not less but more difficult to achieve. In short, the full Hertzogite programme was only realisable if he could in the long run persuade both Afrikaner and Englishman to turn Smutsite.

1. For Hertzogism in general see C. M. van den Heever, *Hertzog* (1943); and the series of pamphlets by A. C. Cilliers: *British Holism and South African Nationalism* (1938); *Quo Vadis?* (1939); *Volkseenheid* (1940); *Voete van Kier* (1940); *Die Stryd om Volkseenheid* (1941); *Hertzogisme en die Handel* (1941); *Nasionale Volksorg en die Demokrasie* (1941).

2. Compare, once again, Finland; where the Hertzogite policy has been put into effect, but has not succeeded in eliminating strained relations between the Finns and the Swedes.

By the beginning of the 1930s it was becoming apparent that Afrikanerdom had reached a crucial point in its development. Its position in the State was now secure, buttressed by every sort of guarantee. It was more conscious of its cultural heritage than were its English-speaking compatriots. The position of South Africa within the Commonwealth had been placed upon such a footing as to remove much of the offence which Afrikaners found in the Imperial connection. A Republic within the Commonwealth was within reach, if the majority of the population should desire it. The battle for survival of Afrikanerdom had been won, and it had been Hertzog who had won it. The question now was, what was Afrikanerdom to make of the existence which Hertzog had thus guaranteed? Hertzog's own answer was clear. Personally, he favoured a Republic—at some unspecified future date—and he recognised that the majority of Afrikaners were of the same opinion. But he was not prepared to press that issue. For the present he was well satisfied with the position of South Africa in the Commonwealth, since, he believed, it secured that South Africa would be able to consult her own interests rather than those of Britain or "the Empire" in any national emergency. To him the great task of the immediate future was the completion of the policy he had been pursuing for the preceding twenty years. While never for a moment deviating from his principle of encouraging the national culture and preserving the way of life of the Afrikaner people, he believed that their position in South Africa was now sufficiently assured for a process of fusion with the English to be safely undertaken. The English, it seemed, had learnt their lesson, and the British Government had reinforced it by the Statute of Westminster.¹ Between himself and Smuts, the political adversaries of a lifetime, there was now a considerable measure of agreement. Hertzog had shown himself an enlightened Commonwealth statesman, and had been among the foremost in assisting to place Commonwealth relations upon a new footing—a footing which in truth provided a more solid foundation for practical Holism than had ever existed before. At the same time, Hertzog could now accept the vague benevolence which had been Smuts' substitute for a racial policy, with a rather easier mind. When, therefore, after a period of political and economic crisis the Hertzog Government broke down in 1933, there was apparently little beyond personal rancour to keep the two apart. The meteoric manoeuvres of Tielman Roos removed even this obstacle, and the Fusion Government was the result. Henceforward both Hertzog and Smuts appeared as the champions of a Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid, which was to draw its strength from all that was best in each of the two streams.

¹ "The 1938 election showed that the old "all-eyes-on-Britain" and "never-trust-the-blank-Dutch" catch-cries of English-speaking South Africa were extinct to all intents and purposes, except in Natal, which has always thought to-day what its compatriots in the rest of the country were thinking the day before yesterday." Long *In Smuts' Camp*, p. 36

The Fusion Government precipitated a crisis in Afrikanerdom which had been banking up for some years. As early as 1926 the more extreme wing of the Nationalist Party had formed an association—Die Republikeinse Bond—pledged to obtain a Republic conformable to the Afrikaner spirit, and divorced from "the Empire." The Hertzog-Smuts alliance forced politicians who were thinking on these lines to form a new Party, led by Malan. For samewerking, they protested, they were perfectly ready, in view of the national emergency; but samesmelting they absolutely declined. It was a blurring of the clear lines of principle. For the first time Hertzog was made to realise that the Nationalism he had fostered in his people might escape his control. Of what use was it, Malan could argue, to nurse the traditions, encourage the cultural efflorescence, and protect the status of the Afrikaner, if, as soon as these great aims were secured, the purity of the Afrikaner way of life were to be watered down by commixture with a civilisation and a people certainly alien to it in spirit, and probably hostile also? The Nationalists could quote history to prove that even samewerking was so risky as to be highly undesirable, while samesmelting would be a pointless national suicide, the destruction of Hertzog's great work at Hertzog's own hands. They saw the best hope for the future of South Africa in the Afrikanerising of the non-Afrikaans elements. Hertzog's policy in the 'twenties, they freely acknowledged, had been necessary and right; but now he was refusing to follow that policy to its logical conclusion. In their view, the Afrikaner should aim at monopolising important appointments; he should deliberately strengthen himself in social groups where hitherto he had been weak—as for instance the world of business;¹ he should understand the principle of bilingualism to mean, not that each citizen should be required to speak both languages, but that every man should be protected against having to speak a language that was not his own. In short, they embarked upon a line of policy which, if followed to its logical conclusion, would have led to racial exclusivism and frank isolationism, ramifying into every aspect of society: and this they did, partly because they believed it necessary in the interests of national purity; partly because, feeling themselves already the stronger section, they were encouraged to make themselves yet more strong; and partly because they honestly believed that the English would never get rid of those ties of sentiment which, by holding them fast to England, made them incapable of becoming good South Africans. If the last hypothesis were true, what hope was there for a South African nation, except in the nationalism of the Afrikaner?² The su-

1. For the Afrikaner economic movement see J. D. Kestell, *My Nasie in Nood* (1939); C. W. G. Schumann, *Die Ekonomiese Posisie van die Afrikaner* (1940); *Reddingsdaad as Volksopbouw* (1941); *Die Reddingsdaadfonds* (1942); N. Diederichs, *Die Reddingsdaadbond en die Toekoms van ons Volk* (1943).

2. See the admirably moderate pamphlet by L. Ign. Coertze: *Die ware politieke probleem vandag 'n antwoord aan praf*, Cilliers (1941).

preme danger—already exemplified in South African history—was that Afrikanerdom should make all the sacrifices, and the English should make none. Thus they did not believe in Hertzog's Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid. They believed rather in an Afrikaner Volkseenheid. In such a unity the average English South African could have no part, either in feeling or in fact. Therefore, in delineating the goal at which they were to aim, there was no need to consider the English-speaking group at all, since they were incapable of a nationalism of their own, and equally incapable of appreciating or conforming to the feelings and ideals of others. The goal, of course, must be an Afrikaner republic, free from "the Empire," with Afrikaans as the senior official language, and an Afrikaner ideology irradiating every branch of the polity. To ask for less than this would be to stultify the whole of Hertzog's earlier career, to abandon all his gains, for only in a truly Afrikaans State could the Afrikaner people develop those gifts and qualities, implanted in them by God, which were in fact His distinguishing mark—the mark whereby they were to be known among the nations. The alternative was, put bluntly, the bastardisation of everything that was noble and true in the Afrikaans inheritance. And since every nationalist, whatever his country seeks inspiration and guidance from his national history, the Afrikaner Nationalists, in framing the Republic of the future, turned to the old Republics, and especially to the Transvaal of Paul Kruger, for their models. Kruger, the great national hero, who had throughout his life stood for resistance to Anglicisation and for the fostering of an Afrikaner national consciousness—Kruger was the grand exemplar whom they must follow. The spirit of Kruger's Republic had never wholly died, even in the darkest days of Milnerism: indeed, there had been a time when it had seemed as though Hertzog might be Kruger's natural successor. So the new doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism came, appropriately enough, to be known as Krugerisme.

It is important to notice that Krugerisme was not purely negative, sterile, and unconstructive, as so many of its critics claim. True, it denied the hypotheses of Smuts and Hertzog, and sought to overthrow the foundations they were laying; but from the Krugerist point of view those foundations themselves were jerry-built. They claimed that their own edifice would be solid and homogeneous and strong; that by their very exclusion of weak or jarring elements they were ensuring its permanence. Moreover, they contended that their idealism was matched with a sober realism which contrasted well with the shallow optimism of their adversaries; and if they were intolerant, that at least was preferable to a tolerance whose real name was infidelity. If sterility were the charge, what more sterile than the monstrous hybrid of Fusion? Fortified by such arguments as these, Malan

and his followers between 1933 and 1939 pursued a course steadily opposed to Hertzog. The General's denunciations of the Broederbond did not cause them to deviate one inch from the path they had marked out for themselves; while the eloquent pamphleteering of Professor Cilliers did not noticeably inhibit the ever-widening activities of the Reddingsdaadbond and its numerous related organisations.

Such was the situation at the beginning of September 1939: Smutsism and Hertzogism on the one hand, Krugerisme on the other; the one urging "in the first place a South African nationhood, and then, if the people should wish it, a Republic, in or out of the Commonwealth;" the other, "in the first place an Afrikaner Republic on a basis of Afrikaner Volkseenheid, and then, if the English behave themselves, their gradual assimilation and admission to civic rights." The outbreak of war threw this alignment into confusion. Hertzog felt, in the defeat of his motion for neutrality, not only a bitter personal betrayal, but also a subverting of the very bases upon which his policy since 1933 had been founded. The Englishmen were Englishmen still, it appeared, prepared to throw South Africa's interests overboard at the call of the "Mother Country," and Fusion was a hollow sham, since at the first real test one party to it had failed to act as became a South African patriot. From the Opposition benches there came indeed no cry of "I told you so!" to rub salt into the wound that the English inflicted, but the Malanites must have felt the temptation, even if they resisted it. Hertzog could not bear that the South African nation which he believed to be slowly ripening under his care should be plunged once more into sectional strife on an issue which he felt to be outside the scope of South Africa's interests. For all his greatness, Hertzog was a somewhat limited statesman. His thinking was deductive; his political philosophy was built up by reasoning from a few postulates of a general nature, the most important being "South Africa first." And so he analysed every European problem through South African eyes. Where Smuts, with his holistic approach, viewed South Africa in relation to the whole European panorama, Hertzog saw the world mainly in relation to South African nationalism: it was not that he was intellectually incapable of realizing the European issue, or of participating in the world's debate; but his concentration on the domestic problem led him too often to deny that any other issue existed. More, it led him to believe that those who saw that it existed were disloyal to South Africa. For Smuts, on the other hand, the outbreak of war was the supreme moment, the concentration into a single clear-cut issue of the whole philosophy of his politics. Nor would it be fair to Smuts' English supporters to charge them with defeating Hertzog simply for the sake of England and "the Empire:"

the sentimental tie with overseas had done this at least for them, that it enabled them to see, more clearly than the Opposition, the wider international implications of the situation. Moreover, Hertzogism had not been without its educative effects upon them. The old English intransigence was weakening: the English South African patriot was beginning to emerge. And even from the point of view of "South Africa first!" it was at least possible to hold different opinions as to where South Africa's true interests lay.

Under the shock of the decision of 4th September 1939, Hertzog allowed himself to be led into Hereniging. It was an alliance far more unnatural than Fusion. Krugerisme, from the Hertzogite point of view, was a distortion, a perversion, of the true faith. Hertzogism, from the point of view of Malan, was the recantation of the creed and the denial of the history of a generation. The compromise could only be made by glossing over fundamentals—provided, of course, that Hertzog's indignation at his defeat did not lead him to a revision of his ideas. To Hertzog's great credit, no such revision took place. Even in the moment of bitterness, he could not bring himself to believe that the English South African was to be considered as wholly incapable of patriotism. He could not lend himself to the project of an Afrikaner state in which the English would be condemned to a position of inferiority. Equality of status was as much his watchword now as in 1913. Some advance he might make towards a more explicit Republicanism, in the interests of Hereniging; but he was not prepared to commit himself to a solution of South Africa's problems through the victory of one section over the other. Nor was he prepared to pass the matter over in silence.

To the Gesuiwerde elements in the Opposition this seemed a sentimental refusal to draw the obvious deductions from undisputed facts. The more tolerant of them were not disposed to bear too hardly upon an old leader reluctant to abandon the tenets of a lifetime in the face of disappointment. But there were many who refused to compromise on a question of principle; and many too, who had felt the edge of the General's sharp tongue in the years between 1933 and 1939, and were not inclined to deal leniently with him. Not even for the "Hertzog-persoon," not even for the Hertzogite votes, were they ready to dilute the creed of Krugerisme. As the servants of an idea, as the seekers after an ideal, they were moved by other than personal considerations.¹

Thus Hertzog was extruded from the H.N.P., and his faithful adherents formed the Afrikaner Party. But it was a Party in the wilderness, without hope and without following, for so long as the war should last. The fact, apparently so surprising, that this

1. For a good statement of the H.N.P.'s doctrines see D. F. du T. Malherbe, *Afrikanersakeenhed* (1942).

great personality should have commanded so little support among Afrikaners, is easily explicable. It was not merely that he was outweighed in the Press; it was rather that he fell hopelessly between two stools. The Hertzogite ideal, in its later developments, had drawn its chief support from elements in the population which in the main recognized the war as necessary from the point of view of purely South African interests. These elements had, as the election of 1943 was to show, transferred for the moment their allegiance to the Government which was prosecuting the war. Among those who were opposed to the war, Hertzogism increasingly appeared to be tainted with a reprehensible tepidity. The emergency regulations, the internments, the Government's propaganda, had driven the opponents of Smuts, more than ever before, to adopt the postulates of Krugerism. This was no time, they felt, to stickle punctiliously over the rights of the English, when every day an "Empire" Government was oppressing more heavily the Afrikaner people. The process of political polarisation which the war had effected in the outside world was at work even in the backwater of South African domestic affairs.¹

By the beginning of 1941, therefore, Krugerism was triumphant, and Hertzogism had become a heresy. But almost immediately there arose problems of interpretation. What exactly did Krugerism mean? The 'thirties had seen the production of a growing bulk of political theory in Afrikaans, which bore witness on the one hand to the ability of the new Afrikaans language to cope with abstract ideas, and on the other to the conscious effort to provide the Nationalist Party with a philosophical basis. Landmarks in this movement were the foundation of the periodical *Koers* at Potchefstroom in 1931, and the publication of Professor N. Diederich's *Nasionalisme as Lewensbeskouing* in 1935.² The output of such works was greatly increased after the Great Trek Centenary celebrations in 1938. By 1941, there was a more or less agreed body of doctrine upon which political action could be founded. It was strongly coloured by religious feeling³; it rested, as to a great part of it, upon the political philosophy of Calvin; and, in regard to some of its exponents at least, it was influenced by writings of a similar tendency by various contemporary authors in Holland. Rejecting on the one hand as too individualistic the liberal philosophy of the nineteenth century, it equally condemned, as idolatrous, those modern extremes of *étatisme* which derive from Hegel and his school. Yet it endowed the nation with most of those powers and attributes which it

1. The Afrikaner Party's later coquetting with the New Order and the O.B. had no basis in principle at all.

2. More recent, and more technical, expositions of general political theory from the Afrikaner point of view are L. J. du Plessis, *Die Moderne Staat* (1941) and H. G. Stoker, *Die Stryd om die Ordes* (1943).

3. A good example of the characteristic blending of the Old Testament with current politics is S. du Toit, *Die Profete en die Wêreldrewolusie* (1943).

denied to the state. With a curious eclecticism it combined a recognition of the ultimate sovereignty of God which was quasi-mediaeval, with a doctrine of "soewereiniteit in die kring" which did not differ widely from the modern interpretations of democracy as exemplified in Laski and Hobhouse. Its faith in representative institutions was tempered by a disposition to entrust large powers to a popularly-elected executive. Its democracy was reminiscent of that of the Greeks in its exclusion from civic rights of whole classes of the population which were not deemed worthy to receive them: indeed, it was among the most fundamental of its principles to draw a sharp distinction between the population (die bevolking) and the people (die Volk). Here and there it inclined a little to the Nazi creed of "Blut und Boden," but on the whole it remained surprisingly free from totalitarian influences: a more serious danger, perhaps, was an unexpected *penchant* for the doctrines of Sir Robert Filmer,¹ which was the result of considering the ruler as the mere agent and delegate of God. Still, this school of Krugerisme was democratic, although after its own Afrikaner fashion. The emphasis was laid, not so much on the rights, as on the duties of the citizen; the rule of law was made subordinate to the Word of God, as interpreted through the Dutch Reformed Church; the nation as an "organic whole" replaced the "mechanical and arithmetical" concept of the state: but still it professed itself democratic. Nationalism did this at least for the political theory of Krugerisme, that it led it to reject un-Afrikaans ideas, whether they came from England or from Germany.

By 1941, however, the prestige of German arms and the rise to political influence of the O.B., had provoked a sharp crisis in the Nationalist camp, which became even more acute with the foundation of the New Order Group. The O.B. and the New Order professed a political religion at variance with any that had hitherto been seen in South Africa.² Not merely did they embrace the German concept of race, but they accepted also the authoritarian state. They openly scorned and derided any sort of parliamentary institution, and pinned their faith on a leader, sustained by the devoted service of his people, and governing in their interests according to his own intuitions. They would not tolerate even the modified, Afrikaner, version of democracy; and if they refrained from directly oppugning the sovereignty of God, it was because they could not afford to antagonise the predikants. Together with democracy and representative institutions, they also threw overboard political

1. See C. J. H. de Wet, *Ons Christelike Republiek* (1940), pp. 3-4: "Die gesag kom dus nie van die mens nie. Net so min as wat die kinders gesag aan hulle ouers gee, of wat die stamgenote gesag aan hulle stamhoof, net so min gee die volk gesag aan die owerheid . . . Die absoluut konings van die 16e en 17e eeu het gesprek van die "goddelike reg van konings," en het toe die gesag misbruik om die onderdane te verdruk. Maar dis duidelik dat dit 'n misbruik van hulle gesag was. Maar ons moet onthou: die misbruik van iets hef nie sy regte gebruik op nie!"

2. We ignore the insignificant Greyshirts.

parties, not merely in the future Republic, but also in the actual circumstances of the moment.¹ It was their contention that the end of the war (and they generally believed in an imminent German victory) would see the collapse of Parliamentaryism in South Africa; but the O.B., at any rate, left nothing to chance, and its Stormjaers bore the appearance of an organisation designed to effect a *Putsch* at the appropriate moment.

These doctrines were not without their effect on the political theory of Afrikanerdom as a whole, which, for a while showed a tendency to move gradually in their direction, even in purely Calvinistic circles.² The deeds of violence, however, which, rightly or wrongly, were attributed to men connected with the O.B. movement, checked any general inclination to remodel Afrikaner ideas on the German pattern, and from the beginning their attack on political parties had made them suspect to the H.N.P. leaders. Besides, Krugerism in its essentials was a real political faith, not merely a collection of ideas brought together to form a theoretical basis for a practical political programme; and it was not easily to be shaken. There was a magic in the name of Kruger, moreover, which attracted those to whom political ideas, other than the simplest, were unintelligible. The O.B. leaders saw this, and directed their propaganda to prove that the true Krugerism was to be found in *their* principles, and not in the semi-democratic tenets of the H.N.P. A battle of the books then began,³ in which each side sought by the adroit use of historical evidence to prove itself the only true political heir of Kruger. Thus the H.N.P.-O.B. conflict was really a controversy about the nature of Krugerism, a struggle in which either side tried to brand the other as unorthodox. In this debate, as in the political grapple, the H.N.P. had the better of the argument, for in fact the truth lay on their side. Kruger might conceivably have been a Malanite; he could never by any stretch of imagination have been an O.B., and no quotation of isolated remarks, wrested from their context in his speeches, could alter that fact. Pirow, indeed, acknowledged as much, when he proclaimed his intention of preparing the way for a Republic which should be better than Kruger's. Circumstances, it seemed, had prevented Kruger from living according to the doctrines of Krugerism; but under the New Order these circumstances would cease to exist, and Krugerism would come into its own in all its pristine purity.⁴

1. See O. Pirow, *Nuwe Orde vir Suid-Afrika*; O. du Plessis, *Die Nuwe Suid Afrika* (both 1940); *Die O.B., Vanwaar en Waarheen* (1942); *Die O.B. en die Parlementsverkiezing* (etc) (1943).

2. See, e.g., J. A. Coetzee, P. Meyer, N. Diederichs, *Ons Republiek* (1941). The movement was most apparent in regard to such matters as education, public entertainment, military training, etc. There had always been a good deal of the "Socialist" element of National-Socialism present in Krugerism.

3. P. J. S. de Klerk, *Gesagstaats en Magstaats*, (1942); J. A. Coetzee, *Oom Paul en die Demokrasie* (1942); *Die O.B. Vanwaar en Waarheen*, p. 54; Editorials in *Die Burger*, 22 and 29 March 1945; and for an objective historical enquiry, E. F. Gey van Pittius, *Staatsopruilings van die Vaartrekkers en die Baere* (1941).

4. See Pirow's speech at Groenvllei, August, 1941.

This was a line of argument which made little appeal either to the historians, the political theorists, or the Afrikaner people. The years 1942 and 1943 made it probable that in the contest for orthodoxy the H.N.P. would be victorious; the General Election of 1943 made it a certainty. The defeat of the O.B., their failure to hold their great following, was not really decided on the merits of the purely personal and political controversy between Malan and van Rensburg. It was the result of fundamental qualities in Afrikanerdom which the O.B. ignored. In the first place, the Afrikaner did not love violence and bloodshed; nor did he particularly love drilling and military discipline. In the second place, the Afrikaner was by nature conservative: he sought inspiration in the traditions of a Golden Age which, in the Transvaal and Orange Free State at any rate, was within the memory of very many. He had no hankerings after New Orders: he believed that what was necessary was to restore the old. Again, in spite of splits and quarrels, the Afrikaner in general did believe in Party government—or at least in government by the Nationalist Party; and the O.B. had only vague alternatives to offer. Further, the H.N.P. version of Krugerism was the version in which the majority of Nationalist Afrikanerdom believed: the O.B. version, in spite of all efforts, was felt to be a neologistic heresy. And lastly, the O.B. Press—*Wapenskou*, *Die O.B.*, *Die Wa-Ketting*—was more limited in its circulation and appeared more rarely than the H.N.P. organs: the daily hammerings of *Die Transvaler*, *Die Burger*, *Die Volksblad*, *Die Oosterlig*, did much to weaken the O.B. cause; while Pirow, apart from the occasional hospitality of *Die Vaderland*, had virtually no Press at all.

The General Election of 1943, therefore, did not merely decide that the Gesuiwerde Party of Malan and Strydom should be the only official Opposition; it decided also that the orthodox doctrine of extreme Nationalist Afrikanerdom should be Krugerism as interpreted by the H.N.P.

In the two years that followed this verdict was never seriously challenged. The H.N.P. had become the sole parliamentary organ of Afrikanerdom. To it, therefore, was entrusted the maintenance of the true faith. The Malanites no doubt believed, as good Protestants, that Faith alone would avail to justify them: if so, they were fortunate indeed, since the times grew increasingly unpropitious to Works. The prospect of being able to translate into action the full Krugerist programme within a foreseeable future receded rapidly as the war in Europe drew to its conclusion. A time was coming, if it had not come already, in which the dogmas of Krugerism would have little relevance to the actual state of affairs in South Africa, and even less to the stream of events in the world outside. It was no longer possible to believe

that South Africa could remain isolated from the general trends of history, free to cultivate a private polity which would be natural because indigenous. Parochialism had become impossible in a world which had shrunk to the dimensions of a parish. The H.N.P. was confronted with a state of affairs in which the United States and the Soviet Union had virtually become South Africa's neighbours. In the old days the world had offered a variety of alternatives to that British-American Liberal-democracy which was so obnoxious to them: the only alternative now seemed to be a Communism which by ingrained habit of thought they identified with Russia. Germany was collapsing; Italy had collapsed; Japan was threatened, and in any case had few attractions for them; the isolation of Spain gave no encouragement to pin hopes on the Falangist system; while of Salazar's Portugal no one but Pirow seemed now to think. The H.N.P., in fact, was faced with the unpleasant prospect of being forced to choose between American or Russian Imperialism. There was, indeed, one other possibility, if they were prepared to accept it: the possibility that the British Commonwealth might succeed in maintaining a middle position balancing the rival ambitions of the two great Powers, and perhaps nullifying the more prejudicial effects of each. In this event, it was at least conceivable that the Commonwealth might provide the safest harbourage for a small nation in distress. This was not Malan's opinion, and still less Strydom's—but in view of Otto du Plessis' reaction to the Cope "kite," it began to be doubtful whether all his followers were with him on this point. And L. J. du Plessis, heretic though he might be, expressed the doubts of many a Malanite when he wrote:

Wie glo nog werklik dat in teenswoordige omstandighede loskoppeling van die Britse Ryk [*sic*] ons vryheid sal verseker? Ons wil graag vryheid hê, maar sal ons dit só verkry? Sal 'n herstelde Volkebond [with liberal-democratic views on native races and mandates!] dit verseker? Sal Amerikaanse of Russiese dominasie beter wees as Britse?¹

For L. J. du Plessis, indeed, this was but a momentary qualm: in his robuster hours he retained his belief that the example of Hitler would survive his death. As it had been impossible, despite the restoration of the Bourbons, to return to 1789, so it would be impossible to eradicate the effects and the principles of the German Revolution. And in those principles, he believed, South Africa would find her escape from the nightmare dilemma that confronted her. But though this was indeed a possible solution, provided the country was willing to place itself in the position of Spain or Argentina, it was not a solution which the H.N.P. could adopt. The H.N.P., for all its abhorrence of Liberalism, was still a believer in Parliamentarism; and the precepts of

1. *Koers*, XI, 145; February 1944.

Krugerisme bade it reject National-Socialism in all its various guises and disguises. The H.N.P., moreover, as the official Opposition, must make the best of the world as it found it. A Russian orientation would involve "black Communism" in South Africa. The inescapable conclusion was therefore that South Africa, to avoid greater evils, must draw closer either to the Commonwealth or to the United States.

Thus circumstances over which they had no control were driving Malan and his followers towards an abandonment of Krugerisme in one of its most important aspects. It was no longer to be possible, it appeared, for a small nation to do exactly as it chose. Moreover, whether the country's foreign policy was based on the Commonwealth or the United States, it was plain that South Africa would be forced into ever more intimate association with nations that were English-speaking. This, in its turn, would buttress that economic predominance of the English language in South Africa which Afrikanerdom had successfully been countering in the years before the war. And thus yet another point in the Krugerist programme would fall away.

The position in regard to internal politics, though less gloomy, was nevertheless sufficiently disturbing. The H.N.P. retained its grip on the Afrikaner electorate, and probably even strengthened it. The attempts at reconciliation from the New Order and the O.B. it could afford to wave aside. But the internal quarrels of Afrikanerdom were already sinking into insignificance before more urgent problems. The alarming progress of the Indians in Natal and the Transvaal, and the obvious tendency in a section of the Government's supporters to meet the Indian demands with sympathy; the spread of Communism among natives and whites alike; the problem, already looming ahead, of the returned native soldier—these were matters to cause the H.N.P. the gravest disquiet. A solution to these issues on Liberal lines would entail, not the evacuation of a few outposts of the Krugerist system, but a capitulation at discretion to the enemy they most despised and feared. And the H.N.P. was beginning to doubt whether it could defeat this challenge without assistance.

• In the last two years of the war, therefore, the pressure of external events, reinforced by internal stresses which threatened a disruption of their social system, were compelling the H.N.P. to move towards a new policy. They were driven, reluctantly but inevitably, to the attempt to beat up recruits from among the English. And at once they were faced with the difficulty that the pure milk of Krugerisme had a bitter taste to an English palate. Strydom and Verwoerd could not bring themselves to admit any abatement of principle for the sake of English aid; but there

were other members of the Party who felt that the situation called for desperate measures. Better to yield something than to lose all.

Thus the H.N.P. embarked on a policy of reconciliation with the English-speaking section. It was not a policy logically or consistently pursued. *The New Era* and *Die Transvaler* spoke sometimes with different voices; an advance to-day might be offset by an austere disclaimer to-morrow; one semi-official pronouncement was apt to be discounted by another in a contrary sense. Yet it is impossible to feel that the Party's position had not sensibly altered by May 1945. The vacillating abandonment of principles under the stress of events had weakened their moral authority, while within their formerly solid ranks had emerged differences of opinion—differences as yet concerned only with tactics, but capable, perhaps, of a more serious extension. There were indeed voices from the H.N.P. benches which spoke in accents strangely reminiscent of Hertzog. *Die Volksblad* could claim, on the morrow of the Election, that the H.N.P. was the true custodian of the principles of Hertzogism.¹ The reputation of Hertzog himself underwent a remarkable revival. It seemed that it needed only the extinction of the Afrikaner Party to popularise its principles. As peace approached, moderate men on either side of the House might permit themselves to cast their minds back to the good old days of Fusion, and reflect that with the removal of the war as an issue in politics, there was not much to separate them from former colleagues. And there were probably not a few who nibbled at the notion of a common white front against the encroachments of the Indian and the native.

Thus in 1945 the position of 1921 seemed to have come round again. A common ground seemed to be emerging for the creation of a middle party based on racial cooperation between English and Afrikaner, and the maintenance of an aristocracy of white labour. If to this were added a foreign policy which looked back to the Hertzog of the Status Act, was there not some justification for those political pundits who had predicted that the end of the war would see the revival of Hertzogism? Yet, though the policy of the colour-bar might pass for Hertzogism, it is difficult to detect, in those members of the H.N.P. who were readiest for a toynadering with the English, any real trace of Hertzogite principle. Krugerists by conviction, they wore their Hertzogite rue with a difference, and certainly without enthusiasm. Alliance with the English, if it came, would be based, not on Hertzogite principles of racial samegroeing, but on harsh necessity—not on Hertzogism, in fact, but on bastard Hertzogism. Nor was it reasonable to

1. *Die Volksblad*, 31 July 1943. The claim was somewhat discounted by the fact that Weichardt made a similar claim for the Greyshirts: *Die Vaderland*, 7 August 1943; and *The Friend* (30 July 1943) for the U.P.

predict for it a much happier life than had once been enjoyed by Hereaigng.

Whether in fact such a middle Party may emerge; whether Malan will remain faithful to the orthodoxy he himself established; whether, if the H.N.P. should tack about, the O.B. may not yet experience a revival of influence, or whether, finally, the exigencies of politics may not force the weaker parties to capitulate to Malan—these are questions upon which, however rewarding as subjects for private speculation, it is happily neither the function nor the wish of the historian to pronounce an opinion.

APPENDICES

THE VRYMESSELAARBRIEWESTORIE

The affair of the Vrymesselaarbriewestorie cannot be cleared up by an approximately contemporary historian, and may indeed very probably remain for ever obscure; for the evidence is conflicting, and is certainly inadequate to the formulation of a definite verdict. However, it so exercised the minds of Afrikaners at the time that it seemed necessary to detail such facts as are available, without attempting to deduce any conclusion. Briefly, the admitted facts are as follows.

Shortly before the Republikeinse Betoging of July 1940, a cabinet-maker named Joubert, employed at the Bloemfontein Hospital, came to one of the Nationalist leaders in the O.F.S. with a story that while engaged in the pursuit of his trade, he had accidentally found, in a chest belonging to the Freemasons, letters from Hertzog and Havenga which made it clear that they were both in league with Smuts to turn South Africa into a Republic within the "Empire," which should also incorporate the Rhodesias, and other adjacent British territories. (The details of the chapter of accidents which led to the discovery show variations which, though interesting, are of minor importance). Soon afterwards Swart sent a message by the Rev. C. R. Kotzé to M. C. de Wet Nel, joint-secretary of the H.N.P. in the Transvaal, informing him of the story. Kotzé was not able to find Nel in the Party offices, and gave the information to the other joint-secretary, N. L. van der Walt, a Hertzogite. General Hertzog heard the story from van der Walt and other sources shortly afterwards, and formed the opinion that it was being spread by Swart and by the O.B. His suspicion of Swart led to a complete estrangement between them, which the efforts of well-meaning friends were unavailing to remove.¹

The truth of the story was explicitly denied by Hertzog.² Joubert refused to give evidence before the Komissie van Ondersoek appointed by the H.N.P. to investigate the case.³ It was asserted by van Rensburg in 1942 that Joubert had since been confined to a lunatic asylum; and this assertion contributed to induce the H.N.P. leaders to publish the findings of their Komissie.⁴ In their report the Komissie stated their belief that the story was untrue.⁵ The O.B. mocked at the H.N.P.'s credulity.⁶ Mr. Scholtz gives it as Dr. N. J. van der Merwe's opinion that the tale was invented by a supporter of Smuts.⁷ Malan was alleged by Hertzog as early as November 1940 to have come to

1. Report of Komissie van Ondersoek, *Die Transvaaler*, 31 March 1942; cited as K.O. henceforward.

2. *Die Vaderland*, 7 November 1941.

3. K.O.

4. K.O.

5. K.O.

6. *Die O.B.*, 8 July, 1942.

7. Scholtz, *van der Merwe*, p. 430.

the conclusion, after personal investigation, that there never were any such letters.¹ Joubert never produced the letters, or a transcript of them, or an excerpt from them. The name of the Lodge concerned was never revealed. No attempt was ever made to explain the ground for supposing the Freemasons as a body to be implicated in an intrigue of this nature.

At the time when Joubert first told his story, the leader of the Nasionale Party in the O.F.S., Dr. van der Merwe, was away in the Transvaal. While in the Transvaal, he is stated by the Komissie van Onderzoek to have received, verbally, from a Rhodesian Afrikaner, the story of the Smuts-Hertzog conspiracy, precisely as Joubert told it, but *minus*, of course, the Freemason element. On the day of his return to Bloemfontein (continued the Komissie's report) a letter addressed to him arrived from Rhodesia. The envelope directed that, should van der Merwe be absent, it was to be opened by F. du Toit, secretary of the Nasionale Party in the O.F.S. As van der Merwe had not returned when the letter arrived, du Toit did open it, and found a communication from another Rhodesian Afrikaner, detailing exactly the same story.²

In *Die Vaderland* of 31st March 1942, appeared a copy of an affidavit made by two persons whose names were withheld. They made this affidavit on 20th December 1940, and deposed that Joubert had in their presence, on 19th December 1940, said: "When I told Swart of the so-called Vrymesselaarbriewe and their contents, he said, 'Man, this is what I want, I want to break the old — once for all.' " This allegation is partly contradicted by the finding of the Komissie that the story was in fact told by Joubert not to Swart but to du Toit, and that it was du Toit who told Swart. Swart himself in a published statement asserted that he heard the rumour only after it was already in circulation.³

N. L. van der Walt, in a Press statement,⁴ reported that Swart arrived "breathless" with the news at Kotzé's house; the implication being that Swart had just heard it, and was excited about it. But ~~since~~ Kotzé saw van der Walt on 22nd July⁵ in Johannesburg, he probably left Bloemfontein on the 21st—*i.e.* after the Republikeinse Betoging. Joubert's story was, therefore, some days old when Swart told Kotzé; indeed, Kotzé stated that he knew it before Swart told him.⁶

The Komissie was of opinion that Hertzog based his suspicion of Swart upon the fact of his having sent this message by Kotzé, which Hertzog considered to be proof that Swart had deliberately tried to disseminate the story. The Komissie considered, however, that Swart's action should be regarded in the context of his statement that he discussed the matter confidentially only with a few trusted friends, and had no intention of spreading the rumour.⁷ Moreover, Hertzog stated⁸ that he first heard the story from a Potchefstroom student,

1. *Die Vaderland*, 11 November 1940.

2. K.O.; Scholtz, p. 426.

3. *Die Transvaler*, 12 December 1940.

4. *Die Vaderland*, 12 November 1940.

5. Private information.

6. *Die Transvaler*, 13 November 1940.

7. K.O.

8. *Die Vaderland*, 8 November 1940; Scholtz, p. 429.

who came, especially to tell him of it, and assured him that it was being spread by certain leading Nationalists: van der Walt did not tell Hertzog till later, when hints began to appear in the Press, since he wished to spare him unnecessary pain.¹

The Hertzogites reproached Swart for taking no steps to inform Hertzog of Joubert's story. The actual position was this: the leader of the N.P. in the O.F.S. was van der Merwe, or, in his absence, the deputy-leader, Swart. But the story was told, according to the Komissie, not to Swart, but to the Party secretary, du Toit; and the Rhodesian letter was also directed to be opened (if necessary) by du Toit. Van der Merwe returned on the day the letter arrived, and very soon after Joubert had told his story. The responsibility for informing Hertzog then fell upon van der Merwe. He did not interview Hertzog about the affair (for which the Komissie expressed regret), and he died soon afterwards, on 11th August, 1940. The task of seeing Hertzog then fell upon Swart, who succeeded van der Merwe. The Komissie explain his neglect to discharge it by pointing out that, in view of the very strained relations between them, it was "psychologically impossible" for Swart to tell Hertzog about it.²

At a meeting of the H.N.P. caucus in Cape Town in August, Hertzog informed his colleagues of the stories that were being put about, and declared that he was not prepared to go on working with the persons responsible for spreading them, and among these he certainly intended Swart. Thereupon (according to the Hertzogite version) he was approached by Swart's friends with a view to a reconciliation. "Hulle het hom vertel wat gebeur het. Daarna het drie van hulle na spreker teruggekom en gesê hulle is hereid om samewerking te bevorder;" and they asked if he were willing to act with Swart. He replied "Yes, but only on condition that Adv. Swart apologises"—and by this it appears that he meant a public apology in the Press of all four Provinces. "Sy vriende het gesê dit is die minste wat hy moet doen."³ Swart, on the other hand, stated that he "knew nothing" of any undertaking to apologise.⁴ The Komissie simply recorded that an attempt at reconciliation had been made, but that Hertzog's conditions had been such that Swart could not possibly accept them.⁵ Hertzog on his side added that at a meeting with Senator S. van Rensburg, Swart had undertaken to see him (Hertzog) but had failed to do so.⁶

Further developments followed in October. For these we are indebted to the investigations of a local committee set up in the Winburg constituency under the chairmanship of Senator Smit, which reported in *Die Vaderland* on 6th December 1940. It appears from their report that Swart wrote to Hertzog on 21st October. He mentioned that there seemed to be "moelikhede" between them, and added:

1. *Die Vaderland*, 12 November 1940.

2. K.O.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 8 November 1940.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 12 November 1940.

5. K.O.

6. *Die Vaderland*, 8 November 1940.

"Indien dit so is, dan is dit ook my verlanget dat enigiets wat in die weg staan van die onderhandelings en saamewerking tussen was leier van die Hertog-groep en my as leier van die Nasionale Party in die Vrystaat so spoedig moontlik weggeruim sal word."

He, therefore, suggested a meeting some time before the O.F.S. congress on 5 November. The General's reply, through his secretary, was cold:

"In antwoord op u brief van 21 deser moet ek u in opdrag van die Generaal meedeel dat wat betref die saak wat u noem, geen versoek van hom aan u gerig was nie. Wat gebeur het is die volgende: die Generaal is genader deur vriende van u. Dié wou weet of na wat algemeen bekend was in verband met die verspreiding op u gesag van die valse gerug omtrent 'n brief wat deur genl. Hertzog sou geskryf gewees het aan 'n sekere vrymesselaarsloge in Bloemfontein, hy bereid sou wees om party-medewerking met u te hervat, en so ja, onder welke voorwaarde.

Sy antwoord was dat hy nie ongereed sou wees om terwille van die volk en die Party dit wel te doen nie, maar dat dit dan alleen kon geskied onder voorwaarde dat hy die versekering kry dat die laakbare en ondermyende handelwyse waarvan u deelname in verband met die verspreiding van bedoelde gerug getuig, 'n einde sal vind; en dat voordat sodanige medewerking kan herstel word, dit dus nodig sal wees dat die valse gerug deur u op 'n behoorlike wyse sal ontken en gerepudieer word en dat sodanige ontkenning en repudiasie op 'n behoorlike wyse deur middel van die pers sal geskied in die verskillende provinsies. My is ook opgedra om u mee te deel dat as dit u begeerte is om die Generaal oor hierdie saak te spreek hy bereid sal wees om u in Bloemfontein voor die begin van die kongres soos deur u verlang, die nodige onderhoud toe te staan."

This reply led to a meeting. Just before the Congress assembled, Swart had a short interview with Hertzog at the latter's club, in the presence of "Kaalkop" van der Merwe, Jan Viljoen, and Jack Reitz. Swart contends that he then explicitly denied all the charges against him; Hertzog alleges that he (Hertzog) told Swart that he would reveal the whole story to the Congress. The other three present at the interview seem to have preserved absolute silence as to what occurred.²

We pass now to the question of the dissemination of the story, and the part alleged to have been played by the O.B. in this matter. The available evidence resolves itself simply into a series of charges against the O.B., and the O.B.'s denial of these charges. It seems undeniable that the story spread very quickly: in a speech at Geluksdam in November J. J. Haywood, a Malanite M.P., spoke of its spreading like a veld-fire, and mentioned that within ten days after the so-called revelation at Bloemfontein, he heard it in Elliot.³ The suspicion, therefore, arose that it had been disseminated in some systematic way.

1. *Die Vaderland*, 6 December 1940.

2. Swart's statement in *Die Transvaler*, 12 December 1940.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 8 November 1940.

Hertzog, believed this, and believed that the O.B. was responsible.¹ Dr. N. J. van der Merwe shared this opinion.² Jim Fouché, in a speech at Rouxville in November said: "I am a member of the O.B. I know that in the highest circles there are malicious stories about our leaders, which are not true."³ On the other hand, Malan denied that the story was spread in any organised manner;⁴ and Swart asserted that the O.B. had nothing to do with it.⁵ Jerling issued a statement in *Die Transvaler* denying that the O.B. had anything to do with the spread of the rumour, and affirming that the matter had never been discussed either in the Groot Raad or in the Transvaal Beheerraad.⁶ Kotzé, the Chairman of the Groot Raad, confirmed Jerling's statement on the following day.⁷

Such, then, is the evidence, as it exists at present. It will be obvious that no certain conclusion can be drawn from it. The reader therefore may exercise his deductive faculties on the material, with results which will vary with his imagination and ingenuity.

1. *Die Vaderland*, 8 November 1940.

2. Scholtz, p. 430.

3. *Die Vaderland*, 11 November 1940.

4. *Die Transvaler*, 21 December 1940.; 6 January 1941.

5. *Die Transvaler*, 12 December 1940.

6. *Die Transvaler*, 12 November 1940.

7. *Die Transvaler*, 13 November 1940.

APPENDIX II

M.Ps. OF HERENIGDE NATIONALE OF
VOLKSPARTY

(January, 1940)

(I) Nasionale Party (28)

- 1 Badenhorst A. L. (Riversdale):
- * Bekker G. (Cradock).
- * Boltman F. H. (Albert-Colesberg)
- * Booysen W. A. (Namaqualand)
- * Br  mer K. Dr. (Graaff-Reinet).
- * Conradie J. H. (Gordonia)
- † Du Toit C. W. M. (Marico).
- * Erasmus F. C. (Moorreesburg).
- Geldenuys C. H. (Prieska).
- * Haywood J. J. (Bloemfontein District).
- * Le Roux S. P. (Oudtshoorn).
- Loubser S. M. (Malmesbury).
- * Louw E. H. (Beaufort West).
- * Malan D. F. Dr. (Piquetberg).
- * Pieterse P. W. A. (Senekal).
- * Sauer P. O. (Humansdorp).
- * Serfontein J. J. (Boshof).
- * Stern G. P. (Willowmore).
- * Strauss E. R. (Harrismith).
- * Strydom G. H. F. (Aliwal).
- * Strydom J. G. (Waterberg).
- 2 Van der Merwe N. J. Dr. (Winburg).
- Van der Merwe R. A. T. (Bethlehem).
- * Van Nierop P. J. Dr. (Mossel Bay).
- * Vosloo L. J. (Somerset East).
- * Warren S. E. (Swellendam).
- * Werth A. J. (George).
- Wolfaard G. van Z. (Worcester).

(II) Volksparty (Hertzogites who left U.P.)¹(37).

- † Badenhorst C. C. E. Mrs. (Vrededorp).
- † Bekker S. (Wodehouse).
- † Bezuidenhout J. T. (Witbank).
- † Bosman P. J. (Middelburg).
- † Brits G. P. (Losberg).
- † Coetzey E. A. (Vredefort).
- † De Bruyn D. A. S. (Heidelberg).
- † De Wet J. C. (Ladybrand).
- † Du Plessis P. J. (Vryburg).

- ³ Fagan H. A. (Stellenbosch).
[†] Fullard G. J. (Kroonstad).
[†] Grobler J. H. (Brits).
⁴ Havenga N. C. (Fauresmith).
⁵ Hertzog J. B. M. General (Smithfield).
^{*} Kemp J. C. G. General. (Wolmaransstad).
[†] Labuschagne J. S. (Delarey).
[†] Liebenberg J. L. V. (Heilbron).
[§] † Lindhorst B. H. (Johannesburg West).
[†] Naudé S. W. (Potgietersrust).
^{*} Naudé J. F. T. (Pietersburg).
[†] Oost H. (Pretoria District).
[†] Pirow O. (Gezina).
[§] † Quinlan S. C. (Germiston North).
⁶ Raubenheimer I. v. W. (Kuruman).
[†] Rooth E. A. (Zoutpansberg).
[†] Schoeman N. J. (Lydenburg).
[†] Schoeman B. J. (Fordsburg).
[†] Swart A. P. (Lichtenburg).
[†] Theron P. (Hopetown).
[†] Van den Berg C. J. (Bethal).
[†] Venter J. A. P. (Wonderboom).
[†] Verster J. D. H. (Zwartruggens).
[†] Viljoen D. T. du P. (Victoria West).
[†] Viljoen L. H. (Hoopstad).
^{*} Wilkens Jan (Klerksdorp).
[†] Wilkens Jacob (Ventersdorp).
[†] Wentzel J. J. (Christiana).

Key to Symbols

Denotes "Became member of Afrikaner Party". † Denotes "Became member of New Order." § Denotes "Became member of United Party." * Denotes "Returned to Parliament at General Election 1943."

(Note : The symbols are to be read from right to left).

Example—§ † Lindhorst B. H.

reads—Left H.N.P. to join A.P.

Left A.P. to join U.P.

Not returned at General Election 1943.

- 1 Deceased (1941). Succeeded by : Le Roux P. M. K.
- 2 Deceased (1940). Succeeded by : * Swart C. R.
- 3 Became Judge (C. P. D.) in 1943.
- 4 Resigned Fauresmith (1940).
Succeeded by : * Dönges T. E. Dr. (Fauresmith, 1941).
- 5 Resigned Smithfield (1940).
Succeeded by : * Fouché J. (Smithfield, 1941).
- 6 Resigned : November 1939. Succeeded by : † P. J. Olivier.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

A. C. CILLIERS was born in 1898. He was educated at Stellenbosch and in Germany. He was appointed as Senior Lecturer in mathematics at the University of Cape Town in 1924; then in Physics. In 1938 he became Professor of Physics at Stellenbosch.

H. DIEDERICHS was born in 1903. He studied in Munich, Cologne, Berlin and Leyden, obtaining the degrees of D.Litt. and D. Phil. He resigned from a Professorship at U.K.O.V.S. to become Joint-Managing Director of Kopersbood and Hoofleier of the R.D.B., and is a director of a number of Afrikaans businesses.

LUDOVICUS JOHANNES DU PLESSIS. Born on 10th February 1897. His grandfathers were the Reverend L. J. du Plessis and the Reverend Prof. D. Postma, the founder of the "Gereformeerde" Church in South Africa. In 1921 he became a lecturer in Classics at Potchefstroom University College, and till 1946 was Professor of Politics and Acting Professor of Classics. Du Plessis has several books to his credit on poetry, politics and jurisprudence. He served as secretary to the translators of the Bible into Afrikaans and has acted as chairman of the Economic Institute of the F.A.K. He is a member of the "Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns." Du Plessis was one of the founders of the short-lived "Republikeinse Bond" in the Nationalist Party. In 1939 he resigned as Chairman of the Nationalist Party in the Transvaal and was appointed a director of the "Voortrekker Pers, Bpk." publishers and owners of *Die Transvaler*. Since 1942 du Plessis has been a member of the "Groot Raad" of the Ossewabrandwag and head of the department of political study which advises on the policy of the movement.

C. W. M. DU TOIT. Born in 1890. Son of the famous Professor S. J. du Toit, one of the pioneers of the Afrikaans language. He entered politics in 1925 and thereafter devoted much of his time to public affairs. He wrote and published numerous political and other pamphlets which were read by an ever-growing Afrikaans-reading public. When "Heereniging" came about du Toit became Chairman of the new Party in the Transvaal. He soon clashed with the leaders of the Party, however, and after resigning, he joined hands with Pirow and his "New Order." He became a fervent disciple of the National-Socialist doctrine. At the beginning of 1943 he broke away from the New Order and took his seat in Parliament as an Independent. In the general election of 1943 du Toit stood as an Independent against J. G. Strydom, the Transvaal Nationalist leader, and suffered a heavy defeat.

JOPIE FOURIE was born in 1878, and entered the public service of the Transvaal Republic in 1897. He served in the South-African War (Anglo-Boer War) as an ordinary soldier. He was one of the first to rebel against the government in 1914. He was captured by government forces, sentenced to death by a military court and shot on 20th Dec. 1914.

NICOLAS CHRISTIAN HAVENGA was born on 1st. May, 1882. When the Anglo-Boer War broke out he was a student at the Grey College, Bloemfontein. He abandoned his studies at the age of seventeen and joined the Republican forces. Judge Hertzog, who was a friend of the Havenga family, had become a General, and it seemed natural for the young Haveoga to attach himself to the General as private secretary. Havenga displayed very great courage in the field and was wounded several times. After the war he continued his studies and eventually set up as an attorney in Fauresmith. When the Union of South Africa was formed Havenga

stood for and was elected to the Provincial Council. He became a member of the Executive Committee. In 1915 was elected to Parliament as a Nationalist. When General de Wet dropped out of the delegation which went to Europe to ask for the restoration of the old Boer Republics, he filled the vacancy. In the first Hertzog ministry of 1924, Havenga held the portfolio of Finance, which he retained up to the split of September, 1939, with outstanding success. He took little part in ordinary politics, concentrating upon the Treasury. His first five years as Union Finance Minister were extraordinarily productive. He rearranged the financial relations between the Central Government and the four Provinces. He took the Union back to the Gold Standard. He made provision for debt redemption. He recast the fiscal policy and enforced a strong Protection policy. He scrapped most of the Imperial preferences and founded a new system of trade treaties with other countries. He placed the pension funds upon a sounder basis and introduced old age and war veterans pensions. He delivered the first Budget speech made in South Africa in Africa. When the split of September 1939 came, Havenga sided with his leader, General Hertzog. When the latter resigned as the Member for Smithfield Havenga loyally followed him into retirement.

GENERAL JAMES BARRY MUNNIK HERTZOG was born on 3rd April 1866. In 1872 the family left for the Diamond Diggings at Kimberley where Hertzog received his early education. In 1880 he entered the Victoria College, Stellenbosch and obtained the B.A. Degree. In 1889, he went to the University of Amsterdam where in 1892 he obtained the Degree of Doctor of Laws. On his return to South Africa he practised for a short time at the Pretoria Bar. In 1895 was appointed a Judge of the Orange Free State.

He entered the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 as legal adviser to the O.F.S. Republican forces; was placed in Supreme Command of the Orange Free State Artillery after the death of Major Albrecht; became second in command of the Orange Free State forces under General de Wet; and after the fall of Bloemfontein in 1900, reorganised the Republican Forces, captured Jagersfontein and with General de Wet, the Commandant General, invaded the Cape Colony; and like General Smuts almost reached the sea. He emerged from the war a General, with a reputation as a military leader.

He was a leading representative of the Republics at the Vereeniging Peace Conference. He and General Smuts were responsible for the clauses in the Peace Treaty which laid it down that Dutch should be recognised as an official language and that self-government should be introduced in the defeated Republics as soon as circumstances permitted it. He was one of the thirteen signatories of the Treaty of Vereeniging.

He returned to Bloemfontein where he became the leading figure of the "Oranje Unie." He was elected to the Orange Free State Parliament for the constituency of Smithfield in 1907, which he continued to represent for 33 years; became Attorney-General and Minister of Education in the first O.F.S. Cabinet, was responsible for the Education Act of 1908 which made it compulsory for every child in the O.F.S. to be thoroughly bilingual; as a consequence was denounced as a violent anti-British racist. Was a member of the National Convention 1909, and insisted that it should be provided for in the draft Constitution that "both the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union, and shall be treated on a footing of equality," etc.

In the first Union Parliament he was Minister of Justice. From the outset he fell foul of the Prime Minister, General Botha, chiefly on account of his (Hertzog's) Education Policy in the O.F.S. On the 7th December, 1912, Hertzog made his famous speech at De Wildt which was to have such far-reaching consequences for South Africa. In it he propounded the doctrine that "he believed in the British Empire only in so far as it benefited South Africa and whenever it was at variance with the interests of South Africa he was strongly opposed to it." He preached the doctrine of "South Africa first." As a result and under pressure from the Natal members of his Party Botha dissolved his cabinet and reconstituted it, omitting Hertzog. In 1914 Hertzog's supporters organised themselves into a new political party, the National Party, of which he was the acknowledged leader.

On the outbreak of war in 1914 he opposed the Union's entry. He had nothing to do with the Rebellion of 1914 but would not publicly denounce it. After the Rebellion he pleaded for leniency for those who had taken part in it.

In the election of 1915 Hertzog was returned to Parliament with 26 Nationalist supporters. In 1919 he headed a deputation to the Versailles Peace Conference to ask for the restoration of the independence of the old South African and Orange Free State Republics.

In 1922 the Rand strike broke out and was suppressed by Smuts. Thereafter Nationalists and Labour formed a Pact and in the 1924 elections Hertzog's Party was returned with 63 seats and Labour with 18 seats as against the South African Party's 53.

Hertzog became Prime Minister and remained in that position until 1939.

Hertzog attended the Imperial Conference of 1926 in England and demanded a formal declaration of equality of the Dominions with Britain and unfettered independence. He succeeded, and scored his greatest triumph. There followed the Statute of Westminster and the Status Act.

Hertzog devoted himself personally to the study of the solution of the Native problems, came to the conclusion that it lay in segregation, and in 1936 introduced four bills giving effect to his policy; and for the first time white men sat in Parliament representing natives only.

In the 1929 Elections Hertzog was again returned to power with a clear majority of 8 over all other parties combined. In 1932 owing to his Government's insisting on remaining on the gold standard, the country drifted to the verge of financial ruin. As a result public opinion was violently aroused against the Government's Gold Standard Policy. Eventually the Government went off the Gold Standard. The Nationalists and S.A. Party then fused into the new United Party and Hertzog became Prime Minister for the third time with General Smuts as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice.

He died on 21st November 1942.

ERNEST GEORGE JANSEN was born on 7th August, 1881. He was a supporter of the first Botha government but became converted to Nationalism and helped to establish the first Nationalist Party in Natal. In the 1915 election he contested Umvoti, but was defeated. He was a member of the deputation which went to New York and then to England and France to ask for the restoration of the two Boer Republics. At the general election of 1921 he won the Vryheid seat for the Nationalist Party by three votes. After the 1924 election at which he was re-elected for Vryheid, he was chosen as the Speaker of the House of Assembly at the early age of 43. He was a marked success in the Chair and was re-elected as Speaker in 1933 and 1938. During the period 1929 to 1933 Janseo was Minister of Native Affairs. At the general election of 1943 he was defeated at Vryheid and subsequently appointed a member of the Central Land Board, a position he held until December 1944, when he resigned to become the first Editor of the new Nationalist Party English weekly *The New Era*.

J. D. JERLING was born in 1909. While studying for the B.A., LL.B. at U.K. Q.V.S., he served, at various times, as registrar to Chief-Justice Jacob de Villiers and to Appeal Judges Sir E. de Villiers and Tielman Roos. After graduating, he was admitted to the Johannesburg Bar where he still practises. He is an Assistant-Kommandant-General of the O.B., and leader of the O.B. in the Transvaal.

GENERAL JAN CHRISTOFFEL GREYLING KEMP, was born on 10th June 1872. He was appointed clerk in the Department of Education in 1890 and subsequently transferred to the office of the Mining Commissioner on the West Rand. He took part in the armed resistance against the Jameson Raid in 1895 and also fought in the Magato Kaffir War.

On the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War he joined the Burgher forces of the Republic and fought at the Battles of Talana, Elandslaagte, Rietfontein, Modderspruit, Nicholson's Nek, Colenso, Platrand and Spioenkop. Became Field Cornet in 1899. Was a delegate to the peace negotiations at Vereeniging and advocated the continuance of the struggle.

He attended the Bloemfontein Military College in 1912, was gazetted a Major in the Union Defence Force and stationed at Potchefstroom. On the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 broke with Generals Botha and Smuts; he resigned his

commission and became one of the leaders of the Rebellion. At the head of a Commando he started his trek across the Kalahari Desert in order to join forces with Maritz, and headed an attack on Upington. Subsequently he was imprisoned, brought to trial and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of £100. In 1916 he was released and associated himself with the Nationalist Party, was elected to Parliament in 1919, was made Minister of Agriculture in 1924 and remained a Cabinet Minister until 1939. He supported the fusion of the Hertzog and Smuts Parties in 1933. At the outbreak of the World War in 1939 he supported General Hertzog's neutrality policy and went into opposition.

He has recently published two books "Vir Vryheid en vir Reg" and "Die pad van die Veroweraar" both dealing with his experiences in the Anglo-Boer War and afterwards.

CHRISTIAAN RUDOLPH KOTZÉ, one of the founders of the Ossewabrandwag, was born on the 28th January, 1881. He is a member of the Raad van Kerke, a member of the Dingaan's Day Commission or the Raad van Kerke, the chairman of the Helpmekaar in the Orange Free State and the Free State member of the "Kweekskool Kuratorium," Stellenbosch. In October 1899 he and his eldest brother were wounded at Elandslaagte where they were captured and sent to St Helena. On his return from St Helena Kotzé completed his studies as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Stellenbosch and was called to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, where he remained from 1911 to 1916. Owing to bad health he had to leave Rhodesia and later officiated at Taikastad, Heidelberg (Cape), Winburg and Bloemfontein. He has been very active in Church affairs all his life and was one of the founders of the Kimberley-Beaconsfield Helpmekaar. He served for many years on the "Hoofbestuur" of the Helpmekaar in the Cape Province.

IVAN M. LOMBARD was born in 1889. He started as a teacher, but gave that up to become full-time secretary to the F.A.K. He is a director of a number of Afrikaner concerns, amongst others, the Voortrekker Pers Unie, and Winkels Koop, he is also a member of the Executive of the F.A.K., the Economic Institute, and the National Council of Trustees.

ERIC HENDRIK LOUW, Member of Parliament for Beaufort-West, Cape Province, and a member of the Federal Council of the Nasionale Party, was born on 20th November 1890. He was defeated at Queenstown in the elections of 1920 and 1924, as the Nationalist candidate, but was elected to parliament for Beaufort West in 1924. In 1925 he was appointed Union Trade Commissioner in New York by General Hertzog. In 1929 Louw was appointed Union High Commissioner in London for one year. After the expiry of his term of office he was offered a further term of 5 years, but he refused, apparently preferring an appointment in the South African Legation in the United States of America. At Washington he was recognised as the first Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union in the United States. In 1933 he served in a similar capacity in Italy and later was appointed first Minister Plenipotentiary in France. Louw was mainly responsible for the French Union trade agreement and was deputed to negotiate one on similar lines with Spain. In 1934 he represented the Union on the League of Nations and in 1935 he submitted to that body the Union's report dealing with its administration of South West Africa, as mandatory power. He has asserted in and out of season that the Union of South Africa is an independent sovereign state and in pursuance of his policy provided only for the Union Flag to be flown at the Union Embassies in Italy, France and Portugal, whilst he was Minister. In 1937 he resigned his post in France and returned to South Africa. The following year he was re-elected to parliament for Beaufort West.

DANIEL FRANÇOIS MALAN, Member of Parliament for Piketberg, Cape Province, and leader of the Herenigde Nasionale Party, was born on 22nd May, 1874. He is Chancellor of the University of Stellenbosch and is also a member of the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie van Wetenskap en Kuns. In 1915, forsaking the pulpit for politics, he became the first editor of *Die Burger*, now a leading Cape Afrikaans daily newspaper. In 1919 Malan was elected to Parliament. In the same year he went overseas as a member of the South African Deputation of Independence. When General Hertzog formed his cabinet in 1924 Malan was entrusted with the portfolios of Interior, Education and Public Health. In 1926 he introduced the

Bill which made Afrikaans an official language of the Union. He also introduced the Union Nationality and Flag Bill (1927) and the Immigration Quota Act (1930). On the formation of the Coalition Government in 1933 by General Smuts and Hertzog, Malan broke with General Hertzog and took with him twenty-five Nationalists who did not approve of Coalition. As the Nationalist Party they became the official Opposition in Parliament, with Malan as leader. In 1939, when the split on the War issue took place, Malan joined forces with General Hertzog and formed the Herenigde Nasionale of Volks Party under the leadership of Hertzog. In 1941, when General Hertzog retired from politics, Malan succeeded him as leader of the Party.

"MANIE" MARITZ (S. G.) was born in 1876. He served in the Republican forces throughout the Anglo-Boer War. After the Treaty of Vereeniging, he went to Europe, returning to South Africa shortly before Union. He was gazetted a Major in the Union Defence Force in 1912. On the outbreak of war in 1914 Maritz refused to attack German South-West and was one of the leaders in the Rebellion. On the 9th October 1914, he actually joined with the German Forces. He went to Angola, Portugal and Spain during the war, and stayed in Europe till 1923. While in Europe, Maritz was sentenced in South Africa to imprisonment for his share in the Rebellion. He was pardoned by the Nationalist government in 1924. On his return from Europe, Maritz farmed in S.W. Africa, formed the 'Boerenasie' in the early days of the war, and was killed in a motor car accident in December 1940.

P. J. MEYER was born in 1909. While at U.K.O.V.S., he became a foundation member, and then organizing secretary of the A.N.S. He completed his education in Amsterdam and America and holds three Doctorates and two M.A.s. He was for a time a member of the Editorial Board of *Die Volksblad*, and has been secretary to the F.A.K., the R.D.B. and the Economic Institute. Once a teacher, he is now the Editor of *Volkshandel*, and a member of the Editorial Board of *Inspan* and the "Tweede-Trek" series.

ADVOCATE OSWALD PIROW, K.C., was born on the 14th August 1890. He received his early education at Potchefstroom, thereafter studied in Germany and in London where he qualified as a Barrister. He was a notable athlete and in England won the Throwing the Javelin Championship at the Amateur Athletic Association's Sports Meeting.

On his return to South Africa after practising for a short time in Johannesburg as an Attorney, he was swept into the Nationalist movement. In 1915 he was the Nationalist candidate in the Parktown (Johannesburg) constituency and was heavily defeated. Thereafter he established himself at the Bar in Pretoria and rapidly acquired a large practice, at the same time taking an active part in politics. In 1924 he entered Parliament defeating Colonel Mentz, the Minister for Defence, at Zoutpansberg. In 1929 opposed General Smuts at Standerton but was defeated, was made a Senator and became Minister of Justice. He followed General Hertzog into fusion in 1933, was made Minister of Railways and Harbours and became one of the inner cabinet, which consisted of Generals Hertzog and Smuts, N. C. Havenga and himself.

In 1938 he was sent by the Union Government on an official visit to Europe and visited Spain, Portugal and Germany and conferred with the heads of those States.

On the outbreak of war in 1939 was Minister of Defence, and supported General Hertzog's neutrality policy.

TIELMAN JOHANNES DE VILLIERS ROOS who in an unguarded moment in Parliament declared "I regard politics as a game," was born at Cape Town on 8th May, 1897. He qualified as a barrister at the age of 23 and commenced practice at the Bar in Pretoria immediately afterwards. When General Hertzog formed his Nationalist Party in 1913 Roos became one of his strongest adherents and within a short time was the recognised leader of the Party in the Transvaal. He was known as "the Lion of the North," preached secession and Republican independence. He was elected to Parliament by Lichtenburg in 1915. He it was who was responsible for the bringing about of the working alliance of Nationalists and Labourites, known as the Pact, and in June 1924 the Pact scored a resounding victory at the polls. Roos became Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister in the first Hertzog ministry. At the beginning of 1929 his health began to fail and he visited

Europe for medical advice. He went to Germany and was away during the general election held in that year. He was however, returned for Bethal, Transvaal, but the moment the election was over he cabled his resignation both from Parliament and the Government. He returned to South Africa in October, 1929, and a week later his appointment as a Judge of Appeal was announced. In December, 1932, when the Nationalist Government was still clinging to the Gold Standard he resigned from the Bench and initiated a personal campaign against the Government's financial policy. The response was sensational, and men of all Parties flocked to his leadership. The country was driven off the Gold Standard and a National Government was formed from which Roos was omitted. He formed a Central Party but they achieved meagre success at the 1933 election and in 1935 he recommended his Party to join the United Party. He died soon afterwards in 1935.

JOHANNES ANTHONIE SMITH "Adjunk-Kommandant-Generaal" and "Organisasieleier" of the Ossewabrandwag was born in 1886 at Aberdeen, Cape. His father was one of the founders of the Afrikanerbond. At the age of 14 Smith joined the Republican Forces in the Anglo-Boer War. In 1916 Smith became editor of *Het Westen* at Potchefstroom. Later he was appointed editor of *Ons Koeant* at Graaff-Reinet and of *Die Afrikaner* at Pietermaritzburg. He also represented *Die Burger* on the Witwatersrand. In 1940 he obtained permission of *Die Burger* to organise the Ossewabrandwag of which he was chief in the Cape. After the resignation of Col Laas as Kommandant-Generaal of the Ossewabrandwag, Smith severed his connection with *Die Burger* and assumed the position of Acting Kommandant-Generaal until the appointment of Dr J F J van Rensburg.

JOHANNES GERHARDUS STRYDOM, joint leader with Gen Kemp, of the Herenigde Nasionale Party in the Transvaal and member of the Federal Council of the Party, was born on 14th July, 1893. After trying ostrich farming for a year or two he joined the public service and was posted to Pretoria. He remained in the service until 1922 when he established himself in practice as an Attorney in Nylstroom in the Waterberg District. In 1929 he was elected to Parliament for the constituency of Waterberg, which seat he still holds. Strydom is Chairman of Directors of the Voortrekker Pers, Bpk owners and publishers of *Die Tansdale*. He is generally regarded as a probable successor to Dr Malao as leader of the Herenigde Nasionale Party.

CHARLES ROBERTS SWART, leader of the Herenigde Nasionale Party in the Orange Free State, was born on 5th December, 1898. He became organising secretary of the Nationalist Party in the Orange Free State and was elected to Parliament in 1923 as member for Ladybrand. He was defeated in 1938 but returned to the House in 1941 as the representative of Winburg Constituency. Swart is a member of the Federal Council of the Herenigde Nasionale Party for the Union, a member of the "Nasionale Vrouemonument Komitee," a member of the "Sinodale Permanente Regskommissie van die N G Kerk" O F S, and a member of the "Provinsiebestuur van die Voortrekkers" in the Free State. He is also a director of a number of Afrikaans companies.

"TOTIUS," is the pseudonym of J D du Toit, the Afrikaans poet. He was born in 1877, the son of the famous S J du Toit. He served for a short while as chaplain during the Anglo-Boer war and then went over to Amsterdam to continue his theological studies. He returned to South Africa in 1905, and, in 1911, became Professor of the Theological Seminary of the Gereformeerde Church.

His first collection of verses, *By die Monument*, was published in 1908. Theo follows *Verse van Potgieters Trek, Wilgerboom-Bogies, Rachel, Trekkerswee* and *Passebloem*. He represented his church in the translation of the Bible into Afrikaans, and he composed, and read, the Oath for the Monument-koppie meeting.

NICOLAAS JOHANNES VAN DER MERWE was born on 17th February, 1888. He died on August 11th, 1940, whilst representing Winburg in the House of Assembly. In 1924 he entered Parliament as a Member for Winburg. In 1934 he became the leader of the Nationalist Party in the Orange Free State and remained in that position until his untimely death in 1940. Apart from his political life he was engaged in various Afrikaner organisations.

He took a leading part in the establishment of the "Voortrekker beweging" (Afrikaans Boy Scouts) and became the leader in 1931.

* J. F. VAN RENSBURG. Born at Winburg, Orange Free State, on 24th September, 1899. When Tielman Roos became Minister of Justice in the first Hertzog cabinet van Rensburg was appointed his private Secretary. He subsequently became a law adviser to the Government and in 1930 was appointed Under-Secretary for Justice. In 1933 he was promoted Secretary for Justice. In 1938 General Hertzog made van Rensburg Administrator of the Orange Free State. This position he resigned on his election as "Kommandant-Generaal" of the Ossebrandweg on the 10th December, 1940.

In 1928 he had joined the Active Citizen Force as private and by 1934 van Rensburg had risen to the rank of Colonel and Officer Commanding the Sixth Brigade. In 1936 he was given the Command of the Fourth Brigade. In the same year he visited Germany where he was invited to take part in military manoeuvres in Vorpommern. Within a fortnight of the outbreak of the War in 1939 van Rensburg was placed on the Reserve list.

J. C. VAN ROOY was born in 1890. After taking his M.A. in Theology at Potchefstroom University, he became the Registrar there. He was subsequently appointed Professor of Sociology and Social Work, and is now (1947) Professor of the Philosophy of Religion. He is the Chairman of the F.A.K. and the Institute for Social Welfare.

HENDRIK FRENCH VERWOERD, editor of *Die Transvaler*, was born on 8th September, 1901. In 1925 he qualified for the degree of D.Phil., in Psychology and Applied Psychology, and in the following year went overseas where he spent some time at the Universities of Hamburg, Leipzig and Berlin, and also visited Holland, France, England and the United States. On his return to South Africa he accepted the newly instituted chair of Applied Psychology at Stellenbosch University. Dr. Verwoerd is actively engaged in politics and resigned from the University of Stellenbosch to become the Editor of *Die Transvaler*, when that paper was founded in Johannesburg in 1935. He is Vice-Chairman of the Nationalist Party organisation on the Witwatersrand and a prominent member of its Council in the Transvaal. Dr. Verwoerd has succeeded in building up a first class newspaper in *Die Transvaler* which has a very wide circulation in the Transvaal and more particularly on the Witwatersrand. He was one of the chief organisers of the National Conference on the Poor White Problem held at Kimberley in 1934.

GERT YSSEL. Born at Abrahamskraal, District Fauresmith, Orange Free State, on 8th June, 1903. When the United Party was formed in 1933, Yssel forsook the teaching profession and became a full-time adherent of the Nationalist Party. In 1937 he received an appointment as lecturer in Geography and Geology at Potchefstroom University College.

When the War broke out in 1939, Yssel became actively engaged in anti-war propaganda and as a result of his activities was elected A.K.G. of the "Handhawersbond". When the Handhawersbond collapsed Yssel linked up with Pirow's New Order from which he also subsequently resigned.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND AFRIKAANS WORDS USED

A

- Afbakening, Delimitation.
- Afbakening van terreine, Delimitation of spheres.
- Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond, Afrikaans National Students' Union.
- Afrikaanssprekende, Afrikaans-speaking; also Afrikaans-speaking person.
- Afrikanereenheid, Afrikaner unity.
- Afrikanereenheidskomitee, Committee for Afrikaner Unity.
- Afrikanertuiste, Home for Afrikaners.
- Afrikaner Unie, Afrikaner Union.
- Afrikaner Volkseenheid, Unity of Afrikaner nation.
- Afskilfering, A chip, splinter, sliver (lit. flaking off).
- Afwykende rigtings, Deviating tendencies.
- A-K-G., "Assistent-Kommandant-Generaal."
- Aksiefront, Action front.
- A.N.S., "Afrikaanse Nasionale Studentebond."
- A.P., Afrikaner Party.
- Assistent-Kommandant-Generaal, Assistant-Commandant-General.
- A.U., "Afrikaner Unie."

B

- Bedrog, Fraud, deceit, betrayal.
- Beginself, Principle.
- Beheerraad, Control Board.
- Beleidsafdeling, Policy Department.
- Beleidsraad, Council of Policy.
- Bestuur, Committee (of management).
- Betoging, Demonstration.
- Beweeg en storm, Move and storm.
- Boere-generaal, Boer General

Boerenasie, Boer nation.

Boere-republiek, Boer republic.

Boerevolk, Boer people.

Bond, League.

Braai-veisaand, Picnic supper (social gathering in the evening when meat is broiled on open fires, speeches made, etc.).

Breë, Broad.

Broederbond, lit. Brothers' League.

Broedertwis, Fraternal quarrel, or feud.

Bywonef, Squatter.

C.

Christelike Republikeinse Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionaal-Sosialistiese Studiekring
Christian Republican South African National-Socialist Study Circle.

D

Daarvoor, For it.

Dagbestuur, *Executive committee*.

Dagboek, Diary.

De Wet Afrikaners, Afrikaners of the type of Gen. de Wet.

Die, The.

Die Nasionale Pers, lit. The National Press.

Die Nuwe Orde Studiekring, The New Order Study Circle.

Die Pad van Suid-Afrika, The course of Afrikanerdom's national endeavour (lit. the Road of South Africa).

Die Republikeinse Bond, The Republican League.

Die Volk, The People (often used in the restricted sense of the Afrikaner people of the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population).

Dienstaers, Service circles (or centres).

Doeltreffende, Effective; achieving the object.

Dominee, Reverend (title of minister of Dutch Reformed Church).

Doodskaduwee, Shadow of death.

Ds., „Dominee.”

Duitse Sappe, South African politicians allegedly sympathetic to German Imperialism.

E

Eenheid, Unity.

Eenhedskomitee, Unity Committee.

Effektiewe, Effective.

Engelssprekende, English-speaking; also English-speaking person.

F

F.A.K., "Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings."

Federale Raad, Federal Council.

Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Societies.

Fees, Festival.

G

Gees, Spirit.

Generaal, General.

Gesuiwerde, Purified.

Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party, Purified Nationalist Party.

Gesuiwerdes, Members of the Purified Nationalist Party.

Groepdiktatuur, Dictatorship of a group.

Groepvorming, Group formation.

Grondbeginsel, Basic principle.

Grondslag, Basis.

Grondwet, Constitution.

Groot Raad, Supreme or Inner Council.

H

Handhawersbond, *lit.* League of Upholders

Heelwat teleurstellend, Quite disappointing.

Helde, Heroes.

Herenigde, Reunited.

Herenigde Nasionale Party, Reunited Nationalist Party.

Herenigde Nasionale of Volksparty, Reunited Nationalist or People's Party.

Hereniging, Reunion.

Hertzog-beginsels, The principles of Hertzog.

Hertzog-groep, Hertzog Group.

Hertzog-persoon, The person of Hertzog.

H.N.P., "Herenigde Nasionale Party."

H.N.P. of V., "Herenigde Nasionale Party of Volksparty."

Hoof, Head.

Hoofbestuur, Head-committee ; executive.

Hoofkomitee, Head-committee.

Hoofleier, Supreme Leader.

Hooforganiseerder, Chief organiser.

Hoofraad, Head Council.

J

Jukskei, A game (similar to the American "horseshoes") played with yoke-pins.

K

Kakieridders, Members of Unity Truth Legio^o (lit. khaki knights)—an organization founded during the war by United Party supporters to counteract German propaganda.

Ketterjag, Hecresy-hunt.

K.-G., "Kommandant-generaal."

Kinderheide, Child heroes.

Komitee, Committee.

Kommandant, Commandant.

Kommandant-generaal, Commandant-General.

Kommando, Commando.

Kommissie, Commission.

Kommissie van Ondersoek, Commission of Enquiry.

Kommunistiese stelsel, Communist system.

Kongres, Congress.

Konsep, Draft.

Konsep-grondwet, Draft constitution.

Konsep-konstitusie, Draft constitution.

Konsiliasie, Conciliation.

Koördinerende hoof, Co-ordinating chief.

Kort verklaring, Concise statement ; summary.

Kreet, Cry, slogan, catchphrase.

Krisis-komitee, Crisis committee.

Krisis-uur, Hour of crisis ; critical moment.

Kruisiesmakery, Making crosses (i.e. voting by ballot).

Krygsraad, Council of war.

Kultuurvereniging, Cultural society.

L

Leding en beheer, Guidance and control.

Leier, Leader.

Leierskap-af-rade, Leadership-in-council.

Lewensbeskouing, View of life.

Lewenstoestande, Living conditions.

Lotbeslissing, Determination of (the people's) destiny.

M

- Magsorder, Authoritative order.
- Massastaat, A state constituted by the masses.
- Menings van ons lesers, Readers' views.
- Moelikhede, Difficulties, trouble.
- M.P., Member of Parliament (actually Member of the House of Assembly).
- M.P.C., Member of Provincial Council.
- Muisbonde, Skunks.
- Murg en been, To the backbone ; out-and-out.

N

- 'n, A.
- Nasionaalgesinde, Nationally-minded.
- Nasionale komitee, National committee.
- Nasionale Party, Nationalist Party.
- Nasionale Volksparty, National People's Party.
- Nasionale Wetgewers Buro, National Legislators' Bureau.
- N.O., "Nuwe Orde."
- N.P., "Nasionale Party."
- Nuwe Orde, New Order.

O

- O.B., "Ossewabrandwag."
- O.F.S., Orange Free State.
- Om en weer, Reciprocally.
- Omsendbrief, Circular.
- Onafhanklikheid, Independence.
- Onbegryplike kortsigtigheid, Inconceivable shortsightedness.
- Ondermynende, Undermining.
- Onnasionale stelsel, Unnational system.
- Onnodige besonderhede, Unnecessary details.
- Ons, Our (*also* we, us.).
- Oritwaak, Wake up.
- Op eie pote, On its own legs.
- Opperste Krygsraad, Supreme Council of War.
- Oranje-Vrystaat, Orange Free State.
- Ossewabrandwag, lit. Oxwagon Guard
- O.V.S., "Oranje-Vrystaat," i.e. the Orange Free State.

P

* Pad, Road.

Pad van Suid-Afrika, See "Die Pad van Suid-Afrika."

Partypolitiek, Party politics.

Pers, Press.

Platteland, Rural areas.

Plattelandse, Country.

Politiek, Politics.

Politieke, Political.

Pote, op eie, On its own legs.

Predikant, Minister of religion.

Program van Beginsels en Aksie, Programme of Principles and Action.

Prokureur, Lawyer (in belittling sense).

R

Rampokkerbende, Band of gangsters.

R.D.B., "Reddingsdaadbond."

Reddingsdaadbond, Organization for the economic and social rehabilitation of poor Afrikaners and for assistance to Afrikaner commercial enterprises.

Republiek, Republic.

Republikeinse betoging, Republican demonstration.

Republikeinse Nasionale Party, Republican Nationalist Party.

Russiese Kommunistiese stelsel, Russian Communist system.

S

Saamwerk-komitee, Committee for collaboration.

Samesmelting, Fusion.

Samewerking, Co-operation.

S.A.P., South African Party or "Suid-Afrikaanse Party."

Selfstandigheid, Autonomy.

Skakelkomitees, Liaison committees.

Skeuring, Schism, split.

Skyneenheid, Apparent or sham unity.

Smelter, Fusionist.

Stem, Vote.

Storm en beweeg, Storm and move.

Stormjaers, Stormtroopers.

Strydsfonds, Fighting fund.

Studiekring, Study circle.

Suid-Afrika, South Africa.

Suid-Afrikaanse Party, South African Party.

Suid-Afrikaanse Volkseenheid, South African national unity.

Susters Bond, Women's League.

T

Taalstryd, Language struggle.

Tak, Branch.

Teleurstellend, Disappointing.

Terrein, Terrain, sphere.

Toenadering, Rapprochement

Trekker, Nomad, pioneer.

U

U.D.F., Union Defence Force.

U.K.O.V.S., "Universiteitskollege van die Oranje-Vrystaat."

Uniale Kongres, Congress of representatives from all provinces, *of the Union*

Uniale Koördinerende Hoof, Co-ordinating Chief for the Union.

Universiteitskollege van die Oranje-Vrystaat, University College of the Orange Free State.

U.P., United Party.

V

Vanselfsprekend onmoontlik, Obviously impossible.

Veekommando, Fighting commando.

Veldkornet, Field-cornet.

Verenigde Party, United Party.

Vereniging, Union (also society).

Verklaring, Statement.

Verklaring namens Volksorganisasies, Statement on behalf of National Organizations.

Versoeningskomitee, Reconciliation Committee.

Versoeningspoging, Reconciliation effort.

Verward, Confused.

Vierkleur, Flag of the old South African Republic (lit. four colours).

Viugskrif, Pamphlet.

Volk, People (see "Die Volk").

Volksbelang, Interest of the people.

Volksbetoging, National demonstration.

Volksbeweging, National movement.

Volkssdisipline, National discipline.

Volkseenheid, National unity.

Volkseenheidsbeweging, Movement for national unity.

Volkseenheidskandidate, National unity candidates.

Volksfront, National front.

Volksgees, National spirit.

Volkskeurder, Divider of the people.

Volkskeuring, Tearing asunder of the people ; national disruption.

Volkskoers, Direction or course of national endeavour.

Volkskongres, National congress. *

Volkskultuur, National culture.

Volksleier, Leader of the people.

Volksleierskap, Leadership of the people.

Volksleierskap-in-rade, National leadership-in-council.

Volksorganisasies, National organizations.

Volksparty, People's party.

Volkspolitiek, National politics.

Volkstoeier, National wrestler.

Volksvergadering, National Assembly.

Volksvryheid, National freedom.

Volksryandelike, Hostile to the people ; nation-damaging.

Volks-wa, The wagon of the nation.

Volkswil, The will of the people.

Voorligtingshoof, information Chief.

Voorlopige Eenheidskomitee, Provisional Committee for Unity.

V.P., "Verenigde Party."

Vrymesselaarsbriewe, Freemason letters.

Vrymesselaarsbriewestorie, The story of the Freemason letters.

Vryheidsoorloë, Wars of Independence (i.e. the Anglo-Boer Wars of 1881 and 1899-1902).

W

Waaksaamheidskomitee, Vigilance Committee.

Waarheidsridders, See "Kakieridders."

Ware Afrikaners, True Afrikaners.

Woordespelery, Quibbling.

TRANSLATION OF THE AFRIKAANS
QUOTATIONS
(APPENDIX V)

TRANSLATION OF AFRIKAANS QUOTATIONS

- P. 2 "Twee van die kinders in die politiek"—"Two of the babes in politics."
- P. 8, n. 1 "I said again and again that I was afraid that he, the Prime Minister [i.e. Hertzog] would be outwitted by the Minister of Justice [i.e. Smuts] and the S.A.P."
- P. 9 "Personally I have always been and will always remain true to the Treaty of Vereeniging; nevertheless I have the right to say that I regard the Republican form of government as the best form of government for South Africa. Every nation has in course of time gained its freedom, and whether it takes a hundred years, or a thousand years, South Africa shall get its freedom."
- P. 9 "Before you can get the English . . . to say 'd,' you first have to teach them to say 'a,' 'b' and 'c' . . ."
- P. 9, n. 1 "There is no doubt about the fact that a large majority in the Party is Republican-minded. But Republicanism as a Party principle to be accepted by every member or which is binding on every member, is not a principle of the Party."
- P. 10 "... the Hertzog policy did not aim at the domination of the Afrikaner over the Englishman; if that were so, he [Steyn] would not have been present on that day."
- P. 10 "... where does this nonsense come from, that if we ask the English-speaking people to co-operate with us, some of our people should shout: Conciliation! . . . That this was not the Botha doctrine and that I had always worked with this end in view, was intimated in my reply to General Botha on March 8th 1912. I asked him whether I had ever despised and ridiculed the idea of conciliation. I pointed out that I despised the cry for conciliation which did not actually aim at co-operation. Then, as now, I wanted conciliation and rapprochement, but not on a basis of one-sided sacrifice."
- P. 11 "Since 1926 General Hertzog had already vigorously repudiated the idea that the word Conciliation should frighten one."
- P. 11 "What I have been feeling for a long time, and also been working for, is that the time has come for us South Africans, Dutch-speaking or English-speaking, to realise and to recognise the fact that as long as we remain separate and try to reach our goal along different roads, we must expect that most of what we as a nation wish to attain, will not be achieved . . . After what has been accomplished at the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, there remains no reason whatsoever today why, in the sphere of politics and statecraft, Dutch- and English-speaking South Africans should not feel and act in the spirit of a consolidated South African nation."

But he added also :

"This will come to pass, and that such an attitude should be adopted, is the task which the Nationalist Party is now called upon to undertake. Is the Nationalist Party equal to the accomplishment of this task ? If not, then it has served its time. Let us, Nationalists, assume our task. English- and Dutch-speaking South Africa are to-day, as never before ready to take each other's hand with mutual sincerity as equal and equally-righted Afrikaners."

- P. 11, n. 2 "The national life in South Africa flows in two streams of culture—an English and an Afrikaans ; they will flow side by side until a historical destiny will in the distant future possibly cause them to merge."
- P. 12, n. 1 "The struggle was brought to an end by the passing of the Statute of Westminster, because thereby South Africa was recognized by Statute as a free and sovereign nation. As to the equality of the languages in practice, that has been applied by the N.P. ever since 1924, and as it has been accepted by the S.A.P. as a basic principle of co-operation, the struggle has been finally decided. The two main points at issue since 1913 have therefore been disposed of . . ."
- P. 13 "Op die breë grondslag van die volkswil"—"Based broadly on the will of the people."
- P. 13, n. 1 "If the coalition is only going to be a temporary collaboration between the two parties for the purpose of seeing the country through economically during this period of crisis and particularly of saving the farmer, no one will support such co-operation with greater joy and loyalty."
- P. 13 "Those Nationalists who do accept the present British connection for the time being, but who cling to the ideal of ultimately seceding from the British Empire and who therefore refused to commit themselves to an active upholding of the British connection."
- Pp. 13-14 "Have the English people ever anywhere in the whole wide world or ever in the history of the world made any concession in respect of the rights of language or government to a subordinate nation—unless they were forced to do so or a different line of action would have had a unfavourable result ? Every page in the history of Ireland during a period of 700 years proves how absolutely vain is any hope of that nature."
- P. 14 "The honest Englishman does not believe in a policy of 50:50 . . . only in 100 per cent or nothing . . . Or else it is the 50:50 of the hotel chef who made a hare-pie from hare's meat and horse-meat according to the 50:50 recipe, that is to say, one hare and one horse."
- P. 14 "The history of South Africa shows that the Englishman is only prepared to collaborate when he sees an opportunity of using the Afrikaner or Anglicising him, if he cannot manage both. Up to now his friendship has merely been a new front for attack . . ."
- P. 14, n. 4 "Between one view of life and another there is often an unbridgeable gulf. Between the view of life of a large portion of the members of the S.A.P. and that of Van der Merwe there was such an unbridgeable gulf."

- P. 15 "We reject," wrote Prof. L. J. du Plessis, "We reject the idea entirely that all South Africans should together be considered as one people. For us Afrikanerdom is the People of South Africa, and the rest of the South Africans are, as far as they are white, either potential Afrikaners, or aliens."
- P. 17 "Binne die raamwerk van die Party"—"Within the framework of the Party"
- P. 17 "... coupled with the healing of the split in politics amongst Afrikaans-speaking Afrikaners, aimed at a united front which would include not only the entire Afrikaans-speaking community, but also those English-speaking persons who had actually come to lay claim to South African citizenship and, in proof thereof, were prepared to collaborate on an equal footing with the former in putting into effect a clearly defined programme of principles and of action."
- P. 18 "Eers skeuring in die V.P., en dan onderhandelinge"—"First a split to the U.P., and then negotiation."
- P. 18, n. 4 "In other words," comments Cilliers, "reunion in the narrow sense, and not national unity in the broad sense."
- P. 19 "On their basis the Afrikaans-speaking section of the population would be the only section of the South African population that would be regarded as a nation and the English-speaking section of Afrikanerdom would not be considered as a part of the Afrikaner nation. The position of power must therefore be vested in the self-constituted Afrikaner nation ..."
- P. 19 "Under no circumstances, I assure you, will I ever extend my collaboration in politics to persons who are not prepared to acknowledge and to accept the principle of absolute equality and equal rights for the Afrikaans- and English-speaking sections of our people."
- P. 19, n. 3 "... as a result of certain manoeuvres by Gen. Smuts, ostensibly for the purpose of prolonging the life of the Senate, but in reality because of other mysterious motives"
- P. 20 "... in order to deliberate in what manner we could further exercise pressure on Gen. Hertzog for neutrality."
- P. 20 "... Hertzog was going to stand for neutrality."
- P. 21 "... in which it was undertaken to serve the people in the cause of its advancement, and to grip each other's hand on 'die Pad van Suid-Afrika' and never again to release that grip."
- P. 21 "What I am referring to is not any sort of unity or unity at any price ... The main point to which I am drawing attention is thus not merely the unification of Afrikanerdom, but unity on 'die Pad van Suid-Afrika'."
- P. 21, n. 1 "... were fully prepared to accept this proposal."
- P. 22 "... from that year" (1934) "up to 1939 the Republican ideal had become so much more deeply rooted in the souls of the Nationalists. They would not be Nationalists if they were not Republicans at the same time. Even in 1939 Nationalist and Republican were synonymous terms."

- P. 23 "The Party is convinced that the Republican form of government, separated from the British Crown, is the most suited to the traditions, circumstances and aspirations of the South African people and is at the same time the only effective guarantee that South Africa will no longer be dragged into the wars of Great Britain. The Party will therefore make every endeavour in this direction by removing all anomalies which stand in the way of the fullest expression of our national freedom. It recognises the fact, however, that a republic can only be established on the broad basis of the will of the people and with true observance of the equality of the language and cultural rights of the two sections of the white population. In accordance therewith it stipulates that such a constitutional change shall be brought about only in pursuance of a special and definite instruction to that effect from the enfranchised white population and not purely as a result of a parliamentary majority secured at an ordinary general election."
- P. 23 „Nie noodwendig beteken dat jy enduit sal gaan nie.”—“Does not necessarily mean that you will go all the way.”
- P. 23 „Op die pad van Ierland”—“On the same road as Ireland.”
- P. 24 “The difference therefore amounted to this. General Hertzog was of the opinion that we could remove the anomaly and still remain under the British Crown and a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, whereas what I had in mind was secession from the British Crown and Commonwealth. General Hertzog declared that, as in 1927, he wanted to have the right to oppose me whenever I made propaganda for a Republic. On this point we therefore came to a deadlock.”
- P. 26 “The fusion of 1934 caused a wave of bitterness, rancour and distrust to sweep over the Afrikaans people such as even the Rebellion of 1944-15 had not caused. Such hatred and bitterness is not removed by the wave of a magic wand. Nor was it removed by the events of 4th September.”
- P. 26, n. 1 Question “Gen. Kemp has declared openly and unambiguously in favour of a Republic. Why do you and Gen. Hertzog differ on this point from the Nationalists?”
 Answer “I have always differed from your Party on this point.”
- P. 26, n. 4 “. . . a political fabrication which from the very beginning impeded and stood in the way of Reunion.”
- P. 27, n. 1 “You (Hertzog) secured fusion and it has been a failure. Much bitterness has been caused amongst Afrikaners as a result of this same fusion. In those days you opposed fellow-Afrikaners. You scolded and insulted them. You wanted to exterminate them. You said that the N.P. was rotten,” etc., etc.
- P. 30 “Die volk was ontstel,”—“The people were upset.”
- P. 32 (1) “The Party accepts the fact and expresses its conviction that owing to historical, geographical, ethnological and political considerations South Africa, as a white man’s country, has only one destination—a free, independent Republic, separated from the British Crown and Empire.”
- (2) “Having this destination in view, the Party regards it as its immediate task to bind together all elements with a South African national feeling into a solid party-political alliance with the purpose of removing, step by step, all anomalies which hamper the fullest expression of our national freedom towards this end.”

"(3)" It recognizes, however, that a Republic can only be brought about on the broad basis of the Will of the people and with true observance of the equality of the language and cultural rights of the two sections of the white population. In accordance therewith it stipulates that such a constitutional change shall be brought about only in pursuance of a special and definite instruction to that effect from the enfranchised white population and not purely as a result of a parliamentary majority secured at an ordinary general election."

- P. 32 "Wat die volste uitlewing van daardie volksvryheid belemmer, uit die weg te ruim."—"To remove that which hampers the fullest expression of such national freedom."
- P. 32 "Afskei van die Britse Kroon en Ryk."—"Separated from the British Crown and Empire."
- P. 32, n. 3 "Ek twyfel of Hertzog dit sal aanvaar."—"I doubt whether Hertzog will accept that."
- P. 34, n. 3 "The Party is convinced that the Republican form of government, separated from the British Crown, is the most suited . . ." etc.
- P. 47 "om stukke in orde te bring vir Kongres"—"To prepare papers for Congress."
- P. 48 "i.v.m. opstel van 'n Program van Beginsels en 'n Program van Aksie"—"In connection with the drawing up of a Programme of Principles and a Programme of Action."
- P. 50 "'n Oorweldigende, oorgrote meerderheid."—"An overwhelming and vast majority."
- P. 53 "Die Afrikanerdom weier om te skeur."—"Afrikanerdom refuses to be split."
- P. 55 "Dat hy so 'n mosie hand en tand sal beveg, indien dit aan die Kongres voorgelê word"—"That he would oppose such a motion tooth and nail if it were submitted to Congress."
- P. 62 (a) "To fight against the Unity Truth Legion and other nation-wide organisations who try to keep the Smuts régime going by threatening and persecuting Afrikaners;
(b) To afford protection to all Afrikaners who are threatened;
(c) To eradicate 'khaki' propaganda in the Union;
(d) To bring to book the violators of monuments; and
(e) Actively to assist in bringing the new Herenigde Nasionale of Volksparty to power and in realising its ideals."
- P. 63 "By any lawful means and regardless of any personal sacrifice, through the manpower of the Boer nation to contribute actively to—
(a) Upholding and living up to the sacred vow made at Monumentkoppie to grip each other's hand on "die Pad van Suid-Afrika" and never again to release that grip;
(b) Upholding, in the full sense of the word, our national self-respect and honour and also having the manpower of Boerdom prepared for any eventuality, now or in the future;
(c) The political and economical deliverance of the Boer nation by actively contributing to the establishment of a Republic suited to the character, and the need for salvation, of the Boer nation;

- (d) The immediate and complete political and economical deliverance of the Boernatioo, in terms of the motto of our Bond: By abnormal measures the Boer nation has been brought to a state of abnormal poverty, only abnormal measures can save us."
- P. 63, n. 1 "The Handhewersbond does not act as a cultural body, but in special instances it may render assistance to cultural organizations."
- Pp. 64 "Men who are men in the fullest sense of the word, bulls who will not be stopped by anything . . . De Wet Afrikaners."
- P. 64 "In order to make passive resistance effective we must have fighting commandos of De Wet Afrikaners throughout the country."
- P. 64 "Just as the police force and the army carry and support the state without any voice to the government, so we want to carry and support the Party without interfering with the organization. But first of all we wish to make it clear that we do not want a repetition of what happened in 1924 and 1929 . . . By abnormal measures we have to cope with an abnormal state of affairs."
- P. 69, n. 1 "The spirit of Afrikanerdom must be your spirit, otherwise it will go under."
- P. 73 "The aims of the Ossewa-Brandwag are: the perpetuation of the spirit of the oxwagon in South Africa, maintaining, amplifying and giving expression to the traditions and principles of the Dutch Afrikaner; protecting and promoting the religious-cultural and material interests of the Afrikaner; fostering patriotism and national pride, and harnessing and uniting all Afrikaners, men as well as women, who endorse these principles and are prepared to make energetic endeavours to promote them . . . The *modus operandi* is as follows: celebrating Afrikaners' national festivals and our heroes' birthdays, erecting memorials, laying wreaths at monuments, locating and keeping in repair places of historical interest as well as the graves of Afrikaners who perished on the „Pad van Suid-Afrika“; organising gatherings such as target-practice, popinjay and „vulture“ shooting, playing jukskei etc., doing folkdances and singing folksongs, holding processions, regular gatherings of an educational and social nature, dramatic performances, lectures on our history, literature . . . debates, camps for men and women, etc."
- P. 74, n. 3 "The O.B. today stands for national unity on a wider basis than the H.N.P. which stands for sectional party unity."
- P. 75, n. 6 "Om sodoende oorvleueling met ander liggame te verhoed"—"Thereby to prevent overlapping the functions of other organisations."
- P. 76 „Eksentrisiteit en organisatoriese bokkesprong"—"His eccentricities and antics as an organiser."
- P. 77 "... that, as an organisation, the O.B. does not aim at, nor does it tolerate, any undermining activities or any recourse to violence or underground revolutionary activities or injuring friendly political parties or organisations in their activities or in any way undermining them."
- P. 77, n. 4 "National disruption and national enslavement will be brought to an end only if leaders lead and followers follow, not according to the arbitrary wishes of the one or the other side, but according to the Word of God and the historically determined destiny of the people"

- P. 77 n. 5 "That the O B recognises the fact that the realisation of political ideals such as, *inter alia*, the establishment of a republic and the determination of its political character and structure, should be along constitutional lines, and that the determination of the steps to be taken towards that goal is part of the functions of the political party and therefore outside its own scope "

They had rejected this clause, and thereby (contends van der Walt) 'it was tacitly, but unmistakably, laid down that although the O B did not wish to enter upon the party political or parliamentary terrain, it did not want to be otherwise restricted in respect of the steps it might deem necessary for the attainment of its object, even should these steps lie along the 'constitutional road' "

- P. 78 "The O B is the core and the concentration of Afrikanerdom" and could not, therefore, stand aloof from the most fundamental institutions of Afrikanerdom. Wherever it can be of service, it shall serve. But service did not lie along the road of revolution. "I have not come into the O B to bring about rebellion and bloodshed "

- P. 78 "You have been chosen by God to lead your people, Johannes van Rensburg. Be strong, hold to your course "

- P. 78, n. 4 "Young, inspiring, and steering a definite political (though not party-political) course "

- P. 80 "If there are persons to-day who say that politics is a farce and that politics is a thing of the past, then I say most emphatically and most decidedly that those persons are not only doing themselves an injustice, but that they are unfaithful to their people "

- P. 81, n. 1 "It is merely designed to convey the will of the people to the leaders and to make known the decisions of the leaders to the people "

- P. 82 "Too young and untried, too inadequately tuned in to the voice of the people, and too indiscreet to be entrusted with the full leadership "

- P. 82, n. 1 "the Reddingsdaad movement, which has unfortunately been dragged into the political arena, where it has been exploited by unprincipled persons "

- P. 84 "In such a manner that the different organisations represented (in the Committee) shall act in a mutually advisory capacity, each retaining its autonomy "

- P. 84 "Congress declares that the H N P of V is, as far as party-political guidance is concerned, the only organization representing nationally-minded Afrikanerdom. Accordingly Congress seriously appeals to all Afrikaners to discourage all divergent tendencies and group-formations within or outside the Party and to support the Party with might and main in its vitally important struggle on the political front "

- P. 84, n. 4 "There shall be no encroachment upon the terrain, and there shall be no interference with the domestic affairs, of any of the national organizations concerned "

- Pp 84-85 "Afrikanerdom is now storming the last position. We have no time now to quarrel or to call a halt for those who fall by the wayside. Everyone who breaks the ranks in order to stab his fellow-Afrikaner in the back, will be driven back into the ranks with the sjambok. He said this with a firmer resolution than he had hitherto said it. The Free State gave him a sjambok and he now offered this sjambok to Dr. Malan "

- P. 86, 2. 4. "We have but one party which can save us, and that is the H.N.P."
- P. 88 "To imbue himself with the aspirations of his people, to sublimate, to strengthen and to convert them into his own personal policy, and to give expression to it through incomparably well-considered and resolute guidance of his people"
- P. 88 "In this connection" (writes do Piessis) "the proclamation of the Party leader as Volksleier caused some misunderstanding which should be cleared up as soon as it is realized that as a result of such mutual collaboration not only has the Party leader become the leader of the people, that is, in the political sphere, but that the cultural leader has also become the leader of the people in the sphere of culture, and the economic leader has become the leader of the people in the sphere of economics, etc. That is actually what the position is now and thereby the autonomy of every one of the national organizations is safeguarded and the equality of all ensured, and especially the political colour of the general collaboration in the unity committee removed"
- P. 89 "In so ver as die Afrikaanse kerke daartoe bereid is"—"In so far as the Afrikaans churches were prepared to act (in the Committee)."
- P. 90 "Kan ons nou die Republiek propageer?" "Are we now allowed to make propaganda for the Republic?" To which Malan replied "Yes, certainly."
- P. 91, n. 2 "This proposal" (comments van der Walt) "sounds decidedly strange coming from the same people who exactly two months earlier were were in favour of a central council of policy constituted by Dr. Malan."
- P. 92 "Volksleierskap-in-rade vir dr. Malan op die gebied van die volkspolitiek"—"National leadership-in-council for Dr. Malan in the sphere of national politics."
- P. 92 "Politically to define and to bring into being the Republic," while that of the O.B. was "to discipline the people in order to bring into being the Republic by means of general national action."
- P. 92 "So that the other participating organisations would not be embarrassed as a result of the circular"
- P. 93 "Adv. Pirow," ran *Die Transvaal's* headlines, "sticks to his Nazism."
- P. 94 "Only this—there are certain people who are going to try and cause a split at the forthcoming Transvaal Congress"
- P. 94 "Emphasised in a rather tactless manner the autonomy of the O.B. as against the character of party-politics"
- P. 94, n. 4 "Op taamlik krasse wyse"—"In a rather drastic manner"
- P. 95 "We are not going to allow ourselves to be tied to sections who want to split." "The O.B. for the whole nation—it covers the whole front." Having hurled this challenge at Malan, he went even further. "It seems, according to the events of the past few days, as though trouble is brewing again in the political field. This dissension is like a canker in the life of our people. Let me say this: the more disruption and trouble there is on the political front, the more reason there is for the O.B. to throw open its doors and to say to every Afrikaner: You are welcome within the O.B. With us in the O.B. national-socialists are also welcome." "We welcome everybody within the O.B.—it seems as though we are on the eve of a new heresy-hunt—as though we are on the point of starting on a new heresy-hunt."

- P. 96 "There are thousands who will join the Afrikaner Party if the New Order is banned "
- P. 97, n. 2 " . . . memories . . . which made one feel sort of faint, as one feels when witnessing an exhumation "
- P. 98 He said, for instance, that "Malan's assertion that the O.B. had recognized the political leadership of the H.N.P. was entirely without any foundation," and added "That the O.B. has therefore accepted in advance the political leadership of our Party is not true "
- P. 99 "But, sir, you have thrown a bomb under my bed this morning," to which the startled predikant could only falter in reply "What! Is that where the bomb landed?"
- P. 99, n. 1 "Against this supposition nothing could and nothing can be said."
- P. 99, n. 2 "Just say the word, and we will go to Bloemfontein now and shoot him "
- P. 99, n. 3 Which Kotze "regarded as a reflection on his conduct and as a personal insult . . ."
- P. 100 "Now the O.B. asks Dr. Malan in all sincerity which of the basic principles mentioned herein do you endorse and which don't you endorse? If this question is answered convincingly and satisfactorily, then the entire O.B., and most definitely I personally as well, extend to Dr. Malan the hand of powerful collaboration "
- Pp. 100-1, n. 2 4. "leidrade vir bespreking by 'n ander liggaam"—"guiding points for discussion by another body "
- P. 101, n. 2 "We are not going to follow the politicians, because the politicians put the Party's interests above the People's interests."
- P. 104 "Which contained principles for the establishment of the Republic as already published by the Unity Committee "
- P. 104 And it had appeared that "there could be no question of insinuation or of dishonesty on any side "
- P. 104 The real cause of the troubles, in his opinion, had been "not so much a difference of principles or intention or even *modus operandi* . . ., as the fact that every collaborating organization had not yet found its acknowledged and fixed scope in the cooperative whole."
- P. 105 "Een van die kinders in die politiek"—"One of the babes in politics."
- Pp. 106-7
- "1. That all the administrative work and other organising activities of the O.B. shall in every respect manifest a Christian and Afrikaner spirit
 2. That the propaganda department of the O.B. shall not be used at the expense or to the prejudice of any organisation or body which, together with the O.B., is coordinated in the Unity Committee.
 3. That this meeting publicly declares itself against National-Socialism or any other foreign system of government for the Boer people
 4. That the Groot Raad will in future be appointed from men who are neither salaried office-bearers nor officers who as such stand under the authority of the Commandant-General."

- P. 109 "Hulle is te gevaarlik"—"They are too dangerous."
- P. 109, n. 2 "... and, you see, although the Republican endeavour is important, what is after all much more important is who will receive the credit!"
- P. 113, n. 2 "I am not going to dwell on the impropriety of a university professor's interference with the affairs of the Party."
- P. 115 "'n Aantal byvoegende persone"—"A number of additional persons."
- P. 116 The remark that "without Hertzog and the O.B. the National Committee will be still-born."
- P. 120, n. 1 "The clique who drove General Hertzog out of politics and banned us, is exactly the same as the one which wants to break the O.B."
- P. 121 The Party must be considered as "the whole nation organized for this task, namely a Republic."
- P. 123 Thus du Plessis wrote that the existing feud threatened "to degrade the Party into a despotic tyranny over all national forces on the pretext that it alone represented the future State"
- and simultaneously to degrade the O.B. into
"a terrorist gang which will be able to seek its salvation only with an eventual German conqueror."
- P. 125, n. 1 Where he challenged the Pirowites "if they were reasonable and manly, to resign from the Party and fight him openly."
- P. 131 "Everyone can see that it *may* come after this war. The A.P. is not going to meet it halfway, but neither is it going to run its head against a wall once it is here."
- P. 132 Which the H.N.P. condemned as a blow "against the language and the culture of our people."
- P. 132, n. 3 (Paardekraal, Dec. 1880).
"... he, Amajuba, he
the Will of the People, speaks:
Where are my warriors, and their faithful wives,
where my people, my glory, my strength?
Wake up! I am calling you, be yourselves!"
- [*The Leader of the People—Paul Kruger:*]
"Fellow-citizens, compatriots, rebels
against Her Majesty's authority. Thus we are
called by those who are stirring up revolt against us."
"Hail the Will of the People! Hail Amajuba! Hail!
Amajuba is the cry of battle, Amajuba is the cry of power!
Hail to thee, anointed, our commander and leader strong!
Amajuba! Amajuba! Amajuba!"
- [*The Present Leader of the People—Commandant-General, 1943:*]
"We are nearing the end of the second epoch
(of eighty years) and are now on the eve of a second
Perdekraal, and shall, with the help of God,
bring the struggle to an end with the Second Amajuba.
Danger has never been greater and our night
has never been darker...
To me leadership and authority have been entrusted.
Follow me on the Afrikaner's
winding path of battle from Blouberg Strand to the Second Amajuba.
The painful road along which the triumphal march is proceeding."
"... one goal, one allegiance, one People."

Our dead do not sleep, our sacrifices are not in vain.
 Nothing happens in vain Everything for all,
 All for one another Our country, our people, our God!
 Remember the Dutch founders of our nation,
 remember our Huguenot forefathers of the faith,
 remember our German ancestors who carried on the nation-building,
 remember our heroic leaders and heroic sufferers.

[*Ranging from Paul Kruger, President of the Republic, to Dirkie Uys and Japie Greyling, child heroes*]

[*In conclusion*] Hail the Will of the People! Hail to thee,
 who command us! Commandant-General, Leader!
 Amajuba is the cry of battle! Amajuba is the cry of power!
 Amajuba! Amajuba! Amajuba!

P. 134 It was to bind together all Afrikaans forces in one endeavour towards the full realisation and expression of the truly national view of life "

P. 134 "The O B has noted with appreciation the movement for restoring the unity of nationally-minded and Republican minded Afrikanerdom—a goal the O B has had in view right from the beginning and for which it has always striven The O B wishes to emphasize that such unity can only be firm on the basis of the Afrikaner nation's definite course of endeavour as was manifested in the national awakening of 1938 The O B has always felt itself bound, in the national interest to continue on the road it has taken of seeking collaboration with all national organizations towards the realization of the republic on a Christian national basis for our people, and welcomes to this end all genuine and true cooperation and support "

P. 136 'The other elements opposing and fighting the H N P' (i.e., other than the United Party) are nothing but a memory now The A P no longer exists, the N O is dead and the O B is a mere shadow of its former self '

P. 136, n. 2 'In the division of Vryburg Dr van Rensburg and the N O pulled together in order to hand over the seat to British Jewish capitalism "

P. 138 "Unity movements have become nothing but political moves aimed at the promotion of self interest by manoeuvring an opponent into a corner, from the point of view of public feeling '

P. 138, n. 5 Give my love to the Free Staters and tell them that the time has come for us to forget the differences of the past so order to be prepared to meet the future that time is so longer very far off "

P. 140 At this meeting, from which the press was excluded "because present circumstances made it too dangerous "

P. 141 "The O B has accepted National-Socialism in its nakedest form This National-Socialism has a disrupting effect The A N S has been split from top to bottom by the National-Socialism of the O B The Calvinistic Bond is in the process of being torn to pieces "

P. 141 *Die Transvaler* did not hesitate to speak of 'toadying to foreign nations "

P. 142, p. 1 Dr Malan seems to have missed his vocation—his native gifts fit him for the part of chief detective in the political section of Dr Colin Steyn's detective force "

P. 143 he must answer that the O B "does not believe in the party-political method of public disputation "

- P. 143 "I am convinced that Nationalists throughout the country agree with me that our Hoofseier, with his prestige and record of national service, is being placed in a humiliating position by having to appear at the same meeting as a political adventurer"
- P. 143, n. 1 *Die Transvaler* printed the following headline "O B nervous about meeting," and asserted that "from this it is evident that the O B feels some trepidation regarding the outcome of the Ventersdorp meeting"
- P. 144 explaining that her husband was in bed and that it would be quite impossible for him to be at Ventersdorp"
- P. 144 "In spite of the disrupting and undermining influences which we, unfortunately, had to contend with during the past year, the organisation of our Party has made tremendous progress, which is unmistakable proof of the fact that in the field of politics Afrikanerdom will allow itself to be represented only by the H N P and will organise itself only in that Party"
- P. 147 "In that spirit the O B declares itself to be prepared to serve Afrikanerdom inside or outside prison, with its life and its property, at the polling-booth or elsewhere. But then it wants to be sure that it is serving its own people and not merely some Party-political group or other which puts a member of the Party above a member of the nation"
- P. 152, n. 5 And there is a headline "Danger that England may buy our Loyalty."
- P. 153, n. 1 Jerling said "Certain people in the country talk of two languages. He wished to state here that the language of the O B will be Afrikaans. As long as there are two languages in the country, there will never be a united nation. The O B will allow only one official language in the Republic and that will be Afrikaans"
- P. 153, n. 2 "The march of Boerdom towards complete freedom can no longer be stopped by force, now it is to be diverted to a wilderness of bread and benevolence where we shall no longer be strong in the purity of our isolation"
- P. 153, n. 4 Smith said "And how could the ballot-box ever destroy Communism? If the Communist candidate in Salt River is defeated, does that mean that Communism has ceased to exist in Salt River? No, on the contrary. If it finds that it cannot accomplish anything by means of the ballot-box it will start using unconstitutional methods, of which there are many examples"
- P. 153, n. 7 an extract from the former runs "In the Nordic race we find the urge to achieve, the acceptance of the world as an antagonistic force. They are headstrong, cautious, reliable, precise and to the point, strong-willed, brave, and they have a profound inner life. They are pre-eminently a persevering type"
- P. 153, n. 8 "Family, blood and native soil—that is, next to our religion and our love of freedom, our greatest and most sacred national heritage"
- P. 154, n. 1 An extract from the latter runs "This process" (of the emancipation of women) "of destruction is what the O B wishes to undo again by issuing a clarion call to all women. Back to your homes! Cease being a caricature of the man, and be a woman and a mother once more. Your task of honour is not to imitate the man, but to mould him and bring him into the world and to build a nation."

P. 154, n. 2

"Out of the national movement of Afrikanerdom will be brought forth the president of South Africa who will be overthrown. It will not be necessary to elect him, because when we move and advance to take over the power, there will be one man in the lead."

P. 154, n. 3

"In the authoritarian state the leader rules his people with love." And again, in the issue of 16th Sep 42: "The authority of the State cannot therefore reject freedom of conscience, because it aims at and strives for the people's happiness and without freedom of conscience there can be no happiness. This is authority exercised with love and no longer authority enforced by means of money."

P. 154, n. 5

e.g. the following quotations: "This national awakening came from the people themselves. It has no carefully worked-out programme, for a nation has no programme. A house can be built according to a plan, but no living being can be built according to a plan. This national awakening is merely a summons and a tiend" (van Rensburg at Crowsby).

"... A State which grows out of the people is like the shell of a tortoise which grows out of and together with the tortoise, thus forming a living unity. The tortoise and the shell are one thing."

P. 155

"The O B idea, being the organic, the family and nation idea, originates in creation, in birth and therefore in God, and we have every right to describe it as the divine idea, whereas in contrast with the divine, the other may be called the human."

The other idea, the Imperialistic, and also the mechanical or liberalistic, originates in the depraved nature of man who is under the influence of the Evil One and is doomed to ultimate downfall.

It should be an inspiration and encouragement to us to realize that our foundation is pure and good and approved by God. We should, if need be, gladly become martyrs for it.

P. 156

"That means that we are going to emphasize what National-Socialism also emphasizes (but overemphasizes), namely the People. That means that there will be similarity between our actions and endeavour and those of National-Socialism, not only negatively in the fight against disrupting Liberalism in all its forms, but also positively in the manner in which our ideals are realized. We are therefore going to postulate the flashes of truth in National-Socialism. We cannot but do all these things, because our national danger No. 1 to-day is Liberalism, and our greatest distress at the moment is our sinking nation. We Calvinists are therefore going to appear as National-Socialists in our actions. Only in appearance, though. For we are not National Socialists. We are not sacrificing our Calvinistic principles when we emphasize the present national distress as well as our duty in the first place to relieve this distress and to endeavour to secure the freedom of our people. As soon as the national distress has more or less been removed, we shall once more have to emphasize, in harmony with our national interests, all these principles."

P. 156

"If there are certain persons who maintain that we are not true National-Socialists but that they are actually such, then the O B asks this question: is what you call 'better National-Socialism' not perhaps precisely that element which is foreign to our people?"

P. 157

"If the National Authoritarian State is established" (said van Rensburg at Cape Town on 19 March 1943) "it will stand on two legs, the one will be the O B and the other the returned soldier."

- P. 157 . . . as a member of the Groot Raad expressed it: "Our greatest achievement is making the Boers socialists."
- P. 157, n. 1 *Die O.B.* for 20 Jan. 1943 had the headlines: "The Old Order is not worth any sacrifice, says soldier's wife." And du Plessis said (*Ibid.* 28th Apr. 1943) "The masses of the people will bring about the revolution, and even if we were to have a British or American Empire here after the war, it will be destroyed by its present defenders—the soldiers in whose minds the spirit of the revolution, the revolt against capitalistic domination, is already beginning to stir . . . It is God who is causing this revolution, for He is the ruler of the destiny of the people. He it is who causes the downfall of Babylon."
- P. 157, n. 2 "All are of equal value, whether they work in the mines or on the railways, on farms or in offices."
- P. 157, n. 4 As du Plessis put it: "The O.B. itself is more and more considered to be a dual national organization (by the grace of God dedicated to the church), namely, as a family organisation for men, women and children in a commando relationship, and a labour or vocational organisation especially for men in the policy department and the anticipated permeation thereof into the vocational relationship."
- P. 158 . . . while its adversaries, to quote Mr. Pirow, "were soundly trounced."
- P. 170 "But only the general world-movement of our time, which aims at the goal of the full, authoritarian development of the material and spiritual riches of a people and a country upon a comprehensive, expert plan, and their equitable division, to the satisfaction of all the material and spiritual needs of the whole people in all its members and all its strata. . . ."
- P. 171, n. 1 "Father Kestell cried, My nation in need! without anybody preaching socialism. And the R.D.B. was launched, without seeking models elsewhere. . . . Let our watchword then not be: Only National-Socialism can save us! No, the only thing that can save us is trust in God and the realisation in our lives of our Boer principles,—in which the Calvinistic heritage of our people has become crystallized!"
- P. 172, n. 2 "The national struggle is in fact already so far won, that even the double-medium school, against which there has rightly been such strong reaction from the Afrikaner side, would, if it came into existence, in the present state of affairs rather Afrikanerise the English-speakers than vice versa."
- P. 190 "Soewereiniteit in eie kring."—"Sovereignty in its own sphere."
- P. 190, n. 1 "Authority does not, therefore, emanate from *man* himself. Just as children do not give the authority to their parents, or members of a tribe do not give the authority to their tribal chief, so the people do not give the authority to their government . . . The absolute kings of the 16th and 17th centuries talked of "the Divine right of kings," and abused their authority by suppressing their subjects. It was clearly an *abuse* of their authority, however. But we must remember that the *misuse* of anything does not suspend its use!"
- P. 193 "Who really believes" (he wrote) "that in the present circumstances separation from the British Empire is going to secure our freedom? We certainly wish for freedom, but shall we get it in that way? Will a revived League of Nations secure it? Will American or Russian domination be any better than British?"

P. 203

... "They told him what had happened. Then three of them returned to him and said they were prepared to support cooperation" ...

P. 203

"His friends said that was the least he should do" ...

P. 204

"If that is so, then it is also my desire that anything standing in the way of negotiations and collaboration between you and me, as leader of the Hertzog Group and leader of the Nationalist Party in the Free State, respectively, should be removed as soon as possible."

P. 204

"In reply to your letter of 21st instant, I have to inform you, by direction of the General, that with regard to the matter mentioned by you, no request by him had been made to you. What happened was as follows: the General was approached by friends of yours. They wanted to know whether, in view of what was generally known in connection with the dissemination on your authority of the false rumour regarding a letter alleged to have been written by Gen. Hertzog to a certain Freemason Lodge in Bloemfontein, he would be prepared to resume Party collaboration with you and, if so, under what conditions.

His reply was that he would not be unprepared, for the sake of the people and the Party, to do so, but that it could only be on the condition that he was given the assurance that the reprehensible and undermining behaviour, of which your participation in connection with the dissemination of the afore-mentioned rumour is proof, would cease; and that before such collaboration could be restored it would therefore be necessary for you to deny and to repudiate the false rumour in a proper manner and that such denial and repudiation should be made in a proper manner by means of the press in the various provinces. I have further been directed to inform you that if you desire to see the General about this matter, he will be prepared to grant you the necessary interview in Bloemfontein before the commencement of the congress, as requested by you."

